- (1 other version)Why There are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.details
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The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Language as thought and as communication.Wilfrid Sellars - 1969 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (4):506-527.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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Whatever happened to deontic logic?Peter T. Geach - 1982 - Philosophia 11 (1-2):1-12.details
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(1 other version)The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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Modest deontologism in epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Individuals-in-communities: The search for a feminist model of epistemic subjects.Heidi E. Grasswick - 2004 - Hypatia 19 (3):85-120.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506.details
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Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.details
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Epistemic Deontologism and Role-Oughts.Jon Altschul - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):245-263.details
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Modality and language.Kai Von Fintel - 2005 - In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. macmillan reference. pp. 20-27.details
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Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177.details
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The Ethics of Requirement.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1964 - American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (2):147 - 153.details
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Knowing communities: An investigation of Harding's standpoint epistemology.Gaile Pohlhaus - 2002 - Social Epistemology 16 (3):283 – 293.details
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(1 other version)Ought we to follow our evidence?Keith Derose - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):697-706.details
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(1 other version)Voluntary belief and epistemic evaluation.Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 77--92.details
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Epistemic Normativity and Cognitive Agency.Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - Noûs 52 (3):508-529.details
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Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology.Rik Peels - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):57-89.details
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Epistemic obligation and the possibility of internalism.Hilary Kornblith - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 231--248.details
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(1 other version)Discrimination and Testimonial Knowledge.John Greco - 2007 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3):335-351.details
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(1 other version)Discrimination and testimonial knowledge.John Greco - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):335-351.details
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Epistemic norms without voluntary control.Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):599-632.details
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Epistemic Norms as Social Norms.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 425-436.details
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(1 other version)Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (1):115-136.details
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In Defense of Moral Evidentialism.Sharon Ryan - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427.details
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Change in view: Principles of reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-46.details
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Ought to Believe.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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(1 other version)Language as Thought and as Communication.Wilfrid Sellars - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 265-285.details
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(1 other version)The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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(1 other version)Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?Keith Derose - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):697-706.details
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The Hypothetical Imperative.Thomas E. Hill - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (4):429-450.details
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The duty to believe according to the evidence.Allen Wood - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1-3):7-24.details
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Why There May Be Epistemic Duties.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (1):63-89.details
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All things considered duties to believe.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):509-517.details
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Normativity and Control.David Owens - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic versus all things considered requirements.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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Chisholmian internalism.Alvin Plantinga - 1988 - In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 127--151.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.details
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Epistemic Norms and the "Epistemic Game" They Regulate: The Basic Structured Epistemic Costs and Benefits.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):367-382.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - Mind 96 (382):285-288.details
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The concept of social role revisited.Mirra Komarovsky - 1992 - Gender and Society 6 (2):301-313.details
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Two Sorts of 'Ought's.I. L. Humberstone - 1971 - Analysis 32 (1):8 - 11.details
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Are Epistemic Norms Fundamentally Social Norms?David Henderson - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):281-300.details
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