- (2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 167-196.details
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(2 other versions)The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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(2 other versions)Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):406-408.details
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(2 other versions)Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):787-791.details
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(1 other version)A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.details
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The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Hilary Kornblith & Richard Foley - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):131.details
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Snatching Hope from the Jaws of Epistemic Defeat.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):257--275.details
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An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke.Peter H. Nidditch (ed.) - 1975 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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(2 other versions)History of Western Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1945 - Routledge.details
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(2 other versions)History of Western Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1945 - Routledge.details
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Utilitarianism: On Liberty ; Essay on Bentham.John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, John Austin & Mary Warnock - 1962 - Plume Books.details
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A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.details
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(2 other versions)Disagreement. [REVIEW]Nathan Ballantyne & Nathan L. King - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):808-812.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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(1 other version)A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Secular Faith.Annette Baier - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):131 - 148.details
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Following the argument where it leads.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):105-124.details
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Friendship and Belief.Simon Keller - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):329-351.details
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Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.details
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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(2 other versions)History of Western Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1946 - Routledge.details
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Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.details
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(1 other version)A justificationist view of disagreement’s epistemic significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-154.details
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The Epistemology of Disagreement.Ernest Sosa - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism.Sarah McGrath - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):111-137.details
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A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue.Matthias Steup (ed.) - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Self-trust: a study of reason, knowledge, and autonomy.Keith Lehrer - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Working without a net: a study of egocentric epistemology.Richard Foley - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The virtue of faith and other essays in philosophical theology.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.details
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Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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Epistemic partiality in friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.details
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A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.details
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(2 other versions)Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.details
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Entitlement and mutually recognized reasonable disagreement.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Episteme (1):1-25.details
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(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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(1 other version)Wrong Kinds of Reason and the Opacity of Normative Force.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9.details
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(2 other versions)A Virtue Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):427-440.details
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(2 other versions)A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume I * by Ernest Sosa. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Analysis 69 (2):382-385.details
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(2 other versions)Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to Find.Nathan L. King - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):249-272.details
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Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others.Richard Foley - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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