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The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.details
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Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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Knowing By Perceiving, by Alan Millar.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Mind 132 (527):852-861.details
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The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.details
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Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press.details
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Wilfrid Sellars, perceptual consciousness, and theory of attention.Paul Coates - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-25.details
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Nonconceptual apprehension and the reason-giving character of perception.Arnon Cahen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2355-2383.details
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Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack on Propositionalism.Attila Tanyi & Morganti Matteo - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):185-205.details
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Fregean Particularism.Susanna Schellenberg - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge as evidence.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):1-25.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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The normative force of reasoning.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):660–686.details
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Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):295-313.details
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A Reverse Interpretation Model of Testimony.Hamid Vahid - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):85-102.details
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Burge on Perceptual Entitlement.Hamid Vahid - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (3):187-203.details
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Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content.Michael Tye - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.details
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Nonconceptual content.Josefa Toribio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.details
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Justified group belief is evidentially responsible group belief.Paul Silva - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):262-281.details
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The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content.Robert Schroer - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.details
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The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):114-135.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism by Duncan Pritchard.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):604-615.details
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The Singular Relational plus Relativistic Content View.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (1):93-114.details
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Saving epistemology from the epistemologists: recent work in the theory of knowledge.Adam Morton - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):685-704.details
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What is it that cognitive abilities are abilities to do?Alan Millar - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (4):223-236.details
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Scepticism, perceptual knowledge, and doxastic responsibility.Alan Millar - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):353-372.details
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Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.details
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How visual perception yields reasons for belief.Alan Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):332-351.details
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Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):82-117.details
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Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of the subjective perceptual experience.Steven Lehar - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):763-764.details
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Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):933-955.details
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Naïve realism and seeing aspects.Daniel E. Kalpokas - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.details
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Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory.Steven James - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 64:189-200.details
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Conceptualism and the myth of the given.Walter Hopp - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):363-385.details
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Reasons for belief, reasoning, virtues.Christopher Hookway - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):47--70.details
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A modest solution to the problem of rule-following.Frank A. Hindriks - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98.details
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Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism.Coos Engelsma - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.details
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Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.Jonathan Way - 2017 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7. Oxford University Press.details
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Prime Time (for the Basing Relation).Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2020 - In J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation.details
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Nonconceptual mental content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Concepts as soft detectors - On the role concepts play in perception.Paweł Grabarczyk - 2016 - New Ideas in Psychology 40:86-93.details
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Mary’s Scientific Knowledge.Luca Malatesti - 2008 - Prolegomena 7 (1):37-59.details
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The Case for Infallibilism.Julien Dutant - 2007 - In C. Penco, M. Vignolo, V. Ottonelli & C. Amoretti (eds.), Proceedings of the 4th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy. Genoa: University of Genoa. pp. 59-84.details
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The Knowledge Argument.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Stirlingdetails
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Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirlingdetails
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Is There Non-Inferential Justification?James Pryor - unknowndetails
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