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Being Rational and Being Right, by Juan Comesaña.Mona Simion - 2022 - Mind 131 (523):1005-1015.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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DefendingThe Epistemic Role of Consciousness: Replies to Byrne, Gertler and Kornblith.Declan Smithies - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):803-816.details
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The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.details
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Nonconceptual modes of presentation.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2006 - European Review of Philosophy 6:65-81.details
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The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation.Harald R. Wohlrapp - 2014 - Dordrecht NL: Springer.details
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Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
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Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.details
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Naïve realism about unconscious perception.Paweł Jakub Zięba - 2019 - Synthese 196 (5):2045-2073.details
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The epistemic import of phenomenal consciousness.Paweł Jakub Zięba - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-37.details
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Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):56-71.details
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Sensitivity Unmotivated.Haicheng Zhao - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):507-517.details
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Revisiting Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Haicheng Zhao - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):847-856.details
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Knowledge without safety.Haicheng Zhao - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3261-3278.details
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Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (2):833-845.details
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Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’?Haicheng Zhao & Peter Baumann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):118-126.details
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Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):391-401.details
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A Dilemma for Globalized Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):249-261.details
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Just As Planned: Bayesianism, Externalism, and Plan Coherence.Pablo Zendejas Medina - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23.details
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No State A Priori Known to Be Factive is Mental.Elia Zardini - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):462-492.details
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K ⊈ E.Elia Zardini - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):540-557.details
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Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and Action.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):341-355.details
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Luminosity and determinacy.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):765-786.details
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Closed without boundaries.Elia Zardini - 2020 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):641-679.details
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Epistemic Pluralism.Nick Zangwill - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (4):485-498.details
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How I Know I'm Not a Brain in a Vat.José L. Zalabardo - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:65-88.details
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Inferentialism and knowledge: Brandom’s arguments against reliabilism.José L. Zalabardo - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 4):975-993.details
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Has Williamson's Claim that Knowledge Is the most General Factive Mental State Been Disproved?Balder Edmund Ask Zaar - 2021 - Theoria 87 (6):1609-1634.details
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Assertion, Stakes and Expected Blameworthiness: An Insensitive Invariantist Solution to the Bank Cases.Brandon Yip - 2020 - Erkenntnis (4):1501-1519.details
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On Extreme versus Moderate Methodological Naturalism.Feng Ye - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):371-385.details
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Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.details
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Thinking animals, disagreement, and skepticism.Eric Yang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):109-121.details
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Getting It Right By Accident.Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):72-105.details
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Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.details
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A Probabilistic Approach to Epistemic Safety from the Perspective of Ascribers.Yingjin Xu - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):31-46.details
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The many (yet few) faces of deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.details
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Why There are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.details
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Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (1):115-136.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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What Williamson's anti-luminosity argument really is.Wai-Hung Wong - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543.details
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The Ordinary Language Case for Contextualism and the Relevance of Radical Doubt.Michael P. Wolf & Jeremy Randel Koons - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):66-94.details
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Mere formalities: fictional normativity and normative authority.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):1-23.details
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Russellian Acquaintance and Frege’s Puzzle.Donovan Wishon - 2016 - Mind 126 (502):321-370.details
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Critical Reasoning and the Inferential Transparency Method.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):23-42.details
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Ways to Knowledge-First Believe.Simon Wimmer - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1189-1205.details
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P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.details
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