- Safety, Closure, and Extended Methods.Simon Goldstein & John Hawthorne - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy 121 (1):26-54.details
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Affectivism about intuitions.Slawa Loev - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-24.details
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The evidence in perception.Ali Hasan - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Epistemic Values: Collected Papers in Epistemology, by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski.Heather Battaly - 2022 - Mind 132 (528):1193-1201.details
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(1 other version)Testimony Amidst Diversity.Max Baker-Hytch - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 183-202.details
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La lógica modal como herramienta metodológica en epistemología.Jose Alejandro Fernández Cuesta - 2022 - Human Review. International Humanities Review / Revista Internacional de Humanidades 1 (11).details
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The subject of knowledge in collaborative science.Duygu Uygun Tunç - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3):1-26.details
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Neuromedia, Cognitive Offloading, and Intellectual Perseverance.Cody Turner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-26.details
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Non-propositional intuition, intuitive belief and ‘intuition that p’.Cyrill Mamin - manuscriptdetails
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Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck.Changsheng Lai - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):896-917.details
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Against the Doctrine of Infallibility.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa082.details
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On the gnoseologic principles of Bertrand Russell.Rafael Andrés Alemañ-Berenguer - 2021 - Naturaleza y Libertad. Revista de Estudios Interdisciplinares.details
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Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification.Luis Oliveira - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 286-312.details
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Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?David Horst - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):509-523.details
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(1 other version)Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
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Circumstance, answerability and luck.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):155-167.details
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Against epistemic absolutism.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3945-3967.details
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Life Through a Lens.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2022 - In Sophie Archer (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (8):405-429.details
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Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.details
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On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.details
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Safety and Necessity.Niall J. Paterson - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1081-1097.details
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Introduction to the special issue ‘knowledge and justification: new perspectives’.Rodrigo Borges - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1473-1480.details
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Partial truth versus felicitous falsehoods.Soazig Le Bihan - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5415-5436.details
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Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs.Timothy Kearl - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2501-2515.details
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No work for a theory of epistemic dispositions.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3477-3498.details
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How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge, issues and solutions.Alexander Gillett & Richard Heersmink - 2019 - Cognitive Systems Research 56 (56):36-49.details
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Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):839-866.details
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Virtue Perspectivism, Normativity, and the Unity of Knowledge.Modesto Gómez Alonso - 2018 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 3 (75):117-130.details
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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Modal Virtue Epistemology.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):61-79.details
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Knowledge-yielding communication.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3303-3327.details
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Who's Afraid of Trolleys?Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. New York: Routledge.details
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(1 other version)Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement, and Control.J. AdamCarter - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):283-304.details
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Rationality as the Rule of Reason.Antti Kauppinen - 2019 - Noûs 55 (3):538-559.details
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The internalist virtue theory of knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5357–5378.details
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Saving safety from counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5161-5185.details
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Lucky Achievement: Virtue Epistemology on the Value of Knowledge.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):303-311.details
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Virtue Epistemology and Explanatory Salience.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In Heather D. Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.details
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Method Coherence and Epistemic Circularity.Will Fleisher - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):455-480.details
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Baseless Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (50):211-231.details
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Is open-mindedness truth-conducive?Brent Madison - 2019 - Synthese 196 (5):2075-2087.details
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‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1641-1656.details
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Intuition in Gettier.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Hetherington Stephen (ed.), Classic Philosophical Arguments: The Gettier Problem. Cambridge University Presss.details
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Epistemic luck and logical necessities: armchair luck revisited.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In Bojan Borstner & Smiljana Gartner (eds.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 137-150.details
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