- (1 other version)Knowledge: A Human Interest Story.Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
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Prescriptive and Evaluative Norms of Assertion.Jonathan Ichikawa - forthcoming - Analysis Reviews.details
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Knowledge, true belief, and the gradability of ignorance.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):893-916.details
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Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Interrogatives, inquiries, and exam questions.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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Fictional Reality.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - manuscriptdetails
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Really Knowing: A Collocational Argument for an Infallibilist Sense of ‘Know’.Mark Satta - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):394-408.details
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Interval-based Dynamics of Loose Talk.Charlie Siu - 2023 - Synthese 202 (10):1-23.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):333-359.details
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The Paradox of Graded Justification.Logins Arturs - forthcoming - Episteme:1-32.details
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The insignificance of philosophical skepticism.Jonathan Dixon - 2022 - Synthese 200 (485):1-22.details
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Not Half True.Poppy Mankowitz - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):84-112.details
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Assertion and the “How do you know?” challenge.Eliran Haziza - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-17.details
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Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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Thinking and being sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):634-654.details
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Epistemic Contradictions Do Not Threaten Classical Logic.Philipp Mayr - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):551-573.details
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P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.details
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Knowledge by constraint.Ben Holguín - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):1-28.details
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An Explanationist Account of Genealogical Defeat.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):176-195.details
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Real and ideal rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):879-910.details
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The knowledge norm of assertion: keep it simple.Max Lewis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12963-12984.details
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Skepticism.Allan Hazlett - 2018 - In Heather D. Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.details
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Truth and ignorance.Brent G. Kyle - 2020 - Synthese (8):1-24.details
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(1 other version)Force, content and the varieties of unity.Michael Schmitz - 2021 - In Gabriele Mras & Michael Schmitz (eds.), Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition. New York: Routledge. pp. 71-90.details
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Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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Strong knowledge, weak belief?Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8741-8753.details
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Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge.Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (3).details
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Free Will in Context.Patrick Grim - 2007 - Behavioral Science and the Law 25:183-201.details
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Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.details
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The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)You gotta believe.John Turri - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 193-199.details
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Linguistic intuitions in context: a defense of nonskeptical pure invariantism.John Turri - 2014 - In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 165-184.details
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To lie or to mislead?Felix Https://Orcidorg Timmermann & Emanuel Https://Orcidorg Viebahn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1481-1501.details
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Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals.Ben Holguín - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771.details
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Knowledge and cancelability.Tammo Lossau - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):397-405.details
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Belief, Rational and Justified.Wes Siscoe - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):59-83.details
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(1 other version)Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support?Artūrs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1231-1255.details
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Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Dissertation, details
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What's the Point of Understanding?Michael Hannon - 2019 - In What's the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Certainty in Action.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):711-737.details
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Describing Law.Raff Donelson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 33 (1):85-106.details
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Logical Omnipotence and Two notions of Implicit Belief.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2019 - In Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.), Epistemologia Analítica: Debates Contemporâneos. Porto Alegre: Editora Fi. pp. 29-46.details
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Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief: why you know your ticket will lose.Mylan Engel - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7891-7921.details
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Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):328-352.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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A solution to the many attitudes problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.details
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Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.details
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