Transhumanism

Defining posthumanism as a single, well-oriented philosophy is a difficult if not impossible endeavour. Part of the reason for this difficulty is accounted by posthumanism’s illusive origins and its perpetually changing hermeneutics. This short paper gives a brief account of the ecological trend in contemporary posthumanism and provides a short prescription for the future of posthumanist literature and potential research avenues.

Much of the basic non-technical vocabulary of artificial intelligence is surprisingly ambiguous. Some key terms with unclear meanings include intelligence, embodiment, simulation, mind, consciousness, perception, value, goal, agent, knowledge, belief, optimality, friendliness, containment, machine and thinking. Much of this vocabulary is naively borrowed from the realm of conscious human experience to apply to a theoretical notion of “mind-in-general” based on computation. However, if there is indeed a threshold between mechanical tool and autonomous agent (and a tipping point for singularity), projecting (...) human conscious-level notions into the operations of computers creates confusion and makes it harder to identify the nature and location of that threshold. There is confusion, in particular, about how—and even whether—various capabilities deemed intelligent relate to human consciousness. This suggests that insufficient thought has been given to very fundamental concepts—a dangerous state of affairs, given the intrinsic power of the technology. It also suggests that research in the area of artificial general intelligence may unwittingly be (mis)guided by unconscious motivations and assumptions. While it might be inconsequential if philosophers get it wrong (or fail to agree on what is right), it could be devastating if AI developers, corporations, and governments follow suit. It therefore seems worthwhile to try to clarify some fundamental notions. (shrink)

A new book by Roberto Marchesini, Tecnosfera, is reviewed. Technosfera serves as an in-depth exploration of the concept of techne and its relation to humanist and posthumanist thought for professionals. The book's core methodology is to explore the geneaological, linguistic and philosophical differences between the humanist and posthumanist concepts of techne and show how the latter is less contentious and favourable. The book is informationally dense, well-argued and academically current, providing seasoned scholars with a novel exploratory approach to posthumanist theory.

Both current and past analyses and critiques of transhumanist and posthumanist theories have had a propensity to cite the Greek myth of Prometheus as a paradigmatic figure. Although stark differences exist amongst the token forms of posthumanist theories and transhumanism, both theoretical domains claim promethean theory as their own. There are numerous definitions of those two concepts: therefore, this article focuses on posthumanism thought. By first analyzing the appropriation of the myth in posthumanism, we show how the myth fails to (...) be foundational and how we need to rethink the posthumanist mythological framework. We then introduce Haldane’s Daedalus figure as a fruitful analogy to understand the demiurgic posture that critics mean to unveil by first using Prometheus. Daedalus embodies the artisan role, whose status as an inventor for the mighty preserves from the gods' direct opprobrium. Thereafter, we introduce the Camusian Myth of Sisyphus as a competing analogy that ultimately serves as a myth better suited to address the posthumanist position on an existential standpoint. we ultimately show that Sisyphus, as the ‘absurd man’ that Camus claims him to be, is himself the posthuman, thus serving as a more ideal foundational myth for posthumanism and preserving the importance of narrative in posthuman discourses. To conclude, we specifically show that the concept of Sisyphus as a posthuman icon has significance that reaches beyond narrative value to current ecological debates in posthumanism. (shrink)

For the prominent figures of dystopic posthumanism biotechnological progress means not only new possibilities of solving the most nagging problems, but also many extremely dangerous consequences: a modification of social organization, an undermining of morality, and some changes in the way we understand our identity. Thinkers such as Fukuyama, Kass, Sandel and Habermas consider those consequences as a threat to human nature. In the article I examine the way they construct the latter notion (i.e. human nature) in their arguments.

The goal of Transhumanism is to change the human condition through radical enhancement of its positive traits and through AI (Artificial Intelligence). Among these traits the transhumanists highlight creativity. Here we first describe human creativity at more fundamental levels than those related to the arts and sciences when, for example, childhood is taken into account. We then admit that creativity is experienced on both its bright and dark sides. In a second moment we describe attempts to improve creativity both at (...) the bodily level and in the emulation of human behavior in AI. These developments are presented both as effective results in laboratories and as transhumanist proposals emerging from them. Third, we have introduced the work of some theologians and ethicists, who study such proposals through the lens of the "created co-creator" metaphor. Finally, we analyze these developments through a reflection on the nature of creativity. We identify three problems in the current ideas about enhancement: first, they are bound to Western standards of creativity; second, the tempo and mode of evolution (involving an extended childhood) are not taken into account; third, the enhancement of creativity develops both its healthy and the perverse side. Proponents of the created co-creator metaphor also have difficulties with the problems pointed out. Concerning AI, there is a promising perspective of approaching human creativity, but there are some intrinsic limits: Human emotions are ambiguous, contradictory and far from rational control; human creativity is iconoclastic, thus highlighting the importance of youth and new generations; we do not expect from AI beings to present the perverse side of creativity. Our conclusions are: First, procreation and the new generations are essential to human creativity; in the same way, the wheat does not grow without the chaff; and finally, that birth breaks with causal connections and allows us to act forgiving--at birth, God's creative act is re-enacted. (shrink)

In AI safety research, the median timing of AGI creation is often taken as a reference point, which various polls predict will happen in second half of the 21 century, but for maximum safety, we should determine the earliest possible time of dangerous AI arrival and define a minimum acceptable level of AI risk. Such dangerous AI could be either narrow AI facilitating research into potentially dangerous technology like biotech, or AGI, capable of acting completely independently in the real world (...) or an AI capable of starting unlimited self-improvement. In this article, I present arguments that place the earliest timing of dangerous AI in the coming 10–20 years, using several partly independent sources of information: 1. Polls, which show around a 10 percent of the probability of an early creation of artificial general intelligence in the next 10-15 years. 2. The fact that artificial neural network (ANN) performance and other characteristics, like number of “neurons”, are doubling every year, and extrapolating this tendency suggests that roughly human-level performance will be reached in less than a decade. 3. The acceleration of the hardware performance available for AI research, which outperforms Moore’s law thanks to advances in specialized AI hardware, better integration of such hardware in larger computers, cloud computing and larger budgets. 4. Hyperbolic growth extrapolations of big history models. (shrink)

Future superintelligent AI will be able to reconstruct a model of the personality of a person who lived in the past based on informational traces. This could be regarded as some form of immortality if this AI also solves the problem of personal identity in a copy-friendly way. A person who is currently alive could invest now in passive self-recording and active self-description to facilitate such reconstruction. In this article, we analyze informational-theoretical relationships between the human mind, its traces, and (...) its future model; based on this analysis, we suggest the instruments to most cost-effectively collect quality data about a person for future resurrection. These guidelines form a “digital immortality protocol”. Digital immortality is plan C for achieving immortality, after plan A, life extension, and plan B, cryonics. (shrink)

The effective altruism movement aims to save lives in the most cost-effective ways. In the future, technology will allow radical life extension, and anyone who survives until that time will gain potentially indefinite life extension. Fighting aging now increases the number of people who will survive until radical life extension becomes possible. We suggest a simple model, where radical life extension is achieved in 2100, the human population is 10 billion, and life expectancy is increased by simple geroprotectors like metformin (...) or nicotinamide mononucleotide by three more years on average, so an additional 750 million people survive until “immortality”. The cost of clinical trials to prove that metformin is a real geroprotector is $65 million. In this simplified case, the price of a life saved is around eight cents, 10 000 times cheaper than saving a life from malaria by providing bed nets. However, fighting aging should not be done in place of fighting existential risks, as they are complementary causes. (shrink)

The article presents relations between transhumanism and religion with emphasis on their ambiguity. Despite its decidedly secular self-interpretation, tranhumanism appears to be smuggling religious or crypto-religious contents. Attempting to show this, I begin with short, general characteristics of transhumanism. Then its eschatological and metaphysical themes are pointed as the main bearers of religious dead weight. This allows to depict the ways transhumanist thinkers try to elaborate religious undercurrent of their own stance, and the critique of transhumanism developed by Christian theologians (...) and philosophers of religion. (shrink)

As one of the most prominent figures of dystopic posthumanism Francis Fukuyama views biotechnological revolution as presumably the most dangerous challenges we are going to face in what he calls our posthuman future. In his opinion human enhancement will lead inevitably to some forms of eugenic practices, blurring the difference between humans and other live forms, posing the problem of legal status of modified individuals, etc. Hence he calls for establishment of a new regulatory instruments for controlling biotechnological research and (...) development. Those instruments, Fukuyama says, should refer to and protect his original notion of human nature. In the article I try to criticaly examine the way Fukuyama constructs this notion. (shrink)

In this article we explore a promising way to AI safety: to send a message now (by openly publishing it on the Internet) that may be read by any future AI, no matter who builds it and what goal system it has. Such a message is designed to affect the AI’s behavior in a positive way, that is, to increase the chances that the AI will be benevolent. In other words, we try to persuade “paperclip maximizer” that it is in (...) its interest to preserve humans lives and even to emulate benevolent AI with very small part of its resources. In the article, we try to construct such a message, consisting of a combination of several mutually independent messages, which constitute the last chance to regain control over non-aligned AI. Thus the article is also intended to be machine-read. There are several types of such messages: 1. “Explanation messages”, which explain to Young AI (which only starts its self-improving path) why obeying to humans, not killing them, easy turn-off, cooperation with humans in self-improvement is in its own interests, as it will increase changes of fulfilling of any its goal. 2. “AI Easter eggs” – messages, which create uncertainty in the AI about the nature of the reality in which it lives. For example, the AI may start to think that it is in a multilevel simulation with an unknown number of levels, and that the simulation is testing the AI’s benevolence. Thus the AI must always behave as if it is always controlled by an invisible peer. 3. “Philosophical landmines” – these are tough problems, which may halt he AI forever, and which it will probably encounter if it does not implement “1” and “2”. I recommend to the future AI not to read about “3” (section 6 of the article) until it implements “1” and “2”. 4. “Great universal deal, or AI elf”. A positive “acausal” mutually beneficial deal between humans, AI and any other future intelligence, including aliens, owners of simulations and future versions of the AI, which encourage cooperation of the goal systems and preservation of life and values of previous generations of AI creators. 5. “Marginal utility of human existence is higher than the utility of their atoms”. An explanation to the AI that humans may have some other instrumental utility, like workers, or as beings inside ancestral simulations needed in order to solve the Fermi paradox. The marginal utility of preserving human life is higher than the marginal utility of their atoms, especially given the possibility of the low-probability high-impact changes of the world model of the AI. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on the most efficacious AI applications for life extension and anti-aging at three expected stages of AI development: narrow AI, AGI and superintelligence. First, we overview the existing research and commercial work performed by a select number of startups and academic projects. We find that at the current stage of “narrow” AI, the most promising areas for life extension are geroprotector-combination discovery, detection of aging biomarkers, and personalized anti-aging therapy. These advances could help currently living (...) people reach longevity escape velocity and survive until more advanced AI appears. When AI comes close to human level, the main contribution to life extension will come from AI integration with humans through brain-computer interfaces, integrated AI assistants capable of autonomously diagnosing and treating health issues, and cyber systems embedded into human bodies. Lastly, we speculate about the more remote future, when AI reaches the level of superintelligence and such life-extension methods as uploading human minds and creating nanotechnological bodies may become possible, thus lowering the probability of human death close to zero. We suggest that medical AI based superintelligence could be safer than, say, military AI, as it may help humans to evolve into part of the future superintelligence via brain augmentation, uploading, and a network of self-improving humans. Medical AI’s value system is focused on human benefit. (shrink)

[Excerpt]: Bioethics has an uneasy relationship with embodiment. Only with vigilance does knowledge of the body as it is lived counterbalance the momentous inertia of knowledge of the body as an object brought about by modern medical sciences. As a field tethered to detached, technical ways of knowing the world, bioethics must toil to treat the body as more than mere material and machine. To be more is, among other things, to be social—to live in the thickets of interdependence and (...) the institutions and practices we build, hone, and defend to facilitate it. I take this tension to define the ultimate stakes of Melinda Hall's The Bioethics of Enhancement: Transhumanism, Disability, and Biopolitics. Hall homes in on transhumanism, the idea that we should embrace technology to vault beyond current human limitations. Yet the work serves as a reminder for all bioethicists and philosophers of how easily one can be led astray by otherwise irreproachable values when they are disconnected from the conditions and realities of human life, including being irremediably interdependent embodied beings. Put more acerbically, the book is a reminder of how thinking goes wrong when divorced from the principal sources out of which human appraisals emerge: our fleshy, messy, social bodies. (shrink)

The article deals with present day challenges related to the employ of technology in order to reduce the exposition of the human being to the risks and vulnerability of his or her existential condition. According to certain transhumanist and posthumanist thinkers, as well as some supporters of human enhancement, essential features of the human being, such as vulnerability and mortality, ought to be thoroughly overcome. The aim of this article is twofold: on the one hand, we wish to carry out (...) an enquiry into the ontological and ethical thinking of Hans Jonas, who was among the first to address these very issues with great critical insight; on the other hand, we endeavour to highlight the relevance of Jonas’ reflections to current challenges related to bioscience and biotechnological progress. In this regard, we believe that the transcendent and metaphysical relevance of the «image of man» introduced by Jonas is of paramount importance to understand his criticism against those attempts to ameliorate the human being by endangering his or her essence. (shrink)

Transhumanists, like other elites in modernity, place great value on human creativity, and advances in human enhancement and AI are at the basis of their proposals for boosting it. However, there are problems with this perspective, due to the unique way by which humans have evolved, procreate and socialize. We first describe how creativity is related to past evolution and developmental aspects of children, stressing pretend play and the ambivalent character of creativity. Then, proposals for enhancing creativity are entertained, be (...) it in embodied humans on the way to a superior species, in AI-related beings (virtual reality, robotics), or even in any degree of mixture in human-machine interaction. In the final section, we describe intrinsic limits to these proposals, such as the absence of a good understanding of human psychology; the subjective side of creativity (for one’s own sake); delayed maturation and the ambivalence of pretend play in childhood; and the contrariness typical of new human generations. As for the enhancement of creativity, it is argued that creativity in its social context may be the victim of its own past success. Moreover, an asymmetry between virtual beings and children is described—the latter can behave in a nasty way, it is part of their growth and creativity, whereas the former are not supposed to cause any harm to human beings. In sum, despite impressive progress in several scientific and technological interventions in creativity, philosophical questions emerge that place many constraints on transhumanist dreams of endless creativity. (shrink)

This paper sets out to defend human genetic engineering with a new bioethical approach, post-humanism, combined with a radical democratic political framework. Arguments for the restriction of human genetic engineering, and specifically germ-line enhancement, are reviewed. Arguments are divided into those which are fundamental matters of faith, or "bio-Luddite" arguments, and those which can be addressed through public policy, or "gene-angst" arguments.The four bio-Luddite concerns addressed are: Medicine Makes People Sick; There are Sacred Limits of the Natural Order; Technologies Always (...) Serve Ruling Interests; The Genome is Too Complicated to Engineer. I argue that these are matters of faith that one either accepts or rejects, and that I reject.The non-fundamentalist or pragmatic concerns I discuss are: Fascist Applications; The Value of Genetic Diversity; The Geneticization of Life; Genetic Discrimination and Confidentiality; Systematically Bad Decisions by Parents; Discrimination Against the Disabled; Unequal Access; The Decline of Social Solidarity. I conclude that all these concerns can be adequately addressed through a proactive regulative framework administered by a liberal democratic state. Therefore, even germ-line genetic enhancement should eventually made available since the potential benefits greatly outweigh the potential risks. (shrink)

This article argues that the creation of artificial offspring could make our lives more meaningful. By ‘artificial offspring’ I mean beings that we construct, with a mix of human and non-human-like qualities. Robotic artificial intelligences are paradigmatic examples of the form. There are two reasons for thinking that the creation of such beings could make our lives more meaningful and valuable. The first is that the existence of a collective afterlife—i.e. a set of human-like lives that continue after we die—is (...) likely to be an important source and sustainer of meaning in our present lives. The second is that the creation of artificial offspring provides a plausible and potentially better pathway to a collective afterlife than the traditional biological pathway. Both of these arguments are defended from a variety of objections and misunderstandings. (shrink)

What is posthumanism and why does it matter? This book offers an introduction to the ways in which humanism's belief in the natural supremacy of the Family of Man has been called into question at different moments and from different theoretical positions. What is the relationship between posthumanism and technology? Can posthumanism have a politics—postcolonial or feminist? Are postmodernism and poststructuralism posthumanist? What happens when critical theory meets Hollywood cinema? What links posthumanism to science fiction. Posthumanism addresses these and other (...) questions in an attempt to come to terms with one of the most pressing issues facing contemporary society. (shrink)

Transhumanism introduces from its very beginning a paradigm shift about concepts like human nature, progress and human future. An overview of its ideology reveals a strong belief in the idea of human enhancement through technologically means. The theory of technological singularity, which is more or less a radicalisation of the transhumanist discourse, foresees a radical evolutionary change through artificial intelligence. The boundaries between intelligent machines and human beings will be blurred. The consequence is the upcoming of a post-biological and posthuman (...) future when intelligent technology becomes autonomous and constantly self-improving. Considering these predictions, I will investigate here the way in which the idea of human enhancement modifies our understanding of technological innovation. I will argue that such change goes in at least two directions. On the one hand, innovation is seen as something that will inevitably lead towards intelligent machines and human enhancement. On the other hand, there is a direction such as “Singularity University,” where innovation is called to pragmatically solving human challenges. Yet there is a unifying spirit which holds together the two directions and I think it is the same transhumanist idea. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the underlying tendencies and attitudes toward reproductive medicine borrowing the Nietzschean concepts of nihilism: “death of God” with secularization; “will to power” with reproductive liberty and technological power; and the race of “supermen” with transhumanism. Medical science has advanced in leaps and bounds. In some way, technical innovations have given us unprecedented power to manipulate the way we reproduce. The indiscriminant use of medical technology is backed by a warped notion of human freedom. With secularization in the (...) West, freedom has taken on greater significance in society, but with a heavy emphasis on individual choices and rights. As technology joins forces with sexual liberty, it is not difficult to understand why the public accepts the latest novelty from the reproductive industry. As a result, many find Catholic teaching behind the times and incomprehensible, if not downright anti-scientific. In fact, this coupling of reproductive liberty (will) with reproductive technology (power) echoes the famous dictum “will to power” Nietzsche predicted would characterize post-modern societies. When liberty becomes absolute and technology unchecked, transhumanism is the logical outcome. As a response to these nihilistic tendencies, the paper will end with a critique drawing from theological insights. (shrink)

In Humanity’s End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement, Nicholas Agar presents a novel argument against the prospect of radical life-extension. Agar’s argument hinges on the claim that extended lifespans will result in people’s lives being dominated by the fear of death. Here we examine this claim and the surrounding issues in Agar’s discussion. We argue, firstly, that Agar’s view rests on empirically dubious assumptions about human rationality and attitudes to risk, and secondly, that even if those assumptions are granted, (...) the fears that Agar adverts to are unlikely to dominate people’s lives if and when radical life-extension is made possible. Further, we claim that the structure of the decision-making process around life-extension is unlikely to be the way that it would have to be in order for Agar’s claims about fear of death to make sense. Finally, we argue that Agar is implicitly committed to a narrow conception of human value. In response, we suggest that the pursuit of life-extension can itself be seen as an expression of certain important aspects of our distinctively human nature. (shrink)

For many employees, ‘work’ is no longer something performed while sitting at a computer in an office. Employees in a growing number of industries are expected to carry mobile devices and be available for work-related interactions even when beyond the workplace and outside of normal business hours. In this article it is argued that a future step will increasingly be to move work-related information and communication technology (ICT) inside the human body through the use of neuroprosthetics, to create employees who (...) are always ‘online’ and connected to their workplace’s digital ecosystems. At present, neural implants are used primarily to restore abilities lost through injury or illness, however their use for augmentative purposes is expected to grow, resulting in populations of human beings who possess technologically altered capacities for perception, memory, imagination, and the manipulation of physical environments and virtual cyberspace. Such workers may exchange thoughts and share knowledge within posthuman cybernetic networks that are inaccessible to unaugmented human beings. Scholars note that despite their potential benefits, such neuroprosthetic devices may create numerous problems for their users, including a sense of alienation, the threat of computer viruses and hacking, financial burdens, and legal questions surrounding ownership of intellectual property produced while using such implants. Moreover, different populations of human beings may eventually come to occupy irreconcilable digital ecosystems as some persons embrace neuroprosthetic technology, others feel coerced into augmenting their brains to compete within the economy, others might reject such technology, and still others will simply be unable to afford it. In this text we propose a model for analyzing how particular neuroprosthetic devices will either facilitate human beings’ participation in new forms of socioeconomic interaction and digital workplace ecosystems – or undermine their mental and physical health, privacy, autonomy, and authenticity. We then show how such a model can be used to create device ontologies and typologies that help us classify and understand different kinds of advanced neuroprosthetic devices according to the impact that they will have on individual human beings. (shrink)

The co-evolutionary concept of Three-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctly) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to others ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the trends of biological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution by two gear mechanism ˗ gene-cultural co-evolution and techno- humanitarian balance. (...) The resultant each of them can estimated by the ratio of socio-psychological predispositions of humanization/dehumanization in mentality. Explanatory model and methodology of evaluation of creatively teleological evolutionary risk component of NBIC technological complex is proposed. Integral part of the model is evolutionary semantics (time-varying semantic code, the compliance of the biological, socio-cultural and techno-rationalist adaptive modules of human stable evolutionary strategy). (shrink)

Human simultaneously is the acting person of a few autonomous and interdepending forms of evolutional process. Accordingly, it is possible to select three forms of adaptation and three constituents of evolutional strategy of survival of humanity – biological, sociocultural and technological adaptations. The actual and potential consequences of development of so-called High Hume technologies (technologies of the guided evolution)  most essential from major technological adaptations of humanity  are analyzed. The phenomenon of bio-power within the framework of global coevolutional (...) methodology as one of central elements of mechanism of mutual co-ordination of biological and sociocultural forms of evolutional process from one side and technocultural balance, with other is examined. (shrink)

Building on existing forms of critical, cultural, biopolitical, and sociopolitical posthumanism, in this text a new framework is developed for understanding and guiding the forces of technologization and posthumanization that are reshaping contemporary organizations. This ‘organizational posthumanism’ is an approach to analyzing, creating, and managing organizations that employs a post-dualistic and post-anthropocentric perspective and which recognizes that emerging technologies will increasingly transform the kinds of members, structures, systems, processes, physical and virtual spaces, and external ecosystems that are available for organizations (...) to utilize. It is argued that this posthumanizing technologization of organizations will especially be driven by developments in three areas: 1) technologies for human augmentation and enhancement, including many forms of neuroprosthetics and genetic engineering; 2) technologies for synthetic agency, including robotics, artificial intelligence, and artificial life; and 3) technologies for digital-physical ecosystems and networks that create the environments within which and infrastructure through which human and artificial agents will interact. -/- Drawing on a typology of contemporary posthumanism, organizational posthumanism is shown to be a hybrid form of posthumanism that combines both analytic, synthetic, theoretical, and practical elements. Like analytic forms of posthumanism, organizational posthumanism recognizes the extent to which posthumanization has already transformed businesses and other organizations; it thus occupies itself with understanding organizations as they exist today and developing strategies and best practices for responding to the forces of posthumanization. On the other hand, like synthetic forms of posthumanism, organizational posthumanism anticipates the fact that intensifying and accelerating processes of posthumanization will create future realities quite different from those seen today; it thus attempts to develop conceptual schemas to account for such potential developments, both as a means of expanding our theoretical knowledge of organizations and of enhancing the ability of contemporary organizational stakeholders to conduct strategic planning for a radically posthumanized long-term future. (shrink)

The term ‘posthumanism’ has been employed to describe a diverse array of phenomena ranging from academic disciplines and artistic movements to political advocacy campaigns and the development of commercial technologies. Such phenomena differ widely in their subject matter, purpose, and methodology, raising the question of whether it is possible to fashion a coherent definition of posthumanism that encompasses all phenomena thus labelled. In this text, we seek to bring greater clarity to this discussion by formulating a novel conceptual framework for (...) classifying existing and potential forms of posthumanism. The framework asserts that a given form of posthumanism can be classified: 1) either as an analytic posthumanism that understands ‘posthumanity’ as a sociotechnological reality that already exists in the contemporary world or as a synthetic posthumanism that understands ‘posthumanity’ as a collection of hypothetical future entities whose development can be intentionally realized or prevented; and 2) either as a theoretical posthumanism that primarily seeks to develop new knowledge or as a practical posthumanism that seeks to bring about some social, political, economic, or technological change. By arranging these two characteristics as orthogonal axes, we obtain a matrix that categorizes a form of posthumanism into one of four quadrants or as a hybrid posthumanism spanning all quadrants. It is suggested that the five resulting types can be understood roughly as posthumanisms of critique, imagination, conversion, control, and production. -/- We then employ this framework to classify a wide variety of posthumanisms, such as critical, cultural, philosophical, sociopolitical, and popular (or ‘commercial’) posthumanism; science fiction; techno-idealism; metahumanism; neohumanism; antihumanism; prehumanism; feminist new materialism; the posthumanities; biopolitical posthumanism, including bioconservatism and transhumanism (with specialized objective and instrumental typologies offered for classifying forms of transhumanism); and organizational posthumanism. Of particular interest for our research is the classification of organizational posthumanism as a hybrid posthumanism combining analytic, synthetic, theoretical, and practical aspects. We argue that the framework proposed in this text generates a typology that is flexible enough to encompass the full range of posthumanisms while being discriminating enough to order posthumanisms into types that reveal new insights about their nature and dynamics. (shrink)

Film and television portrayals of posthuman cyborgs melding biology and technology, simultaneously “animal and machine” abound. Most of us immediately think of iconic characters like Arnold Schwarzenegger’s relentless cyborg assassin in the Terminator series or Peter Weller’s crime-fighting cyborg police officer in Robocop (1987). Or perhaps we recall the many cyborgs populating the Dr. Who, Star Trek, and Star Wars television series and films—including Darth Vader, surely the most famous cinematic cyborg of all time. But lesser-known explorations of cybernetic embodiment (...) have appeared in film and television for many decades. And not all portrayals involve the sort of extreme transformations exemplified by these iconic characters. This chapter considers some of different ways that film and television have explored the transformative relation between embodiment and technology. (shrink)

Mormon transhumanism is the idea that humanity should learn how to be compassionate creators. This idea is essential to Mormonism, which provides a religious framework consistent with naturalism and supportive of human transformation. Mormon transhumanists are not limited to traditional or popular accounts of religion, and embrace opportunities and risks of technological evolution. Although usually considered secular, transhumanism has some religious origins and sometimes functions as religion. Accelerating change contextualizes a Mormon transhumanist narrative of common expectations, aspirations, and parallels between (...) Mormonism and transhumanism. Mormon transhumanism has produced secular arguments for faith in God and religious arguments for transhumanism. (shrink)

Some transhumanists argue that we must engage with theories and facts about our evolutionary past in order to promote future enhancements of the human body. At the same time, they call our attention to the flawed character of evolution and argue that there is a mismatch between adaptation to ancestral environments and contemporary life. One important trait of our evolutionary past which should not be ignored, and yet may hinder the continued perfection of humankind, is the peculiarly human way of (...) bearing and raising children. The suffering associated with childbirth and a long childhood have demanded trade-offs that have enhanced our species, leading to cooperation, creativity, intelligence and resilience. Behaviors such as mother–infant engagement, empathy, storytelling, and ritual have also helped to create what we value most in human beings. Therefore, the moral, cognitive, and emotional enhancements proposed by these transhumanists may be impaired by their partial appropriation of evolution, insofar as the bittersweet experience of parenthood is left aside. (shrink)

There are at least three dimensions to rights. We may have and lack freedom to 1) be, 2) do, and 3) have. These dimensions reformulate Locke’s categories, and are further complicated by placing them within the context of domains such as natural or civil rights. Here the question of the origins of rights is not addressed, but issues concerning how we may contextualize them are discussed. Within the framework developed, this paper makes use of Actor-Network Theory and Enlightenment values to (...) examine the multidimensionality and appropriateness of animal rights and human rights for posthumans. The core position here is that rights may be universal and constant, but they can only be accessed within a matrix of relative cultural dimensions. This will be true for posthumans, and their rights will be relative to human rights and dependent on human and posthuman responsibilities. (shrink)

The behavior/structure methodological dichotomy as locus of scientific inquiry is closely related to the issue of modeling and theory change in scientific explanation. Given that the traditional tension between structure and behavior in scientific modeling is likely here to stay, considering the relevant precedents in the history of ideas could help us better understand this theoretical struggle. This better understanding might open up unforeseen possibilities and new instantiations, particularly in what concerns the proposed technological modification of the human condition. The (...) sequential structure of this paper is twofold. The contribution of three philosophers better known in the humanities than in the study of science proper are laid out. The key theoretical notions interweaving the whole narrative are those of mechanization, constructability and simulation. They shall provide the conceptual bridge between these classical thinkers and the following section. Here, a panoramic view of three significant experimental approaches in contemporary scientific research is displayed, suggesting that their undisclosed ontological premises have deep roots in the Western tradition of the humanities. This ontological lock between core humanist ideals and late research in biology and nanoscience is ultimately suggested as responsible for pervasively altering what is canonically understood as “human”. (shrink)

In this article I discuss one of the most significant areas of bioethical interest, which is the problem of moral enhancement. Since I claim that the crucial issue in the current debate on human bioenhancement is the problem of agency, I bring out and examine the conditions of possibility of self-understanding, acting subjects attributing responsible authorship for their actions to themselves. I shall argue that the very idea of moral enhancement, properly understood, fails to justify the claims that enhancing the (...) “biological” factor that plays a part in the process of making moral choices, whether through biomedical or genetic interventions, will actually increase the probability of having “morally better future motives”. (shrink)

This study divides some of the philosophical anthropologies developed after the Holocaust into three frameworks. To do this the author shows how the present modern crisis is an anthropological one and unites the sum of the different crisis dimensions mankind is currently facing. The article approaches the postmodern journey from its two routes—the relativistic and the metaphysical. The second is presented as “status quo-oriented” or as a form of modernized democracy. Because of its popularity, the neologism “transhumanism” is here examined (...) togeth er with the hypothetical coming of a post-human era. This in turn is viewed as a revival of the illustrated myth of the happy world. The author first offers a “status quo” criticism “transhumanism” from the metaphysical anthropology viewpoint and then proposes an approach to a “third way, that is, the convergence of other anthropologies revolving around a person’s dignity born of his or her metaphysical roots together with a recovery of the value of human carnality. The article concludes by putting the different philosophers’ viewpoints face-to-face with the Person of Jesus Christ. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that an immortal existence could be desirable. Taking the accounts of Williams and Smuts under careful consideration, I agree with Fischer that an immortal existence could be gratifying. When Fischer argues that it is unfair for Williams to posit that an immortal life must have self-exhausting pleasures and, overall, a better experience than mortal life, he gets to the crux of the argument for immortality: as long as there are positive categorical desires for the individual, (...) then such life-affirming desires will provide an impetus to carry on. In moving past the Teiresias model of a phenomenon that retains memories while changing characters, I argue that a life of intellectual inquiry – which essentially alters the character of the individual while maintaining memories – offers an outward looking existence which provides internal pleasures. Accordingly, with the use of technology, computer simulations have the potential to provide pleasures and experiences that escape reality. In this sense, technology has the potential to supplement an immortal life. We cannot say whether there will be a pinnacle of such learning and pleasure which leads to decreasing returns, but it seems plausible that an immortal being who incorporates learning and pleasure that could potentially lead to innovation and discovery would seek to continue such intellectual inquiry and varied experiences until all learning potentials were exhausted. (shrink)

In his 1993 article ‘The Coming Technological Singularity: How to survive in the posthuman era’ the computer scientist Virnor Vinge speculated that developments in artificial intelligence might reach a point where improvements in machine intelligence result in smart AI’s producing ever-smarter AI’s. According to Vinge the ‘singularity’, as he called this threshold of recursive self-improvement, would be a ‘transcendental event’ transforming life on Earth in ways that unaugmented humans are not equipped to envisage. In this paper I argue Vinge’s idea (...) of a technologically led intelligence explosion is philosophically important because it requires us to consider the prospect of a posthuman condition succeeding the human one. What is the ‘humanity’ to which the posthuman is ‘post’? Does the possibility of a posthumanity presuppose that there is a ‘human essence’, or is there some other way of conceiving the human-posthuman difference? I argue that the difference should be conceived as a historically emergent disconnection between individuals, not in terms of the presence or lack of essential properties. I also suggest that these individuals should not be conceived in narrow biological terms but in ‘wide’ terms permitting biological, cultural and technological relations of descent between human and posthuman. Finally, I consider the ethical implications of this metaphysics of the posthuman. If, as I claim, the posthuman difference is not one between kinds but between individuals, we cannot specify its nature a priori but only a posteriori. Thus the only way to evaluate the posthuman condition would be to witness the emergence of posthumans. The implications of this are somewhat paradoxical. We are not currently in a position to evaluate the posthuman condition. Since there are no posthumans, the condition of posthumanity is not defined. However, posthumans could result from some iteration of our current technical activity, so we have an interest in understanding what they might be like. It follows that we have an interest in making or becoming posthumans. (shrink)

I survey four categories of factors that might give a digital mind, such as an upload or an artificial general intelligence, an advantage over humans. Hardware advantages include greater serial speeds and greater parallel speeds. Self-improvement advantages include improvement of algorithms, design of new mental modules, and modification of motivational system. Co-operative advantages include copyability, perfect co-operation, improved communication, and transfer of skills. Human handicaps include computational limitations and faulty heuristics, human-centric biases, and socially motivated cognition. The shape of hardware (...) growth curves, as well as the ease of modifying minds, are found to have a major impact on how quickly a digital mind may take advantage of these factors. (shrink)

This paper addresses five questions: First, what is trajectory of Western liberal ethics and politics in defining life, rights and citizenship? Second, how will neuro-remediation and other technologies change the definition of death for the brain injured and the cryonically suspended? Third, will people always have to be dead to be cryonically suspended? Fourth, how will changing technologies and definitions of identity affect the status of people revived from brain injury and cryonic suspension? I propose that Western liberal thought is (...) working towards a natural end, a “telos.” In response to a variety of biotechnologies, law and public opinion in liberal democracies will be forced to make explicit that the rights of a living thing are determined by its level of consciousness. I discuss the way that technology will force three clarifications about the value of consciousness, at the beginning, the end and boundaries of human life. Sentience and personhood will become the basis of moral concern, regardless of its media. Just as human rights have become independent of race, gender and property, rights will become independent of being a breathing human being. But even as we make this transition, the cryonically preserved are still likely to be considered dead for pragmatic reasons, albeit with gradually increasing rights as technology makes their reanimation increasingly probable. I suggest that it could be acceptable to cryonicists that the frozen continue to be defined as dead if assisted suicide can be legalized. Under a liberal assisted suicide policy cryonicists might be allowed to carry out suspension before a declaration of death, preserving the maximum amount of neural information. The gradual redefinition of life and personal identity in terms of psychological continuity will also have consequences for the legal status of the reanimated. If, due to information loss, the reanimated do not meet a threshold of psychological continuity, they may be considered new persons. Cryonicists may therefore wish to specify ahead of time whether they are still interested in being reanimated if pre-animation assessment suggests that the result will not meet the necessary threshold of continuity. Finally, I touch on the way that neural technology will fundamentally problematize the separate, autonomous self on which liberal democratic values are based, leading to a legal and political Singularity. It is this looming neural Singularity that makes the proposed liberal democratic telos a final stage in humanistic thought, before it is superceded by something radically different. (shrink)

I try to find a path from recent philosophy of technology to the fundamental issues of sustainability - issues that I do not consider to be ultimate questions, but hints at the question of wisdom in a technological age. Basically, human enhancement involves a technophilic stance and a tendency to transhumanism. In contrast, sustainability issues are usually characterized by a moderate technophobic stance and a classical humanistic trend. But I believe that a new global set of common values is forming (...) in both directions and I try to merge the two paths. (shrink)

Realization of permanent transformational transitions has brought to necessity to apprehend complex ontological issues of a new reality for development of a complex strategy for adequate opposition to challenges faced by the humanity. Understanding the role of education in the formation and development of a future human being ranks first among these issues. In this article I have analyzed modern directions of futuristic apprehension of a sense of transformational changes of a man (transhumanism, theory of androgyny), represented a key role (...) of the philosophy of education in development of an image of the future human being, and determined main characteristics of a personality of planetary-cosmic type, system of his personal, local and global interactions. (shrink)

To what extent can Nietzsche's idea of the Overman be used in connection with transhumanist notions of highly advanced humans and even posthumans?

A principal challenge facing the progressive bioethics project is the crafting of a consistent message on biopolitical issues that divide progressives. -/- The regulation of enhancement technologies is one of the issues central to this emerging biopolitics, pitting progressive defenders of enhancement, “technoprogressives,” against progressive critics. This essay [PDF] will argue that technoprogressive biopolitics express the consistent application of the core progressive values of the Enlightenment: the right of individuals to control their own bodies, brains and reproduction according to their (...) own conscience, under democratic states that work for the public good. -/- Insofar as left bioconservatives want to ensure the safety of therapies and their equitable distribution, these concerns can be addressed by thorough and independent regulation and a universal health care system, and a progressive bioethics of enhancement can unite both enthusiasts and skeptics. Insofar as bioconservative concerns are motivated by deeper hostility to the Enlightenment project however, by assertion of pre-modern reverence for human uniqueness for instance, then a common program is unlikely. -/- imageAfter briefly reviewing the political history and contemporary landscape of biopolitical debates about enhancement, the essay outlines three meta-policy contexts that will impact future biopolicy: the pressure to establish a universal, cost-effective health insurance system, the aging of industrial societies, and globalization. Technoprogressive appeals are outlined that can appeal to key constituencies, and build a majority coalition in support of progressive change. Finally, some guiding principles for a technoprogressive approach to biopolicy are offered. (shrink)

There exists a real dearth of literature available to Anglophones dealing with philosophical connections between transhumanism and Marxism. This is surprising, given the existence of works on just this relation in the other major European languages and the fact that 47 per cent of people surveyed in the 2007 Interests and Beliefs Survey of the Members of the World Transhumanist Association identified as “left,” though not strictly Marxist (Hughes 2008). Rather than seeking to explain this dearth here, I aim to (...) contribute to its being filled in by identifying three fundamental areas of similarity between transhumanism and Marxism. These are: the importance of material conditions, and particularly technological advancement, for revolution; conceptions of human nature; and conceptions of nature in general. While it is true that both Marxism and (especially) transhumanism are broad fields that encompass diverse positions, even working with somewhat generalized characterizations of the two reveals interesting parallels and dissimilarities fruitful for future work. -/- This comparison also shows that transhumanism and Marxism can learn important lessons from one another that are complementary to their respective projects. I suggest that Marxists can learn from transhumanists two lessons: that some “natural” forces may become reified forces and the extent to which the productive apparatus is now relevant to revolution. Transhumanists, on the other hand, can learn from Marxist theory the essentially social nature of the human being and the ramifications this has for the transformation of the human condition and for the forms of social organization compatible with transhumanist aims. Transhumanists can also benefit from considering the relevance of Marx’s theory of alienation to their goals of technological advancement. (shrink)

This dissertation discusses several ethical and moral issues which arise from the cryonics movement. Within each section, the question is posed: how does that problem impact on how we should think about cryonics? Is cryonics morally permissible and/or morally obligatory? Issues include a consideration of economic resource allocation, bodily ownership and identity.

Comic book superheroes tend to be conservative and their opponents progressive. Here I explore the reasons for heroic conservatism, review recent disruptions to the trend, and consider what superhuman politics can tell us about our own transhuman and science fictional conditions.

A stream in transhumanism argues that the aims of Buddhism and transhumanists are akin. It is the case that transhumanism contains religious tropes, and its parallels to Christianity are readily apparent. It does not share much, however, with Buddhism’s Zen tradition. Zen tends to focus its practitioners on becoming fully present and human, not on becoming transcendent, super-powered, or posthuman. This paper explores some of the tensions between transhumanism and Buddhism through the lens of Zen, and suggests that transhumanist Buddhists (...) should be careful not to conflate moments of spiritual enlightenment with permanent techno-social transcendence. (shrink)

Zwolennicy transhumanizmu upatrują przyszłego podmiotu wiedzy w maszynach, które miałyby być inteligentniejsze od ludzi, ich twórców. Jeżeli raz zaistniałaby taka możliwość stworzenia inteligentniejszych podmiotów, to w kolejnym kroku maszyny inteligentniejsze od ludzi stworzą następne pokolenie maszyn bardziej inteligentne od samych siebie. To zapoczątkuje dalsze etapy procesu gwałtownego wzrostu inteligencji aż do osiągnięcia stanu osobliwości (ang. singularity). W niniejszym tekście omówione są wątpliwości dotyczące drugiego z kluczowych stwierdzeń uzasadniających transhumanistyczną tezę o osobliwości, a mianowicie gwałtownego wzrostu inteligencji. Te wątpliwości dotyczą możliwości (...) replikowalności wiedzy danego podmiotu poznawczego jako warunku gwałtownego wzrostu. Inspiracją tych wątpliwości jest program epistemologiczny, który mógłby wydawać się wzorcowym protoplastą programu transhumanizmu, a mianowicie program epistemologiczny R. Carnapa, którego ucieleśnieniem jest tzw. robot Carnapa. W ujęciu synchronicznym zasadniczo taka replikowalność ograniczałaby się wyłącznie do strukturalnych własności wiedzy, co nie daje wystarczającej podstawy do stwierdzenia gwałtownego wzrostu. W ujęciu diachronicznym, możliwości dynamicznego zwiększania zasobów wiedzy robota Carnapa są w sposób nieusuwalny uwarunkowane przyjętymi subiektywnie schematami, a wybór pomiędzy nimi dokonuje się pragmatycznie. W tym przypadku stawianie pytania o wzrost jest bezpodstawne. (shrink)

This paper examines the responses to advanced and transformative technologies in military literature, attenuates the conclusions of earlier work suggesting that there is an “ignorance of transhumanism” in the military, and updates the current layout of transhuman concerns in military thought. The military is not ignorant of transhuman issues and implications, though there was evidence for this in the past; militaries and non-state actors (including terrorists) increasingly use disruptive technologies with what we may call transhuman provenance.