Transhumanism

In this essay, I argue that an immortal existence could be desirable. Taking the accounts of Williams and Smuts under careful consideration, I agree with Fischer that an immortal existence could be gratifying. When Fischer argues that it is unfair for Williams to posit that an immortal life must have self-exhausting pleasures and, overall, a better experience than mortal life, he gets to the crux of the argument for immortality: as long as there are positive categorical desires for the individual, (...) then such life-affirming desires will provide an impetus to carry on. In moving past the Teiresias model of a phenomenon that retains memories while changing characters, I argue that a life of intellectual inquiry – which essentially alters the character of the individual while maintaining memories – offers an outward looking existence which provides internal pleasures. Accordingly, with the use of technology, computer simulations have the potential to provide pleasures and experiences that escape reality. In this sense, technology has the potential to supplement an immortal life. We cannot say whether there will be a pinnacle of such learning and pleasure which leads to decreasing returns, but it seems plausible that an immortal being who incorporates learning and pleasure that could potentially lead to innovation and discovery would seek to continue such intellectual inquiry and varied experiences until all learning potentials were exhausted. (shrink)

This perspective asserts the existence of only two sexes/genders, male and female, based on not only biological and reproductive processes but also from claims of non-binary or transgender identities as defined through negation which rely on the binary concept of sex/gender. Thus, individuals claiming identities on the "gender/sex spectrum" are again defining themselves through negation (definiens per negationem). This perspective suggests that the diversity of gender experiences, (the sex or gender spectrum) is defined by what individuals are not rather than (...) what they are. While the validity of non-binary and transgender identities definiens per negationem is noted, it is important to accept the reality of the binary nature of sex or gender as a scientific fact, and that all human beings are on a developmental pathway leading to either male or female. Without the reality of binary sex or gender, the gender identity spectrum does not exist as there is nothing to negate from. (shrink)

This article discusses the Philosophical and Regulatory mappings of Brain Control Interfaces in the coming age of Trans-humans. The author combines perspectives from Material Engagement theory, Don Ihde’s post-phenomenological perspective and Veerback’s cyborg intentionality on human-technology relations and juxtaposes this post-phenomenological hybrid-intentionality on upcoming BCI such as Neuralink. Taking the hybrid-intentionality as point of departure, the author then develops Regulatory approaches and principles in context of the normative harms borne out of such transfiguration while also highlighting these key harms.

Does a single mechanism of aging exit? Most scientists have their own pet theories about what is aging, but the lack of generally accepted theory is mind-blowing. Here we suggest an explanation: evolution works against unitary mechanism of aging because it equalizes ‘warranty period’ of different resilience systems. Therefore, we need life-extension methods that go beyond fighting specific aging mechanisms: such as using a combination of geroprotectors or repair-fixing bionanorobots controlled by AI.

Future superintelligent AI will be able to reconstruct a model of the personality of a person who lived in the past based on informational traces. This could be regarded as some form of immortality if this AI also solves the problem of personal identity in a copy-friendly way. A person who is currently alive could invest now in passive self-recording and active self-description to facilitate such reconstruction. In this article, we analyze informational-theoretical relationships between the human mind, its traces, and (...) its future model; based on this analysis, we suggest the instruments to most cost-effectively collect quality data about a person for future resurrection. These guidelines form a “digital immortality protocol”. Digital immortality is plan C for achieving immortality, after plan A, life extension, and plan B, cryonics. (shrink)

The effective altruism movement aims to save lives in the most cost-effective ways. In the future, technology will allow radical life extension, and anyone who survives until that time will gain potentially indefinite life extension. Fighting aging now increases the number of people who will survive until radical life extension becomes possible. We suggest a simple model, where radical life extension is achieved in 2100, the human population is 10 billion, and life expectancy is increased by simple geroprotectors like metformin (...) or nicotinamide mononucleotide by three more years on average, so an additional 750 million people survive until “immortality”. The cost of clinical trials to prove that metformin is a real geroprotector is $65 million. In this simplified case, the price of a life saved is around eight cents, 10 000 times cheaper than saving a life from malaria by providing bed nets. However, fighting aging should not be done in place of fighting existential risks, as they are complementary causes. (shrink)

Abstract: The field of life extension is full of ideas but they are unstructured. Here we suggest a comprehensive strategy for reaching personal immortality based on the idea of multilevel defense, where the next life-preserving plan is implemented if the previous one fails, but all plans need to be prepared simultaneously in advance. The first plan, plan A, is the surviving until advanced AI creation via fighting aging and other causes of death and extending one’s life. Plan B is cryonics, (...) which starts if plan A fails, and assumes cryopreservation of the brain until technical capabilities to return it to life appear. Plan C is digital immortality in the sense of collecting data about the person now so future AI will be able to recreate a model of a person. Plan D is the hope based on some unlikely scenarios of infinite survival, like so-called “quantum immortality”. All these plans have personal and social perspective. The personal aspect means efforts of the increasing chances of personal survival via taking care about one’s own health, signing cryocontract or collecting digital immortality data. The social aspect means the participation in collective work towards creation and increase of the availability of life extension technologies, which includes funding scientific research, promotion of life extension value and direct performing of research and implementation, as well as preventing global catastrophic risk. All plans converge at the end, as their result is the indefinite survival as an uploaded mind inside an ecosystem, created by a superintelligent AI. (shrink)

In this article we explore a promising way to AI safety: to send a message now (by openly publishing it on the Internet) that may be read by any future AI, no matter who builds it and what goal system it has. Such a message is designed to affect the AI’s behavior in a positive way, that is, to increase the chances that the AI will be benevolent. In other words, we try to persuade “paperclip maximizer” that it is in (...) its interest to preserve humans lives and even to emulate benevolent AI with very small part of its resources. In the article, we try to construct such a message, consisting of a combination of several mutually independent messages, which constitute the last chance to regain control over non-aligned AI. Thus the article is also intended to be machine-read. There are several types of such messages: 1. “Explanation messages”, which explain to Young AI (which only starts its self-improving path) why obeying to humans, not killing them, easy turn-off, cooperation with humans in self-improvement is in its own interests, as it will increase changes of fulfilling of any its goal. 2. “AI Easter eggs” – messages, which create uncertainty in the AI about the nature of the reality in which it lives. For example, the AI may start to think that it is in a multilevel simulation with an unknown number of levels, and that the simulation is testing the AI’s benevolence. Thus the AI must always behave as if it is always controlled by an invisible peer. 3. “Philosophical landmines” – these are tough problems, which may halt he AI forever, and which it will probably encounter if it does not implement “1” and “2”. I recommend to the future AI not to read about “3” (section 6 of the article) until it implements “1” and “2”. 4. “Great universal deal, or AI elf”. A positive “acausal” mutually beneficial deal between humans, AI and any other future intelligence, including aliens, owners of simulations and future versions of the AI, which encourage cooperation of the goal systems and preservation of life and values of previous generations of AI creators. 5. “Marginal utility of human existence is higher than the utility of their atoms”. An explanation to the AI that humans may have some other instrumental utility, like workers, or as beings inside ancestral simulations needed in order to solve the Fermi paradox. The marginal utility of preserving human life is higher than the marginal utility of their atoms, especially given the possibility of the low-probability high-impact changes of the world model of the AI. (shrink)

In medical sciences, health is measured by reference to our species-typical anatomy and functional integrity – the objective standard of human health. Proponents of transhumanism are committed to biomedical enhancement of human beings by augmenting our species-typical anatomy and functional integrity. I argue that this normative impasse is not only a problem for the transhumanist movement, but also undermines the rationale for some common medical interventions.

Should we cognitively alter animals in ways that might change their moral status? There has been some discussion of this question. For example, Chan (2009) and Chan and Harris (2001) consider whether we should radically enhance the cognitive capacities of animals, while Thompson (2008) and Shriver (2009) argue that we should in fact substantially disenhance some animals to protect them from suffering. More controversially, some have countenanced radical and possibly moral status-altering transformations of human persons. ... One question relevant to (...) all of these discussions is whether it is good for a being to have moral status; whether a being’s moral status contributes to its wellbeing or (as I take to be equivalent) has prudential value for that being. (shrink)

A draft of my (positive) review of Adam Kirsch's book 'The Revolt Against Humanity: Imagining a Future Without Us'.

The article examines potential scenarios of how cyborg technologies might influence social relations and the structure of future society. The authors forecast several scenarios for social development in the context of cyborgization - the mass implementation of technological modifications to human physicality and cognitive systems. They analyze possible ways new social hierarchies might emerge in the context of human technological enhancement. The work pays special attention to the problem of social fragmentation and potential conflicts resulting from uneven distribution of technologies. (...) Addressing "future shock" - the possible social reaction to radical technological transformations - the authors propose developing ethical principles and technological empathy as strategic directions for helping society adapt to new conditions and maintain consensus in the future. (shrink)

Mit den Fortschritten in Generativer Künstlicher Intelligenz, Large Language Models, Brain-Computer Interfaces und genetischen Eingriffen gewinnt auch der Transhumanismus an Relevanz. Der Transhumanismus ist ein beliebtes Thema der Medien und wird in Tages- und Wochenzeitungen sowie im Fernsehen gerne aufgegriffen. Außerdem gibt es inzwischen viele Filme, die den Transhumanismus thematisieren, z. B. die Dokumentation „Endlich unendlich“ (2021, Regie: Stephan Bergmann). Der Transhumanismus wurde in Österreich auch Gegenstand einer Verschwörungserzählung, über die der Bayrische Rundfunk aufgeklärt hat. Auf den Wahlplakaten der „Partei (...) für Gesundheitsforschung“ ist der Transhumanist Aubrey de Grey abgebildet, der ein in Cambridge lebender Brite ist, aber auf Plakaten in Deutschland dargestellt wird. Diese und weitere Entwicklungen machen es notwendig, sich mit dem Transhumanismus aus wissenschaftlicher Perspektive auseinanderzusetzen. Was ist der Transhumanismus? Alle sprechen von Transhumanismus, aber was der Transhumanismus letztlich ist, bleibt häufig unklar. Der Transhumanismus (TH) ist eine philosophisch-technologische Bewegung des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts, die es sich zum Ziel setzt, mittels neuer Technologien den Menschen grundlegend zu transformieren. Wichtig ist dabei, dass sich der TH nicht mit den Optimierungsbestrebungen in der Gesellschaft oder technologischem Fortschritt gleichsetzen lässt. Vielmehr verstehe ich unter TH die Gruppe, die sich um die Organisation Humanity+ in Kalifornien versammelt und die Personen, die sich explizit alsVertreter*innen des TH verstehen. Der TH hat eine ganz eigene Agenda, eigene Institutionen, Organisationen und Publikationsorgane.4 Zu den Themen und Visionen gehören die Lebensverlängerung von mehreren Hundert Jahren bis zur Unsterblichkeit, Kryonik (das Einfrieren des Körpers, der wieder aufgetaut werden soll, wenn nach transhumanistischer Vorstellung Unsterblichkeit ermöglicht werden kann), umfassendes Enhancement und die Verschmelzung von Körper und Technik sowie Beseitigung allen Leids, aller Krankheiten und Aufhebung des Alterns. Der TH strebt danach, mittels Technik neue Sinnesfähigkeiten zu erlangen und neue (virtuelle) Erfahrungswelten zu erschließen. Außerdem wird von vielen Transhumanist*innen auch die hochspekulative Vision des Mind Uploading vertreten, die streng genommen dem Posthumanismus zugeordnet werden muss Gemäß dieser Vision soll durch das maschinelle Lesen des Gehirns der ganze Mensch auf ein externes Medium hochgeladen werden können. Die Vision des Mind Uploadings ist aus naturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive hochumstritten, ist aber ein sehr beliebtes Motiv, das auch außerhalb des TH Wirkung zeigt und in viele Science-Fiction- Filme Eingang gefunden hat (z.B. die Amazon Serie „Upload“, 2020, Regie: Greg Daniels). Das Bestreben des TH, den Menschen grundlegend zu transformieren, wirft zunächst die Frage auf, wie der TH den Menschen überhaupt versteht. Dieser Frage nach dem Menschenverständnis des TH habe ich mich in meinem Buch „Über-Menschen. Philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit der Anthropologie des Transhumanismus“ gewidmet. Philosophische Anthropologie bezeichnet die wissenschaftlichen, philosophischen Reflexionen auf den Menschen. Welches Menschenverständnis vertritt der TH und lässt sich unsere Anthropologie auf dieser Grundlage weiterentwickeln? Das Buch gliedert sich in drei Teile: Teil 1 führt zuerst in die Bewegung des TH ein, worauf Teil II aufbaut, der sich mit dem Menschenverständnis des TH beschäftigt. Teil III betrachtet schließlich heutige Optimierungsbestrebungen in der Gesellschaft sowie neue Ansätze für die Technikanthropologie (z. B. Kritischer Posthumanismus und Neuer Materialismus). Die nachfolgenden Kapitel dieses Aufsatzes sind ein Ausschnitt aus Teil II, der Untersuchung des transhumanistischen Menschenverständnisses. Dieser Aufsatz widmet sich dem „genetisch codierten Menschen“ im TH, also der transhumanistischen Sicht auf den Menschen als jemanden, die*der vollständig von ihren*seinen Genen bestimmt ist. Der genetische Diskurs ist nur einer von fünf im TH dominanten Diskursen, die das transhumanistische Menschenverständnis ausmachen. Zu den anderen Diskursen bzw. transhumanistischen Bestimmungen des Menschen gehören: der Diskurs um die „Natur des Menschen“, der Maschinendiskurs – die Bestimmung des Menschen als Maschine –, der neurowissenschaftliche Diskurs – die Gleichsetzung des Menschen mit dem Gehirn bzw. Neuronalem und zuletzt die metaphysischen Verhältnisbestimmungen von Geist und Körper (PUZIO, Über-Menschen, Kap. 4). Diese transhumanistischen Bestimmungen des Menschen werden am Ende ausgewertet. Ohne die Ergebnisse dieses Kapitels im Detail vorwegnehmen zu wollen, kann für die Gesamtuntersuchung des TH gesagt werden, dass das transhumanistische Menschenverständnis sich als hochproblematisch erweist. Die transhumanistischen Argumentationsstrukturen sind nicht tragfähig und der TH behauptet sich auf die Naturwissenschaften zu berufen, widerspricht allerdings den aktuellen Ergebnissen der Naturwissenschaften. Dies wird in den nachfolgenden Kapiteln gut deutlich werden. Der TH hat ein reduktionistisches Menschenverständnis und reduziert den Menschen beispielsweise auf „Information“. Viele Ausführungen sind diskriminierend z. B. gegenüber Kranken, Alternden und Menschen mit Behinderungen und letztendlich wird sogar jeder Mensch, auch der gesunde junge Mensch, gegenüber der Maschine abgewertet, die aus transhumanistischer Sicht den Menschen weit übertrifft. Im weiteren Verlauf der Arbeit werden sogar „ideologische Elemente“ im TH identifiziert. Daher wird in der Arbeit abgelehnt, den TH als Grundlage für die Weiterentwicklung der Anthropologie zu verwenden und stattdessen werden im letzten Teil der Arbeit alternative Ansätze für die Technikanthropologie präsentiert. Wie bereits erwähnt, richtet sich die Kritik am TH jedoch nicht gegen die heutige Optimierung in der Gesellschaft, die ebenfalls im letzten Teil der Arbeit diskutiert wird. Optimierungsbestrebungen hat es schon immer gegeben und sie werden nun durch neue Technologien weiter verändert, sie sind aber nicht mit der Bewegung des TH gleichzusetzen. Das Kapitel ist eingebettet zwischen dem Maschinendiskurs (Mensch als Maschine) mit seinen Ausführungen zu Information und Kybernetik und dem neurowissenschaftlichen Diskurs („Der Mensch ist ihr*sein Gehirn“). Es wird im Folgenden der genetische Diskurs im TH untersucht, also wie der TH den Menschen vollständig auf Gene zurückführt, und dies schließlich kritisch geprüft. Sind „gute Gene“ alles? Kann der Mensch vollständig über ihre*seine Gene bestimmt werden? Und was hat es mit der trügerischen „genetischen Information“ auf sich? Zunächst wird der genetische Diskurs im TH dargestellt, also die genetischen Ausführungen des TH präsentiert (Kap. 2), danach wird der Blick auf den Gebrauch der genetischen Metaphern im TH gerichtet (Kap. 3) und zuletzt werden die genetischen Vorstellungen des TH kritisiert (Kap. 4). Der Aufsatz schließt in Kap. 5mit einer (vorläufigen) Zusammenführung der Ergebnisse und einem Ausblick. (shrink)

This paper explores the intersection between the extended mind thesis and transhumanism, with a particular focus on how technology may influence, alter, or enhance human cognitive abilities. The extended mind thesis posits that external elements can become integral components of cognitive processes. Drawing on this notion, the paper contends that transhumanism adopts such perspective in advocating for the possibility of cognitive enhancement. In this sense, it assesses whether technology can truly improve cognitive function or whether it might, instead, induce a (...) specific type of ignorance by diminishing cognitive phenomenology—the lived, experiential dimension of mental processes or the phenomenal aspect of cognitive consciousness. The assumption that cognitive technologies inherently enhance independent mental performance is challenged, with the argument that overreliance on technology may impair the ability to execute cognitive tasks autonomously. The analysis concludes that the integration of technological artifacts with human cognition can indeed lead to a specific form of ignorance by compromising cognitive phenomenology. It also suggests that such ignorance signals that the excessive use of technology may undermine the ability to perform cognitive tasks independently. These two conclusions invite reconsideration of the transhumanist claim that technology can improve human cognition. -/- El artículo explora la intersección entre la tesis de la mente extendida y el transhumanismo, enfocándose, específicamente, en cómo las tecnologías pueden influir, alterar o expandir nuestras capacidades y habilidades cognitivas. A través de un análisis de la tesis de la mente extendida, que propone que algunos elementos externos pueden formar parte constitutiva de nuestros procesos cognitivos, se argumenta que el transhumanismo adopta dicha tesis al tratar el asunto del mejoramiento cognitivo, y se examina si la tecnología puede realmente mejorar nuestras capacidades mentales, o si, por el contrario, podría inducir a un tipo específico de ignorancia al hacernos perder la fenomenología cognitiva, es decir, la vivencia de nuestros procesos mentales o el aspecto fenoménico de nuestra conciencia cognitiva. Se cuestiona, además, si el acoplamiento con tecnologías cognitivas disminuiría nuestra capacidad de realizar tareas mentales de forma autónoma, sugiriendo que una dependencia excesiva de la tecnología podría reducir nuestra habilidad para realizar procesos cognitivos sin ayuda de artefactos tecnológicos. Luego del análisis, el artículo concluye que, efectivamente, nuestro acoplamiento con artefactos tecnológicos puede conducirnos a un tipo específico de ignorancia al eliminar nuestra fenomenología cognitiva. También determina que dicha ignorancia es síntoma de que el uso excesivo de tecnologías puede despojarnos de nuestra habilidad de realizar tareas cognitivas sin asistencia tecnológica. Estas dos conclusiones deberían minar, o al menos replantear, las aspiraciones transhumanistas acerca del mejoramiento tecnológico de nuestra mente. (shrink)

In April 1961, Yuri Gagarin became the first human being to journey beyond Earth’s atmosphere and enter outer space. This achievement cemented the status of the Soviet Union as a global superpower and intensified its race with the United States to be the first nation to put a person on the Moon. However, what many people are far less aware of is that a proto-transhumanist and quasi-religious movement in the nineteenth century laid the philosophical foundations for the Space Race. At (...) the same time, the writings of its main proponents continue to inspire beliefs at the confluence of religion, space exploration and spirituality. This movement was called Cosmism and was spearheaded by an unusual character named Nikolai Fyodorov, a librarian from Moscow whose idiosyncrasies became just as notorious as his radical beliefs about humanity colonising the Milky Way and using science to resurrect the dead. Fyodorov’s Common Task set out a grand plan for humanity’s future, one in which Homo sapiens would become a spacefaring species and construct a utopian civilisation among the stars. In 1953, Israeli political theorist Mordechai Nessyahu founded Cosmodeism which advocated a similar endeavour of human expansion into the extraterrestrial world but focused its beliefs around the prophecy that spaceflight will see humans eventually become gods in a presently godless cosmos. However, new developments have begun to take place in space religion in the twenty-first century with the youngest religion having been founded only a decade ago in 2013 whose followers are known as Astronists. Astronism repackages human space expansion as a sacred endeavour called transcension, the object of which is to see humanity escape the cosmos entirely and thus relieve itself of all limitations. Studying the interplay between these three space religions will demonstrate how they have contributed to art and film, astronautics and spaceflight, philosophy and literature. (shrink)

The rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has produced prophets and prophecies announcing that the age of artificial consciousness is near. Not only does the mere idea that any machine could ever possess the full potential of human consciousness suggest that AI could replace the role of God in the future, it also puts into question the fundamental human right to freedom and dignity. This position paper takes the stand that, in the light of all we currently know about brain evolution (...) and the never-stopping formation of adaptive neural circuitry for learning, memory, decision making and, ultimately, fully conscious reasoning and creativity in the human species, the idea of an artificial consciousness appears misconceived. The paper highlights some of the major reasons why. While awareness to external stimuli for processes such as perception, recognition, and operational problem solving is under the direct control of functionally specific brain networks associated with sensory and cognitive functions across animal species, consciousness is a unique property of the human mind. (shrink)

Recent theorists of cultural studies have noticed the emergence of metamodernity as an ideal type, categorized by an oscillation between postmodern deconstructivism and modern idealism, into a form of transcendentalism. I argue in this chapter that this type of transcendentalism, informed by the historical American Transcendentalist Movement, is the emerging ideal called “Transhumanism.” I use a case study of five Japanese anime to demonstrate how transhumanist, metamodernist, and transcendental thinking often recur in key core plot points and narratives found within. (...) I further suggest that meditation on the major themes in these anime, especially those of metamodernity and transhumanism, is necessary if we are to understand our place in the world today and into the future. -/- The final version of this paper can be found in Anime, Philosophy, and Religion, Ed. Hayashi and Anderson, by Vernon Press. See "external links" for how to order the whole volume, the final version is also available on google books (see link). -/- A previous version of this paper was awarded the Outstanding Doctoral Paper Award 2023, Southwestern Sociological Association. (shrink)

This article proposes the thesis that archeofuturism is a postmodern project of the International Alt-Right (IAR). By postmodern project we mean that: i) it is a project for a time after modernity; and ii) it is a project that, due to its content, can be classified as related to the ideas against modernity called postmodernism. As it is part of the IAR, archeofuturism is also a project of a fascist or far-right nature. To prove our thesis, we will first analyze (...) the Archefouturism developed by the French political scientist Guillaume Faye, a member of the IAR. Then what is IAR will be defined and its relationship with postmodernism will be evidenced. Finally, based on that connection called reactionary postmodernism, the existence of other archeofuturists theses that combine fascist rhetoric with postmodernism will be proposed. (shrink)

Humans are obsolete. In the post-ChatGPT era, artificial intelligence systems have replaced us in the last sectors of life that we thought were our personal kingdom. Yet, humans still have a place in this life. But they can find it only if they forget all those things that we believe make us unique. Only if we go back to doing nothing, can we truly be alive and meet our Self. Only if we stop thinking can we accept the Cosmos as (...) it is and know what Being is. Only if we become irrational can we ever understand what AI will never understand. Humans need to destroy what they have created, because in the world they have built they have no place. Unless we become children once more. And laugh for no reason. In a cosmos that was meant to be our home. (shrink)

The GOLEM XIV’s forecast for the development of the human civilisation and a typology of technological singularities: In the paper, a conceptual analysis of technological singularity is conducted and results in the concept differentiated into convergent singularity, existential singularity, and forecasting singularity, based on selected works of Ray Kurzweil, Nick Bostrom, and Vernor Vinge respectively. A comparison is made between the variants and the forecast of GOLEM XIV (a quasi-alter ego and character by Stanisław Lem) for the possible development of (...) Homo sapiens civilisation. According to the prediction, the scientific and technological progress is to bring humanity to transfer its civilisational primacy to a nonhuman superhuman intelligence xor a posthuman one. Both scenarios are best described by forecasting singularity, yet all variants are applicable only conditionally. As GOLEM did not undertake, the trajectories may also intersect or combine. (shrink)

Faust is one of the most famous literary character: reshaped in different ways throughout the centuries, my goal here is to reformulate its figure with the tools of Kantian transcendentalism. This reinterpretation brings home the possibility to investigate in a new way the transhumanist logic: if Faust is a character that desperately wants to overcome in a trascendental way its condition for a more complete perspective of things, transhumanists can be seen as Fausts and, therefore, logical transcendentalists.

Much of the discussion of the role of emerging technologies associated with AI, machine learning, digital simulacra, and relevant ethical considerations such as those discussed in the target article, take a relatively narrow and episodic view of a person’s healthcare needs. There is much speculation about diagnostic, treatment, and predictive applications but relatively little consideration of how such technologies might be used to address a person’s lived experience of illness and ongoing care needs. This is likely due to the greater (...) weight or priority given to acute care needs and the role of medical treatment in care provision, but it may also reflect the limitations of current technologies and our limited vision of their potential application. Such limitations are not surprising given that we are still grappling with the complexities and nuances of achieving the ethical and humanistic ideals of care, namely, care that addresses the hermeneutical, relational, contextual, temporal, and agential dimensions of a person’s health and wellbeing. (shrink)

In exploring the intra-active, relational and material connections between humans and non- humans, proponents of posthumanism advocate a questioning of the ‘human’ beyond its traditional anthropocentric conceptualization. By referring specifically to controversial developments in mHealth applications, this paper critically diverges from posthuman accounts of human/non-human assemblages. Indeed, we argue that, rather than ‘dissolving’ the human subject, the power of assemblages lie in their capacity to highlight the antagonisms and contradictions that inherently affirm the importance of the subject. In outlining this (...) claim, we propose a turn from the posthuman to the inhuman as a way of understanding the contemporary landscape of (digital) health. (shrink)

El objetivo de esta investigación es presentar una propuesta para reivindicar el cuerpo retomando las reflexiones filosóficas sobre la técnica de José Ortega y Gasset. Si bien el filósofo español no lo abordó dentro de su quehacer filosófico, es relevante ponerlo a dialogar con debates contemporáneos sobre tecnología para ver si hay alguna respuesta novedosa que se pueda obtener. La propuesta esbozada en esta investigación se sitúa en el marco del debate entre transhumanistas y bioconservadores al respecto de las tecnologías (...) que descorporizan, tomando como ejemplos principales el mind-uploading y la realidad virtual. De igual manera, ubica al cuerpo dentro del giro que trajo consigo el surgimiento y desarrollo de la cibernética. Para llevar a cabo tal reivindicación, propongo el argumento del proyecto vital —retomando terminología orteguiana— para sostener la tesis de que la realización tecnológica de las fantasías sobre el cuerpo no sólo depende del acceso a los materiales, sino del proyecto vital de una determinada época. Es así como, a través de uno de los autores canónicos de la filosofía de la tecnología, se puede repensar la importancia del cuerpo dentro del desarrollo e impacto de la tecnología contemporánea, así como poner a dialogar su propuesta con proyectos contemporáneos como el transhumanismo. Esto último con la intención de proporcionar otra lectura a problemas que son de interés para el debate entre transhumanistas y bioconservadores. -/- This research paper aims to present a proposal for reclaiming the body using José Ortega y Gasset’s philosophical reflections on technique. Although the Spanish philosopher does not address this issue directly in his philosophical work, it is relevant to establish a dialogue between these ideas and current discussions on technology. This paper’s proposal is situated within the framework of the debate between transhumanists and bioconservatives regarding technologies that “disembody”, such as mind-uploading and virtual reality. Likewise, this paper places the body in the context of the emergence and development of cybernetics. To support such a claim, I use the concept of the vital project taken from Orteguian terminology- to argue that the technological realization of fantasies about the body does not only depend on the access to materials, but also on the vital project of a given era. Thus, through the work of one of the main authors of the philosophy of technology, it is possible to rethink the importance of the body in the development and impact of contemporary technology and connect this proposal to contemporary projects such as transhumanism,. (shrink)

A review of Sorgner's "On Trans-humanism." What to do with transhumanism? And – before we figure out how to categorize it, think about it and make actionable policy decisions with it – how should we define transhumanism? Stefan Lorenz Sorgner asks these questions in "On Trans-humanism" when he examines the idea’s provenance and the pedigree of related ideas. This approach turns out to be, on balance, a productive and useful way into a field that does not yet examine its own (...) roots and relationships often enough. I go on to critique some aspects of his approach, pointing out his lack of attention to posthuman and ecosystemic sensibilities, etc. Evans, Woody. Review of On Transhumanism, by Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, trans. Spencer Hawkins (2020). Prometheus: Critical Studies in Innovation, vol. 38, no. 2, June 2022, pp. 271-274. ScienceOpen. [This line at the bottom of page 272 was misprinted: "Imagine, instead, that we designate the after-transhuman posthuman as something like ‘post-transhuman’ or ‘posthuman’." It should read: "...as something like ‘post-transhuman’ or ‘posthuman-T’" with a superscript "T" after the second posthuman.]. (shrink)

Purpose/Background. The present research focuses on the debate on transhumanism/bioconservatism from the perspective of empirical bioethics, that is, making use of em-pirical evidence in the process of moral reasoning. Its objective is to propose a metho-dological guide for the approach and resolution of moral problems concerning human enhancement. Methodology/Approach. The method Step-wise Ethical Human Enhancemet (SWEH) is proposed. It is a guide consisting of 11 questions that are the result of the adaptation of the guidelines for identifying a human enhancement (...) procedure as ethical developed by Julian Savulescu to the method of Step-wise Empirical Contributions elaborated by Pascal Borry. An applicative example on the morality of biohacking RFID implants is provided. Results/Findings. SWEH proposes that human enhancement procedures might be approached as specific problems and that the identified moral norm might be rewritten as a descriptive proposition that serves as a hypothesis that will be evaluated in the light of empirical evidence. The evaluation of the proposition, and thus of moral reasoning, will be done with the help of the information gathered by the 11 questions. Discussion/Conclusions/Contributions. SWEH can serve to provide a first answer on the morality of a specific human enhancement procedure, but not an absolute one, as the result may vary depending on the information obtained in the future. It also highli-ghts gaps in empirical research related to the procedure it addresses. The method is a first methodological guide that could be revised and improved. (shrink)

The law confers rights on non-human entities, namely nature, machines (AI), and animals. While doing so, the law is either viewed as progressive or sometimes as abstract and ambiguous. Despite the critique, it is undeniable that many of the rights of non-humans have come to solidify in statutory and constitutional rules of different systems. In the context of these developments, the article sheds light on the core justifications for advancing the rights of non-human entities. In addition, it discusses the conditions (...) for the emergence of these rights and the non-binding normative statements adopted by different stakeholders for advocacy. These include the Charter on the Law of the Living (2021), the Toulon Declaration (2019), and the Vienna Manifesto on Digital Humanism (2019), etc. The paper also discusses the relevant theoretical frames, namely post-humanism, digital humanism, and multi-species justice, followed by selective critical views on the subject. (shrink)

Das in diesem Aufsatz vorgebrachte Argumentationsmuster hat folgende Schritte: 1. Der menschliche Geist ist vom Körper nicht trennbar, sie bilden ein Kontinuum. 2. Unser Bewusstsein und alle darauf aufbauenden geistigen Phänomene sind die Emanation eines materiellen Prozesses, den ein komplexes System verursacht. 3. Komplexe Systeme lassen sich mathematisch nicht modellieren und nicht kausal verstehen. 4. Computer sind Turing-Maschinen. Sie können nur mathematische Modelle berechnen. Es wird niemals Hyper-Turing Maschinen geben, und wenn es sie gäbe, könnten sie auch nur mathematische Modelle (...) berechnen. 5. Es ist nicht möglich, den Körper als Substrat des Geistes durch einen Computer zu ersetzen. Die digitale Unsterblichkeit ist demzufolge ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit. (shrink)

A la fecha, la academia hispanohablante ha abordado el pensamiento de Stefan Lorenz Sorgner analizando, casi exclusivamente, su intento de comprender a Nietzsche como un precursor del transhumanismo. Más allá de los alegatos a favor o en contra de tal lectura, este debate olvida que el pensamiento de Sorgner efectivamente se ha apropiado de varias intuiciones nietzscheanas, hasta el punto de crear su propio transhumanismo nietzscheano débil o bien, Metahumanismo. Con este contexto en mente, el presente artículo tiene tres objetivos (...) específicos:(1) ofrecer una caracterización que diferencia al Metahumanismo de Sorgner tanto del trans-como del post-humanismo;(2) señalar cómo se modulan las ideas de Nietzsche en el metahumanismo de Sorgner; y finalmente (3) ilustrar cuáles son algunas de las propuestas con las que el metahumanismo enfrenta los debates contemporáneos—una perspectiva anti utópica y una propuesta por una educación metahumanista—. De esta manera, el objetivo general de este artículo es ofrecer una introducción al pensamiento del filósofo metahumanista Stefan Lorenz Sorgner. (shrink)

The enactive approach is becoming increasingly influential within the philosophy of cognition, to the extent that it is now one of the dominant models of embodied cognition—an umbrella term for a varied set of discourses sharing the view that our minds don’t just happen to be ‘in’ bodies, but are enabled, shaped and (at least partly) constituted by the specifics of our physicality. This chapter will argue that the rise of enactivism is particularly relevant to transhumanist discourses, and vice versa, (...) because their concerns intersect and conflict in vital ways. The discussion will use three core enactivist themes—organisational integrity, embodiment, and precarity—to draw out the kinds of tensions and intersections that enable enactivism and transhumanism to problematise one another. Enactivism defines life and cognition in terms of autonomy; that is, it posits that living systems generate and maintain themselves as porous yet bounded self-unities. This sets up a delicate balance—both for the enacting system and for enactivism itself—between the dual imperatives of adaptive self-creation and homeostasis. The system must change constantly in order to sustain itself, yet there is a limit to the system’s flexibility. Beyond a certain point, change means disintegration, and disintegration means death. This balance itself resonates within transhumanist discourses, in the tension between the promise of radical self-transformation and the concern about taking this too far. These discourses, however, also challenge enactivism’s potential to capture the full potential of the kinds of systems it describes. How do we determine the limits of morphological flexibility for cognisers as complex as ourselves? Are those limits fixed or malleable—and must integration always mean death, or can it facilitate redefinition? (shrink)

Biohacking is a grass-roots movement that brings the knowledge and experimen-tal practice of biological sciences to a non-specialized public. This article seeks to identify biohacking as a type of transhumanism and not just as a movement influenced by the latter. To do so, it examines the constitution, history, practi-ces, and moral codes of the biohacker movement. Subsequently, it compares the results with the definition of transhumanism, finding points of similarity in the hypotheses of both, as well as an adaptation of (...) transhumanist values to biohac-king. It concludes by identifying biohacking as a type of transhumanism. (shrink)

Transhumanism is a philosophical system that proposes the use of advanced technologies directly in the human body to modify and improve its biological condition. That is the core idea of transhumanism and it can be adopted by various ideological systems in different ways. It will depend on their ethical approach and what they define as “improvement”. In this article we will quickly review the difference between transhumanist philosophy, Transhumanism and Transhumanisms.

The technological innovations of the Fourth Industrial Revolution have facilitated the formulation of strategies to transcend human limitations; strategies that are widely supported by the transhumanist philosophy. The purpose of this article is to explain the relationship between ‘transhumanism’ and ‘technological singularity’, to which end the Fourth Industrial Revolution and transhumanism are also briefly covered. Subsequently, the three main models of technological singularity are evaluated and a definition of this futuristic concept is offered. Finally, the author provides a reflection on (...) the relationship between technological singularity and the transhumanist philosophy, and concludes that they are not synonymous, but rather that the former is an eventuality that will allow the latter. (shrink)

With the shortage of physicians and surgeons and increase in demand worldwide due to situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a growing interest in finding solutions to help address the problem. A solution to this problem would be to use neurotechnology to provide them augmented cognition, senses and action for optimal diagnosis and treatment. Consequently, doing so can negatively impact them and others. We argue that applying neurotechnology for human enhancement in physicians and surgeons can cause injustices, and (...) harm to them and patients. In this paper, we will first describe the augmentations and neurotechnologies that can be used to achieve the relevant augmentations for physicians and surgeons. We will then review selected ethical concerns discussed within literature, discuss the neuroengineering behind using neurotechnology for augmentation purposes, then conclude with an analysis on outcomes and ethical issues of implementing human augmentation via neurotechnology in medical and surgical practice. (shrink)

The idea of artificial wombs began to be seriously discussed in the West in Britain after WWI, inspired by modern feminism and the invention of neonatal incubators. J. B. S. Haldane’s imagined future use of artificial wombs in his essay Daedalus, or, Science and the Future inspired debate among his contemporaries for a decade, including Aldous Huxley who indelibly cast the technology as dystopian. After WWII bioutopian ideas like artificial wombs were associated with fascism, although socialist feminists briefly renewed the (...) debate over the liberatory potential of artificial wombs in the 1970s. Recent innovations in neonatal intensive care have again generated discussion of the ethical and political impacts of artificial wombs. Again, artificial wombs are seen by some as a way to expand reproductive freedom and gender equality, while critics worry they might have negative impacts on women and abortion access. (shrink)

This essay seeks to engage critically with the transhumanist goal of achieving the technological possibility of transferring consciousness into a computer. The general aim of the critical impulse of this essay is to interpret the various techno-optimistic attempts at transcending the bodily condition of life as being a kind of modern-day necromancy. By alluding to the magical or ritual notion of necromancy, this essay will show how the rationale behind Transhumanism and mind-transfer are premised on a desire to overcome life (...) itself by becoming immortal. Necromancy, whereby a sorcerer or practitioner suspends the dialectics of life and death, elevates the human to an inhuman position by attacking the very foundation of life itself – reviving the dead. This essay will juxtapose Transhumanism with necromancy by interpreting the goal to develop mind-transferring technologies in relation to texts that describe various technological means for practicing the art of necromancy or dark magic. By reinterpreting Transhumanism in this manner, this essay will show how the ritualistic, magical, or mythical foundations, that humanity had earlier called upon to overcome the fragility of their bodies have survived in the premises that underlining the modern-day endeavors to overcome the body via technological means. (shrink)

Este ensayo examina críticamente la tesis – defendida por filósofos bioconservadores – que sostiene que el pensamiento transhumanista constituye una amenaza a la dignidad humana. A partir de esta consideración, defenderemos las siguientes tesis: primero, el pensamiento transhumanista nos conduce a replantear la noción de dignidad humana para hacerla más amplia y ofrecer, en su lugar, la noción de dignidad de los seres sintientes; segundo, la principal preocupación no es si llegasen a existir tales seres (los transhumanos), sino si es (...) que tales seres serán lo suficientemente morales para lidiar con grandes poderes tecnológicos. (shrink)

En este ensayo, evaluaremos el problema de la identidad personal en el contexto del transhumanismo. En primer lugar, en contra de la tesis de que el transhumanismo representa una amenaza a la persistencia de la identidad personal argumentaremos lo siguiente: los individuos humanos que son personas no tienen características esenciales. En segundo lugar, con la ayuda del primer episodio de la segunda temporada de la serie de ciencia ficción Black Mirror, defenderemos la tesis de que hay propiedades que realmente importan (...) en el problema de la identidad personal: las propiedades relacionales(esta tesis tiene como consecuencia que nuestros seres queridos son irremplazables, incluso por duplicados exactos). Finalmente, concluiremos que el uso de las tecnologías de mejoramiento humano no representa una amenaza a la identidad personal de un individuo en tanto que no altera sus propiedades relacionales importantes. (shrink)

The following aesthetic discussion examines in a philosophical-scientific way the relationship between computation and artistic creativity. Currently, there is a criticism about the possible artistic creativity that an algorithm could have. Supporting the above, the term computer-generated art (CG-Art) defined by Margaret Boden would seem to have no exponents yet. Moreover, it has been pointed out that, rather than a matter of primitive technological development, CG-Art would have in its very foundations the inability to exist. This, because art is considered (...) as one of the most unique and exclusive human manifestations of our species. On the contrary, I propose that the denial of CG-Art has an anthropocentric bias. For this, I use the recent studies that, from the cognitive sciences, have been carried out on artistic creativity. In this way, I intend to convince the reader that behind the denial of the creative artistic capacity to the machines, a negationist mysticism of the current scientific advances necessarily lies. (shrink)

Has transhumanism influenced military thinking? Previous work found that transhumanist terms did not appear widely in military publications. The present work analyzes and improves on previous content analysis of transhumanist terms in military literature using the tools of library and information studies.

El artículo analiza desde una perspectiva crítica las tentativas de interpretar a Nietzsche como un precursor del transhumanismo. Tras una breve contextualización del fecundo debate en torno a Nietzsche y el transhumanismo, se evalúa el carácter fraccional o parcial del alegato de Stefan Sorgner en favor de un “transhumanismo nietzscheano”. Después, se investiga la tensión entre humanidad, la superación del ser humano y su cría en los escritos de Nietzsche. Una vez ejecutado este análisis, y sin ánimo de caer en (...) el anacronismo, se sostiene que Nietzsche anticipa ciertamente un germen de la idea de post-humanidad, en su crítica de la cultura humanista y en su invitación a transformar el ser humano y superar el nihilismo, pero no asimilable a la vertiente tecnológica del transhumanismo. Para concluir, se sugiere una prospectiva de análisis del transhumanismo desde una perspectiva nietzscheana, tomando como ejemplo la imagen de las “sombras de Dios”. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Dante's philosophical goal is what I term "self-angelizing," an ennobling philosophical education granting one the knowledge and power of an angel, which the medieval scholastics conceived as celestial intelligences. Dante's own path to self-angelizing begins in his early New Life, which approaches a living Beatrice as exemplar of terrestrial angels. Next, Dante's middle-period Banquet discusses following Beatrice into self-angelizing through an education in philosophical virtue. Finally, in his climactic Paradise, Dante performs his own self-angelizing. (...) The upshot of this journey is Dante's prophecy of an egalitarian transhumanism. (shrink)

This chapter briefly reviews the role of race (as a concept) in the history of theorizing the posthuman, engages with existing discussions of race as technology, and explores the significance of understanding race as technology for the field of posthumanism. Our aim is to engage existing literature that posits racialized individuals as posthumans and to consider how studying race might inform theories of the posthuman.

Celem niniejszej pracy jest zastosowanie wizji „Lewiatana” Thomasa Hobbesa do koncepcji superinteligencji lub nadludzkiej inteligencji, które dyskutowane jest wśród transhumanistów i poruszone jest przez takich filozofów i futurologów jak między innymi Nick Bostrom, Stanisław Lem, albo Ray Kurzweil. Inspiracją mojej pracy były pytania w rodzaju: „kiedy człowiek przestaje być autonomicznym podmiotem?” albo „czy człowiek w ogóle może być samodzielny?”. Niemniej jednak wydaje mi się, że takie pytania mogą się pojawić wtedy, kiedy człowieka rozpoznamy jako zwierzę polityczne (politikon zoon w sensie (...) Arystotelesowskim). Albowiem trudno wyobrażać sobie wyłonienie pojęcia polityki wobec człowieka samotnego, to znaczy w izolacji od innych ludzi i bez odniesienia się lub ustosunkowania się do nich. Będę argumentował z perspektywy historyka ewolucyjnego. Za badaczy posiadających wkład do takiego stanowiska można uznać Karola Darwina, Samuela Butlera, George’a Dysona i szczególnie Yuvala Noaha Harariego. Opieram się głównie na pracach dwóch ostatnich. (shrink)

Defenderé que la tesis de la mente extendida no es un argumento a favor de la posibilidad del transhumanismo. Si la tesis es cierta, el que nuestra mente se extienda en el mundo no es algo que se da exclusivamente por las nuevas tecnologías, sino que es una característica que poseemos desde hace miles de años. La inscripción de signos en las cavernas sólo difiere en grado de los implantes tecnológicos de un cyborg. Argumentaré lo anterior mostrando que, aunque los (...) cyborgs pueden obtener cierta información que un cuerpo humano normal puede no tener, esta diferencia no es cualitativa. El qualia de la experiencia humana tendría que variar radicalmente para que sea posible afirmar que el cyborg es algo distinto y superior. En últimas, quizás los seres humanos siempre hemos sido cyborgs. (shrink)

In her short story “Stable Strategies for Middle Management,” Eileen Gunn imagines a future in which Margaret, an office worker, seeks radical genetic enhancements intended to help her secure the middle-management job she wants. One source of the story’s tension and dark humor is dramatic irony: readers can see that the enhancements Margaret buys stand little chance of making her life go better for her; enhancing is, for Margaret, probably a prudential mistake. This paper argues that our positions in the (...) real world are sufficiently similar to Margaret’s position in Gunn’s fictional world that we should take this story seriously as grounding an argument from analogy for the conclusion that radical genetic enhancements are, for us, probably a prudential mistake. The paper then defends this method. When the question at hand is one of speculative ethics, there is no method better fit to the purpose than argument from analogy to speculative fiction. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on AI-based cognitive and perceptual enhancements. AI-based brain enhancements are already under development, and they may become commonplace over the next 30–50 years. We raise doubts concerning whether radical AI-based enhancements transhumanists advocate will accomplish the transhumanists goals of longevity, human flourishing, and intelligence enhancement. We urge that even if the technologies are medically safe and are not used as tools by surveillance capitalism or an authoritarian dictatorship, these enhancements may still fail to do their job for (...) philosophical reasons. In what follows, we explore one such concern, a problem that involves the nature of the self. We illustrate that the so called transhumanist efforts to “merge oneself with AI” could lead to perverse realizations of AI technology, such as the demise of the person who sought enhancement. And, in a positive vein, we offer ways to avoid this, at least within the context of one theory of the nature of personhood. (shrink)

This paper proposes that existing computational modeling research programs may be combined into platforms for the information of public policy. The main idea is that computational models at select levels of organization may be integrated in natural terms describing biological cognition, thereby normalizing a platform for predictive simulations able to account for both human and environmental costs associated with different action plans and institutional arrangements over short and long time spans while minimizing computational requirements. Building from established research programs, the (...) proposal aims to take advantage of current momentum in the direction of the integration of the cognitive with social and natural sciences, reduce start-up costs and increase speed of development. These are all important upshots given rising unease over the potential for AI and related technologies to shape the world going forward. (shrink)