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A normatively adequate credal reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.details
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Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Lottery Paradox Generalized?Jake Chandler - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):667-679.details
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Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):169-183.details
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Subjective Probability and the Content/Attitude Distinction.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - In Claus Beisbart & Nicole J. Saam (eds.), Computer Simulation Validation: Fundamental Concepts, Methodological Frameworks, and Philosophical Perspectives. Springer Verlag. pp. 525-540.details
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Applying pragmatics to epistemology.Kent Bach - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):68-88.details
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A Bitter Pill for Closure.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Synthese 196:3773-3787.details
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The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeffrey Dunn - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):541-551.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 37-47.details
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Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 75--93.details
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The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 49--74.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
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Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):179-196.details
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Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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A way out of the preface paradox?Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):ant091.details
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Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
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Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--126.details
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Deconstructing the mind.Stephen P. Stich - 1996 - In Deconstructing the mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 479-482.details
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Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
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The Rational Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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The Lottery: A Paradox Regained And Resolved.R. Weintraub - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):439-449.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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