- Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.details
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(1 other version)II—Peter Milne: What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.details
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The Ambiguity of Quantifiers.Francesco Paoli - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):313-330.details
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Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for Epistemology.Ram Neta - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):247-280.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry.Marcello Di Bello - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.details
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From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism: Theoretical and Empirical Developments.John Turri - 2016 - In Judy Dodge Cummings (ed.), Hillary Clinton. Essential Library. pp. 315-330.details
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Assertibility and Sensitivity.Geoff Pynn - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):99-117.details
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The Self-Knowledge Gambit.Berislav Marušić - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):1977-1999.details
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Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries.John Turri & Ori Friedman - 2014 - In James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 45-69.details
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Justification as the appearance of knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.details
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Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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(1 other version)What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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A noncontextualist account of contextualist linguistic data.Mylan Engel - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):56-79.details
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Confusion about concessive knowledge attributions.Dylan Dodd - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):381 - 396.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and practical reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101–118.details
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What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.details
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Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Reliabilist justification (or knowledge) as a good truth-ratio.Jonathan E. Adler - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):445–458.details
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Epistemic Norms for Public Political Arguments.Christoph Lumer - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (1):63-83.details
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The Logical and Philosophical Foundations for the Possibility of True Contradictions.Ben Martin - 2014 - Dissertation, University College Londondetails
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Conditional Collapse.Sam Carter - 2023 - Mind 132 (528):971-1004.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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In defense of ordinary language philosophy.Herman Cappelen & Matthew McKeever - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):221-237.details
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Knowledge of Future Contingents.Andrea Iacona - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):447-467.details
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Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge.Yacin Hamami - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):77-89.details
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Knowledge attributions and lottery cases: a review and new evidence.John Turri - forthcoming - In Igor Douven (ed.), The lottery problem. Cambridge University Press.details
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Incoherent but Reasonable: A Defense of Truth-Abstinence in Political Liberalism.Wes Siscoe & Alexander Schaefer - 2020 - Social Theory and Practice 46 (3):573-603.details
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DeRose on Lotteries.Peter Baumann - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):44-67.details
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Scepticisme, fidéisme et évidentialisme : oppositions et origines.Artūrs Logins - 2013 - Dialogue 51 (4):613-642.details
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Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.details
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The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.details
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Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).details
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Lotteries And Contexts.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2):415-428.details
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Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.details
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Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence1.Martin Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):273-295.details
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Relevant Alternatives Contextualism and Ordinary Contingent Knowledge.Franck Lihoreau - 2008 - Disputatio 2 (24):281-294.details
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Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):285 - 300.details
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Two claims about epistemic propriety.E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):471-488.details
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Subjunctivitis.Jonathan Vogel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.details
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Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief: why you know your ticket will lose.Mylan Engel - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7891-7921.details
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Three Puzzles about Lotteries.Julia Staffel - 2020 - In Igor Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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