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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.details
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A New Perceptual Adverbialism.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (8):413-446.details
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Reflective epistemological disjunctivism.J. J. Cunningham - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):111-132.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Review: The Knowability Paradox. [REVIEW]C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1141-1147.details
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Moral Enhancement Can Kill.Parker Crutchfield - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):568-584.details
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Comments on Vogel.Troy Cross - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):89 - 98.details
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In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.details
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The No-No Paradox Is a Paradox.Roy T. Cook - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):467-482.details
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Good to know.Earl Conee - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):311-331.details
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Falsehood and Entailment.Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):82-94.details
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Empirical justification and defeasibility.Juan Comesaña - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1771-1786.details
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Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation.Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):237-260.details
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A Plea for Falsehoods.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):247-276.details
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Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Henry Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.details
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Theorizing about the epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.details
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Warrant without truth?E. J. Coffman - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):173-194.details
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Thinking about luck.E. J. Coffman - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):385-398.details
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Two claims about epistemic propriety.E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):471-488.details
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Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:241-258.details
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Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):285 - 300.details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science.Kelly James Clark & Dani Rabinowitz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):67 - 81.details
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Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.details
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50 Years of Gettier: A New Direction in Religious Epistemology?Ian M. Church - 2015 - Journal of Analytic Theology 3:147-171.details
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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
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Virtue epistemology and the Gettier dilemma.Ian M. Church - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (5):681-695.details
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Manifest Failure Failure: The Gettier Problem Revived.Ian M. Church - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):171-177.details
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Intuitive knowledge.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.details
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Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram (2015).Kyriacou Christos - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2017 (3):1-9.details
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How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
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Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):57-72.details
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On Two Versions of 'the Surprise Examination Paradox'.Leo K. C. Cheung - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):159-170.details
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The Lottery Paradox Generalized?Jake Chandler - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):667-679.details
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Presupposition and the a priori.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):509-526.details
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Factivity, consistency and knowability.James Chase & Penelope Rush - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):899-918.details
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What is Knowledge?Quassim Cassam - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:101-120.details
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Reply to Duncan Pritchard and John Campbell.Quassim Cassam - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):325-333.details
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Assertion and relative truth.Ramiro Caso - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1309-1325.details
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Varieties of cognitive achievement.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.details
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The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.details
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The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (2):220-242.details
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Trust and Trustworthiness.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):377-394.details
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Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4989-5007.details
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Perceptual knowledge and relevant alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.details
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On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-21.details
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On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
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Limits of Optimization.Cesare Carissimo & Marcin Korecki - 2024 - Minds and Machines 34 (1):117-137.details
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