- Inquiry, reasoning and the normativity of logic.van Remmen Maximilian - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-28.details
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The irrelevance of the subject: Against subject-sensitive invariantism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.details
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Can we Agree About agree?Emmanuel Chemla & B. R. George - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):243-264.details
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Idle Questions.Jens Kipper, Alexander W. Kocurek & Zeynep Soysal - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy.details
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Better virtuous than safe.Haicheng Zhao - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):6969-6991.details
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Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and Action.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):341-355.details
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Three Arguments for Humility.David Yates - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):461-481.details
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Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
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Open knowledge and changing the subject.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1047-1071.details
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Who Asks Questions and Who Benefits from Answers: Understanding Institutions in Terms of Social Epistemic Dependencies.Konrad Werner - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-31.details
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Subject-specific intellectualism: re-examining know how and ability.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1619-1638.details
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What the metasemantics of "know" is not.Peter van Elswyk - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1):69-82.details
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Unreliable Knowledge.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):529-545.details
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Knowledge and assertion in “Gettier” cases.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):759-775.details
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Reliabilism Defended.Jeffrey Tolly - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):619-635.details
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What You Know When You Know an Answer to a Question.Rowland Stout - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):392 - 402.details
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Knowing the Answer to a Loaded Question.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2015 - Theoria 81 (2):97-125.details
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An instrumentalist unification of zetetic and epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Approaching Truth by Resolving Questions.Jakob Süskind - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.details
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Negative Reason Existentials.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):108-116.details
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Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives.Justin Snedegar - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):682-702.details
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Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought.Justin Snedegar - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (6):379-388.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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What’s your Opinion? Negation and ‘Weak’ Attitude Verbs.Henry Ian Schiller - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1141-1161.details
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The Contrast-sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245.details
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Knowing the Answer Redux: Replies to Brogaard and Kallestrup.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):477-500.details
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Knowledge in the image of assertion.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.details
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Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):491-543.details
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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
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Closure, Contrast, and Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):233-255.details
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A counterexample to the contrastive account of knowledge.Jason Rourke - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):637-643.details
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Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):839-866.details
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The knowledge relation: Binary or ternary?René van Woudenberg - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):281-288.details
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Contrastive Intentions.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (4):24.details
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Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.details
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Rule Following and Metaontology.T. Parent - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (5):247-265.details
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Knowing‐Wh and Embedded Questions.Ted Parent - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):81-95.details
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Externalism and “knowing what” one thinks.T. Parent - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1337-1350.details
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Modeling practical thinking.Matthew Mosdell - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (4):445-464.details
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A modal theory of discrimination.Guido Melchior - 2021 - Synthese 198 (11):10661-10684.details
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Questions, answers, and knowledge- wh.Meghan Masto - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):395-413.details
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Skepticism Between Excessiveness and Idleness.Berislav Marušić - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):60-83.details
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First‐Person Authority: An Epistemic‐Pragmatic Account.Neil C. Manson - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):181-199.details
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Knowing What an Experience Is Like and the Reductive Theory of Knowledge‐wh.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):252-275.details
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Humility and constraints on O-language.Stephan Leuenberger - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):327-354.details
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Giving the Value of a Variable.Richard Lawrence - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):135-150.details
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In defense of subject-sensitive invariantism.Brian Kim - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):233-251.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals.Ben Holguín - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771.details
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