- Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Christopher Cowie - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):115-130.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Guard against temptation: Intrapersonal team reasoning and the role of intentions in exercising willpower.Natalie Gold - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):554-569.details
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On Margaret Gilbert's Rights and Demands.Stephen Darwall - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):499-504.details
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Should agents be immodest?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251.details
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Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.details
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The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules.Marc-Kevin Daoust & Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1741-1765.details
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Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1095-1116.details
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Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):139-156.details
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Introduction.Garrett Cullity - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):289-292.details
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Describing rationality.Garrett Cullity - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3399-3411.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.details
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Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?Christopher Cowie - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1685-1702.details
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Two types of epistemic instrumentalism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5455-5475.details
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‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1641-1656.details
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Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective.James Conant & Dawa Ometto (eds.) - 2023 - De Gruyter.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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A New Problem for Internalism.Chad Carmichael - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13187-13199.details
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Normative Reasons Qua Facts and the Agent-Neutral/relative Dichotomy: a Response to Rønnow-Rasmussen.Jamie Buckland - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):207-225.details
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Agent-Relativity and the Status of Deontological Restrictions.Jamie Buckland - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (2):233-255.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.John Brunero - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):313-317.details
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The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):13-37.details
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Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing.John Brunero - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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Synchronic requirements and diachronic permissions.John Broome - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):630-646.details
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Reason versus ought.John Broome - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):80-97.details
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Rationality versus Normativity.John Broome - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):293-311.details
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Responses to Setiya, Hussain, and Horty.John Broome - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):230-242.details
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Responses to Commentaries on ‘Rationality Versus Normativity’.John Broome - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):393-401.details
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Responses.John Broome - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3431-3448.details
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Normativity in Reasoning.John Broome - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):622-633.details
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A Stronger Doctrine of Double Effect.Ben Bronner & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):793-805.details
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A Linguistic Turn in the Philosophy of Normativity?John Broome - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):1-14.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick Bondy - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-21.details
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Empathy for a reason? From understanding agency to phenomenal insight.Celine Boisserie-Lacroix & Marco Inchingolo - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7097-7118.details
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Empathy for a reason? From understanding agency to phenomenal insight.Celine Boisserie-Lacroix & Marco Inchingolo - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7097-7118.details
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Rationality, reasoning and rules: reflections on Broome’s rationality through reasoning.Paul Boghossian - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3385-3397.details
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The Hereby-Commit Account of Inference.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):86-101.details
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Normative Models and Their Success.Lukas Beck & Marcel Jahn - 2021 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 51 (2):123-150.details
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Reasoning and Arguing, Dialectically and Dialogically, Among Individual and Multiple Participants.Michael D. Baumtrog - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (1):77-98.details
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Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind.Lisa Bastian - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3615-3636.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Moral Rationalism and the Normativity of Constitutive Principles.Zachary Bachman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):1-19.details
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On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
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Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):95-115.details
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