Classical Greek Philosophy, Misc

In questa nota storico-critica, anche contestualmente alla nozione di cambio concettuale toulmiano, si vuol riflettere sull'opportunità metodologica di un ritorno, in senso heideggeriano, all'autenticità dell'originario pensiero filosoco greco sia per meglio chiarire i termini dei rapporti fra pensiero scientifico e teologia sistematica sia per inquadrare, in maniera più coerente e maggiormente comprensiva, le principali concezioni della dottrina eucaristica della teologia cattolica che, ripensate entro l'impianto ontoteologico heideggeriano, avvaloreranno e giusticheranno le teorie transustanziali rispetto a quelle consustanziali.

The intellectual history of evolutionary theory really does not begin in earnest until the late seventeenth/early eighteenth century. Prior to that, the idea that species might have evolved over time was not a serious possibility for most naturalists and philosophers. There is certainly no substantive debate in antiquity about evolution in the modern sense. There were really only two competing explanations for how living things came to have the parts they do: design or blind chance. Ancient Greek Atomism, for example, (...) taught that all composite bodies, including living things, are generated through the random collision of atoms as they rebel and move in the void. Plato and Aristotle both dismissed this possibility on the grounds that living things are too complex and too well-adapted to be products of chance. This eventually became the central premise in Galen’s own Argument from Design. That species forms might have gradually evolved over time by a process of natural selection was not seen as a plausible alternative. Of course, such a theory had been proposed by Empedocles in the fifth century BCE. But because his theory still relied heavily on chance, it was not taken seriously by any of the later ancient Greek or Roman thinkers. My aim in this paper is to investigate the reasons why evolutionary thinking failed to gain momentum in antiquity after its introduction by Empedocles. (shrink)

Phenomenology and ancient Greek philosophy. The title of this book, indicating these topics as its two main subjects, could give the impression that the subjects are held together by a circumstantial “and.” The title would then indicate a connection between phenomenology and a topic, ancient Greek philosophy, the way titles such as Art and Phenomenology, Phenomenology and Psychological Research, Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics do. This impression would be wrong. First, ancient Greek philosophers take pride of place in the dialogues initiated (...) by many phenomenologists with various figures from the history of philosophy. Second, this is not just because phenomenological philosophers have tended to regard ancient Greek philosophy as the revered beginning of Western thought, reflection upon which may help illuminate any topic modern human beings wish to inquire into or give it a kind of historical dignity. It is first and foremost because ancient Greek philosophy, understood as the scientific attempt to understand the world, ourselves, and our place in the world, in the phenomenological tradition is regarded as one important origin of contemporary Western philosophy and science, even if contemporary philosophy and science is also determined by a new ideal of philosophy that emerges in early modernity. Indeed, for most phenomenologists, Greek philosophy can be regarded as the roots supporting this new ideal—even if these roots are sometimes hidden from sight or forgotten. The main rationale for confronting ancient Greek philosophy phenomenologically is accordingly the attempt to bring to light in its full radicality the phenomenon “philosophy.” Unearthing philosophy as it was originally understood by Greek thinkers may, according to many phenomenologists at least, help us understand what philosophy in the full sense of the word was, has been, and may be again, but also what it has become or even degenerated into in modern times, for instance positivism. It is this way of approaching ancient Greek philosophy that we wish to concentrate on in this book, in the hope that the volume will prove instructive both to people who have an interest in ancient Greek philosophy and wish to know more about the phenomenological approach to it and to people who work within phenomenology and wish to know more about the various approaches to ancient Greek philosophy characterizing the phenomenological movement. We have therefore sought to make the introduction and the individual chapters accessible to non-experts, for instance by transliterating all Greek text, and confining quotes in other languages than English to footnotes and glosses. (shrink)

O presente estudo, fruto de inquietação surgida em aulas de Filosofia no curso de mestrado em Direito pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP), investiga a concepção filosófica da liberdade humana e o impacto da pena de prisão, visando à compreensão da eficácia da ressocialização. Com esta pesquisa, busca-se verificar como ocorre a privação de liberdade no Brasil para que se possa compreender de que forma o sistema de Justiça brasileiro persegue a almejada ressocialização prevista no art. 1º da (...) Lei nº 7.210/1984 (Lei de Execução Penal). Utilizando metodologia de levantamento bibliográfico, aborda-se inicialmente a perspectiva de renomados filósofos sobre a liberdade. Em seguida, traça-se uma análise histórica das origens das prisões e sua evolução como forma de punição estatal. O artigo também examina a realidade contemporânea do sistema carcerário, destacando violações de Direitos Humanos e dados estatísticos relevantes, além de considerar decisões da Suprema Corte brasileira. Conclui-se que a restrição da liberdade pode não ser o caminho para se atingir a ressocialização de pessoas que não utilizaram bem sua liberdade e, como consequência, cometeram crimes. Com isso, não se quer defender o fim da pena privativa de liberdade, mas reservar essa intervenção aos casos estritamente necessários. Diante do atual cenário de encarceramento em massa e do Estado de Coisas Inconstitucional do sistema carcerário, o Estado brasileiro não proporciona efetivavas condições à ressocialização dos detentos. Este estudo contribui para a discussão crítica da política de encarceramento a fim de contribuir com soluções para os desafios enfrentados pelo sistema prisional. (shrink)

One usually considers that pre-Aristotelian thought had little interest in economic problems. In reality, various authors from the end of the 5th or beginning of the 4th century BC (Ps.-Xenophon, Plato, Xenophon, Phaleas of Chalcedon) paid particular attention to these questions when they developed their political thought. Although their ideas differ in detail, they all share the same distrust of trade and monetary economy. These thinkers develop, from a certain number of (aristocratic) political presuppositions, a strong and detailed critique of (...) the economic transformations of which they are contemporary. The importance that Plato, in particular, attaches to economic realities appears in his harsh criticism of Athenian democracy, as well as in his political constructions of the Republic, the Critias and the Timaeus, or the Laws. By alternating a general approach and a detailed one (because the importance of the economy, in Plato, is also revealed in apparently minor details), we propose to show the fundamental importance of economic reflections in classical Greek thought, even before the Stagirite. (shrink)

Recent authors hold that the role of historical scholarship within contemporary philosophical practice is to question current assumptions, to expose vestiges or to calibrate intuitions. On these views, historical scholarship is dispensable, since these roles can be achieved by nonhistorical methods. And the value of historical scholarship is contingent, since the need for the role depends on the presence of questionable assumptions, vestiges or comparable intuitions. In this paper I draw an analogy between scientific and philosophical practice, in order to (...) float one role for historical scholarship that is nonreplicable and noncontingent. It has long been acknowledged that cognitive values – features of theories that facilitate understanding, such as ontological parsimony, ideological simplicity, computational ease and fecundity – play a key role within science. The role of some of these values within philosophy also has received attention but left understudied are the values of novelty and conservativeness. These values influence theory choice, the selection of methodology, the setting of research agenda, and the presentation of results; and are best assessed with a historically informed evaluation. This role for historical scholarship is not replicable by nonhistorical methods, and is not contingent on the presence of questionable assumptions, vestiges or comparable intuitions. (shrink)

Usage of the Greek verb ‘to be’ is generally divided into three broad categories — the predicative use, the existential and the veridical—and these usages often inform the way we understand Being in ancient philosophy. This article challenges this approach by arguing that Being is not the product of linguistic reflection in Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle; rather, these thinkers treat Being as the ontological and epistemological primary. Though this may overlap with the linguistic senses, it is not the same thing. (...) The article is divided into three sections: the first one raises several basic issues with the predicative interpretation of Being, the second argues that Being is unified and singular in a significant sense and the third brings out the special pre-immanence of Being. (shrink)

There are elements in Heraclitus that are enticing to modern readers in that they point toward a certain intimacy of consciousness. Having read the fragments of this philosopher, we propose a reading that harmonizes his assertions about universality with his assertions about self-knowledge, in which we believe we can glimpse the discovery of self-awareness. In Heraclitus’ view, humans possess a soul with an unlimited horizon and a capacity to access the logos. A person must pursue introspection, listen to the logos, (...) and find the unity of all things and himself. This will enable us to gain a deeper understanding of the interiority of self-awareness without sacrificing its connection to the universal. Furthermore, individuals must speak the logos to themselves to act according to it. By acting otherwise, one would be acting against his own inner self. (shrink)

Aristotle tells us that in order to develop virtue, one needs to come to love and hate the right sorts of things. However, his description of the virtuous person clearly privileges love to hate. It is love rather than hate that is the main driving force of a good life. It is because of her love of knowledge, truth and beauty that the virtuous person organizes her life in a certain way and pursues these rather than other things (such as (...) pleasure). When hate comes into the picture, it is merely an unavoidable consequence of loving those noble and beautiful things. The virtuous person hates things that are contrary to her values, but does not concentrate on them, much less constructs her life in the pursuit of their destruction. But why privilege love over hate in this way? Why could not a good (happy) and virtuous life be a life driven primarily by hate (in particular, one aimed at eradicating what one (correctly) considers shameful and evil)? Without appealing to any consequences or harmful effects that hate might have on other People, the paper gives two answers to this question. First, allowing hate (rather than love) to dominate one’s life would undermine the right relationship between the two parts of the soul (the rational and the non-rational one) that Aristotle recognizes. Virtue involves establishing the right kind of internal ordering of one’s soul and this cannot be done if one’s soul is dominated by hate. Second, hate has negative cognitive effects insofar as it renders one insensitive to the beauty of human nature and behavior and actively precludes one from acquiring knowledge and understanding. Accordingly, if a good life is a life that involves virtue and knowledge, a life fueled by hate cannot but fall short of that ideal. (shrink)

Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams -/- The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” (...) or “refine” the notion of the voluntary, with a view to securing “ultimate justice”. It is these aims and aspirations, he argues, that take us to the precipice of scepticism. In Shame and Necessity (1993) Williams advances a vindicatory genealogy that unmasks the “illusions” and “fantasies” of our current ethical ideas as they relate to agency and responsibility. What we are then left with is the task of “recasting our ethical conceptions” . It is here that Williams is especially insistent on the importance and value of historical consciousness and reflection. The role of our reflections about the Greeks and tragedy is precisely to show that in order to move forward, into the future, we need to first look back at where we have come from. The value of these “untimely” observations is that they provide us with alternatives and options that we might otherwise lack. What we discover, when we consider the Greeks, is their commitment to a “pessimism of strength” that rests on rejecting scepticism. It is this two-sided perspective on our ethical predicament that delivers a more truthful account of our human situation, one that will help us discard those illusions and fantasies of "morality" that we are “better off” without. An account of this kind refuses to accept an optimism that insists that any form of responsible ethical life must be one that is immune to the influence of luck and fate. This is the fundamental lesson that we can learn from the ancient Greeks and that Williams seeks to “recover” for us. (shrink)

In contrast to the abundance of discussion of Plato’s portrayal of the Socratic elenchos, relatively little work has been done on the elenchos as it appears in Xenophon. The reason is obvious: Xenophon makes much less use of the elenchus than Plato and what he does offer is not as interesting philosophically. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to look more closely at Xenophon’s portrait. It provides a corrective to the excessively intellectualizing portrait of the elenchus found in Plato’s writings, and (...) exhibits an educational quality that is characteristic of ancient Greek attitudes but not always stressed in treatments of Socrates. In the introduction to Bandini and Dorion 2000-2010, cxviii-clxxxii, Louis-André Dorion offers a probing analysis of the term elenchos as used by Xenophon and a broad survey of the elenchoi in Xenophon’s Socratic writings. Although Xenophon’s Socrates sometimes uses argumentation reminiscent of his Platonic cousin, this is only a minor part of his over-all conversational repertoire. Education is accomplished not by interrogation but by the direct and open communication of doctrine and by the practice of virtue (askēsis: see Mem. i 2.23, ii 1.1). Rather than employing the elenchos, Xenophon’s Socrates generally spends his time offering abundant useful advice to his friends. According to Dorion, Xenophon’s scant use of the elenchos is a result of his deep skepticism about its educational value. As a result of this skepticism, Xenophon creates an alternative portrait of Socrates in which interrogation plays a much smaller role. Dorion is certainly right to note that the elenchos is far less important for Xenophon than for Plato, but his conclusion is somewhat extreme. Although Xenophon does not focus on the Socratic elenchos, he does offer some portraits of it and he does not contest Plato’s fuller portrait of it either. This is because the elenchos does have some value for Xenophon, even if this value differs from what we may assume is its value in the Platonic portrait. As Morrison 1994 has shown, the elenchos serves a valuable role in selecting or preparing students for more substantive lessons. It can also play a valuable role in training for and acting in political affairs. And the elenchos can serve an educational role in another way, by contributing directly to the acquisition of virtue (sophrosune) by the interlocutor. I shall trace these significant roles of the elenchos for Xenophon. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the use of the name 'Pseudo-Archytas' to refer to two aspects of the reception of Archytas of Tarentum in antiquity: the 'author-inflection' and the 'authority-inflection'. In order to make progress on our understanding of authority and authorship within the Pythagorean tradition, it attempts to reconstruct Porphyry's views on the importance of Archytas as guarantor of Pythagorean authenticity in the former's lost work On the History of the Philosophers by considering a fragment preserved in Arabic by Ibn (...) Abī Uṣaybi‘a. The article finally argues that a range of problems attend our use of the term 'pseudo-Archytas', which is not fit for purpose when considering the evidence regarding authorship and authority in the Pythagorean tradition. It recommends a more critical approach to the notion of authenticity within the Pythagorean tradition and suggests a new term, 'Archytism', as a more useful point of reference. (shrink)

To relate theories of affordance and frame with the tradition of formal aesthetics, philosophical iconology and the life sciences (keyword Vitality Semiotics) is the starting point of the paper. According to this approach, the structural preconditions of images, as determined by materials, techniques and the composition of the design means, become essential. Through these structures, the producers are able to set impulses that become decisive for the interpretation of space and time or the "scene" as a dynamic event. Against the (...) social and cultural background of the recipients the "scene" gains a meaning to their life. This means to understand the productʼs conception and composition as an affordance which determines the framework of the reception conditions. The benefit of this approach lies in the identification of changes in the self-understanding and thus of trends in to new standards of societies. This is to be illustrated by Exekiasʼ drinking bowl around 540/30 BC in Munich. (shrink)

Aristotle, though not the first Greek virtue ethicist, was the first to establish virtue ethics as a distinct philosophical discipline. His exposition of the subject in his Nicomachean Ethics set the terms of subsequent debate in the European and Arabic traditions by proposing a set of plausible assumptions from which virtue ethics should proceed. His conception of human well-being and virtue as well as his brand of ethical naturalism were influential from antiquity through the Middle Ages and continue to be (...) influential today. (shrink)

This essay presents an account of what it takes to live a philosophical way of life: practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth‐directed practices. Contra John Cooper, it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition‐based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are (...) correct. The essay argues that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life. The offered view acknowledges more ways to develop the art of living and enables a broader range of people to count as living philosophically. (shrink)

Is there grounding in ancient philosophy? To ask a related but different question: is grounding a useful tool for the scholar of ancient philosophy? These questions are difficult, and my goal in this paper is not so much to give definitive answers as to clarify the questions. I hope to direct the student of contemporary metaphysics towards passages where it may be fruitful to look for historical precedent. But I also hope to offer the student of ancient philosophy some guidance (...) on when drawing on the contemporary discussion of grounding may be beneficial. (shrink)

From famous figures in the history of philosophy to questions in religious theology to the relationship between knowledge and power, The Handy Western Philosophy Answer Book: Ancient Greek to Its Influence on Philosophy Today takes the sometimes esoteric ideas and the jumble of names and makes them easy to understand, enriching readers' lives and answering the question "What do the ancient Greek philosophers have to teach us about contemporary culture?".

This article intends to navigate through three distinctive paths. The first of them being Ancient Greece, through Artemidorus, especially from his absorption by Foucault; The second being Ancient Rome, as worked by Paul Veyne in the Constantine’s analyses; and the third path is constituted from a series of ethnographic reports about the South American Amerindian communities. This theoretical trail will be taken to show other analytical possibilities for what is understoodas oneiromancy, that is, the analysis of dreams, that was not (...) framed by the occidental modernity. (shrink)

At least since Socrates, philosophy has been understood as the desire for acquiring a special kind of knowledge, namely wisdom, a kind of knowledge that human beings ordinarily do not possess. According to ancient thinkers this desire may result from a variety of causes: wonder or astonishment, the bothersome or even painful realization that one lacks wisdom, or encountering certain hard perplexities or aporiai. As a result of this basic understanding of philosophy, Greek thinkers tended to regard philosophy as an (...) activity of inquiry (zētēsis) rather than as a specific discipline. Discussions concerning the right manner of engaging in philosophical inquiry – what methodoi or routes of inquiry were best suited to lead one to wisdom – became an integral part of ancient philosophy, as did the question how such manners or modes of inquiry are related to, and differ from, other types of inquiry, for instance medical or mathematical. In this special issue of History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, we wish to concentrate in particular on ancient modes of inquiry. (shrink)

Heidegger develops his reading of a-lētheia as privative un-concealment (Unverborgenheit) in tandem with his early phenomenological theory of truth. He is not simply reinterpreting a word, but rather reading Greek philosophy as having a primordial understanding of truth which has itself been concealed in interpretation. After shedding medieval and modern presuppositions of truth as correspondence, the existential truth-experience shows itself, no longer left puzzlingly implicit in unsatisfactory conventional readings of Greek philosophy. In Sein und Zeit §44, Heidegger resolves interpretive difficulties (...) in Parmenides through his interpretation of alētheia and philologically grounds this reading in Heraclitus’s description of the unconcealing logos. Although this primordial sense of the word has already been obscured in Plato and Aristotle, the structural gradation of their theories of truth conserves the primordial pre-Socratic sense of truth as the experience of unconcealment. (shrink)

The appropriationist approach to history of philosophy is often accused of being antihistorical and thus unreliable. The appropriationists are only concerned with their own philosophical problems, and they make discriminating use of the historical data as far as it serves their needs. Its rival, the contextualist approach, claims to be an honest, dedicated and reliable treatment of history. The contextualists are willing to make use of the tedious methodology of Classical studies as long as it promises to uncover the true (...) historical data. In this paper I present a case where the contextualists have failed to surpass their rival appropriationists in their quest for veracity. The case is the debate about Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 9, which took place in 1950-1980s. In this debate the contextualists were unable to offer any other results except for those which have already been suggested by the appropriationists. In addition I demonstrate how the contextualists selectively used the arsenal of Classical methodology not to uncover the truth, but to justify their own preconceived interpretations. (shrink)

In this paper, we intend to explore the possible influences of legislative prose in the Anaximander’s cosmological prose construction, who would have been, according to Themistius, “the first Greek who dared to expose a written discourse about nature” (ἐθάρρησε πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν Ἑλλήνων λόγον ἐξενεγκεῖν περὶ φύσεως συγγεγραμμένον, Or. 26 p. 383 = DK12A7). Our aim is to clarify which notions of nature and justice are assumed in its emergent cosmology, considering that, at least from the lexical point of view, (...) it seems strongly suggestive to be undefined the barriers between the legal and cosmic order, between the Human and the Natural. Indeed, this is what the peripatetic tradition seems to suggest by judging Anaximander’s language extremely poetic (ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων), since he would use legal terms (διδόναι αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας) to explain the natural processes of generation and corruption (ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι, Simpl. in Phys. 24. 13–25 = DK12B1). ——— Objetivamos neste artigo explorar as possíveis influências da prosa legislativa na constituição da prosa cosmológica de Anaximandro de Mileto, que teria sido, segundo Temístio, “o primeiro grego que ousou expor um discurso escrito sobre a natureza” (ἐθάρρησε πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν Ἑλλήνων λόγον ἐξενεγκεῖν περὶ φύσεως συγγεγραμμένον, Or. 26 p.383 = DK12A7). Visamos aclarar que noções de natureza e de justiça estão sendo pressupostas nessa cosmologia então emergente, considerando que, ao menos do ponto de vista lexical, parece fortemente sugestivo serem indefinidas as barreiras entre a ordem jurídica e a cósmica, entre o âmbito humano e o natural. Com efeito, é o que parece já sugerir a tradição peripatética ao julgar o linguajar de Anaximandro extremamente poético (ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων) por o milésio empregar termos considerados do âmbito jurídico (διδόναι αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας) para explicar os processos ditos naturais de geração e corrupção (ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι, Simpl. in Phys. 24.13–25 = DK12B1). (shrink)

In this article, it is claimed that it is not possible to find a modern capitalist order in Ancient Greece. This claim is supported by the economic activities and historical findings of the ancient period and it is also shaped by reference to the 'primitivist-modernist debate'. In this context, firstly, Mosses I. Finley's primitivist views that claim capitalism cannot be possible in ancient Greece will be explained by taking into consideration the accounting system, commercial activity, social status, labor usages, and (...) land treatments. Secondly, the article will analyze Michael I. Rostovtzeff’s objection to primitivist ideas, and reveal his thoughts by supporting modernist ideas on the existence of capitalism in ancient Greek. Based on these analyses, it is concluded that it is unreasonable to talk about the existence of capitalism in ancient Greece. (shrink)

The book Speech of Greek Philosophy is worth reading for a number of reasons, including: It covers history of Greek philosophy from its early days, Thales and his natural school to the Hellenistic age. In addition, the modern world admits, whether in the East or the West, that it owes the Greek mentality the overwhelming majority of its philosophical, literary and artistic products. It is the special belief of European scholars that the Greeks are masters of the modern world in (...) everything that affects the mental and technical matters, but rather many of the natural sciences that have reached at present a distinct amount, thanks to the founding of the Greeks. The book briefly provides the reader with what these Greek ideas are. (shrink)

Evidence for a Parmenidean influence on Plato’s Republic typically focuses on content from Bks. V-VI, and the development of Plato’s Theory of Forms. This essay aims to suggest that Plato’s censorship of poetic content in Bks. II-III—particularly the rules for portraying divine nature (376e-383c)—also draw heavily upon the Eleatic tradition, particularly Parmenides’s. Identifying this further Eleatic influence will be enhanced by my own reading of Parmenides. This reading advocates understanding Parmenides in a more Xenophanean-vein—i.e. by taking What-Is to be an (...) explication of the essential qualities of divine nature, and the overall poem as rejecting traditional, mythopoetic accounts of divinity. Recognizing this Eleatic influence on the censorship of poetic content, a tension arises. For Plato infamously censors poetic styles next, concluding that mimetic dialogue may only be rarely employed, and only then in imitation of virtuous persons and actions (392c-398b). This would entail banning all poetic works relying exclusively on mimetic dialogue. Yet, not only do Plato’s own dialogues entirely consist of mimetic dialogue, so does Parmenides’s proto-dialogue. Furthermore, by so closely imitating Parmenides’s thought and language in Republic, has not Plato himself engaged in a type of intellectual and compositional mίμησις? Just as it would be strange to ban the very dialogue (Republic) which outlines and justifies Kallipolis in the first place, it would also be troubling to ban a philosophical work (i.e. Parmenides’s poem) which Republic is so heavily indebted to. Such a ban would also seem strongly at odds with Plato’s general reverence for Parmenides. In an attempt to address these tensions, I suggest that in Republic II-III, Plato’s lack of concern for banning philosophical works along with mimetic poetry should further suggest that he intends the ban to be far narrower than it first appears: as a rejection of performative, rather than compositional, mίμησις. (shrink)

In Nascimento (2015) I criticized the thesis defended in Irwin (1983) according to which two of the most famous characters in Euripides’ plays, Phaedra and Medea, could be said to exemplify akratic behavior and, in the case of Phaedra, even to explain it. In that article, I’ve pointed out several weakness in these thesis in order to justify my disagreement. I also suggested that, although there was no reason why we should stop looking for examples and explanations of akratic behavior (...) in Euripides’ plays, that should not be the only kind of irrational behavior we ought to be interested in finding there. In this paper, I argue that Medea actually instantiates a form of irrational behavior that is different from akratic behavior. The argument that follows is divided in four parts. After a brief introduction (section I), I clarify what sort of irrationality I believe to be instantiated by Medea’s behavior using Michael Bratman’s theory of plan stability (section II). Then, I analyze Euripides’ text in order to show why I think we should say that Medea does display that kind of irrationality (section III). The paper concludes with a brief summary of the argument (section IV). (shrink)

Ancient Greek Psychology and the Modern Mind-Body Debate offers an overview of Platonic-Aristotelian thought on man with a view to considering what its alternative conceptual framework may contribute to the modern debate which is dominated by the scepticism confronting modern reductionism. The mind-body problem is central to the modern philosophical and cultural debate because we cannot understand what man is until we understand what consciousness is and how it interacts with the body. Although many suggestions have been offered, no convincing (...) account has as yet appeared. Perhaps it was all mistaken ideology from the start? A crucial (and fatal?) distinction was made by modern natural science in the 17th century between the subjective/qualitative and the objective/quantitative. The ancient Greeks, notably Plato and Aristotle, focused not on consciousness and experience, but on goal-directed reason/form, and the contrast was not mechanical matter, but the particular. The latter owed its intelligibility and being to reason and form and did not, therefore, constitute a realm of its own. Hence the ancient picture of man did not fall apart either: the soul is conceived of as a dynamic-telic aspect of the human organism. Considering the problems and consequent scepticism that confronts modern reductionism and the recent appearance of holistic ideology in many areas it is suggested that we take a fresh look at the alternative conceptual framework of our ancient Greek ancestors. (shrink)

This article is the first to bring into scientific discussion and to provide a historico-philosophical analysis of a manuscript “Neoplatonic Philosophy from the archive of Pamfil Danylovych Yurkevych (1826–1874). The reviewed manuscript belongs to P. D. Yurkevych’s handwritten nachlass stored in the funds of the Institute of Manuscript of V. I. Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine in the city of Kyiv. Additional archival materials (in particular, programs of P. D. Yurkevych’s lectures that took place in 1850s – beginning of 1860s (...) in Kyiv Theological Academy) are involved to answer several research questions. The author of this article provides arguments in favor of proving that the manuscript is to be attributed to P. D. Yurkevych’s own handwriting, to be dated circa 1856, and that the purposing of its content is to be qualified as didactic. As it is established in the article, textual content of the manuscript in question is an original concise description and analysis of neoplatonic philosophy, which belongs to the set of materials created by P. D. Yurkevych in preparation for teaching the course on Ancient Philosophy in Kyiv Theological Academy during Kyivan period of his work. Turning to the inner critique of the manuscript, author of this article emphasizes an analysis that P. D. Yurkevych conducts concerning Plotinus’s ideas of the process of emanation of the world from the One and the role that philosophy has in true cognition. While comparing the manuscript “Neoplatonic Philosophy” with one of P. D. Yurkevych’s substantial philosophical works “Idea” (1859), additional light is shed upon the prosess of genesis and development of Christian-Platonic worldview of the thinker. Furthermore, it is established that the manuscript in question played a major role in P. D. Yurkevych’s own schooling, particulary concerning his view on the philosophy of Plotinus, and his general reception of the Platonic tradition. (shrink)

Mimesis can refer to imitation, emulation, representation, or reenactment - and it is a concept that links together many aspects of ancient Greek Culture. The Western Greek bell-krater on the cover, for example, is painted with a scene from a phlyax play with performers imitating mythical characters drawn from poetry, which also represent collective cultural beliefs and practices. One figure is shown playing a flute, the music from which might imitate nature, or represent deeper truths of the cosmos based upon (...) Pythagorean views (which were widespread in Western Greece at the time). The idea that mimesis should be restricted to ideals was made famous by Plato (whose connections to Pythagoreanism and Siracusa are well-known), and famously challenged by his student Aristotle (not to mention by the mimetic character of Plato’s own poetry). This volume gathers essays not only on the philosophical debate about mimesis, but also on its use in architecture, drama, poetry, history, music, ritual, and visual art. The emphasis is on examples from Hellenic cities in Southern Italy and Sicily, but the insights apply far beyond – even to modern times. Contributors include: Thomas Noble Howe, Francisco J. Gonzalez, Gene Fendt, Guilherme Domingues da Motta, Jeremy DeLong, Carolina Araújo, Marie-Élise Zovko, Lidia Palumbo, Sean Driscoll, Konstantinos Gkaleas, Anna Motta, Jure Zovko, Alexander H. Zistakis, Christos C. Evangeliou, Dorota Tymura, Iris Sulimani, Elliott Domagola, Jonah Radding, Giulia Corrente, Laura Tisi, Ewa Osek, Argyri G. Karanasiou, Rocío Manuela Cuadra Rubio, Jorge Tomás García, Aura Piccioni, and José Miguel Puebla Morón. (shrink)

In Metaphysics Γ 4-6 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed not just to denying the PNC, but also to asserting its contrary. In this paper, I offer an analysis of this commitment. I try to show that Aristotle is working with a specific idea in mind: a Protagoreanism ontologically linked to the flux doctrine, as Plato suggested in Theaetetus 152-160.

Review of Carlo M. Lucarini et Claudio Moreschini, Hermias Alexandrinus, In Platonis Phaedrum scholia, Berlin – Boston: De Gruyter, 2012, lxiv+293 pp., ISBN 978-3-11-020115-4.

This paper seeks to elucidate the distinctive nature of the rational impression on its own terms, asking precisely what it means for the Stoics to define logikē phantasia as an impression whose content is expressible in language. I argue first that impression, generically, is direct and reflexive awareness of the world, the way animals get information about their surroundings. Then, that the rational impression, specifically, is inherently conceptual, inferential, and linguistic, i.e. thick with propositional content, the way humans receive incoming (...) information from the world. When we suspend certain contemporary assumptions about propositional content, the textual evidence can be taken at face value to reveal why, for the Stoics, rational impressions are called thoughts (noēseis) and how the Stoics’ novel semantic entities called lekta (roughly, the meanings of our words) depend on rational impressions for their subsistence. (shrink)

Warranting further examination is how the nascent philosophical tradition initially spread to this region from its Ionian provenance. Despite numerous ancient attestations that Parmenides of Elea was influenced, or even directly instructed, by the Ionian-born Xenophanes, many modern scholars remain skeptical of this historical association. The extent of this skepticism ranges from cautious uncertainty to outright denial of any historical plausibility. The skeptical grounds similarly vary, from distrusting the historical veracity of late and/or perhaps biased commentators, to understanding these thinkers (...) as involved in radically different projects. This essay aims to challenge the skeptical position, and establish a direct link disseminating Ionian philosophy to Magna Graecia via Xenophanes and Parmenides. The argument is straightforward. First, the ancient geographical and temporal evidence is noted, establishing that it was possible for Parmenides to have been influenced and/or taught by Xenophanes. Next, the metaphysical and epistemological parallels between these thinkers are considered. Despite notable differences, on balance, these close parallels suggest against the skeptical view, making it quite plausible to impute a direct intellectual link between these thinkers. Third, I consider ancient claims that both thinkers were engaging with religious topics, offering a sort of “rational theology.” This evidence for a close intellectual relationship between these thinkers has been entirely ignored by modern scholars, and orthodox interpretative models cannot readily provide a charitable explanation for them. However, by reconsidering the theistic content in Parmenides’s poem, a new interpretative approach is revealed which can. Once this evidence is considered in its totality, the case for imputing a close and direct intellectual heritage from Xenophanes to Parmenides proves quite substantial. (shrink)

The text was originally a conference speech. In principle, it was prepared for teachers of philosophy and people interested in philosophy, therefore it has the character of an essay and only to a small extent refers to the literature of the subject. However, I am deeply convinced of the validity of the thesis that I propose in it, even if they may seem only to a small extent supported by references to the state of research. -/- Synthetical studies take a (...) special place in the research on the history of ancient philosophy. They demonstrate the existing perspective by performing a selection and arrangement of the material, presenting the periodisation, accentuating and determining what is “philosophically significant.” This article points out that despite the great progress made in detailed research that has taken place over the last few decades, the general framework of development of philosophy, derived from Hegel’s thought, has remained unchanged for two centuries. Hegel’s perspective has instilled a certain pattern that encompasses a whole series of debatable solutions. These include (1) development of a certain understanding of what “philosophy” is and thus separating it from a wide spectrum of literature, rhetoric, medicine, and religion; (2) introduction of a dubious periodisation (e.g. the distinction between the Presocratic period and Socrates’ breakthrough in the form of a departure from the philosophy of nature and return to ethical considerations; (3) adoption of philosophy of Plato and Aristotle as the apex of thought. The author highlights the need to change the approach to the history of ancient philosophy and modify the existing paradigm. He calls for paying greater attention to the intertextual element and to the fact that the assessment of originality and relevance of preserved works is falsified due to the disappearance of comparative material. The proposal to establish a new reconstructive paradigm is based on the belief that during further research on ancient philosophy it would be advisable (1) to expand the research perspective and enrich it with the fields of education, medicine, the great sphere of literature, the spheres of fine arts and music, (2) to focus more on the issue of transmission and reception of texts thanks to which it is possible to deepen and extend the reconstructed context of philosophical discussions, (3) to come to the realisation that the abstract character of description, connected with all the syntheses of the philosophical thought in antiquity lead to its oversimplification and impoverishment by presenting it out of the context and depriving of what is individual and specific for a particular thinker. (shrink)

This study asks after the fate of sophistry in the Eleatic Stranger's investigation of the best of the six regimes governed by law, and outlines as far as possible the role of the rhetor under the supervision of the true statesman, as well as the function and effects of myth on the citizens of the best regime. In short, I argue that Socrates' competitors do, in a qualified manner, still have a place in such a polis precisely where the work (...) of gathering intelligence finds its civic limit. (shrink)

The goal of this research was to analyze the philosophical meaning of the sentence of the fifth century sophist a.C. Protagoras de Abdera: “Man is the measure of all things: of the things that are, that they are, of the things that are not, that they are not”. That phrasing wording was criticized by philosophers of the time, especially Plato. Drawing from various sources, I intend to retrace Protagoras' ideas and its philosophical force. I intend to investigate how, in a (...) way, Protagoras contributes to Plato's philosophical reflection and to investigate, on the other hand, whether there are relevant arguments to show that the interpretation of Protagoras's sentence is different from that of Plato. (shrink)

At the heart of the Stoic theory of modality is a strict commitment to bivalence, even for future contingents. A commitment to both future truth and contingency has often been thought paradoxical. This paper argues that the Stoic retreat from necessity is successful. it maintains that the Stoics recognized three distinct senses of necessity and possibility: logical, metaphysical and providential. Logical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a priori. Metaphysical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a posteriori, a (...) world order according to certain metaphysical principles and natures that god crafts within the constraints of matter. Finally, what is providentially necessary is what occurs according to the chain of fate, but only once it is in process or past. -/- The method of the paper is a close reading of Diogenes Laertius 7.75, adducing broad textual evidence along the way, to show that the Stoic theory of modality embraces Philonian possibility, both that which is capable of being true as a matter of logical consistency, and that which is possible according to the bare fitness of the entity. What differentiates the Stoics from Philo is their additional commitment to possibility as opportunity, resisting the collapse of determinism into necessity. (shrink)

Comme de nombreux penseurs antiques avant et après eux et contrairement à Socrate, Calliclès et Diogène ont déclaré avoir fondé leur éthique sur l’observation de la nature. Et pourtant, les deux discours normatifs qui sont tirés d’une nature que l’on pourrait a priori croire être la même sont on ne peut plus opposés. Calliclès croit que l’homme est appelé à dominer autrui ; Diogène pense plutôt qu’il doit se dominer lui-même ; le premier est un hédoniste débridé, le second croit (...) que le bonheur ne s’achète qu’au prix du sacrifice des désirs artificiels. Comment expliquer cette dichotomie ? Nous empruntons deux routes explicatives. D’abord, nous montrons que pour Calliclès et Diogène, la notion de nature non seulement diffère, mais est observée sous un angle différent. La première est celle des tyrans et de dieux anthropomorphes, la seconde, celle de petits animaux et de dieux autarciques. La première concerne la relation des hommes entre eux ; la seconde, celle de l’homme avec lui-même. Ensuite, nous exposons la différence des présupposés normatifs qui précèdent ou accompagnent l’observation de la nature ; nous contrastons, pour ce faire, les formes d’anticonventionnalisme et d’anti-intellectualisme défendues par Calliclès et Diogène. -/- SUMMARY. Like many ancient thinkers before and after them and contra Socrates, Callicles and Diogenes said they based their ethics on the observation of nature. And yet, the two normative discourses that are derived from nature that we might a priori believe to be the same could not be more opposed. Callicles believes that people are called to dominate others, Diogenes rather thinks people must dominate themselves. The first is an unbridled hedonist, the second believes that happiness can be bought only at the price of sacrificing artificial desires. How to explain this dichotomy? We take two explanatory routes. First, we show that for Callicles and Diogenes, the notion of nature not only differs but is observed from a different angle. The first one is the nature of tyrants and anthropomorphic gods, the second that of small animals and autarkic gods. The first focuses on the relationship between people, the second focuses on the relationship of a person with themselves. Secondly, we expose the difference in normative assumptions that precede or accompany the observation of nature; in order to do so, we contrast anticonventionalism and anti-intellectualism forms proper to both Callicles and Diogenes. (shrink)