- (1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.details
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Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.details
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The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 167-196.details
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Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
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(1 other version)Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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Highlights of recent epistemology.James Pryor - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.details
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The Nature of Intuitive Justification.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.details
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Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.details
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Introspection.Alex Byrne - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition.Michael Huemer - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.details
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Knowledge of Logic.Paul Boghossian - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers.Jonathan Weisberg - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):793-812.details
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How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):1-40.details
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(1 other version)Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Coulda, woulda, shoulda.Stephen Yablo - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 441-492.details
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Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.Nicholas Silins - 2008 - In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 108.details
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Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Deeply contingent a priori knowledge.John Hawthorne - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):247-269.details
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(1 other version)Improbable knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):417-430.details
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A note on Jeffrey conditionalization.Hartry Field - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):361-367.details
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Bootstrapping, defeasible reasoning, and a priori justification.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.details
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The Puzzle of Metacoherence.Michael Huemer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):1-21.details
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(1 other version)When warrant transmits.James Pryor - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowing that I am thinking.Alex Byrne - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.details
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Probability kinematics and commutativity.Carl G. Wagner - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):266-278.details
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Lucky to be rational.Adam Elga - 2008details
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Confirmational holism and bayesian epistemology.David Christensen - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):540-557.details
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(1 other version)Pollock on defeasible reasons.Scott Sturgeon - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):105-118.details
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(1 other version)A Priori Bootstrapping.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 226-246.details
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Skepticism and the vagaries of justified belief.Stephen Schiffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):161-184.details
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Is Jeffrey Conditionalization Defective By Virtue of Being Non-Commutative? Remarks on the Sameness of Sensory Experiences.Marc Lange - 2000 - Synthese 123 (3):393-403.details
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Field and Jeffrey conditionalization.Daniel Garber - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (1):142-145.details
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On having no reason: dogmatism and Bayesian confirmation.Peter Kung - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):1 - 17.details
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Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism.Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):533-562.details
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Is Conditioning Really Incompatible with Holism?Carl Wagner - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):409-414.details
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The Bayesian explanation of transmission failure.Geoff Pynn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1519-1531.details
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Knowledge and scepticism.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Induction and Supposition.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - The Reasoner 6:78-80.details
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