- Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
|
|
Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315-331.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.details
|
|
Will, Freedom and Power.Peter Van Inwagen - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (1):99.details
|
|
Wiggins on Practical Knowledge.Henry Clarke - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):113-124.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
|
|
Skill in epistemology I: Skill and knowledge.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):642-649.details
|
|
Skill in epistemology II: Skill and know how.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):650-660.details
|
|
Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.details
|
|
How many meanings for ‘may’? The case for modal polysemy.Barbara Vetter & Emanuel Viebahn - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.details
|
|
(1 other version)Dispositions.Shungho Choi & Michael Fara - 2012 - The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts.Jason Stanley & John W. Krakauer - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.details
|
|
Grounding: Toward a Theory of the I n-Virtue-Of Relation.Paul Audi - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (12):685-711.details
|
|
Stanley and Williamson on Knowing How.John Koethe - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):325.details
|
|
(1 other version)Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.details
|
|
Skill.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):713-726.details
|
|
Attitudes Towards Objects.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):314-328.details
|
|
Practical Know‐Wh.Katalin Farkas - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):855-870.details
|
|
Virtue Epistemology: Contemporary Readings.John Greco & John Turri (eds.) - 2012 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Knowing (How).Jason Stanley - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):207-238.details
|
|
Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.details
|
|
Why Intellectualism Still Fails.Andreas Ditter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):500-515.details
|
|
Cognition in Skilled Action: Meshed Control and the Varieties of Skill Experience.Wayne Christensen, John Sutton & Doris J. F. McIlwain - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):37-66.details
|
|
Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):893-904.details
|
|
Open MIND.Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer Windt (eds.) - 2015 - MIND group.details
|
|
Practical Senses.Carlotta Pavese - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
|
|
(1 other version)A Virtue Epistemology: Volume I: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality.Barbara Vetter - 2014 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Rule-Following and Meaning.Alexander Miller & Crispin Wright (eds.) - 2002 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.details
|
|
The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence.Keith Frankish & William M. Ramsey (eds.) - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Extended Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):259-273.details
|
|
Knowledge-how, Linguistic Intellectualism, and Ryle's Return.David Löwenstein - 2011 - In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. De Gruyter. pp. 269-304.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why Know-how and Propositional Knowledge Are Mutually Irreducible.David Löwenstein - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 365-371.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why Know-how and Propositional Knowledge Are Mutually Irreducible.David Löwenstein - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 365-371.details
|
|
Polysemy: Current perspectives and approaches.Ingrid Lossius Falkum & Agustin Vicente - 2015 - Lingua:DOI: 10.1016/j.lingua.2015.02.00.details
|
|
(1 other version)Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Oxford,: Blackwell.details
|
|
Infinite Regress Arguments.Jan Willem Wieland - 2013 - Cham: Springer.details
|
|
Dispositions without Conditionals.Barbara Vetter - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):129-156.details
|
|
An Essay on Door-Knocking.Georg Henrik von Wright - 1988 - Rechtstheorie 19 (3):275-288.details
|
|
Knowing how and pragmatic intrusion.Alessandro Capone - 2011 - Intercultural Pragmatics 8 (4):543-570.details
|
|
They’ve lost control: reflections on skill.Ellen Fridland - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2729-2750.details
|
|
Chimpanzee Ai and her son Ayumu: An episode of education by master-apprenticeship.Tetsuro Matsuzawa - 2002 - In Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 189--195.details
|
|
Infinite regress arguments.David Sanford - 1984 - In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Principles of philosophical reasoning. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld. pp. 93--117.details
|
|
(1 other version)Knowing How and Knowing Answers.David Braun - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 244.details
|
|
Vermischte Bemerkungen.P. Long, Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. H. von Wright & H. Nyman - 1979 - Philosophical Quarterly 29 (114):81.details
|
|
The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):338-346.details
|
|
Revisionary intellectualism and Gettier.Yuri Cath - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27.details
|
|