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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Sleeping beauty should be imprecise.Daniel Jeremy Singer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3159-3172.details
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Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
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Book review. [REVIEW]Michael Schütte - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):143-146.details
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A Conflict between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation.Joel Pust - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (3):385-397.details
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Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation.Andrew Peet - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):395-416.details
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What evidence do you have?Ram Neta - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):89-119.details
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Bayesian agnosticism and constructive empiricism.Bradley Monton - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):207–212.details
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What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
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Calibrated probabilities and the epistemology of disagreement.Barry Lam - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1079-1098.details
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This paper surely contains some errors.Brian Kim - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1013-1029.details
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A dilemma for the imprecise bayesian.Namjoong Kim - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1681-1702.details
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Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Ramsey's Foundations Extended to Desirabilities.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (3):231-278.details
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Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.details
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The Thomas-Nolt Dispute: Some Lessons about Induction.David Hitchcock - 1999 - Informal Logic 19 (2).details
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Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
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Restoring ambiguity to Achinstein's account of evidence.Steven Gimbel - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):269-285.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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