- Conciliatory Reasoning, Self-Defeat, and Abstract Argumentation.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):740-787.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 167-196.details
|
|
On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games.Phan Minh Dung - 1995 - Artificial Intelligence 77 (2):321-357.details
|
|
Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.details
|
|
How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
|
|
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
|
|
Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.details
|
|
The Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - New York: Palgrave.details
|
|
(1 other version)A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.details
|
|
Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
|
|
Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.details
|
|
Resolute conciliationism.John Pittard - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):442-463.details
|
|
Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism.Thomas Mulligan - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):67-78.details
|
|
Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating?Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (2):145-159.details
|
|
Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 77.details
|
|
Disagreement and Defeat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Who is an epistemic peer?Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.details
|
|
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
|
|
Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 54.details
|
|
(1 other version)Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for how to Build a Person.John L. Pollock - 1995 - MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Defeasible Reasoning and Degrees of Justification.Pollock † & L. John - 2010 - Argument and Computation 1 (1):7-22.details
|
|
Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.details
|
|
A Vindication of the Equal Weight View.Thomas Bogardus - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):324-335.details
|
|
Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
|
|
Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
|
|
What should we do when we disagree?Jennifer Lackey - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 274-93.details
|
|
A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.details
|
|
Reasons as Defaults.John Horty - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-28.details
|
|
(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
|
|
Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
|
|
(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
|
|
(1 other version)How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Defeasibility in Epistemology.Aleks Knoks - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Maryland at College Parkdetails
|
|
Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to Find.Nathan L. King - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):249-272.details
|
|
(1 other version)A justificationist view of disagreement’s epistemic significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-154.details
|
|
(1 other version)Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Defeasible reasoning and degrees of justification.John L. Pollock † - 2010 - Argument and Computation 1 (1):7-22.details
|
|
A recursive semantics for defeasible reasoning.John Pollock - unknowndetails
|
|
``Defeasible Reasoning with Variable Degrees of Justification".John L. Pollock - 2001 - Artificial Intelligence 133 (1-2):233-282.details
|
|
(1 other version)Reasons as Defaults.John F. Horty - 2012 - Oxford, England: Oup Usa.details
|
|
Conciliation and Self-incrimination.Jason Decker - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1099-1134.details
|
|