- Closure principles.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.details
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Contrastivism and closure.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256.details
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The genealogical method in epistemology.Martin Kusch & Robin McKenna - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1057-1076.details
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Knowledge and Certainties in the Epistemic State of Nature.Martin Kusch - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):6-23.details
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‘Knowledge’ as a natural kind term.Victor Kumar - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):439-457.details
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What ignorance could not be.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).details
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A logic for factive ignorance.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5917-5928.details
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The Veil of Abstracta.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.details
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Justifying Desires.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (3):335-349.details
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Against Interpretability: a Critical Examination of the Interpretability Problem in Machine Learning.Maya Krishnan - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 33 (3):487-502.details
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Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious.Tim Kraft - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2617-2632.details
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Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios.Tim Kraft - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):269-295.details
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Bolzano on the intransparency of content.Stephan Krämer - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):189-208.details
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Inferring as a way of knowing.Nicholas Koziolek - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 7):1563-1582.details
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Belief as an act of reason.Nicholas Koziolek - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318.details
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How to be an uncompromising revisionary ontologist.David Mark Kovacs - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2129-2152.details
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On the Pareto Condition on Permissible Belief.Jakob Koscholke - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1183-1188.details
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Hinge commitments vis-à-vis the transmission problem.Ladislav Koreň - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2513-2534.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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Skepticism and the principle of sufficient reason.Robert C. Koons & Alexander R. Pruss - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1079-1099.details
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The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.details
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Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.details
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In Defense of the Trichotomy Thesis.Justin Klocksiem - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (3):317-327.details
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Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat.Michael Klenk - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):43-60.details
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Group knowledge: a real-world approach.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):813-839.details
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The Epistemology of Folk Epistemology.Richard F. Kitchener - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):521-530.details
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Safety, Closure, and the Flow of Information.Jens Kipper - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):1109-1126.details
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Acting on true belief.Jens Kipper - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2221-2237.details
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Supplementives, the coordination account, and conflicting intentions.Jeffrey C. King - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):288-311.details
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How to expect a surprising exam.Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3101-3133.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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What Kind of Perspectivism?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (4):415-443.details
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The ‘extendedness’ of scientific evidence.Eric Kerr & Axel Gelfert - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):253-281.details
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Infelicitous Cancellation: The Explicit Cancellability Test for Conversational Implicature Revisited.Jonas Åkerman - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-10.details
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How to modify the strength of a reason.Andrew Kernohan - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1205-1220.details
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Epistemic authority, testimony and the transmission of knowledge†.Arnon Keren - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):368-381.details
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Savoir que l’on sait. La question de la transparence dans les attitudes épistémiques.Neil Kennedy - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):451-478.details
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Naive realism and experiential evidence.Matthew Kennedy - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):77-109.details
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Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.Matthew Kennedy - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):77-102.details
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Familiarity inferences, subjective attitudes and counterstance contingency: towards a pragmatic theory of subjective meaning.Christopher Kennedy & Malte Willer - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1395-1445.details
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Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases.Matthew Kennedy - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 221-254.details
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Defending the Possibility of Knowledge.Neil Kennedy - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):579-601.details
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Taking things for granted: comments on Harman and Sherman.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):141-147.details
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The knowledge norm of blaming.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):256-261.details
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No justification for lottery losers.Christoph Kelp - unknowndetails
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Is reflective equilibrium enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.details
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Inquiry, knowledge and understanding.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1583-1593.details
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Inquiry And The Transmission Of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):298-310.details
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Epistemology extended.Christoph Kelp - unknowndetails
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Common sense as evidence: Against revisionary ontology and skepticism.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):53-78.details
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