- Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.details
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Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):561-577.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Peerage.Earl Conee - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):313-323.details
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Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. [REVIEW]David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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A Vindication of the Equal Weight View.Thomas Bogardus - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):324-335.details
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Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2010 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oup Usa. pp. 194-214.details
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Framing how we think about disagreement.Joshua Alexander, Diana Betz, Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2539-2566.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.details
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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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Belief in the Face of Controversy.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Disagreement Defended.Earl Conee - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Three Kinds of Idealization.Michael Weisberg - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (12):639-659.details
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Two theories of group agency.David Strohmaier - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1901-1918.details
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Disagreement and epistemic improvement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.details
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Social objects.Anthony Quinton - 1976 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1):1-27.details
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Socially extended knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):282-298.details
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Modelling collective belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.details
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Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure.Michael Bergmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):336-353.details
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Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.details
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Disagreement Without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts.John Hawthorne & Amia Srinivasan - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 9--30.details
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How to be an Epistemic Permissivist.Thomas Kelly - unknowndetails
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Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 77.details
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Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - In Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 54.details
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Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?Hilary Kornblith - 2013 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge. pp. 260.details
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