- Experimental philosophy and the method of cases.Joachim Horvath & Steffen Koch - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716.details
|
|
On Second Thought: Reflections on the Reflection Defense.Markus Kneer, David Colaco, Joshua Alexander & Edouard Machery - 2021 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 4. New York: pp. 257–296.details
|
|
Counterpossibles.Alexander W. Kocurek - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11):e12787.details
|
|
The Epistemology of Modality.Margot Strohminger & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):825-838.details
|
|
Getting Gettier straight: thought experiments, deviant realizations and default interpretations.Pierre Saint-Germier - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1783-1806.details
|
|
Modal skepticism and counterfactual knowledge.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):605-623.details
|
|
Evidence and intuition.Yuri Cath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):311-328.details
|
|
Realism and relativism about the normative.Paul Boghossian - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
|
|
Recent Attempts to Defend the Philosophical Method of Cases and the Linguistic (Re)turn.Avner Baz - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):105-130.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
How to Use Thought Experiments.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Teleologies and the Methodology of Epistemology.Georgi Gardiner - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 31-45.details
|
|
Interpreting Intuitions.Marcus McGahhey & Neil Van Leeuwen - 2018 - In Julie Kirsch Patrizia Pedrini (ed.), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 73-98.details
|
|
Platonism and the Apriori in Thought Experiments.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge.details
|
|
Thought experiments in current metaphilosophical debates.Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist - 2018 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge. pp. 406-424.details
|
|
Avner Baz on the ‘Point’ of a Question.Max Deutsch - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):875-894.details
|
|
Semantic externalism without thought experiments.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2018 - Analysis (1):81-89.details
|
|
Running risks morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.details
|
|
Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
|
|
Modal Humeanism and Arguments from Possibility.Margot Strohminger - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):391-401.details
|
|
Thought Experiments, Semantic Intuitions and the Overlooked Interpretative Procedure.Krzysztof Sękowski - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.details
|
|
The ‘If’ in the ‘What If’.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):811-820.details
|
|
The ‘If’ in the ‘What If’.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):811-820.details
|
|
Carving Intuition at its Joints.Jason Schukraft - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):326-352.details
|
|
Kant on the epistemic role of the imagination.Tobias Rosefeldt - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3171-3192.details
|
|
New Arguments that Philosophers don't Treat Intuitions as Evidence.Bernard Molyneux - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (3):441-461.details
|
|
Varieties of Inference?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.details
|
|
Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge.Antonella Mallozzi - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1315-1337.details
|
|
Précis of Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds.Edouard Machery - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):221-229.details
|
|
On the Problem of Deviant Realizations.Kok Yong Lee - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1250-1269.details
|
|
The threat of the intuition-shaped hole.Ethan Landes - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):539-564.details
|
|
The traditional conception of the a priori.Masashi Kasaki & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2725-2746.details
|
|
Intuitions as inferential judgments.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):7-29.details
|
|
A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem.Paul Oghenovo Irikefe - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):840-867.details
|
|
Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View.Joachim Horvath - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):724-750.details
|
|
Thought Experiments, Formalization, and Disagreement.Sören Häggqvist - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):801-810.details
|
|
Judgements, Expertise, and Counterfactuals.Sören Häggqvist - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):741-754.details
|
|
Are Gettier cases disturbing?Peter Hawke & Tom Schoonen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1503-1527.details
|
|
Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations.Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):525-533.details
|
|
Judgements about Thought Experiments.Alexander Geddes - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):35-67.details
|
|
Normalcy and the Contents of Philosophical Judgements.Georgi Gardiner - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):700-740.details
|
|
The Problem of Intuitive Presence.Miguel Egler - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
|
|
Philosophical Methods Under Scrutiny: Introduction to the Special Issue "Philosophical Methods".Anna-Maria A. Eder, Insa Lawler & Raphael van Riel - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):915-923.details
|
|
Philosophical expertise beyond intuitions.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):253-277.details
|
|
Thought experiments without possible worlds.Daniel Dohrn - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):363-384.details
|
|
Counterfactuals versus conceivability as a guide to modal knowledge.Daniel Dohrn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3637-3659.details
|
|
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Intuition.Joel Pust - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Thought Experiments.Yiftach J. H. Fehige & James R. Brown - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 25 (1):135-142.details
|
|