- Do We See Facts?Alfredo Vernazzani - 2020 - Mind and Language (4):674-693.details
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Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.details
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Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.details
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Undetachable Concepts in Non-Human Animals.Laura Danón - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (2):14.details
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Two conceptions of conceptualism and nonconceptualism.T. M. Crowther - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276.details
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Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)?Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):316-337.details
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Demonstrative concepts without reidentification.Philippe Chuard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.details
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Taking non‐conceptualism back to Dharmakīrti.Amit Chaturvedi - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):3-29.details
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Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9243-9272.details
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Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus‐Independence.Elisabeth Camp - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.details
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Nonconceptual apprehension and the reason-giving character of perception.Arnon Cahen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2355-2383.details
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Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.details
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Strong representationalism and centered content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.details
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Perceptual justification and assertively representing the world.Jochen Briesen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2239-2259.details
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Consciousness and content in perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):41-54.details
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Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique.Matthew Boyle - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):527-555.details
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Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.details
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Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions.Reid D. Blackman - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):67-90.details
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What is at stake in the debate on nonconceptual content?José Luis Bermúdez - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):55–72.details
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Immunity to error through misidentification and past-tense memory judgements.J. L. Bermudez - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):211-220.details
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Practical Perception and Intelligent Action.John Bengson - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):25-58.details
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On Perceptual Confidence and “Completely Trusting Your Experience”.Jacob Beck - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (2):174-188.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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The conceptual nature of imaginative content.Margherita Arcangeli - 2020 - Synthese (1-2).details
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Thinking through illusion.Dominic Alford-Duguid - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):617-638.details
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A Note on McDowell's Response to the Fineness of Grain Argument.Andre J. Abath - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):677-686.details
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What is Conscious Attention?Wayne Wu - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):93-120.details
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Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.details
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Compositionality, iconicity, and perceptual nonconceptualism.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):177-193.details
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Reduction and the determination of phenomenal character.Jennifer Matey - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):291-316.details
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First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):947-969.details
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Empirical Support for Perceptual Conceptualism.Nicolás Alejandro Serrano - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (2):8.details
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Internalist Reliabilism.Matthias Steup - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):403-425.details
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Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.details
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Defeating looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Synthese 195 (7):2985-3012.details
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Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism.Daniel Enrique Kalpokas - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):715-738.details
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Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.details
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Pictures Have Propositional Content.Alex Grzankowski - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):151-163.details
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Pictures, Propositions, and Predicates.Dominic Gregory - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):155-170.details
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Belief, Re‐identification and Fineness of Grain.Bénédicte Veillet - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):229-248.details
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Walter Hopp, Perception and Knowledge: a Phenomenological Account: Cambridge University Press. 2011. ISBN: 978-1-107-00316-3. [REVIEW]Corijn van Mazijk - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1185-1191.details
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Emotion and the new epistemic challenge from cognitive penetrability.Jona Vance - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):257-283.details
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Defining and defending nonconceptual contents and states.James Van Cleve - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):411-430.details
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Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):295-313.details
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Burge on Perceptual Entitlement.Hamid Vahid - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (3):187-203.details
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Opacity, Know-How States, and their Content.Josefa Toribio - 2015 - Disputatio 7 (40):61-83.details
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Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 17):1-19.details
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Non‐epistemic perception as technology.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):324-345.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.details
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