- Atomic event concepts in perception, action and belief.Lucas Thorpe - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):110-127.details
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Has the ethics of belief been brought back on the right track? [REVIEW]Mark Textor - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):123-142.details
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Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces.Folke Tersman & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
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Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder.Evan Taylor - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (1):73-93.details
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Semantic relativism and ways of knowing.Leonid Tarasov - 2019 - Synthese 196 (5):2089-2109.details
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On deviant causal chains - no need for a general criterion.Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):469-473.details
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Conceptualism and the New Myth of the Given.Refeng Tang - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):101-122.details
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Is epistemic circularity a fallacy?William J. Talbott - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2277-2298.details
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Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?Eyal Tal & Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):95-112.details
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Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.details
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Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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Can performance epistemology explain higher epistemic value?Kurt L. Sylvan - 2017 - Synthese 197 (12):5335-5356.details
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The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty.Eric Swanson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):121-146.details
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Deflationary representation, inference, and practice.Mauricio Suárez - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49 (C):36-47.details
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Why the Method of Cases Doesn’t Work.Christopher Suhler - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):825-847.details
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Cognitive Science and Thought Experiments: A Refutation of Paul Thagard's Skepticism.Michael T. Stuart - 2014 - Perspectives on Science 22 (2):264-287.details
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Self-Awareness: Acquaintance, Intentionality, Representation, Relation.Galen Strawson - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):311-328.details
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Self-intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.details
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Perceptual Knowledge of Nonactual Possibilities.Margot Strohminger - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):363-375.details
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Knowledge of objective modality.Margot Strohminger & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1155-1175.details
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The epistemic analysis of luck.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):319-334.details
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Introspection and Necessity.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):389-410.details
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In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5099-5113.details
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Contextualism and warranted assertion.Jim Stone - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.details
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Modular architectures and informational encapsulation: A dilemma.Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):315-38.details
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Topical epistemologies.Todd Stewart - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (1):23–43.details
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Mathematical Knowledge and Naturalism.Fabio Sterpetti - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):225-247.details
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Luck as an epistemic notion.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):361-377.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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Empiricism, metaphysics, and voluntarism.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):19-26.details
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Evidence in biology and the conditions of success.Jacob Stegenga - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (6):981-1004.details
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Explosion and the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):385-419.details
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Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):875-898.details
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Against Right Reason.Robert Steel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):431-460.details
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The Importance of Being Rational, by Errol Lord. [REVIEW]Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):523-527.details
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Replies to Cuneo, Driver, and Littlejohn.Daniel Star - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):728-744.details
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Replies to Gilbert Harman, Ram Neta, and Stephen Schiffer. [REVIEW]Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):196-210.details
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Précis of Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics.Daniel Star - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):706-708.details
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On the linguistic basis for contextualism.Jason Stanley - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):119-146.details
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On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.R. C. Stalnaker - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):399-409.details
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Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.details
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Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Full‐On Stating.Robert J. Stainton - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):395-413.details
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Diagnosing Sorites arguments.Robert Stalnaker - 2018 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 33 (3):509-520.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Two faces of rationality.Vishnu Sridharan - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):11103-11124.details
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Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431.details
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The ethics of believing out loud.Heather Spradley - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):1-15.details
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Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3837-3856.details
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