- Representationalism, supervenience, and the cross-modal problem.John W. O’dea - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):285-95.details
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A Higher-order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia.John O'dea - 2007 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):81-93.details
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Spatial position and perceived color of objects.Romi Nijhawan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):43-44.details
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Against intentionalism.Bernard Nickel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279-304.details
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An account of color without a subject?Erik Myin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):42-43.details
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Intentional and Phenomenal Properties: How not to be Inseparatists.Miklós Márton - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):127-147.details
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Mental Strength: A Theory of Experience Intensity.Jorge Morales - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):1-21.details
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What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?Michelle Montague - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):359-380.details
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The Phenomenal Contribution of Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Is color-dispositionalism nasty and unecological?Nenad Miscevic - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):203 - 231.details
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Peacocke’s trees.Boyd Millar - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):445-461.details
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Exploring Subjective Representationalism.Neil Mehta - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):570-594.details
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Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.details
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Clarifying the problem of color realism.Barry Maund - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):40-41.details
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Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight into the nature of color perception?Rainer Mausfeld & Reinhard Niederée - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):41-42.details
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Color nominalism, pluralistic realism, and color science.Mohan Matthen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):39-40.details
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Consciousness-dependence, and the conscious/unconscious contrast. [REVIEW]Neil Manson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):115-129.details
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Surface color perception in constrained environments.Laurence T. Maloney - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):38-39.details
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Anticipation and variation in visual content.Michael Madary - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):335-347.details
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Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):369-392.details
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Color as a material, not an optical, property.Bruce J. MacLennan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):37-38.details
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Metaphysics of Color 1: Physicalist Theories of Color.Heather Logue - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):211-219.details
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Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.details
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Subjective Facts about Consciousness.Martin A. Lipman - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10:530-553.details
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Phenomenal experience: A cartesian theater revival.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):209-225.details
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In Defense of Cognitive Phenomenology: Meeting the Matching Content Challenge.Preston Lennon - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2391-2407.details
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Sensory experience and intentionalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.details
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Explaining away temporal flow – thoughts on Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’.Geoffrey Lee - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):315-327.details
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The intuitive case for naïve realism.Harold Langsam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):106-122.details
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Hue magnitudes and revelation.John Kulvicki - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):36-37.details
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Olive green or chestnut brown?Rolf G. Kuehni - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):35-36.details
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Some arguments against intentionalism.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.details
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Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):585-617.details
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Perceptual experience, conscious content, and nonconceptual content.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.details
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Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.details
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Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.details
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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness.Amy Kind - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):902-913.details
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Restrictions on representationalism.Amy Kind - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427.details
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Visual awareness of properties.Matthew J. Kennedy - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325.details
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Familiarity inferences, subjective attitudes and counterstance contingency: towards a pragmatic theory of subjective meaning.Christopher Kennedy & Malte Willer - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1395-1445.details
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A plea for epistemic ontologies.Gilles Kassel - 2023 - Applied ontology 18 (4):367-397.details
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The Multiply Qualitative.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):239-262.details
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Metamerism, constancy, and knowing which.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):549-585.details
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Fenomenologia cognitiva.Marta Jorba - 2017 - Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2).details
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Against qualia theory.James John - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.details
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The representational theory of phenomenal character: A phenomenological critique.Greg Janzen - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339.details
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In Defense of the What-It-Is-Likeness of Experience.Greg Janzen - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.details
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Intentionalism and change blindness.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.details
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An Adverbialist–Objectualist Account of Pain.Greg Janzen - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):859-876.details
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