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Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.details
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Should we respond to evil with indifference?Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):613–635.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.details
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Reliabilism and imprecise credences.Weng Hong Tang - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1463-1480.details
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What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.details
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Uncertainty, equality, fraternity.Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9603-9619.details
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Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):17-45.details
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How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss.Katie Steele - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):427-444.details
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Distinguishing indeterminate belief from “risk-averse” preferences.Katie Steele - 2007 - Synthese 158 (2):189-205.details
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Distention for Sets of Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):604-620.details
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Conditional choice with a vacuous second tier.Rush T. Stewart - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):219-243.details
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Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2018 - Philosophy of Science (2):236-254.details
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Respecting Evidence: Belief Functions not Imprecise Probabilities.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (475):1-30.details
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Acting on belief functions.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2023 - Theory and Decision 95 (4):575-621.details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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Rationality and uncertainty.Amartya Sen - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (2):109-127.details
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Substitution of indifferent options at choice nodes and admissibility: a reply to Rabinowicz.Teddy Seidenfeld - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (4):305-310.details
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Statistical Evidence and Belief Functions.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1978 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978 (2):478-489.details
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Coherent choice functions under uncertainty.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):157-176.details
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A contrast between two decision rules for use with (convex) sets of probabilities: Γ-maximin versus e-admissibilty.T. Seidenfeld - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):69 - 88.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Decision making in the face of parity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277.details
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Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
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Is it rational to carry out strategic intentions?Michael H. Robins - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):191-221.details
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Chance without Credence.John T. Roberts - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):33-59.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions.Agustín Rayo - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):289 - 295.details
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Robust Bayes classifiers.Marco Ramoni & Paola Sebastiani - 2001 - Artificial Intelligence 125 (1-2):209-226.details
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Probabilistic Belief Contraction.Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.details
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A Battle in the Statistics Wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13689-13748.details
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Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.details
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Comparative Expectations.Arthur Paul Pedersen - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):811-848.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Sobre la justificación de las proposiciones ante los desafíos escépticos.Federico Matías Pailós - 2014 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 47:249-258.details
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Choosing and Describing: Sen and the Irrelevance of Independence Alternatives. [REVIEW]Michael Neumann - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (1):79-94.details
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Pascal’s Wager and Decision-making with Imprecise Probabilities.André Neiva - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (3):1479-1508.details
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Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):620-638.details
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Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
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Uncertainty, credal sets and second order probability.Jonas Clausen Mork - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):353-378.details
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Models for belief revision.Raymundo Morado - 1992 - Philosophical Issues 2:227-247.details
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Un problème interne à la Théorie de la justice : comment concilier les différents arguments de Rawls pour le principe de différence?Philippe Mongin - 2020 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 135 (4):29-41.details
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Maximal Cluelessness.Andreas Mogensen - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):141-162.details
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Critical notice.Alexander Miller - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):125 – 140.details
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Critical notice.David Miller, Catherine Z. Elgin, Jonathan E. Adler & Douglas N. Walton - 1980 - Synthese 43 (3):125 – 140.details
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Ordering and Independence.Edward F. McClennen - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):298-308.details
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Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.details
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Axiomatic justifications of the utility principle: A formal investigation.Per-Erik Malmnäs - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):233 - 249.details
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