- Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):689-704.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan H.\'aje & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Cognitive Mobile Homes.Daniel Greco - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):93-121.details
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Acting on Probabilistic Knowledge.Daniel Greco - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (1):109-117.details
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Moral encroachment and the epistemic impermissibility of (some) microaggressions.Javiera Perez Gomez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9237-9256.details
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Triviality Results For Probabilistic Modals.Goldstein Simon - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):188-222.details
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Losing Confidence in Luminosity.Simon Goldstein & Daniel Waxman - 2020 - Noûs (4):1-30.details
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Losing confidence in luminosity.Simon Goldstein & Daniel Waxman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):962-991.details
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Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
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Self‐deception and pragmatic encroachment: A dilemma for epistemic rationality.Jie Gao - 2020 - Ratio 34 (1):20-32.details
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Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.details
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Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind.James Fritz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3051-3070.details
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Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.James Fritz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1191-1210.details
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Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.details
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Encroachment on Emotion.James Fritz - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):515-533.details
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Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.James Fritz - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):98-116.details
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Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):963-981.details
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Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.details
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Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right.Davide Fassio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):265-289.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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Formal Epistemology.Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):651-662.details
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Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):261-285.details
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Against philosophical proofs against common sense.Louis Doulas & Evan Welchance - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):207–215.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Public Justification and the Veil of Testimony.Sean Donahue - 2020 - Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (4):378-396.details
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Knowledge and non-traditional factors: prospects for doxastic accounts.Alexander Dinges - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8267-8288.details
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Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
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Assertion and Certainty.Alexander Dinges - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):169-186.details
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Knowledge: A Human Interest Story.Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
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Ethics and Epistemic Hopelessness.James Fritz - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):977–1005.details
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Instrumentalism, Moral Encroachment, and Epistemic Injustice.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Resource Rationality.Thomas F. Icard - manuscriptdetails
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Wagering on Pragmatic Encroachment.Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8:96-117.details
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A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.details
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Rational Faith and Justified Belief.Lara Buchak - 2014 - In Timothy O'Connor & Laura Frances Callahan (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-73.details
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Wittgenstein and Contemporary Belief-Credence Dualism.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Wittgenstein and the Epistemology of Religion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Explaining the Justificatory Asymmetry between Statistical and Individualized Evidence.Renee Bolinger - forthcoming - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge. pp. 60-76.details
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Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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An externalist decision theory for a pragmatic epistemology.Brian Kim - 2019 - In Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.details
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Morality Under Risk.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2019 - Dissertation, details
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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Credal sensitivism: threshold vs. credence-one.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Contextualism about Belief Ascriptions.Clarke Roger - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. London, UK: pp. 400-410.details
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In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge Series in Epistemology. pp. 129-153.details
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The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
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When Obstinacy is a Better Policy.Justin Dallmann - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.details
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