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La lógica modal como herramienta metodológica en epistemología.Jose Alejandro Fernández Cuesta - 2022 - Human Review. International Humanities Review / Revista Internacional de Humanidades 1 (11).details
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Virtue Perspectivism, Normativity, and the Unity of Knowledge.Modesto Gómez Alonso - 2018 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 3 (75):117-130.details
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The Division of Epistemic Labor.Sandy Goldberg - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):112-125.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2007 - Introduction 2 (23):153-160.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2007 - Introduction 2 (23):153-160.details
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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The evidence in perception.Ali Hasan - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.Christoph9 Kelp & Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2015 - In Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. New York: Routledge.details
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Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.details
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Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
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Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge.Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Noûs 46 (1):127 - 158.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 225–247.details
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Life Through a Lens.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2022 - In Sophie Archer (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs.Timothy Kearl - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2501-2515.details
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Experiential evidence?Jack C. Lyons - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079.details
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Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.details
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The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth.Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):209-233.details
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Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Who's Afraid of Trolleys?Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. New York: Routledge.details
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Understanding and Structure.Allan Hazlett - 2017 - In Stephen R. Grimm (ed.), Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Inferential Knowledge and the Gettier Conjecture.Rodrigo Borges - 2017 - In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidence and Bias.Nick Hughes - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
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Phenomenal conservatism and the problem of reflective awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Epistemologia e Filosofia da Ciência.Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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Epistemic Values: Collected Papers in Epistemology, by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski.Heather Battaly - 2022 - Mind 132 (528):1193-1201.details
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Truth Analysis of the Gettier Argument.Yussif Yakubu - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):449-466.details
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Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Two Kinds of Knowledge.Michael Williams - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (2):124-137.details
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Against the Doctrine of Infallibility.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa082.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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The internalist virtue theory of knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5357–5378.details
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The Concept of Knowledge: What is It For?Jesús Vega-Encabo - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):187-202.details
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The subject of knowledge in collaborative science.Duygu Uygun Tunç - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3):1-26.details
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We should redefine scientific expertise: an extended virtue account.Duygu Uygun Tunç - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (4):1–30.details
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Unreliable Knowledge.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):529-545.details
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The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.details
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Neuromedia, Cognitive Offloading, and Intellectual Perseverance.Cody Turner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-26.details
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The metaepistemology of knowing-how.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.details
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Knowledge of language in action.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):68-89.details
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Debunking and fully apt belief.Joshua C. Thurow - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3).details
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What seemings seem to be.Samuel A. Taylor - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):363-384.details
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Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.details
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On perceptual expertise.Dustin Stokes - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):241-263.details
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Skill.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):713-726.details
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No work for a theory of epistemic dispositions.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3477-3498.details
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The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Against Credibility.Joseph Shieber - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):1 - 18.details
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1% Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):271-290.details
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