- Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved.John Turri - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Sustaining rules: a model and application.John Turri - 2017 - In Knowledge first: approaches in epistemology and mind.details
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Promises to Keep: Speech Acts and the Value of Reflective Knowledge.John Turri - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):583-590.details
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Is knowledge justified true belief?John Turri - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):247-259.details
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Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less.John Turri - 2016 - In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 124-134.details
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Linguistic intuitions in context: a defense of nonskeptical pure invariantism.John Turri - 2014 - In Anthony Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 165-184.details
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Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries.John Turri & Ori Friedman - forthcoming - In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. London, United Kingdom: pp. 45-69.details
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You gotta believe.John Turri - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic norms: new essays on action, belief and assertion. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 193-199.details
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A conspicuous art: putting Gettier to the test.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
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The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.details
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Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.details
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Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory.John Turri - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):83-98.details
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Prompting challenges.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):456-462.details
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The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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In the Thick of Moral Motivation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):433-453.details
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Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):391-409.details
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Belief through Thick and Thin.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):748-775.details
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Two more for the knowledge account of assertion.Matthew Benton - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):684-687.details
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Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions.Matthew Benton - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):355-358.details
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Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts.Kent Bach & Robert M. Harnish - 1979 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.details
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Applying pragmatics to epistemology.Kent Bach - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):68-88.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Preempting Paradox.John Turri - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):659-662.details
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Mythology of the Factive.John Turri - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):141-150.details
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The folk conception of knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.details
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Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.details
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Dubious assertions.David Sosa - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.details
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Assertion and its constitutive norms.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.details
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Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):977-978.details
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A self-referential paradox for the truth account of assertion.Charlie Pelling - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):688-688.details
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Irksome assertions.Rachel McKinnon & John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):123-128.details
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Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts.Warren Ingber, Kent Bach & Robert M. Harnish - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (1):134.details
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Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122.details
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Knowing Failably.Stephen Hetherington - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):565.details
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Actually knowing.Stephen Hetherington - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):453-469.details
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The Myth of Factive Verbs.Allan Hazlett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):497 - 522.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.A. Brueckner - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):160-165.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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