- Epistemic and Aesthetic Conflict.Zoe Jenkin - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (4):457-479.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Trying without fail.Ben Holguín & Harvey Lederman - manuscriptdetails
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Perception needs modular stimulus-control.Anders Nes - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-30.details
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Inferential Deflationism.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.details
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Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first program.Paul Silva & Sven Bernecker - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):617-625.details
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Stupefying.Michael Deigan - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1).details
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Curiosity and Zetetic Style in ADHD.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Somogy Varga - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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The evidence in perception.Ali Hasan - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Group Dispositional Belief, Information Possession, and “Epistemic Explosion”: A Further Reply to Jesper Kallestrup.Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (5):8-16.details
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Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.details
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Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.details
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Epistemic Norms for Public Political Arguments.Christoph Lumer - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (1):63-83.details
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Implicit Bias: from social structure to representational format.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1):41-60.details
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Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.details
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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Aesthetic Testimony and Aesthetic Authenticity.Felix Bräuer - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (3):395–416.details
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Rethinking Implicatures.Matheus Silva - manuscriptdetails
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Naming and epistemic necessity.Dilip Ninan - 2019 - Noûs 55 (2):334-362.details
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Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.details
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The Microstructure of Experience.Andrew Y. Lee - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):286-305.details
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Knowledge Is All You Need.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):353-378.details
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Brains in vats and model theory.Tim Button - 2015 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-154.details
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Neutralism and the Observational Sorites Paradox.Patrick Greenough - manuscriptdetails
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Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
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Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief.Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):153-176.details
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Epistemicism and Commensurability.Paul Forrester - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The uncoordinated teachers puzzle.Michael Cohen - forthcoming - Episteme:1-8.details
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Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Opaque Updates.Michael Cohen - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):447-470.details
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Three Questions About Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Giovanni Merlo - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):603-623.details
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One Kind of Asking.Dennis Whitcomb - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266).details
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Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories.Zeev Goldschmidt - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
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Truth Predicates, Truth Bearers, and their Variants.Friederike Moltmann - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 2):1-28.details
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The distinctive character of knowledge.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.details
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
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On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
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Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.details
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Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.details
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Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact.Paul Silva Jr & Eyal Tal - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Morality, fiction, and possibility.Brian Weatherson - 2004 - Philosophers' Imprint 4:1-27.details
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IV—Lost in (Modal) Space: Demographic Base-Rate Neglect in the Service of Modal Knowledge.Jessie Munton - 2023 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 123 (1):73-96.details
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Perceptual Skill And Social Structure.Jessie Munton - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):131-161.details
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Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.details
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Knowing from testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (5):432–448.details
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Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 50 (4):661-688.details
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The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging.Thomas Grundmann - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (2):208-218.details
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