- Conciliatory Views on Peer Disagreement and the Order of Evidence Acquisition.Marc Andree Weber - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):33-50.details
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The role of source reliability in belief polarisation.Leah Henderson & Alexander Gebharter - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10253-10276.details
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Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems.Ted Poston - 2022 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):83-111.details
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Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology.Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.) - 2019 - PhilPapers Foundation.details
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Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.details
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Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):189-213.details
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(1 other version)An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.C. I. Lewis - 1946 - Mind 57 (225):71-85.details
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Testimony.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - In Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Deliberation, Judgement and the Nature of Evidence.Jon Williamson - unknowndetails
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Models, Mechanisms, and Coherence.Matteo Colombo, Stephan Hartmann & Robert van Iersel - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):181-212.details
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Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Confirmation.Franz Huber - 2011 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.details
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The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Applications.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.details
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In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2006 - Philosophy Compass.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.details
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What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.details
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What You See Is What You Get.Jeff B. Paris - 2014 - Entropy 16 (11):6186–6194.details
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Maximum Entropy Applied to Inductive Logic and Reasoning.Jürgen Landes & Jon Williamson (eds.) - 2015 - Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.details
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(1 other version)An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.C. I. Lewis - 1949 - Review of Metaphysics 2 (7):99-115.details
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Can free evidence be bad? Value of informationfor the imprecise probabilist.Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):1-28.details
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Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions.Julia Staffel - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1467-1493.details
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(1 other version)An 'evidentialist' worry about Joyce's argument for Probabilism.Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.details
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Coherence and Reduction.Andrea Giuseppe Ragno - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):51-81.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.Jürgen Landes - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-7.details
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Learning by Ignoring the Most Wrong.Seamus Bradley - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):9-31.details
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The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable.Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-15.details
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A General Framework for Probabilistic Measures of Coherence.Michael Schippers & Jakob Koscholke - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (3):395-424.details
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The Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx060.details
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(1 other version)Coherentism.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1995 - Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):159-168.details
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Invariant Equivocation.Jürgen Landes & George Masterton - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):141-167.details
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Is coherence truth conducive?Tomoji Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.details
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Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.details
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Coherence in the aggregate: a betting method for belief functions on many-valued events.Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo & Hykel Hosni - unknowndetails
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The development of subjective Bayesianism.James M. Joyce - 2004 - In Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods & Akihiro Kanamori (eds.), Handbook of the history of logic. Boston: Elsevier. pp. 10--415.details
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On the principle of total evidence.Irving John Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):319-321.details
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Public Reception of Climate Science: Coherence, Reliability, and Independence.Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Adam Corner - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):180-195.details
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State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47 (C):81-90.details
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Objective Bayesianism and the maximum entropy principle.Jürgen Landes & Jon Williamson - 2013 - Entropy 15 (9):3528-3591.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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New Hope for Shogenji's Coherence Measure.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):125-142.details
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(1 other version)Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - In Claus Beisbart & Nicole J. Saam (eds.), Computer Simulation Validation: Fundamental Concepts, Methodological Frameworks, and Philosophical Perspectives. Springer Verlag. pp. 525-540.details
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Evidence amalgamation in the sciences: an introduction.Roland Poellinger, Jürgen Landes & Samuel C. Fletcher - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3163-3188.details
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Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence.Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):841-850.details
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The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.details
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Evidence and Knowledge from Computer Simulation.Wendy S. Parker - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1521-1538.details
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The Limits of Piecemeal Causal Inference.Conor Mayo-Wilson - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (2):213-249.details
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