- Reasons and Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Subjective and Objective Reasons.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Fitting Inconsistency and Reasonable Irresolution.Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Value relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Understanding What’s Good for Us.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):429 - 439.details
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Responsibility, Reaction, and Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (2):103-115.details
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On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):577-597.details
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On the Nature, Existence and Significance of Organic Unities.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (3):1-25.details
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Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal?Michael J. Zimmerman - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):247-263.details
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Diotima's eudaemonism: Intrinsic value and rational motivation in Plato's symposium.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - Phronesis 54 (4-5):297-325.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Frondizi and Mandelbaum on the Phenomenology and Ontology of Value.Ian Verstegen - 2019 - Gestalt Theory 41 (3):277-291.details
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Simply Good: A Defence of the Principia.Miles Tucker - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (3):253-270.details
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Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: a defense of indefinability.Miles Tucker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2261-2276.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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Reasons and value – in defence of the buck-passing account.Jussi Suikkanen - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.details
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A puzzle for epistemic WAMs.Mona Simion - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4679-4689.details
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Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem.Richard Rowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1455-1474.details
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The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and Empiricism.Georges Rey - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):227-258.details
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Values Compared.Włodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):73-96.details
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Consequentializing moral theories.Douglas W. Portmore - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):39–73.details
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The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of Value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1845-1860.details
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What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing?Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.details
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The Personal and the Fitting.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (3):341-352.details
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Intrinsicalism and conditionalism about final value.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):31-52.details
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Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge.Jonas Olson - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):365-378.details
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Hohfeld on the duties in privileges and claims.Daniel Simão Nascimento - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (2).details
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Kinds of consequentialism.Michael Smith - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals. pp. 257-272.details
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Business ethics and doing what one ought to do.Gregory Mellema - 1994 - Journal of Business Ethics 13 (2):149 - 153.details
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Values and Harms in Loss and Damage.Katie McShane - 2017 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 20 (2):129-142.details
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Neosentimentalism and the valence of attitudes.Katie McShane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):747-765.details
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.details
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Objectivism and Prospectivism about Rightness.Elinor Mason - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-22.details
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Overcoming the limits of empathic concern: the case for availability and its application to the medical domain.Elodie Malbois & Christine Clavien - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (2):191-203.details
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The buck-passing account of value: lessons from Crisp.S. Matthew Liao - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.details
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"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent.Benjamin Kiesewitter - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.details
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Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes.Leonard Kahn - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.details
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CHOICE: an Objective, Voluntaristic Theory of Prudential Value.Walter Horn - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):191-215.details
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Monism and Pluralism about Value.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 136-157.details
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The guise of the good and the problem of partiality.Allan Hazlett - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):851-872.details
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Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.details
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Ethical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6943-6965.details
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Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like.James Fritz - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2597-2616.details
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Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.details
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Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):261-285.details
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Emotions and Their Correctness Conditions: A Defense of Attitudinalism.Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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