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Representing as Adapting.Benjamin Jarvis - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):17-39.details
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Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox.Tomasz Jarmużek, Krzysztof Krawczyk & Rafał Palczewski - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (4):291-313.details
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Epistemic and non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.Steven James - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:109-127.details
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Norms of Testimony in Broad Interdisciplinarity: The Case of Quantum Mechanics in Critical Theory.Rasmus Jaksland - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (1):35-61.details
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Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 8):1-19.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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How to Formulate Arguments from Easy Knowledge.Alexander Jackson - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):341-356.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context?Alexander Jackson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):8579-8610.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Mind-wandering is unguided attention: accounting for the “purposeful” wanderer.Zachary C. Irving - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):547-571.details
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The paradigm response to skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-16.details
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Knowledge-to-fact arguments can deliver knowledge.Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):52-56.details
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Question closure to solve the surprise test.Daniel Immerman - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4583-4596.details
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Quantifiers and epistemic contextualism.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):383-398.details
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Basic Knowledge First.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):343-361.details
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Justification is potential knowledge.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.details
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TxW Epistemic Modality.Andrea Iacona - 2012 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 10:3-14.details
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Knowledge of Future Contingents.Andrea Iacona - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):447-467.details
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The most general factive stative attitude.John Hyman - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):561-565.details
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II—Knowledge and Belief.John Hyman - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):267-288.details
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Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Consistency and evidence.Nick Hughes - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):333-338.details
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Epistemicism, paradox, and conditional obligation.Ivan Hu - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2123-2139.details
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New foundations for counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.details
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Know-how-first anti-intellectualism: Williamson against Williamson.M. Hosein & M. A. Khalaj - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-30.details
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Understanding as a Source of Justification.Joachim Horvath - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):509-534.details
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Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?David Horst - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):509-523.details
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Actions and accidents.David Horst - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):300-325.details
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An argument concerning the unknowable.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):240-242.details
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Uttering Moorean Sentences and the pragmatics of belief reports.Frank Hong - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1879-1895.details
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Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.details
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Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.details
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Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals.Ben Holguín - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771.details
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Indicative conditionals without iterative epistemology.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Noûs 55 (3):560-580.details
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Three kinds of reliabilism.Frank Hofmann - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.details
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Introspective Self-Knowledge of Experience and Evidence.Frank Hofmann - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):19-34.details
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Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):1-18.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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On Virtue, Credit and Safety.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):98-120.details
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Is it Safe to Disagree?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):305-321.details
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Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
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Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1167-1186.details
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Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122.details
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From Isolation to Skepticism.Scott Hill - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):649-668.details
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