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Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011details
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What is the “Equal Weight View'?Branden Fitelson & David Jehle - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):280-293.details
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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
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Inquiry Beyond Knowledge.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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The value of information and the epistemology of inquiry.Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
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The theory of games as a tool for the social epistemologist.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1381-1401.details
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Just As Planned: Bayesianism, Externalism, and Plan Coherence.Pablo Zendejas Medina - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23.details
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The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.Ru Ye - 2019 - Episteme:1-20.details
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Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.details
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Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.details
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Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.details
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Consequences of Calibration.Robert Williams & Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:14.details
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Why change your beliefs rather than your desires? Two puzzles.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):275-281.details
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On the Ecological and Internal Rationality of Bayesian Conditionalization and Other Belief Updating Strategies.Olav Benjamin Vassend - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Justifying the Norms of Inductive Inference.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (1):135-160.details
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Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism.Brett Topey - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1407-1433.details
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Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.details
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Should I pretend I'm perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.details
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Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3837-3856.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist.Daniel J. Singer - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):580-602.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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XII—Deferring to Doubt.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):269-290.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):639-663.details
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Diachronic Norms for Self-Locating Beliefs.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
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Accuracy and Verisimilitude: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):373-406.details
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An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
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Ideological innocence.Daniel Rubio - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-22.details
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On the proper formulation of conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):1935-1965.details
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An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1013-1041.details
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Open-Minded Orthodox Bayesianism by Epsilon-Conditionalization.Eric Raidl - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (1):139-176.details
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A Battle in the Statistics Wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13689-13748.details
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Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Domination Results for Proper Scoring Rules.Alexander R. Pruss - 2024 - Review of Symbolic Logic 17 (1):132-143.details
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Accuracy, probabilism and Bayesian update in infinite domains.Alexander R. Pruss - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-29.details
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What is justified credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.details
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How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Episteme:1-25.details
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What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3427-3463.details
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The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):336-372.details
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Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):749-754.details
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Précis and replies to contributors for book symposium on accuracy and the laws of credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):1-30.details
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On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12407-12438.details
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Logical ignorance and logical learning.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9991-10020.details
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Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of ‘the will to believe’.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):253-268.details
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Bayesian updating when what you learn might be false.Richard Pettigrew - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):309-324.details
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