Switch to: References

Citations of:

Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

Analysis 23 (6):121-123 (1963)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. On Robinson’s Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):627-641.
    Qualia Epiphenomenalism is the view that qualitative events lack causal efficacy. A common objection to qualia epiphenomenalism is the so-called Self-Stultifying Objection, which suggests that justified, true belief about qualitative events requires, among other things, the belief to be caused by the qualitative event—the very premise that qualia epiphenomenalism denies. William Robinson provides the most sustained response to the self-stultification objection that is available. In this paper I argue that Robinson's reply does not sufficiently overcome the self-stultification objection.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Conclusive reasons, knowledge, and action.John A. Barker & Fred Adams - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
    The article presents information on the capabilities of Dretske-style analysis of knowing (DAK) and of several competing analyses with respect to accounting for the apparent facts. It informs that the DAK can ground plausible verdicts about knowledge and ignorance in cases involving lotteries. It further informs that the knowledge-efficacy donor imply the implausible thesis.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Deliberation and Reason.Richard Baron - 2010 - Matador.
    The topic of this book is the thinking in which we engage when we reflectively decide what to do, and when we reflectively reach conclusions as to the correct answers to questions. The main objective is to identify a way of looking at ourselves and at our deliberations that is adequate to our lives. It must accommodate both our conception of ourselves as free, rational and self-directed subjects, and our feeling that we deliberate freely. It must also identify a place (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement.Boaz Miller - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.
    Scientific consensus is widely deferred to in public debates as a social indicator of the existence of knowledge. However, it is far from clear that such deference to consensus is always justified. The existence of agreement in a community of researchers is a contingent fact, and researchers may reach a consensus for all kinds of reasons, such as fighting a common foe or sharing a common bias. Scientific consensus, by itself, does not necessarily indicate the existence of shared knowledge among (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • (1 other version)Book Review of Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction.David J. Frost - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):903-917.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Margins and Errors.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):63-76.
    Recently, Timothy Williamson has argued that considerations about margins of errors can generate a new class of cases where agents have justified true beliefs without knowledge. I think this is a great argument, and it has a number of interesting philosophical conclusions. In this note I’m going to go over the assumptions of Williamson’s argument. I’m going to argue that the assumptions which generate the justification without knowledge are true. I’m then going to go over some of the recent arguments (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Why ‘What Works’ Still Won’t Work: From Evidence-Based Education to Value-Based Education. [REVIEW]Gert J. J. Biesta - 2010 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (5):491-503.
    The idea that professional practices such as education should be based upon or at least be informed by evidence continues to capture the imagination of many politicians, policy makers, practitioners and researchers. There is growing evidence of the influence of this line of thought. At the same time there is a growing body of work that has raised fundamental questions about the feasibility of the idea of evidence-based or evidence-informed practice. In this paper I make a further contribution to this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Context as knowledge.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes & Andreas Stokke - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (4):543-563.
    It has been argued that common ground information is unsuited to the role that contexts play in the theory of indexical and demonstrative reference. This paper explores an alternative view that identifies shared information with what is common knowledge among the participants. We argue this view of shared information avoids the problems for the common ground approach concerning reference while preserving its advantages in accounting for communication.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)A Critical Analysis of Floridi’s Theory of Semantic Information.Pieter Adriaans - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):41-56.
    n various publications over the past years, Floridi has developed a theory of semantic information as well-formed, meaningful, and truthful data. This theory is more or less orthogonal to the standard entropy-based notions of information known from physics, information theory, and computer science that all define the amount of information in a certain system as a scalar value without any direct semantic implication. In this context the question rises what the exact relation between these various conceptions of information is and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Effective Sceptical Hypotheses.Steven L. Reynolds - 2012 - Theoria 79 (3):262-278.
    The familiar Cartesian sceptical arguments all involve an explanation of our experiences. An account of the persuasive power of the sceptical arguments should explain why this is so. This supports a diagnosis of the error in Cartesian sceptical arguments according to which they mislead us into regarding our perceptual beliefs as if they were justified as inferences to the best explanation. I argue that they have instead a perceptual justification that does not involve inference to the best explanation and that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The folk conception of knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.
    How do people decide which claims should be considered mere beliefs and which count as knowledge? Although little is known about how people attribute knowledge to others, philosophical debate about the nature of knowledge may provide a starting point. Traditionally, a belief that is both true and justified was thought to constitute knowledge. However, philosophers now agree that this account is inadequate, due largely to a class of counterexamples (termed ‘‘Gettier cases’’) in which a person’s justified belief is true, but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations  
  • The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Georges Rey - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Three challenges from delusion for theories of autonomy.K. W. M. Fulford & Lubomira Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-74.
    This chapter identifies and explores a series of challenges raised by the clinical concept of delusion for theories which conceive autonomy as an agency rather than a status concept. The first challenge is to address the autonomy-impairing nature of delusions consistently with their role as grounds for full legal and ethical excuse, on the one hand, and psychopathological significance as key symptoms of psychoses, on the other. The second challenge is to take into account the full logical range of delusions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • 'Knows' Entails Truth.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
    It is almost universally presumed that knowledge is factive: in order to know that p it must be the case that p is true. This idea is often justified by appealing to knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena; i.e., an utterance of the form ‘S knows that p, but not-p’ sounds contradictory. In a recent article, Allan Hazlett argues that our ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. From this it seems to follow that epistemologists cannot appeal to ordinary language (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Knowledge as a thick concept: explaining why the Gettier problem arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.
    The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But, whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier problem arises because knowledge is a thick concept, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Is knowledge justified true belief?John Turri - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
    Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly ‘no’, as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don’t obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in JTB, though it takes some work to appreciate just what it is. The nature of the flaw helps us better (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • La naturalizzazione dell'epistemologia. Contro una soluzione quineana.Nicla Vassallo - 1997 - Franco Angeli.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier’s Challenge: A Case Study.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.
    Taking his conceptual cue from Ernest Sosa, John Turri has offered a putative conceptual solution to the Gettier problem: Knowledge is cognitively adept belief, and no Gettiered belief is cognitively adept. At the core of such adeptness is a relation of manifestation. Yet to require that relation within knowing is to reach for what amounts to an infallibilist conception of knowledge. And this clashes with the spirit behind the fallibilism articulated by Gettier when stating his challenge. So, Turri’s form of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Evidence and intuition.Yuri Cath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):311-328.
    Many philosophers accept a view – what I will call the intuition picture – according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: it is consistent with a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Gettier Problem in informed consent.S. Cohen - 2011 - Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (11):642-645.
    The duty to procure informed consent (IC) from patients before any significant intervention is among the pillars of medical and research ethics. The provision by the doctor of relevant information about treatment and free decision-making by the patient are essential elements of IC. The paper presents cases of IC where the free decision about treatment is not causally related to the information provided, and claims that such cases pose a difficulty parallel to that presented by the Gettier Problem in epistemology. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.
    Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • Justification as the appearance of knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.
    Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Belief-Forming Processes, Extended.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):741-765.
    We very often grant that a person can gain knowledge on the basis of epistemic artifacts such as telescopes, microscopes and so on. However, this intuition threatens to undermine virtue reliabilism according to which one knows that p if and only if one’s believing the truth that p is the product of a reliable cognitive belief-forming process; in an obvious sense epistemic artifacts are not parts of one’s overall cognitive system. This is so, unless the extended cognition hypothesis (HEC) is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • A Defense of Lucky Understanding.Kevin Morris - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):357-371.
    It is plausible to think that the epistemic benefit of having an explanation is understanding. My focus in this article is on the extent to which explanatory understanding, perhaps unlike knowledge, is compatible with certain forms of luck—the extent to which one can understand why something is the case when one is lucky to truly believe an explanatorily relevant proposition. I argue, contra Stephen Grimm ([2006]) and Duncan Pritchard ([2008], [2009]), that understanding quite generally is compatible with luckily believing a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?Jack C. Lyons - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
    The New Evil Demon Problem is supposed to show that straightforward versions of reliabilism are false: reliability is not necessary for justification after all. I argue that it does no such thing. The reliabilist can count a number of beliefs as justified even in demon worlds, others as unjustified but having positive epistemic status nonetheless. The remaining beliefs---primarily perceptual beliefs---are not, on further reflection, intuitively justified after all. The reliabilist is right to count these beliefs as unjustified in demon worlds, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • A problem for Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):253-275.
    Duncan Pritchard has, in the years following his (2005) defence of a safety-based account of knowledge in Epistemic Luck, abjured his (2005) view that knowledge can be analysed exclusively in terms of a modal safety condition. He has since (Pritchard in Synthese 158:277–297, 2007; J Philosophic Res 34:33–45, 2009a, 2010) opted for an account according to which two distinct conditions function with equal importance and weight within an analysis of knowledge: an anti-luck condition (safety) and an ability condition-the latter being (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Justification logic.Sergei Artemov - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • What You Don't Know Won't Hurt You?John A. Barker - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4):303 - 308.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Why There is No Justified Belief at Demon Worlds.Thomas D. Senor - manuscript
    The New Demon World Objection claims that reliabilist accounts of justification are mistaken because there are justified empirical beliefs at demon worlds—worlds at which the subjects are systematically deceived by a Cartesian demon. In this paper, I defend strongly verific (but not necessarily reliabilist) accounts of justification by claiming that there are two ways to construct a theory of justification: by analyzing our ordinary concept of justification or by taking justification to be a theoretic term defined by its role in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Popper, Refutation and 'Avoidance' of Refutation.Greg Bamford - 1989 - Dissertation, The University of Queensland
    Popper's account of refutation is the linchpin of his famous view that the method of science is the method of conjecture and refutation. This thesis critically examines his account of refutation, and in particular the practice he deprecates as avoiding a refutation. I try to explain how he comes to hold the views that he does about these matters; how he seeks to make them plausible; how he has influenced others to accept his mistakes, and how some of the ideas (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
    Many epistemologists use intuitive responses to particular cases as evidence for their theories. Recently, experimental philosophers have challenged the evidential value of intuitions, suggesting that our responses to particular cases are unstable, inconsistent with the responses of the untrained, and swayed by factors such as ethnicity and gender. This paper presents evidence that neither gender nor ethnicity influence epistemic intuitions, and that the standard responses to Gettier cases and the like are widely shared. It argues that epistemic intuitions are produced (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   111 citations  
  • Reply to Pardo: Unsafe Legal Knowledge?Mark McBride - 2011 - Legal Theory 17 (1):67-73.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Utilitarian epistemology.Steve Petersen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1173-1184.
    Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value theory: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Natural Kinds and Concepts: A Pragmatist and Methodologically Naturalistic Account.Ingo Brigandt - 2011 - In Jonathan Knowles & Henrik Rydenfelt (eds.), Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism. Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 171-196.
    In this chapter I lay out a notion of philosophical naturalism that aligns with pragmatism. It is developed and illustrated by a presentation of my views on natural kinds and my theory of concepts. Both accounts reflect a methodological naturalism and are defended not by way of metaphysical considerations, but in terms of their philosophical fruitfulness. A core theme is that the epistemic interests of scientists have to be taken into account by any naturalistic philosophy of science in general, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Getting It Right By Accident.Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):72-105.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths.Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
    That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • The Case for Infallibilism.Julien Dutant - 2007 - In Carlo Penco, Massimiliano Vignolo, Valeria Ottonelli & Cristina Amoretti (eds.), Proceedings of the 4th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy. Genoa: University of Genoa. pp. 59-84.
    Infallibilism is the claim that knowledge requires that one satisfies some infallibility condition. I spell out three distinct such conditions: epistemic, evidential and modal infallibility. Epistemic infallibility turns out to be simply a consequence of epistemic closure, and is not infallibilist in any relevant sense. Evidential infallibilism i s unwarranted but it is not an satisfactory characterization of the infallibilist intuition. Modal infallibility, by contrast, captures the core infallibilist intuition, and I argue that it is required to solve the Gettier (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):263-327.
    It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a priori, if and when they are justified at all. In this paper I defend this view — ‘rationalism’ — against a recent objection by Timothy Williamson. I argue that his objection fails on multiple grounds, but the reasons why it fails are instructive. Williamson argues from a claim about the semantics of intuitive judgements, to a claim about their psychological underpinnings, to the denial of rationalism. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • On the Proposed Exhaustion of Truth.John Collins - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (4):653.
    Dans la première partie de cet article, je presente une thèse parapluie — la thèse de l'«exhaustion» — qui cerne bien l'élément central des diverses positions déflationnistes au sujet de la vérité : l'idée que le contenu du prédicat de vérité s'épuise entièrement dans le contenu de ce à quoi le prédicats'applique. Je soutiens que cette thèse n'est supportée que d'une manière triviale par l'idée courante que la vérite résiste à une analyse substantielle, car les prédicats en général ne se (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Is reflective equilibrium enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.
    Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method of reflective equilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and a reflective equilibrium methodology. Here, for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
    Given the fundamental role that concepts play in theories of cognition, philosophers and cognitive scientists have a common interest in concepts. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of controversy regarding what kinds of things concepts are, how they are structured, and how they are acquired. This chapter offers a detailed high-level overview and critical evaluation of the main theories of concepts and their motivations. Taking into account the various challenges that each theory faces, the chapter also presents a novel approach (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   252 citations  
  • An Oblique Epistemic Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Alexander S. Harper - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (3):235-256.
    This article argues, against contemporary experimentalist criticism, that conceptual analysis has epistemic value, with a structure that encourages the development of interesting hypotheses which are of the right form to be valuable in diverse areas of philosophy. The article shows, by analysis of the Gettier programme, that conceptual analysis shares the proofs and refutations form Lakatos identified in mathematics. Upon discovery of a counterexample, this structure aids the search for a replacement hypothesis. The search is guided by heuristics. The heuristics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Gettier Problem and the Parable of the Ten Coins.Don S. Levi - 1995 - Philosophy 70 (271):5 - 25.
    ‘Where have you been?’ I expect philosophers to ask me this when I tell them that this paper is on the Gettier Problem. I found it difficult to participate in the discussion of the problem until now because instead of wanting to consider what could be done to revive the project of identifying necessary and conditions for knowledge after the apparent damage done to it by Gettier counter-examples, I wanted to question the legitimacy of the project itself.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Contextualism, invariantism and semantic blindness.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):639-657.
    Epistemic contextualism, many critics argue, entails that ordinary speakers are blind to the fact that knowledge claims have context-sensitive truth conditions. This attribution of blindness, critics add, seriously undermines contextualism. I show that this criticism and, in general, discussions about the error theory entailed by contextualism, greatly underestimates the complexity and diversity of the data about ordinary speakers? inter-contextual judgments, as well as the range of explanatory moves that are open to both invariantists and contextualists concerning such judgments. Contextualism does (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • On the need for a metaphysics of justification.D. E. Bradshaw - 1992 - Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):90-106.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Constitutive Luck.Andrew Latus - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (4):460-475.
    ‘Constitutive luck’ refers to luck that affects the sort of person one is. This article demonstrates that it is a philosophically troubling sort of luck, causing problems in, at least, ethics and political philosophy. Some, notably Susan Hurley, Nicholas Rescher, and Daniel Statman, have argued that such trouble can be avoided, by pointing out that the notion of constitutive luck is incoherent. The article examines this claim by means of a discussion of the idea of luck in general, settling on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • The Theory of Questions, Epistemic Powers, and the Indexical Theory of Knowledge.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):193-238.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Empathy and Emotions: On the Notion of Empathy as Emotional Sharing.Peter Nilsson - 2003 - Dissertation, Umeå University
    The topic of this study is a notion of empathy that is common in philosophy and in the behavioral sciences. It is here referred to as ‘the notion of empathy as emotional sharing’, and it is characterized in terms of three ideas. If a person, S, has empathy with respect to an emotion of another person, O, then (i) S experiences an emotion that is similar to an emotion that O is currently having, (ii) S’s emotion is caused, in a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Warrant and Objectivity.Jon Barton - 2008 - Dissertation, Kings College London
    Wright's _Truth and Objectivity_ seeks to systematise a variety of anti-realist positions. I argue that many objections to the system are avoided by transposing its talk of truth into talk of warrant. However, a problem remains about debates involving 'direction-of-fit'. -/- Dummett introduced 'anti-realism' as a philosophical view informed by mathematical intuitionism. Subsequently, the term has been associated with many debates, ancient and modern. _Truth and Objectivity_ proposes that truth admits of different characteristics; these various debates then concern which characteristics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology.Michael Bishop & J. D. Trout - 2005 - Noûs 39 (4):696-714.
    Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) names a contingently clustered class of methods and theses that have dominated English-speaking epistemology for about the past half-century. The major contemporary theories of SAE include versions of foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and contextualism. While proponents of SAE don’t agree about how to define naturalized epistemology, most agree that a thoroughgoing naturalism in epistemology can’t work. For the purposes of this paper, we will suppose that a naturalistic theory of epistemology takes as its core, as its starting-point, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations