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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Explaining coincidences.Julio De Rizzo - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14843-14864.details
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Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism?Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A:30-38.details
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How do practising clinicians and students apply newly learned causal information about mental disorders?Leontien de Kwaadsteniet, Nancy S. Kim & Jennelle E. Yopchick - 2013 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (1):112-117.details
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The Deductive Method.Daniel M. Hausman - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):372-388.details
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New Axioms for Probability and Likelihood Ratio Measures.Vincenzo Crupi, Nick Chater & Katya Tentori - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):189-204.details
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On Russell's principle of induction.Newton C. A. Costa & Steven French - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):285-295.details
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Confirmation theory and indispensability.Mark Colyvan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 96 (1):1-19.details
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A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651.details
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Some problems for bayesian confirmation theory.Charles S. Chihara - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):551-560.details
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Is Epistemic Anxiety an Intellectual Virtue?Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-25.details
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Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited.Peter Brössel - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):521-553.details
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On the role of explanatory and systematic power in scientific reasoning.Peter Brössel - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3877-3913.details
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Monty hall, doomsday and confirmation.Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):23–31.details
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Four Problems about Self-Locating Belief.Darren Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177.details
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Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty.Darren Bradley - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.details
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Conditionalization and Belief De Se.Darren Bradley - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):247-250.details
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Realism versus anti-realism: philosophical problem or scientific concern?Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):3961-3977.details
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Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.details
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Evil and the god of indifference.László Bernáth & Daniel Kodaj - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (3):259-272.details
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A strike against a striking principle.Dan Baras - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1501-1514.details
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Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon G. Brittan - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):259-293.details
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Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
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The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.details
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Independent Tests and the Log‐Likelihood‐Ratio Measure of Confirmation.Alexander R. Pruss - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):124-135.details
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Critical review: Horwich on the ravens, projectability and induction. [REVIEW]James Woodward - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (3):409 - 428.details
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Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress.J. D. Trout - 1991 - Synthese 87 (June):379-400.details
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Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?Katya Tentori, Nick Chater & Vincenzo Crupi - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):758-778.details
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Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Sharon Street - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):213-248.details
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Hypothetico‐Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.details
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Probabilistic measures of coherence: from adequacy constraints towards pluralism.Michael Schippers - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3821-3845.details
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Hempel's Paradox, Law‐likeness and Causal Relations.Severin Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (3):244-263.details
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Scientific innovation and the limits of social scientific prediction.Alex Rosenberg - 1993 - Synthese 97 (2):161 - 181.details
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A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.Susanna Rinard - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100.details
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What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.details
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Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.details
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Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance.Robert T. Pennock - 2004 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-26.details
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Not giving the skeptic a hearing: Pragmatism and radical doubt.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):98–126.details
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Corroborating testimony, probability and surprise.Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):273-288.details
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What did Hume really show about induction?Samir Okasha - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):307-327.details
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The uncertain reasoner: Bayes, logic, and rationality.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.details
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Précis of bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):69-84.details
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Conditional probability and the cognitive science of conditional reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):359–379.details
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Deontic Reasoning, Modules and Innateness: A Second Look.Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):191-202.details
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