- Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent-neutrality.Matthew Hammerton - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):239-250.details
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Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.details
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Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”.Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulford - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5).details
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You gotta do what you gotta do.John Gibbons - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):157-177.details
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Introspecting knowledge.John Gibbons - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):559-579.details
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Requiring and justifying: Two dimensions of normative strength. [REVIEW]Joshua Gert - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (1):5 - 36.details
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Brute rationality.Joshua Gert - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):417–446.details
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Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.James Fritz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1191-1210.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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The Instrumental Rule.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):444-462.details
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What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it.Stephen Finlay - 2009 - Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.details
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What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning?Julian Fink - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482.details
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The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Julian Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):117-140.details
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Recent work on normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):331-346.details
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One Ought Too Many.Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):102-124.details
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Oughts and ends.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.details
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It's OK to Make Mistakes: Against the Fixed Point Thesis.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):175-185.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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Intending, acting, and doing.Luca Ferrero - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):13-39.details
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Two Objections to Wide-Scoping.Daan Evers - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):251-255.details
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Belief and normativity.Pascal Engel - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):179-203.details
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The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge.Julien Dutant - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):141-162.details
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Whither anankastics?Billy Dunaway & Alex Silk - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):75-94.details
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What's Wrong With Recalcitrant Emotions? From Irrationality to Challenge of Agential Identity.Sabine A. Döring - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):381-402.details
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Rationality, time and normativity: On Hedden’s time-slice rationality.Sabine A. Döring & Bahadir Eker - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):571-585.details
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Do de re necessities express semantic rules?Jamie Dreier - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.details
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Instrumental rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:280-309.details
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Teleology and Normativity.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:214-240.details
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Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:18-44.details
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Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Metaethics After Moore.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Agent-Relativity and the Foundations of Moral Theory.Matthew Hammerton - 2017 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Hume on Justice.Rosalind Hursthouse - 2009 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264.details
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Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reasons and Rationality: The Case of Group Agents.Lara Buchak & Philip Pettit - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome. Oxford University Press.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Shared Agency.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Kant and the Fact of Reason.Kenneth K. H. Chung - unknowndetails
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The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason.details
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Humean sources of normativity.Herlinde Pauer-Studer - 2009 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 186.details
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From Life-Like to Mind-Like Explanation: Natural Agency and the Cognitive Sciences.Alex Djedovic - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto, St. George Campusdetails
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Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor.Luca Ferrero - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10:1-23.details
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Reasons, concerns, and necessity.Theo Van Willigenburg - 2005 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):75-87.details
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Weakness of the Will as Furtive Irrationality.Monika Betzler - 2009 - Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):191–215.details
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