- Three things to do with knowledge ascriptions.Tammo Lossau - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):99-110.details
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Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition.Wesley Buckwalter - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):294-308.details
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Knowing What It is Like and Testimony.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):105-120.details
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Assertion and Modality.Fabrizio Cariani - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 505-528.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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Conhecimento, Contexto e Infiltração Pragmática.T. V. Rodrigues - 2013 - Intuitio (Nº 2):05-18.details
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Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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Googled Assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501.details
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Knowledge and normativity.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.details
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Objectivism and Subjectivism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Elusive Counterfactuals.Karen S. Lewis - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):286-313.details
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Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?Thomas Kelly - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179-209.details
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Evidence and armchair access.Clayton Mitchell Littlejohn - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):479-500.details
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Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology.John Turri & Wesley Buckwalter - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):25-46.details
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Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.details
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Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.details
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Telling, showing and knowing: A unified theory of pedagogical norms.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):16-20.details
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No Evidence is False.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.details
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Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory.John Turri - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):83-98.details
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A problem for Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):253-275.details
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Common sense as evidence: Against revisionary ontology and skepticism.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):53-78.details
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Knowledge by indifference.Gillian K. Russell & John M. Doris - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):429 – 437.details
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The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.details
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Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.details
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On the linguistic basis for contextualism.Jason Stanley - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):119-146.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Knowledge, assertion and lotteries.Keith DeRose - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568–580.details
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Withdrawal and contextualism.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):280–285.details
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Perception and conceptual content.Alex Byrne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 231--250.details
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Escepticismo y anti-intelectualismo: una revisión del ideal socrático desde la perspectiva pirrónica.Jorge Ornelas - 2014 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 46:175-202.details
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Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):689-704.details
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Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K.Artūrs Logins - 2016 - Theoria 83 (2):120-137.details
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Introduction.Baumann Peter - 2016 - In Peter Baumann (ed.), Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 1-5.details
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Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):69-104.details
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Pritchard’s Reasons in advance.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.details
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The Truth in Gnosticism.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica.details
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What is Knowledge?Quassim Cassam - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:101-120.details
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Meta-epistemological Scepticism: Criticisms and a Defence.Chris Ranalli - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Skepticism and the Prediction Objection.Esben Petersen - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (3):193-217.details
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Pritchard’s Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:201-219.details
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Epistemology Idealized.Robert Pasnau - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):987-1021.details
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Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias.John Turri - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):307-324.details
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Davidson was Almost Right about Lying.Don Fallis - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.details
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Knowledge Guaranteed.John Turri - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):602-612.details
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Two Types of Scepticism.Douglas Odegard - 1979 - Philosophy 54 (210):459 - 472.details
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