- Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.details
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Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):269-279.details
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Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197.details
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Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.details
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Verbal Debates in Epistemology.Daniel Greco - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):41-55.details
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Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2571-2591.details
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A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.details
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Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.details
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Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Noûs 49 (4):776-799.details
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(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.details
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Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Unravelling the Tangled Web: Continuity, Internalism, Non-Uniqueness and Self-Locating Beliefs.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2007 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 3. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 86.details
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Distorted reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.details
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Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.details
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How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.details
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Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Niko Kolodny - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):437-463.details
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Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Rational resolve.Richard Holton - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):507-535.details
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(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.details
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Diachronic coherence versus epistemic impartiality.David Christensen - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):349-371.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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(1 other version)Time–Slice Epistemology and Action under Indeterminacy.Sarah Moss - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:172--94.details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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(1 other version)Reflections on Knowledge and its Limits.Gilbert Harman - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):417-428.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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Conciliationism and Uniqueness.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.details
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(1 other version)Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):69 - 91.details
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Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Scepticism and evidence.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):613-628.details
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Immodest inductive methods.David Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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(1 other version)Reflections on knowledge and its limits.Gilbert Harman - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):417-428.details
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Deference Done Right.Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19.details
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Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.details
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Have we reason to do as rationality requires? - a comment on Raz.John Broome - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (Symposium):1-10.details
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Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.details
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(1 other version)Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:143-164.details
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How to be an Epistemic Permissivist.Thomas Kelly - unknowndetails
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Experience First.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 2.details
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