- Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error.Andy Egan - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.details
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The Moral Irrelevance of Constitutive Luck.Mihailis E. Diamantis - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1331-1346.details
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Mathematics and conceptual analysis.Antony Eagle - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):67–88.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐naturalism.Billy Dunaway - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):627-655.details
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Moral psychology and expressivism.Robert Dunn - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):178–198.details
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Moraliser les conventions.Benoit Dubreuil - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):261-280.details
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What a Difference Emotions Make.Sabine A. Döring - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 191–199.details
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Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise.Julia Driver - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):619-644.details
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Love, Reasons, and Desire.Nicholas Drake - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3):591-605.details
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Remembering what is right.Casey Doyle - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):49-64.details
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Why should Welfare ‘Fit’?Dale Dorsey - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):685-24.details
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Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism.Alexander Dietz - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):497-510.details
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Affective Consciousness and Moral Status.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Suppositional Desires and Rational Choice Under Moral Uncertainty.Nicholas Makins - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
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Aspects of Blame: In which the nature of blame, blameworthiness, standing to blame and proportional blame are discussed.Marta Johansson Werkmäster - 2023 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Urges.Ashley Shaw - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.details
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Émotions et Valeurs.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.details
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Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.details
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The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation.Adam Lerner - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:123-144.details
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Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.details
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Irreducibly Normative Properties.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10:216–244.details
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The Goals of Moral Worth.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.details
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Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Moral Reality: A Defence of Moral Realism.Caj Strandberg - 2004 - Lund University.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Metaethics After Moore.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Corrupting the youth: a history of philosophy in Australia.James Franklin - 2003 - Sydney, Australia: Macleay Press.details
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Realism.Alexandern D. Miller - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Is Epistemology Autonomous?Daniel Greco - 2019 - In John McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Insight Knowledge of No Self in Buddhism: An Epistemic Analysis.Miri Albahari - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.details
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A defence of the desire theory of well-being.Atus Mariqueo-Russell - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Southamptondetails
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Hume on Justice.Rosalind Hursthouse - 2009 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264.details
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Actions of Trust and Their Cognitive Motivation.Christian Carbonell - 2021 - Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Australasia 3:19-35.details
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Nomic moral naturalness.Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.details
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Pluralists about Pluralism? Versions of Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry.Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti, D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, Th Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science (The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Series). Springer. pp. 105-119.details
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Is the Achievement of Moral Character the Ultimate Goal of Higher Education?Lee Jeong-Kyu - 2022 - Eric.details
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Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Walesdetails
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Hip to Be Square: Moral Saints Revisited.Liam D. Ryan - 2023 - Ethics, Politics and Society 6 (2):1-25.details
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The case against evaluative realism.Dan López de Sa - 2006 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (3):277-294.details
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How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression.Gunnar Björnsson - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.details
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A Hybrid Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Connecticutdetails
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Altruistic Motivation Beyond Ultimate Desires.Junior Mendonca - 2023 - Dissertation, The University of Western Australiadetails
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Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.Jonathan Way - 2017 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7. Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.details
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