- How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.details
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Evidentialism, circularity, and grounding.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1847-1868.details
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Truthy psychologism about evidence.Veli Mitova - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1105-1126.details
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How to derive a narrow-scope requirement from wide-scope requirements.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):535-542.details
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Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.details
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The Norm of Belief.John Gibbons - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The rules of thought.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Benjamin W. Jarvis.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Epistemological disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Without Justification.Jonathan Sutton - 2007 - MIT Press.details
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Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action.Maria Alvarez - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
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Internalism Explained.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):349-369.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition.Michael Huemer - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
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Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 37-47.details
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Doubt truth to be a liar.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidentialism: essays in epistemology.Earl Brink Conee - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Richard Feldman.details
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Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.details
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Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.) - 2013 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(2 other versions)Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2007 - Studia Logica 87 (1):129-134.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):147-149.details
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On Sensations of Position.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):55-58.details
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Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Unprincipled virtue—synopsis.Nomy Arpaly - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):429-431.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
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Fitting belief.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):167-187.details
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Book Review: Unprincipled Virtue by Nomy Arpaly. [REVIEW]Manuel Vargas - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):201-204.details
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The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge.Susanne Mantel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888.details
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Truth as the aim of epistemic justification.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Vagueness and ignorance.Timothy Williamson - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 145 - 177.details
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Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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