- Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Disagreement and easy bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.details
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Rational Uniqueness and Religious Disagreement.Christopher Willard-Kyle - manuscriptdetails
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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Might Moral Epistemologists Be Asking The Wrong Questions?Caleb Perl - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):556-585.details
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(1 other version)Overcoming Disagreement Through Ordering: Building an Epistemic Hierarchy.Martin Hinton - 2018 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 55 (1):77-91.details
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Friedman on suspended judgment.Michal Masny - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5009-5026.details
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‘Peer Disagreement’ and Evidence of Evidence.John Biro & Fabio Lampert - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):379-402.details
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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.details
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A different kind of dream-based skepticism.Michael Veber - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1827-1839.details
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Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.details
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Epistemic Peer Disagreement.Filippo Ferrari & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Disagreement and the division of epistemic labor.Bjørn G. Hallsson & Klemens Kappel - 2018 - Synthese 197 (7):2823-2847.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What Pessimism about Moral Deference Means for Disagreement.James Fritz - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):121-136.details
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Fallibility and Normativity.DiPaolo Joshua - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherstdetails
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Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.details
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Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaz Potrc & Hannah Tierney - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):194-225.details
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Peer-Disagreement about Restaurant Bills and Abortion.Martin Sticker - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):577-604.details
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(1 other version)Overcoming Expert Disagreement In A Delphi Process. An Exercise In Reverse Epistemology.Lalumera Elisabetta - 2015 - Humana Mente 8 (28):87-103.details
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The epistemology of moral disagreement.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.details
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When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.details
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Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16 (11):1-39.details
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The Epistemology of Education.Lani Watson - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (3):146-159.details
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Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.details
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A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):403-409.details
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XI—Literature and Disagreement.Eileen John - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):239-260.details
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism.Thomas Mulligan - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):67-78.details
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How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View?Jonathan Matheson & Brandon Carey - 2012 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge. pp. 131-149.details
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Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Scientific Controversies and the Ethics of Arguing and Belief in the Face of Rational Disagreement.Xavier de Donato Rodríguez & Jesús Zamora Bonilla - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (1):39-65.details
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The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement.Georgi Gardiner - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):83-95.details
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(1 other version)From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary.Errol Lord - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-13.details
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Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):173-183.details
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Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief.Rik Peels & Anthony Booth - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):75-88.details
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Editor's Introduction.Diego E. Machuca - 2012 - In Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge.details
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When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement.Boaz Miller - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.details
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Counterfactual Philosophers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):368-387.details
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On “Epistemic Permissiveness”.Anthony Brueckner & Alex Bundy - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):165-177.details
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