Results for 'Dretske Fred'

103 found
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  1. Chris Hill's Consciousness. [REVIEW]Fred Dretske - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):497-502.
    Chris Hill’s consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9812-4 Authors Fred Dretske, 212 Selkirk, Durham, NC 27707, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  2. Misrepresentation.Fred Dretske - 1986 - In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36.
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  3. What We See.Fred Dretske - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 54.
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  4. Epistemology and Information.Dretske Fred - 2008 - In Pieter Adriaans & Johan Van Benthem (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 8. Philosophy of Information. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier-North Holland. pp. 29-47.
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  5.  60
    Dretske on Explaining Behavior.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1993 - Acta Analytica 11 (11):111-124.
    Fred Dretske has recently argued, in a highly original book and a series of articles, that action explanations are a very special species of historical explanation, in opposition to the traditional view that action explanations cite causes of actions, which are identical with bodily movements. His account aims to explain how it is possible for there to be a genuine explanatory role for reasons in a world of causes, and, in particular, in a world in which we have (...)
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  6.  42
    There's Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke.John N. Williams - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):363-378.
    Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. Fred Adams, John Barker and Murray Clarke argue that Backward Clock is no such counterexample. Their argument fails to nullify Backward Clock which also shows that other tracking analyses, such as Dretske’s and one that Adams et al. may well have in mind, are inadequate.
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  7.  80
    Introspection as a Game of Make‐Believe.Wolfgang Barz - 2014 - Theoria 80 (4):350-367.
    The aim of this article is to provide an account of introspective knowledge concerning visual experiences that is in accordance with the idea of transparent introspection. According to transparent introspection, a person gains knowledge of her own current mental state M solely by paying attention to those aspects of the external world which M is about. In my view, transparent introspection is a promising alternative to inner sense theories. However, it raises the fundamental question why a person who pays attention (...)
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  8.  4
    Les Opérateurs Epistémiques (trans. of Dretske, F. I. (1970), “Epistemic Operators”).Steve Humbert-Droz & François Pellet - 2014 - Repha 8:87-108.
    French translation of Dretske's article "Epistemic Operators", The Journal of Philosophy, 67 (24): 1007-23.
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  9.  41
    Beat the (Backward) Clock.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):353-361.
    In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.
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  10.  19
    Rejoinder to Haze.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):227-230.
    Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counter-examples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Here we respond to his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his claims.
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  11. Mental Acts and Mechanistic Psychology in Descartes' Passions.Gary Hatfield - 2008 - In Neil Robertson, Gordon McOuat & Tom Vinci (eds.), Descartes and the Modern. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 49-71.
    This chapter examines the mechanistic psychology of Descartes in the _Passions_, while also drawing on the _Treatise on Man_. It develops the idea of a Cartesian “psychology” that relies on purely bodily mechanisms by showing that he explained some behaviorally appropriate responses through bodily mechanisms alone and that he envisioned the tailoring of such responses to environmental circumstances through a purely corporeal “memory.” An animal’s adjustment of behavior as caused by recurring patterns of sensory stimulation falls under the notion of (...)
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  12.  63
    Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock.Murray Clarke, Fred Adams & John A. Barker - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):99-112.
    In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
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  13.  49
    Alternatives to HOT Theories of Consciousness.Brent Silby - manuscript
    Higher-order thought theories (or HOT theories) state that a mental state is conscious only when it is accompanied by a higher-order thought (HOT). -/- The thought that makes a state conscious is not conscious in itself, but having that thought is what make the state of which it is about conscious. If there is no HOT about a mental state, then that state is not a conscious state. On this view, a state can only be a conscious state if we (...)
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  14.  32
    Ephemeral Vision.Mohan Matthen - 2018 - In Thomas Crowther & Clare Mac Cumhaill (eds.), Perceptual Ephemera. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 312-339.
    Vision is organized around material objects; they are most of what we see. But we also see beams of light, depictions, shadows, reflections, etc. These things look like material objects in many ways, but it is still visually obvious that they are not material objects. This chapter articulates some principles that allow us to understand how we see these ‘ephemera’. H.P. Grice’s definition of seeing is standard in many discussions; here I clarify and augment it with a criterion drawn from (...)
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  15. Attention, Fixation, and Change Blindness.Tony Cheng - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):19-26.
    The topic of this paper is the complex interaction between attention, fixation, and one species of change blindness. The two main interpretations of the target phenomenon are the ‘blindness’ interpretation and the ‘inaccessibility’ interpretation. These correspond to the sparse view (Dennett 1991; Tye, 2007) and the rich view (Dretske 2007; Block, 2007a, 2007b) of visual consciousness respectively. Here I focus on the debate between Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Section 1 describes the target phenomenon and the dialectics (...)
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  16. Tooley's Account of the Necessary Connection Between Law and Regularity.Tyler Hildebrand - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):33-43.
    Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and David Armstrong accept a theory of governing laws of nature according to which laws are atomic states of affairs that necessitate corresponding natural regularities. Some philosophers object to the Dretske/Tooley/Armstrong theory on the grounds that there is no illuminating account of the necessary connection between governing law and natural regularity. In response, Michael Tooley has provided a reductive account of this necessary connection in his book Causation (1987). In this essay, I discuss (...)
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  17. Review of Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar’s (Eds.) Introspection and Consciousness (2012, Oxford University Press). [REVIEW]Michael Roche & William Roche - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):203-208.
    This is an excellent collection of essays on introspection and consciousness. There are fifteen essays in total (all new except for Sydney Shoemaker’s essay). There is also an introduction where the editors explain the impetus for the collection and provide a helpful overview. The essays contain a wealth of new and challenging material sure to excite specialists and shape future research. Below we extract a skeptical argument from Fred Dretske’s essay and relate the remaining essays to that argument. (...)
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  18.  83
    Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):975-992.
    Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske’s theory on which the knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the knowledge denied by its negative (...)
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  19.  37
    Affording Illusions? Natural Information and the Problem of Misperception.Hajo Greif - manuscript
    There are two related points at which J.J. Gibson’s ecological theory of visual perception remains remarkably underspecified: Firstly, the notion of information for perception is not explicated in much detail beyond the claim that it “specifies” the environment for perception, and, thus being an objective affair, enables an organism to perceive action possibilities or “affordances.” Secondly, misperceptions of affordances and perceptual illusions are not clearly distinguished from each other. Although the first claim seems to suggest that any perceptual illusion amounts (...)
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  20. Naturalizing Phenomenology? Dretske on Qualia.Ronald McIntyre - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford University Press. pp. 429--439.
    First, I briefly characterize Dretske’s particular naturalization project, emphasizing his naturalistic reconstruction of the notion of representation. Second, I note some apparent similarities between his notion of representation and Husserl’s notion of intentionality, but I find even more important differences. Whereas Husserl takes intentionality to be an intrinsic, phenomenological feature of thought and experience, Dretske advocates an “externalist” account of mental representation. Third, I consider Dretske’s treatment of qualia, because he takes it to show that his representational (...)
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  21.  99
    Can Mental Representations Be Triggering Causes?Carrie Figdor - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.
    Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends (...)
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  22.  10
    Jaké to je, nebo o čem to je? Místo vědomí v materiálním světě.Tomas Hribek - 2017 - Praha, Česko: Filosofia.
    [What It’s Like, or What It’s About? The Place of Consciousness in the Material World] Summary: The book is both a survey of the contemporary debate and a defense of a distinctive position. Most philosophers nowadays assume that the focus of the philosophy of consciousness, its shared explanandum, is a certain property of experience variously called “phenomenal character,” “qualitative character,” “qualia” or “phenomenology,” understood in terms of what it is like to undergo the experience in question. Consciousness as defined in (...)
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  23.  73
    Kant, Co-Production, Actuality and Pedestrian Space: On the Philosophical Writings of Fred Sandback.Juliette Kennedy - forthcoming - In Roman Kossak & Philip Ording (eds.), Simplicity. Springer.
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  24.  9
    Is Dretske's Theory of Information Naturalistically Grounded? How Emergent Communication Channels Reference an Abstracted Ontic Framework.Timothy M. Rogers - manuscript
    By bringing together Dretske’s theory of knowledge, Shannon’s theory of information, and the conceptual framework of statistical physics, this paper explores some of the meta-physical challenges posed by a naturalistic notion of semantical information. It is argued that Dretske’s theory cannot be said to be naturalistically grounded in the world described by classical physics and that Dretske information is not consistent with Shannon information. A possible route to reconciling Dretske’s insights with Shannon’s theory is proposed. Along (...)
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  25.  28
    Higher-Order Intentionality and Dretske's View of Analytic Knowledge.Sudan A. Turner - manuscript
    Dretske makes arguments in which he suggests three levels of the intentionality of knowledge: (1) a low level belonging to law-like causal relationships between physical properties, (2) a middle level defined in terms of the intensionality of sentences describing knowledge of these properties, and (3) a highest level of human cognition. Acknowledging the need to explain humans’ analytic knowledge, however, he proposes that we know a proposition P analytically when we know that P entails Q, even though P and (...)
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  26. Shutting Dretske’s Door.Nicholas Shackel - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):393-401.
    Dretske proposes a theory of knowledge in terms of a theory of information, but wishes to deny that empirical knowledge settles the large question of scepticism. This leads him to deny the closure of knowledge under known entailment. In a recent paper Jäger argues that Dretske's theory of information entails closure for knowledge, 'at least for the kind of propositions here at issue'. If Jäger is right, Dretske is seriously embarrassed and must give something up. In this (...)
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  27. Review of Fred Feldman, What is This Thing Called Happiness? [REVIEW]Anthony Skelton - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):395-398.
    A critical review of Fred Feldman's What is This Thing Called Happiness? which includes a partial defence of the life satisfaction theory of happiness.
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  28. Dretske and the Causality of Reasons.Henk Bij de Weg - manuscript
    In his work on reasons Dretske argues that reasons are only worthwhile for having them if they are causally relevant for explaining behaviour, which he elaborates in his representational theory of explanation. The author argues against this view by showing that there are reasons that are relevant for explaining behaviour but not causally relevant. He gives a linguistic foundation of his argumentation and shows that Dretske’s representational theory cannot explain human actions because man does not only perceive things (...)
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  29.  19
    Distributive Justice: Getting What We Deserve From Our Country, Fred Feldman. Oxford University Press, 2016, Ix + 279 Pages. [REVIEW]Huub Brouwer & Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (1):146-153.
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  30. What is This Thing Called Happiness? By Fred Feldman. [REVIEW]Alex Gregory - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):fzt092.
    A review of Feldman's "What is this thing called happiness"?
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  31. Two Non-Counterexamples to Truth-Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):67-73.
    In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick's Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick's theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick's theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we will also explain why they are not counterexamples to Dretske's Conclusive Reasons Theory of Knowledge.
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  32. Natureza e Política: Pierre Aubenque e Fred Miller sobre Aristóteles.Odílio Alves Aguiar - 2014 - Argumentos 11:212-228.
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  33.  41
    Authority Without Privilege: How to Be a Dretskean Conciliatory Skeptic on Self-Knowledge.Michael Roche & William Roche - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    Dretske is a “conciliatory skeptic” on self-knowledge. Take some subject S such that (i) S thinks that P and (ii) S knows that she has thoughts. Dretske’s theory can be put as follows: S has a privileged way of knowing what she thinks, but she has no privileged way of knowing that she thinks it. There is much to be said on behalf of conciliatory skepticism (“CS” for short) and Dretske’s defense of it. We aim to show, (...)
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  34.  19
    The Advice Models of Happiness: A Response to Feldman.Jussi Suikkanen - forthcoming - International Journal of Wellbeing.
    In his critical notice entitled ‘An Improved Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of Happiness?’ focusing on my article that was previously published in this journal, Fred Feldman raises an important objection to a suggestion I made about how to best formulate the whole life satisfaction theories of happiness. According to my proposal, happiness is a matter of whether an idealised version of you would judge that your actual life corresponds to the life-plan, which he or she has constructed for you (...)
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  35. Representations Gone Mental.Alex Morgan - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):213-244.
    Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially involves the manipulation of (...)
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  36. Expressions, Looks and Others' Minds.William E. S. McNeill - forthcoming - In Matthew Parrott & Anita Avramides (eds.), Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We can know some things about each others' mental lives. The view that some of this knowledge is genuinely perceptual is getting traction. But the idea that we can see any of each others' mental states themselves - the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis - remains unpopular. Very often the view that we can perceptually know, for example, that James is angry, is thought to depend either on our awareness of James' expression or on the way James appears - versions of what (...)
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  37. Don't Fear the Reaper: An Epicurean Answer to Puzzles About Death and Injustice.Simon Cushing - 2007 - In Kate Woodthorpe (ed.), Layers of Dying and Death. Oxford, UK: Inter-Disciplinary Press. pp. 117-127.
    I begin by sketching the Epicurean position on death - that it cannot be bad for the one who dies because she no longer exists - which has struck many people as specious. However, alternative views must specify who is wronged by death (the dead person?), what is the harm (suffering?), and when does the harm take place (before death, when you’re not dead yet, or after death, when you’re not around any more?). In the second section I outline the (...)
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  38.  62
    Sensory Malfunctions, Limitations, and Trade-Offs.Todd Ganson - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1705-1713.
    Teleological accounts of sensory normativity treat normal functioning for a species as a standard: sensory error involves departure from normal functioning for the species, i.e. sensory malfunction. Straightforward reflection on sensory trade-offs reveals that normal functioning for a species can exhibit failures of accuracy. Acknowledging these failures of accuracy is central to understanding the adaptations of a species. To make room for these errors we have to go beyond the teleological framework and invoke the notion of an ideal observer from (...)
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  39. Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality.George Bealer - 1996 - In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
    After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis a feature which entails the existence (...)
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  40. Trees for a 3-Valued Logic.Fred Johnson - 1984 - Analysis 44 (1):43-6.
    Fred shows how problems with Slater's restriction of the classical propositional logic can be solved.
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  41. Review of H Kragh (1996) Cosmology and Controversy. [REVIEW]Graham Oppy - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):387-9.
    Short review of Helge Kragh's excellent book on the contest between big bang and steady state theories of the universe.
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  42.  77
    Epistemic Closure Principles.John M. Collins - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is an encyclopedia article about epistemic closure principles. The article explains what they are, their various philosophical uses, how they are argued for or against, and provides an overview of the related literature.
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  43.  83
    Modal Ecthesis.Fred Johnson - 1993 - History and Philosophy of Logic 14 (2):171-182.
    Fred's semantics for McCall's syntactic presentation of Aristotle's assertoric and apodeictic syllogistic is altered to free it from Thom's objections that it is unAristotelian. The altered semantics rejects Baroco-XLL and Bocardo-LXL, which Thom says Aristotle should have accepted. Aristotle's proofs that use ecthesis are formalized by using singular sentences. With one exception the (acceptance) axioms for McCall's system L-X-M are derivable. Formal proofs are shown to be sound.
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  44. Contingentism in Metaphysics.Kristie Miller - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):965-977.
    In a lot of domains in metaphysics the tacit assumption has been that whichever metaphysical principles turn out to be true, these will be necessarily true. Let us call necessitarianism about some domain the thesis that the right metaphysics of that domain is necessary. Necessitarianism has flourished. In the philosophy of maths we find it held that if mathematical objects exist, then they do of necessity. Mathematical Platonists affirm the necessary existence of mathematical objects (see for instance Hale and Wright (...)
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  45. The Link Between Organizational Ethics and Job Satisfaction: A Study of Managers in Singapore. [REVIEW]Hian Chye Koh & El'fred H. Y. Boo - 2001 - Journal of Business Ethics 29 (4):309 - 324.
    Based on a survey of 237 managers in Singapore, three measures of organizational ethics (namely, top management support for ethical behavior, the organization''s ethical climate, and the association between ethical behavior and career success) are found to be associated with job satisfaction. The link between organizational ethics and job satisfaction is argued from Viswesvaran et al.''s (1998) organizational justice and cognitive dissonance theories. The findings imply that organizational leaders can favorably influence organizational outcomes by engaging in, supporting and rewarding ethical (...)
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  46. Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty-Dunn - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper (...)
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  47. Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - forthcoming - Mind.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation (...)
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  48. Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.
    Many people have recently argued that we need to distinguish between experiences and seemings and that this has consequences for views about how perception provides evidence. In this article I spell out my take on these issues by doing three things. First, I distinguish between mere sensations like seeing pitch black all around you and perceptual experiences like seeing a red apple. Both have sensory phenomenology in presenting us with sensory qualities like colors, being analog in Dretske's sense, and (...)
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  49. Embodied Cognition.Fred Adams - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):619-628.
    Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet. On a non-embodied approach, the sensory system informs the cognitive system and the motor system does the cognitive system’s bidding. There are causal relations between the systems but the sensory and motor systems are not constitutive of cognition. For embodied views, the relation to the sensori-motor system to cognition is constitutive, not just causal. This paper examines some recent empirical evidence used to support the view that cognition is embodied and raises questions about some (...)
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  50. Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that (...)
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