I discuss an aspect of the relation between accounts of de se thought and the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that a deflationary account of the latter—the Simple Account, due to Evans —will not do; a more robust one based on an account of de se thoughts is required. I will then sketch such an alternative account, based on a more general view on singular thoughts, and show how it can deal with the (...) problems I raise for the Simple Account. (shrink)

Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who (...) have written on the de se have primarily focused on de se thoughts of individuals. This paper looks at where these two lines of investigations intersect: collective de se thoughts, such as bands' and teams' beliefs and desires that are essentially about themselves. There is a surprising problem at this intersection: the most prominent framework for modeling de se thoughts, the framework of centered worlds, cannot model a special class of collective de se thoughts. A brief survey of this problem's solution space shows that collective de se thoughts pose a new challenge for modeling mental content. (shrink)

Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts, as Lewis called them – raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought – to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing (...) the main tenets of two contrasting accounts – a Lewisian one and a Perrian one – in the first section of this paper, in the second I will present a proposal of my own, which is a specific elaboration of the Perrian account. In the first section I will indicate some weaknesses of Perry’s presentation of his view; the proposal I will articulate in the second overcomes them. I will conclude with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of de se thoughts. (shrink)

Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued in the 1960’s and 1970’s that thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts – require special treatment, and advanced different accounts. In this paper I discuss Ernest Sosa’s approach to these matters. I first present his approach to singular or de re thought in general in the first section. In the second, I introduce the data that need to be explained, Perry’s and Lewis’s proposals, and Sosa’s own account, in relation to (...) Perry’s, Lewis’s, and his own views on de re thought. In the third section I present the account I prefer – a “token-reflexive” version of Perry’s original account that Perry himself came to adopt in reaction to Stalnaker’s criticisms. In the final section I take up Recanati’s recent arguments, from a viewpoint on de se thought very similar to Sosa’s, to the effect that such an account is in a good position to explain the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I argue there that that is not the case, and I conclude by suggesting that the token-reflexive account fits better both with the data and with Sosa’s Fregean take on de re thought in general. (shrink)

_(MA thesis)_ Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) describes a sort of immunity against such a situation that the thinker wrongly identifies something as other things. Philosophers consider it as being especially relevant to first-person or de se judgments. Many philosophers seem to advance IEM as an alternative to a Cartesian method of defining first-person privilege and of circumscribing the first-person perspective. However, as more and more representative instances are substantiated as being vulnerable to error through misidentification, it is thus (...) necessary to offer an account sufficient to explain IEM. Then, there are roughly two approaches in the literature: the identification-freedom approach and the metasemantic approach. The former is characterised by the claim that the presence of IEM is always explained by the absence of an identificatory-component in the thought's grounds. The latter is more heterogeneous than the former. Nevertheless, it can be roughly described by their focus on explaining the IEM of de se thoughts based on an account of how the reference of de se thoughts is fixed, rather than just on the grounds of particular de se thoughts. However, there are still some problems with the existing accounts. More specifically, some problems from the indexical thoughts put at risk Recanati's appeal, which is viewed as a representative of the metasematic approach. Nonetheless, I think these problems can be resolved competently by pointing out the fact that there are three levels of reflection in introspection. Thoughts produced by the first level of reflection (first-level thoughts, hereafter) correspond to Recanati's implicit thoughts; Third-level thoughts are Recanati's explicit thoughts (whether it is made explicit by an extra reflective act, as Recanati puts it). However, second-level thoughts, which include a sort of aboutness in their content, could explain the subject appearing in indexical statements with IEM, guaranteeing IEM of these thoughts in the meanwhile. (shrink)

It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible (...) appeal to cognitive economy, the relativist theory does not fully account for the epistemic profile that distinguishes de se thinking, as some of its proponents hope to do. A deeper worry concerns the reliance of the theory on a primitive notion of “centre” that hasn’t yet received enough critical attention, and is ambiguous between a thin and a rich reading. I argue that while the rich reading is required if the relativist analysis of the de se is to achieve its most ambitious aims, it also deprives the theory of much of its explanatory power. (shrink)

The problem of communication in de se thoughts is the problem of communication of first-person or self-locating thoughts across the speakers of a conversation. The problem mainly stems from the lack of a proper account of attitude and content — an account that is supposed to explain whether or how the context of linguistic utterances is related to the semantic content of a sentence, assertion and belief. In this paper, after introducing two new semantic items, namely, almost-impossible and (...) almost-necessary propositions, that could be taken as theoretically primitive entities in the semantic framework I wish to draw, I propose an account of modified Lewisian-centered content and attitude based on the metaphysical framework of the Lewisian counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic to the extent that the modification relies on those new semantic items. I then show that we can solve the problem by using our modified account. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also (...) explains why neither Lewis’s two gods nor Mary’s surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism. (shrink)

Moderate skepticism about de se thought accepts that there is a kind of mental state which is about the thinker and is psychologically indispensable for intentional action, but rejects the claim that this kind employs an indexical way of referring. Morgan (2021) has proposed an explanatory argument meant to show that the psychological kind does employ an indexical way of referring to the thinker, on the basis of the special connection between these thoughts and the use of the first-person (...) pronoun (‘I’ in English), which does have an indexical semantics. This paper offers a clear motivation for the moderately skeptical position, shows that Morgan’s argument is based on a mistaken analysis of that special connection, and proposes a more viable alternative. However, on this alternative, the relationship between the psychological role of de se thoughts and the first person in language means Morgan’s explanatory argument cannot go through. (shrink)

De se thoughts have traditionally been seen to be exceptional in mandating a departure from orthodox theories of attitudes. Against this, skeptics about the de se have argued that the de se phenomena demand no more of our theories of attitudes than traditional Frege cases. In this camp one view is that the de se can be accounted for by MOPs in the same way that MOPs can account for how it can be rational to believe, for instance, ”Hesperus (...) is shining” while also believing ”Phosphorus is shining.” This paper formulates some minimal conditions that de se MOPs must have in order to explain the relevant de se phenomena. Some potential replies are answered. I conclude that de se MOPs are not exceptional. (shrink)

We develop an approach to the problem of de se belief usually expressed with the question, what does the shopper with the leaky sugar bag have to learn to know that s/he is the one making the mess. Where one might have thought that some special kind of “de se” belief explains the triggering of action, we maintain that this gets the order of explanation wrong. We sketch a very simple cognitive architecture that yields de se-like behavior on which the (...) action-triggering functionality of the belief-state is what counts it as de se rather than some prior property of being “de se” explaining the triggering of action. This functionality shows that action-triggering change in belief-state also undergirds a correlative change in the objective involved in the triggered action. This model is far too simple to have any claim to showing how the de se works for humans, but it shows, by illustration, that nothing mysteriously “subjective”” need be involved in this aspect of self-conception. While our exposition is very different from those of Perry and Recanati, all three of us are developing the same kind of view. (shrink)

Since the classic works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis, de se thoughts have been described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. In recent years, various theoretical perspectives have gained ground, and even if the transcendental system does not seem to contemplate an explicit articulation of de se thoughts, apparently a few features of transcendental apperception and I think do anticipate a few points in Perry and Recanati’s claims on the so-called implicit de se thoughts in the (...) specific terms of Transcendentalism. (shrink)

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant- neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. I argue that when we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. To prove this (...) I propose a concrete model of communication as the transmission of information from the speaker’s mental state to the hearer’s. My analysis is couched in Discourse Representation Theory, a formal semantic framework that linguists use for modeling conversational common ground updates, but that can also be applied to describe the individual speech participants’ dynamically changing mental states. (shrink)

I argue that de se attitudes pose a special problem for philosophical theories of attitudes. Attitude contents are supposed to play a role in characterizing agreement and are also supposed to play a role in the explanation of action. De se attitudes reveal that no single type of object can play both roles.

This paper is a new defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness requires self- concepts. My defense relies on two crucial constraints. The first is what I call Bermúdez’s Constraint (2007), that is, the view that any attribution of content must account for the intentional behavior of the subject that reflects her own way of understanding the world. The second is the well-known Generality Constraint of Evans (1982), which is also termed the recombinability constraint. The claim I want to (...) support in this paper is the follow- ing: Since whether and to what extent we can attribute to non-linguistic creatures and prelinguistic infants genuine knowing self-reference or de se contents is an open empirical question, the proponents of the nonconceptual self-consciousness face a dilemma. If we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is overwhelming, I argue based on Evans’s Generality Constrain—that these self-representations are nothing but primitive prelinguis- tic self-concepts. However, if we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is not persuasive, I mainin—relying on Bermudez’s Conraint—that we do better by assuming that the subject is not self-represented. The content of her experiences and thoughts are best modeled as simple selfless propositional functions that are true or false relative to the subject of these experiences and thoughts. I refer to this as self-concernment without self- reference. Thus, against the recent ingenious work of Peacocke (2014), I claim that there is no compelling reason for postulating nonconceptual middle level self-representation, be- tween self-concernment and conceptual self-reference. However, as I hope to make clear, my claim is quite different from those of other recent oppositions to the idea of noncon- ceptual self-consciousness. According to the thesis of self-concernment without self-reference, the contents of experiences and thoughts are selfless propositional functions, true or false relative to the bearer of the respective mental states. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant uses the term ‘object’ in various ways and often without clearly signaling its different meanings. As a result, it is hard to gauge the extent to which Kant’s account of the object of cognition breaks new ground. In this article, I take the Critique to establish what is required to generate an object of cognition per se soleley by examining the various ways in which the human mind can objectify the content (...) of its representations. To clarify this endeavor, I distinguish four different ways in which the term ‘object’ is used in the Critique, namely, to refer to (1) material things, (2) the content of any type of thought, (3) the mind-immanent correlate of a cognition in the broad sense of the term, and (4) the mind-immanent correlate of a cognition in the strict sense of the term. On my reading, the fourth meaning of the term ‘object’ is key to the Transcendental Deduction and completes Kant’s unprecedented conception of the cognitive acts by means of which the human mind produces objects of cognition out of a manifold of representations. (shrink)

Je commence par quelques commentaires célèbres par le philosophe (psychologue) Ludwig Wittgenstein parce que Pinker partage avec la plupart des gens (en raison des paramètres par défaut de notre psychologie innée évoluée) certains préjugés sur le fonctionnement de l’esprit, et parce que Wittgenstein offre des idées uniques et profondes dans le fonctionnement du langage, la pensée et la réalité (qu’il considérait comme plus ou moins coextensive) ne trouve nulle part ailleurs. Lare est seulement une référence à Wittgenstein dans ce volume, (...) ce qui est très malheureux étant donné qu’il était l’analyste le plus brillant et original de la langue. Dans le dernier chapitre, en utilisant la célèbre métaphore de la grotte de Platon, il résume magnifiquement le livre avec un aperçu de la façon dont l’esprit (langage, pensée, psychologie intentionnelle) - un produit de l’égoïsme aveugle, modéré que légèrement par l’altruisme automatisé pour les proches portant des copies de nos gènes (Inclusive Fitness)- fonctionne automatiquement, mais tente de se terminer sur une note optimiste en nous donnant l’espoir que nous pouvons néanmoins utiliser ses vastes capacités pour coopérer et faire du monde un endroit décent pour vivre. Pinker est certainement au courant, mais dit peu sur le fait que beaucoup plus sur notre psychologie est laissé de côté que inclus. Parmi les fenêtres de la nature humaine qui sont laissées de côté ou qui reçoivent un minimum d’attention, on peut lire les mathématiques et la géométrie, la musique et les sons, les images, les événements et la causalité, l’ontologie (classes de choses ou ce que nous savons), la plupart de l’épistémologie (comment nous le savons), les dispositions (croire, penser, juger, avoir l’intention, etc.) et le reste de la psychologie intentionnelle de l’action, des neurotransmetteurs et des enthéogènes, des états spirituels (p. ex. satori et illumination, stimulation et enregistrement du cerveau, lésions cérébrales et déficits comportementaux et troubles, jeux et sports, théorie de la décision (théorie des jeux et économie comportementale), comportement animal (très peu de langage mais un milliard d’années de génétique partagée). De nombreux livres ont été écrits sur chacun de ces domaines de la psychologie intentionnelle. Les données de ce livre sont des descriptions, pas des explications qui montrent pourquoi notre cerveau le fait de cette façon ou comment il est fait. Comment pouvons-nous utiliser les phrases de leur manière (c.-à-d., connaître toutes leurs significations)? Il s’agit d’une psychologie évolutive qui fonctionne à un niveau plus fondamental, c’est-à-dire le niveau où Wittgenstein est le plus actif. Et il y a peu d’attention au contexte dans lequel les mots sont utilisés - une arène que Wittgenstein a lancée. Néanmoins, il s’agit d’une oeuvre classique et avec ces mises en garde est encore bien la peine de lire. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Vous pouvez obtenir un résumé rapide de ce livre sur p 135 ou 326. Si vous n’êtes pas, à la hauteur sur la psychologie de l’évolution , vous devriez d’abord lire l’un des nombreux textes récents avec ce terme dans le titre. L’un des meilleurs est "The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology" 2nd ed par Buss. Jusqu’à il y a une quinzaine d’années, les «explications» du comportement n’ont pas vraiment été des explications des processus mentaux du tout, mais plutôt des descriptions (...) vagues et largement inutiles de ce que les gens ont fait et ce qu’ils ont dit, sans aucune idée de pourquoi. Nous pourrions dire que les gens se rassemblent pour commémorer un événement, louer Dieu, recevoir ses (ou ses) bénédictions, etc., mais rien de tout cela décrit les processus mentaux pertinents, donc nous pourrions dire qu’ils sont des explications à peu près de la même manière qu’il explique pourquoi une pomme tombe au sol si nous disons son parce que nous l’avons libéré, et il est lourd-il n’y a pas de mécanisme et pas de puissance explicative ou prédictive. Ce livre poursuit l’élucidation de la base génétique du comportement humain qui a été presque universellement ignorée et niée par le milieu universitaire, la religion, la politique et le public (voir l’excellent livre de Pinker ''The Blank Slatè'). Sa déclaration (p3) qu’il est inutile de demander si la religion est génétique est confondue comme le pourcentage de variation de tout comportement dû aux gènes et à l’environnement peut être étudié, tout comme ils le sont pour tous les autres comportements (voir par exemple, Pinker). Le titre devrait être "Tentatives préliminaires pour expliquer certains aspects de la religion primitive" car il ne traite pas du tout la conscience supérieure (par exemple, satori, illumination, etc.) qui sont de loin les phénomènes les plus intéressants et la seule partie de la religion d’intérêt personnel pour les personnes intelligentes et instruites au 21e siècle. En lisant tout ce livre, vous ne devineriez jamais que de telles choses existent. De même, pour l’immense domaine de la drogue et de la religion. Il manque un cadre de rationalité et ne mentionne pas les deux systèmes de vision de la pensée qui sont aujourd’hui si productifs. Pour cela, je suggère mes propres articles récents.. Néanmoins, le livre a beaucoup d’intérêt, et en dépit d’être daté vaut encore la peine d’être lu. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux systemes peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Empiezo con algunos comentarios famosos del filósofo (psicólogo) Ludwig Wittgenstein porque Pinker comparte con la mayoría de la gente (debido a la configuración predeterminada de nuestra psicología innata evolucionada) ciertos prejuicios sobre el funcionamiento de la mente, y porque Wittgenstein ofrece una visión única y profunda del funcionamiento del lenguaje, el pensamiento y la realidad (que él consideraba más o menos coextenso) que no se encontraba en ningún otro lugar. Ahí esta sólo referencia a Wittgenstein en este volumen, lo que (...) es más desafortunado teniendo en cuenta que él era el analista más brillante y original del lenguaje. -/- En el último capítulo, usando la famosa metáfora de la cueva de Platón, resume bellamente el libro con una visión general de cómo la mente (lenguaje, pensamiento, psicología intencional)-un producto de egoísmo ciego, moderado sólo ligeramente por el altruismo automatizado para cerca parientes que llevan copias de nuestros genes (Fitness inclusivo)--funciona automáticamente, pero trata de terminar en una nota optimista al darnos la esperanza de que, sin embargo, podemos emplear sus vastas capacidades para cooperar y hacer del mundo un lugar digno para vivir. -/- Pinker es ciertamente consciente de, pero dice poco sobre el hecho de que mucho más sobre nuestra psicología se deja fuera de lo incluido. Entre las ventanas a la naturaleza humana que se dejan fuera o se presta una atención mínima son las matemáticas y la geometría, la música y los sonidos, las imágenes, los eventos y la causalidad, la ontología (clases de cosas o lo que sabemos), la mayor parte de la epistemología (cómo sabemos), disposiciones (creer, pensar, juzgar, pretender, etc.) y el resto de la psicología intencional de la acción, neurotransmisores y entheogens, Estados espirituales (por ejemplo, Satori e iluminación, estimulación y grabación del cerebro, daño cerebral y comportamiento déficits y trastornos, juegos y deportes, teoría de la decisión (incluyendo la teoría del juego y la economía conductual), comportamiento animal (muy poco lenguaje pero mil millones de años de genética compartida). Se han escrito muchos libros sobre cada una de estas áreas de la psicología intencional. Los datos de este libro son descripciones, no explicaciones que muestran por qué nuestro cerebro lo hace de esta manera o cómo se hace. ¿Cómo sabemos usar las oraciones de manera diversa (es decir, conocer todos sus significados)? Esta es la psicología evolutiva que opera a un nivel más básico: el nivel en el que Wittgenstein es más activo. Y hay escasa atención a el Contexto en el que se utilizan palabras = una arena que Wittgenstein fue pionera. -/- Sin embargo, Este es un trabajo clásico y con estas precauciones todavía vale la pena leer. -/- Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos Sistemas View puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje Een Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd ED (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) y otras. -/- "Si Dios nos miró a la mente, no sería capaz de ver en quién estábamos pensando." Wittgenstein PI P217 -/- "¿Debe evitarse la palabra" infinito "en las matemáticas? Sí: donde parece conferir un significado sobre el cálculo; en lugar de conseguir uno de él. " Edición revisada de la RFM (1978) P141 -/- "Una y otra vez el intento de usar el lenguaje para limitar el mundo y establecerlo en relieve, pero no se puede hacer. La auto-evidencia del mundo se manifiesta en el mismo hecho de que el lenguaje puede y sólo se refiere a él. Porque el lenguaje sólo deriva la forma en que significa, su significado, del mundo, no hay lenguaje concebible que no represente a este mundo. " Observaciones filosóficas de Wittgenstein S47 . (shrink)

The course delivered by Heidegger during the Summer semester of 1923, and published later under the title of Ontology – The hermeneutics of facticity, is one of the most important loci in which we can have a glimpse of Kierkegaard’s influence on and importance to Heidegger, as well as of some of his interpretations about the thought of the Dane philosopher. One of them, notwithstanding puts forward a very interesting assessment of the relation between Kierkegaard and Hegel – through F. (...) A. Trendelenburg –, one of hottest topics in the Kierkegaardian scholarship, is not usually analyzed by that scholarship. Hence, this paper aims to show and analyze Heidegger’s theses on the relation between Kierkegaard-Hegel in that work in order to evaluate their correctness. As final remarks, this paper presents some metaphilosophical reflections on the very notions of relation and dependence between philosophers. (shrink)

Puede obtener un resumen rápido de este libro en p 135 o 326. Si no estás a la velocidad de la psicología evolutiva, primero debe leer uno de los numerosos textos recientes con este término en el título. Uno de los mejores es "el manual de la psicología evolutiva" 2Nd Ed por Buss. Hasta hace unos 15 años, las explicaciones del comportamiento no han sido realmente explicaciones de los procesos mentales, sino descripciones vagas y en gran medida inútiles de lo (...) que la gente hizo y lo que dijeron, sin ninguna idea de por qué. Podríamos decir que la gente se reúne para conmemorar un acontecimiento, alabar a Dios, recibir sus (o sus) bendiciones, etc., pero nada de esto describe los procesos mentales relevantes, por lo que podríamos decir que son explicaciones de la misma manera que explica por qué una manzana cae al suelo si decimos que es porque la lanzamos, y es pesada-no hay ningún mecanismo y ninguna potencia explicativa o predictiva. Este libro continúa la elucidación de la base genética del comportamiento humano que ha sido casi universalmente ignorado y negado por el mundo académico, la religión, la política y el público (véase el excelente libro de Pinker ' ' The Blank Slatè '). Su declaración (P3) de que no tiene sentido preguntar si la religión es genética se confunde como el porcentaje de variación de cualquier comportamiento debido a los genes y el medio ambiente se pueden estudiar, tal como lo son para todos los demás comportamientos (ver por ejemplo, Pinker). El título debe ser "intentos preliminares para explicar algunos aspectos de la religión primitiva", ya que él no trata la conciencia superior en absoluto (por ejemplo, Satori, iluminación, etc.) que son, con mucho, los fenómenos más interesantes y la única parte de la religión de interés personal a las personas inteligentes, educados en el siglo 21. Leyendo todo este libro, nunca adivinaría que esas cosas existirían. de la misma manera, para el inmenso campo de las drogas y la religión. Carece de un marco para la racionalidad y no menciona los sistemas duales de visión del pensamiento que ahora es tan productivo. Para eso sugiero mis documentos recientes. Sin embargo, el libro tiene mucho interés, y a pesar de estar fechada todavía vale la pena leer. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna Dos Sistemas Punto de Vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2ª Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3a Es (2019) y Delirios utópicos suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

In a survey of his views in the philosophy of mind, David Lewis criticizes much recent work in the field by attacking an imaginary opponent, Strawman. His case against Strawman focuses on four central theses which Lewis takes to be widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of mind. These theses concern (1) the language of thought hypothesis and its relation to folk psychology, (2) narrow content, (3) de se content, and (4) rationality. We respond to Lewis, arguing that he underestimates Strawman’s (...) theoretical resources in a variety of important ways. (shrink)

Bien que l’Iran ait fondé la première république islamique, on ne peut lui attribuer la paternité de la radicalisation de l’Islam. Théorisé avant la Révolution islamique et importé en Iran à la fin de des années 1960, l’Islam radical, qui est fondamentalement sunnite, n’a guère attiré l’attention des milieux islamistes de l’Iran de l’époque, le chiisme s’accommodant mal d’une grille de lecture essentiellement salafiste. En plus d’une incompatibilité théologique, la lecture salafiste ne pouvait mobiliser la société civile, désireuse de se (...) moderniser. En effet, depuis l’adoption de la première constitution en 1906, la société iranienne s’était considérablement distancée des communautés traditionnelles, des Salafs en particulier. (shrink)

Celebrated as the equal to the great philosophers of old, namely Plato and Aristotle, whom – as Cassiodorus put it – he taught to speak Latin better than they spoke Greek, Boethius aspired to fully emancipate Roman culture from its Greek models through translations and exegesis so faithful they would leave nothing more to be desired from the original. The essay focuses on Boethius philhellenism, without complexes insofar as it had little to do either with the mixed feelings of his (...) Roman predecessors or with the plundering agenda of his Christian contemporaries. Special attention is paid to the close relationship Boethius established between word for word translations and multi-layered commentaries which he thought of and – albeit partially – carried out as part of the same scholarly endeavour. Devoid of literary pretentions as well as free from aspirations to autonomy, Boethius literal rendering and scrupulous interpretation were meant to be completely self-sufficient. Together they stand out as both the most innovative and the most conservative features of his ambitious cultural project. -/- Célébré comme l’égal des grands philosophes du passé, auxquels il aurait appris à parler Latin mieux qu’ils ne parlaient Grec, Boèce a caressé le rêve d’une émancipation radicale de la culture romaine vis-à-vis des modèles grecs qu’il se proposait de traduire et interpréter assez fidèlement pour que la comparaison avec les sources ne soit plus nécessaire. De son effort de livrer un Aristote et un Platon latins à la hauteur des originaux grecs, nous étudions l’étroite solidarité qui relie la traduction mot-à-mot des textes grecs et la restitution scrupuleuse de leur sens. Cette double tâche, que Boèce a conçue et menée d’un seul tenant, nous est dès lors apparue comme le reflet d’un philhellénisme sans complexes, tout aussi éloigné des sentiments ambivalents que nourrissaient vis-à-vis des hellènes ses devanciers romains que des efforts visant à domestiquer l’héritage classique auxquels se livraient certains de ses contemporains de même confession que lui. Affranchis de tout rêve d’autonomie, les traductions et les commentaires de Boèce se conçoivent comme parfaitement autosuffisants. Ensemble ils constituent ce qu’il y a à la fois de franchement novateur et de profondément conservateur dans son projet de faire parler Latin les sources grecques. (shrink)

(English below) -/- Normalmente se piensa en la percepción y la memoria como dos capacidades independientes, creyendo que la primera solo tiene influencia sobre la segunda durante la codificación. En las entrevistas autobiográficas de historia oral y memoria histórica, los entrevistados seleccionan, adaptan y completan sus recuerdos para crear diferentes versiones de ellos. En este artículo se argumenta que lo anterior es consecuencia de la naturaleza simulativa de la memoria episódica, y del empleo por los entrevistados de información perceptiva para (...) generar y adaptar sus recuerdos a un discurso autobiográfico, buscando satisfacer un propósito comunicativo. Para ilustrar esto, se analizan tres factores contextuales que influyen sobre la construcción del recuerdo en una entrevista autobiográfica (objetivo comunicativo, idioma de comunicación e interacción emocional), mostrando que, en este tipo de recuperación, memoria y percepción contribuyen simultáneamente a construir simulaciones de eventos que se adaptan en tiempo real al contexto donde ocurre la evocación. /////////////Abstract/////////////// Perception and memory are usually thought to be two independent faculties, where the former is believed to only have an influence on the latter at encoding. In autobiographical interviews of oral history and historical memory, interviewees select, adapt, and complete their memories to create different versions. This paper argues that this process is a consequence of the simulative nature of episodic memory and the interviewees’ use of perceptual information to generate and adapt their memories to an autobiographical discourse with the goal of satisfying a communicative purpose. To illustrate this, three contextual factors that influence the construction of a memory in an autobiographical interview are analyzed, showing that, in this type of recall, memory and perception simultaneously contribute to constructing episodic simulations of events, which adapt in real-time to the context in which recall happens. (shrink)

Critico la teoría hermenéutica de Landgrebe sobre el cartesianismo de Husserl mostrando la estructura argumentativa en la que se inserta, lo que pretende y lo que está forzada a pretender. Su núcleo duro radica en los conceptos de crítica inmanente y lógica interna y tiene como meta final promover una idea de trascendental no-entitativa voluntarista y correlacional opuesta a la de un yo absoluto. Para probar esto, analizo tres niveles del cartesianismo de Landgrebe: primero, la síntesis contradictoria entre apodicticidad y (...) experiencia; segundo, su interpretación de Filosofía Primera, y, tercero, el objetivismo de Husserl. Concluyo de la función que juega el cartesianismo en este esquema y del fracaso de documentar con ejemplos la idea que el concepto no describe una noción en la filosofía de Husserl, sino que es una herramienta hermenéutica para controlar el sentido de trascendental en esta filosofía.I criticize Landgrebe’s hermeneutical theory about Husserl’s Cartesianism describing the structure of the argument where this concept is rooted, what it claims and what it is forced to claim. The theory’s hard core is based on the concepts of immanent critique and internal logic and it’s final goal consists in advancing a non-entitative voluntaristic and correlational definition of transcendental opposite to that of an absolute I. To prove this, I analyze three levels inside Landgrebe’s concept of Cartesianism: first, the contradictory synthesis of experience and apodicticity; second, his interpretation of First Philosophy, and, third, Husserl’s objectivism. I conclude from the goal that Cartesianism plays in this argument and the failure in documenting this idea with examples that Landgrebe’s Cartesianism is rather an hermeneutical tool made to control the definition of transcendental in Husserl’s philosophy than a concept describing Husserl’s thought. (shrink)

O presente ensaio tem como objetivo mostrar consequências teóricas de uma tensão latente entre a noção de tragédia no Nietzsche d’O nascimento da tragédia e a compreensão schopenhaueriana da música. Tal tensão se dá não apenas no âmbito de interpretações estéticas das referidas artes por parte dos filósofos mencionados, mas demonstra disparidades fundamentais no pensamento do jovem Nietzsche em relação à metafísica de O mundo como Vontade e Representação. A hipótese é que essas disparidades culminariam num ponto de cesura entre (...) as filosofias de Schopenhauer e Nietzsche, bem como no fenecimento da amizade deste com Richard Wagner. The following essay aims to show the theoretical consequences of a latent tension between the notion of tragedy in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy and the Schopenhauerian comprehension of music. This tension occurs not just within the aesthetics interpretations of the mentioned arts by the philosophers cited, but it demonstrates fundamental disparities in the young Nietzsche’s thought in respect to the metaphysics of The World as Will and Representation. The hypothesis is that these disparities would culminate in a caesura point between the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, as well in the decline of the friendship of this one with Richard Wagner. (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es analizar el modo en que se presenta la virtud política en los principales textos de Montesquieu y su resonancia en la obra de Rousseau. La hipótesis general que se propone es que, a pesar de sus enormes divergencias, los dos elaboraron una lectura eminentemente moderna que los separa de la filosofía política clásica. Ambos habrían compartido la idea de que la virtud es una pasión ―o que es intercambiable por una pasión―, apartándose de (...) las jerarquías del pensamiento antiguo. Se sostiene en este artículo que Montesquieu declarará, ante la muerte de la virtud clásica, su sucedáneo en el placer de la seguridad que es capaz de garantizar la libertad por medio del gobierno mixto. Por su lado, Rousseau hará una reivindicación de la virtud antigua, pero identificándola con la compasión, dislocando el status de la virtud civil. Estas lecturas darán lugar a dos maneras muy distintas de comprender la relación existente entre derecho natural y derecho positivo. // Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyze the way in which political virtue appears in the main texts of Montesquieu and and its repercussions in Rousseau’s work. The hypothesis proposed is that, despite their enormous divergences, both of them developed an eminently modern reading that separates them from Classical Political Philosophy. Both authors would have shared the idea that virtue is a passion ―or that it is interchangeable with a passion―, moving away from the hierarchies of ancient thought. This paper argues that Montesquieu will declare after the death of classical virtue the pleasure of security as a substitute capable of guaranteeing modern liberty by means of States organized as mixed constitutions. For his part, Rousseau will make a vindication of ancient virtue, but identifying it with compassion, dislocating the status of civil virtue. These readings will give rise to two very different ways of understanding the relationship between natural law and positive law. -/- Palabras clave: virtud – pasión – modernidad – seguridad – compasión. Key-words: virtue – passion – modernity – security – compassion. (shrink)

In reasoning, we draw conclusions from multiple premises. But thinkers can be fragmented. And if there is no single fragment of the agent that thinks all of the premises, then the agent cannot draw any conclusions from them. It follows that reasoning from multiple premises depends on their being thought together. But what is it to think premises together? What is the condition that contrasts with fragmentation? This paper provides an answer to this question that is simple but compelling: to (...) think premises together is to attribute those very thoughts to one and the same self. The ability to reason depends on the ability to attribute the thoughts from which one reasons to oneself. Reasoning—at least the sort of reasoning that we do—requires de se thought. (shrink)

Self-locating attitudes and assertions provide a challenge to the received view of mental and linguistic intentionality. In this paper I try to show that the best way to meet this challenge is to adopt relativistic, centred possible worlds accounts for both belief and communication. First, I argue that self-locating beliefs support a centred account of belief. Second, I argue that self-locating utterances support a complementary centred account of communication. Together, these two claims motivate a unified centred conception of belief and (...) communication. (shrink)

La discusión sobre las consecuencias políticas del pensamiento de L. Wittgenstein ha girado sobre la posibilidad de construir miradas críticas sobre lo social, su legitimidad, amplitud, fuerza, etc. Sin embargo, aproximar a Wittgenstein a una posición materialista, como la entendía L. Althusser, conduce a una comprensión diferente de la crítica, vinculada a la tarea de deconstruir el discurso filosófico que intenta unificar y organizar jerárquicamente las evidencias (certezas) constitutivas de los diferentes juegos de lenguaje en los que se despliega lo (...) social. Se intenta extraer de esta aproximación una distinción entre la filosofía como práctica teórica ideológica y como práctica teórica crítica. The discussion regarding the political consequences of Wittgenstein's thought has focused on the possibility of building critical approaches to the legitimacy, amplitude, strength, etc. of the social sphere. However, bringing Wittgenstein close to a materialist position as understood by L. Althusser leads to a different understanding of critique, linked to the deconstruction of the philosophical discourse that attempts to unify and hierarchically organize the certainties that are constitutive of the different language games in which the social is deployed. On the basis of this approach, the article attempts to draw a distinction between philosophy as ideological theoretical practice and as critical theoretical practice. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new explanation for the paradoxes related to anthropic reasoning. Solutions to the Sleeping Beauty Problem and the Doomsday argument are discussed in detail. The main argument can be summarized as follows: -/- Our thoughts, reasonings and narratives inherently comes from a certain perspective. With each perspective there is a center, or using the term broadly, a self. The natural first-person perspective is most primitive. However we can also think and express from others’ perspectives with a (...) theory of mind. A perspective’s center could be unrelated to the topic of discussion so its de se thoughts need not to be considered, e.g. the perspective of an outside observer. Let’s call these the third-person perspective. First-person reasoning allows primitive self identification as I am inherently unique as the center of the perspective. Whereas from third-person perspective I am not fundamentally special comparing to others so a reference class of observers including me can be defined. It is my contention that reasonings from different perspectives should not mix. Otherwise it could lead to paradoxes even independent of anthropic reasoning. The paradoxes surrounding anthropic reasoning are caused by the aforementioned perspective mix. Regarding the sleeping beauty problem the correct answer should be double halving. Lewisian halving and thirding uses unique reasonings from both first and third-person perspectives. Indexical probabilities such as “the probability that this is the first awakening” or “the probability of me being one of the first 100 billion human beings” also mixes first- and third-person reasonings. Therefore invalid. Readers against perspectivism may disagree with point 1 and suggest we could reason in objective terms without the limit of perspectives. My argument is compatible with this belief. Objective reasoning would be analytically identical to the third-person perspective. My argument would become that objective reasoning and perspective reasonings should not mix. In the following I would continue to use “third-person perspective” but readers can switch that to “objective reasoning” if they wish so. (shrink)

[No hay resumen disponible, se incluyen los primerso párrafos del texto] Hace ya mucho tiempo algunos amigos de alrededor de treinta años comenzamos a estudiar filosofía bajo la dirección de Gregorio Klimovsky. Muy pronto uno de nosotros se destacó por su capacidad creadora y su curiosidad filosófica: era Juan Larreta. Es así que, a pesar de haber iniciado tarde su formación, descolló como filósofo de mérito tanto en la Argentina como en el exterior. Presidente de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis (...) Filosófico (SADAF) durante dos períodos, obtuvo el Diploma al M érito en Filosofía de la Fundación Konex en el 2006 y fue nombrado miembro honorario de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica (SEFA) en 2010. Organizó seminarios y dictó conferencias en centros de estudios filosóficos y en universidades argentinas y extranjeras, en cuyas publicaciones escribió numerosos artículos de singular valía, todos ellos caracterizados por su originalidad, su irreverente desafío al sentido común y sus ingeniosos experimentos mentales (thought experiments). Esta despedida dolorosa se empeña en acercar a la memoria recuerdos queridos de circunstancias compartidas con este amigo excepcional. fue nuestro centro: en su casa organizó, durante muchos años, seminarios de filosofía, de economía y, junto con María Elisa, esas reuniones cinéfilas de divertidas, sorprendentes y variadas interpretaciones... (shrink)

El presente artículo se enmarca en el contexto de la alternativa ofrecida por Quentin Meillassoux a la cuestión de la pregunta canónica ¿por qué hay algo y no más bien nada? (2018f) y pretende reflexionar sobre las condiciones que posibilitan la solución del dilema espectral (2016b) en el marco de una ontología extra científica (2020). Concebir el advenimiento de una entidad divina implicaría comprender, al menos, tres conceptos claves para el pensamiento del filósofo, a saber, el correlacionismo, factualidad y contingencia (...) absoluta. De esta manera, el objetivo principal de este artículo es esbozar una lectura introductoria a los cimientos de la filosofía de Meillassoux a fin de comprenderla como una ontología capaz de dar cuenta de la inexistencia divina. -/- The present article takes place in the context of the alternative offered by Quentin Meillas-soux to the question of the canonical question “why is there something and not rather nothing?” (2018f) and aims to reflect on the conditions that make the solution of the spectral dilemma possible (2016b) within the framework of an extra-scientific ontology (2020). To conceive of the advent of a divine entity would imply understanding at least three key concepts for the philos-opher’s thought, namely, correlationism, factuality and absolute contingency. Thus, the main objec-tive of this article is to outline an introductory reading of the fundamentals of Meillassoux’s phi-losophy in order to understand it as an ontology capable of accounting for divine non-existence. -/- . (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article propose une analyse détaillée des considérations de Hans-Georg Gadamer sur l’herméneutique théologique proprement dite. Pensée dans et pour la foi chrétienne, la conception de l’herméneutique théologique qu’il met en avant se veut essentiellement une herméneutique du texte biblique. Les réflexions de Gadamer sur ce thème nous conduisent cependant tout droit dans sa théorie de la littérature. La question directrice devient celle de la nature du texte religieux (entendons : du texte biblique, reçu en son unité canonique) en (...) tant que texte éminent, dont la structure singulière est mise en relief au moyen d’une éclairante comparaison avec les textes poétique, philosophie et juridique. L’Écriture, en tant qu’elle répond à la structure textuelle de la promesse, exige du lecteur une forme particulière d’appropriation qui trouve sa réalisation exemplaire dans la prédication. Toutefois, contre une lecture (Ommen, Eberhard, etc.) qui insiste sur la discontinuité de l’herméneutique théologique de Gadamer avec sa propre oeuvre philosophique, je soutiens la thèse de leur foncière cohérence. ABSTRACT: This paper offers a detailed analysis of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s considerations on theological hermeneutics proper. Thought within and for the Christian faith, the conception of theological hermeneutics he puts forward is mainly understood as a hermeneutics of the biblical text. However, Gadamer’s reflections on this theme bring us straight to his theory of literature. The guiding question becomes that about the nature of the religious text (meaning : the biblical text, received in its canonical unity) as eminent text, which peculiar structure is thrown into relief through an enlightening comparison with the poetical, the philosophical and the legal text. The Scripture, in that it has the textual structure of a promise, requires from the reader a particular form of appropriation, which finds its exemplary fulfillment in preaching. Against a reading that emphasizes discontinuity between Gadamer’s theological hermeneutics and his own philosophical work (Ommen, Eberhard, etc.) I defend the thesis of their fundamental coherence. (shrink)

En la filosofía de Aristóteles y en la filosofía escolástica de cuño aristotélico, la abstracción constituía un acto fundamental del proceso cognitivo: marcaba el salto o ascenso de la sensibilidad a la inteligibilidad, del conocimiento del individuo al conocimiento de su esencia. En la teoría del conocimiento de Hegel, por el contrario, el concepto abstracto o, como Hegel prefiere llamarlo, la “representación abstracta” o “representación universal” es tan sólo un momento intermedio en el proceso fluido que va del conocimiento del (...) objeto como algo sensible -en la forma de la intuición y la subforma de la imagen- al conocimiento de su naturaleza intrínseca -en la forma del pensar. Sobre la base, por un lado, de los escasos textos en los que Hegel se ocupa expresamente del tema, y, por el otro, de la contextualización de estos textos en un análisis general de la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo teórico, el presente trabajo busca reconstruir las tesis fundamentales de Hegel sobre la abstracción y esclarecer con ello el sentido y función que la misma tiene en su teoría del conocimiento. The concept of abstraction in Hegel's theory of knowledgeIn both Aristotelian philosophy and the scholastic philosophy that bears its stamp, the concept of abstraction constitutes a fundamental act in the cognitive process; it signaled the leap or ascent from the realm of the senses to the realm of intellection, from knowledge of the individual to knowledge of his essence. By way of contrast, in Hegel's theory of knowledge, the abstract concept -or, as Hegel himself preferred to call it, “abstract representation” or “universal representation”­- is nothing but an intermediate moment in the fluid process of going from knowing the object as something given to the senses -in the form of intuition and the subform of image- to knowing its intrinsic nature -in the form of thought. Based on the scant writings by Hegel wherein he expressly addresses the matter, and by subsequently placing these texts into the broader context of an analysis of Hegel's philosophy of theoretical subjective spirit, this paper attempts to reconstruct Hegel's most significant ideas on abstraction. Hopefully, this will serve to clarify both the meaning and the role of that notion in Hegelian theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Os problemas da lei e da autoridade marcaram fortemente o pensamento políticomedieval ocidental, e em especial o desenvolvimento da noção de soberania, ponto deconvergência dos grandes conflitos de jurisdição no período. O debate acerca dadistribuição das jurisdições constituiu um dos momentos importantes para a construção damoderna idéia de soberania. Na medida em que se tomava a lei como dada, o sentido daautoridade tinha necessariamente de ser vinculado à idéia de comissão: a autoridade eraum atributo daquele que podia fazer cumprir a (...) lei em nome do legislador divino. Outromomento relevante foi o da emergência do problema do poder legislativo, tal como entendidomodernamente. Jurisdição, a partir daí, passaria a incluir também o direito de criar ede impor as normas válidas para toda a comunidade por um legislador agora humano. Aospoucos, a vontade do príncipe, que não se limita mais pelo rigor da razão e da moralidade,passa a ser entendida como fonte criadora, transformadora e revogadora da lei. Mostrar aslinhas gerais deste percurso constitui o objetivo imediato deste artigo. (shrink)

Resumen. El presente texto se centra en la crítica que el pensamiento decolonial ha dirigido a la cultura occidental, focalizada en la modernidad, como intrínsecamente violenta y respecto de la cual las culturas que sufrieron la colonización debieran cortar radicalmente. Con el objetivo de poner en cuestión algunos aspectos centrales de este planteamiento se analizan críticamente sus conceptos de modernidad, de geopolítica del conocimiento y de cultura. Palabras clave: modernidad; cultura; geopolítica del conocimiento. [en] The Critique of Modernity in the (...) Decolonial Thought Abstract. This paper takes as its central issue the criticism that the decolonial thought has made to the Western culture, focused on modernity, as an internally violent culture. For this reason, the decolonial authors think that the cultures which have suffered the colonization should set a cut in regard of Western culture. We try to put in question some central aspects of this conception, as their concepts of modernity, culture, and geopolitics of knowledge. Keywords: Modernity; Culture; Geopolitics of Knowledge. (shrink)

This study brings light to the concepts of State and Government in the thought of Marsilio de Padua pointing out to profoundly modern institutions present in the reflection of this medieval philosopher. We attempt to show that Marsilio de Padua reflects based on Aristotle´s categories, but proposes a State and Government conception different from that common place of medieval politics as he insists on the need of the popular consent as a criterion of political legitimacy. -/- O estudo explicita os (...) conceitos de Estado e de Governo no pensamento de Marsílio de Pádua apontando as intuições profundamente modernas presentes na reflexão desse filósofo medieval. Procuramos mostrar que Marsílio reflete com categorias aristotélicas, mas propõe uma concepção de Estado e de Governo que se distancia do lugar comum da reflexão política medieval ao insistir na necessidade do consentimento dos súditos como critério de legitimidade política. (shrink)

Original source :「委員会の論理」『世界文化』[Culture du monde], n° 13, janvier 1936, 2–17 ; n° 14, février 1936, 16–33 ; n° 15, mars 1936, 12–25. Repris dans nmz 1 : 46–108. La version des œuvres complètes présente un certain nombre de variantes par rapport à la première publication en 1936. « La logique des comités » a été traduit en espagnol par Agustín J. Zavala. Je remercie vivement Saitō Takako pour sa relecture et ses précieuses remarques.

En el pensamiento de Santo Tomás de Aquino, la Filosofía Moral y la Teología Moral tienen al bien como concepto central, es decir, el ser en cuanto apetecible y en cuanto fin de la tendencia o apetito. Lo anterior es debido a que lo bueno expresa el en cuanto se relaciona con el apetito y de este modo señala la capacidad del ser para mover la voluntad o una tendencia cualquiera hacia su fin. Es por esto que Santo Tomás sostiene (...) con Aristóteles que el bien coincide con la noción de fin. Y es por la importancia de estos principios y por la repercusión en la moral y sobretodo en la explicación de la libertad moral, que este breve trabajo consiste en una profundización en las relaciones entre el bien, el fin y la naturaleza y algunas de sus aplicaciones a lo que se conoce como tendencia natural o apetito natural y la tendencia libre que se refiere a la voluntad sobre todo a la voluntad de la persona humana. No se trata de un intento por presentar todas las conclusiones que de estos principios se siguen, lo cual correspondería a la Filosofía o a la Teología Moral, sino más bien de una profundización en los principios metafísicos, para asentar los cimientos del orden moral. -/- In the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, both ethics and moral theology have as their central concept of the good, that is, of being insofar as it is desirable and insofar as it is the end of appetitive tendencies. This is due to the fact that the good expresses being insofar as it relates to the appetite, and thus it expresses the capacity of being to move the will, or to any tendency towards its end. For this reason St. Thomas holds with Aristotle that the good is convertible with the notion of end. And it is due tuo the importance of these principles and their consequences for morality and moral freedom that in this brief work I attempt to delve into the relationship between the good, the end, and nature, and some of its applications to what is known as natural tendency or natural appetite as well as to the free tendency which is called "the will", especially the will of the huma person. It is not an attempt to present all the conclusions that follow form these principles -a task that would correspond to ethics or to moral theology- but attempt to delve into the metaphysical principles that ground the moral order. (shrink)

El pensamiento de los pueblos de la Antigüedad se compuso de lenguajes, sistemas de valores y planteamientos que escapan no sólo a los convencionalismos lingüísticos actuales, también resultan ajenos a las categorías propias de la filosofía, la religión y la mitología misma. Un caso revelador es la (hek3) egipcia, traducida a lenguas contemporáneas como magia, magic, Zauber o Magie; en dicho traslado, se le adhiere una serie de connotaciones propias de la mentalidad judeocristiana y evolucionista. Una magia sin más, producto (...) del hombre crédulo, perezoso de mente y supersticioso. Sin embargo, tal reducción no se preocupa en estudiar aspectos de gran trascendencia como el proceso de transmisión que la palabra sufrió al cabo de los siglos, omitiendo el papel que jugó la magia persa dentro de la reflexión de filósofos, historiadores y poetas de la Hélade. La (hek3)fue una manera de concebir el universo que no puede reducirse sólo a creencias pseudoreligiosas, fue una sofisticada estructura para entender las cosas que, sencillamente, desconocemos. El presente artículo es una invitación a revisar los productos culturales de siglos lejanos, sin perder de vista que la incomprensión no se da exclusivamente con lo distante, sino en las entrañas mismas de nuestro tiempo. (shrink)

Starting from the assumption that aesthetic is an anthropological fact which like language or symbolic thought belongs to the behavioral, cognitive and social register of our species, the article aims to clarify the uses of the category of aesthetic in the human sciences (social anthropology, cognitive psychology, evolutionary anthropology). The epistemological analysis focuses on the implicit assumptions that guide the different methodologies and leads to the elaboration of a conceptual map of the several models of aesthetic adopted in the contemporary (...) debate. Such a result is presented as a preliminary analytical step aimed at fostering an interdisciplinary approach to the complexity and socio-biological diversity of aesthetic phenomena. // Lo estético es un hecho antropológico que —como el lenguaje o el pensamiento simbólico— pertenece al registro comportamental, cognitivo y social de nuestra especie. A partir de esta consideración, el artículo pretende aclarar los usos de la categoría de lo “estético” en las ciencias humanas (antropología social, psicología cognitiva, antropología evolutiva). La investigación epistemológica se concentra en los supuestos implícitos que guían las diferentes metodologías y enfoques teóricos, y finalmente propone un mapa conceptual de los modelos estéticos adoptados en el debate contemporáneo. Este resultado se presenta como un paso analítico preliminar destinado a promover un enfoque interdisciplinario de la complejidad y diversidad sociobiológica de los fenómenos estéticos. (shrink)

Abstract: In 1934 Gadamer delivered the lecture Plato und die Dichter. Its central topic was the relationship between poetry, philosophy and politics in Plato’s thought. Gadamer developed an original phenomenological investigation on Plato’s ethical-political philosophy and the role that art played in it, in which the dimension of language and the meaning of utopia are structural for his arguments. This article aims, in the first place, to elucidate some political dimensions of Plato und die Dichter. In order to do this, (...) I will carry out a critical review of Donatella Di Cesare’s and Dennis Schmidt’s contemporary readings of these aspects. In the conclusions, after briefly analysing in the third section the relationship between phrónēsis, aretḗ and andreía in the Platonic dialogues, I will try to demonstrate how these notions illuminate the question of the seduction of power (neglected by Schmidt in his reading of Gadamer’s Plato), as well as the inseparability of this problem with respect to the dialectical conception of utopia. It will be suggested that it is possible, from and beyond the Gadamerian reading of Plato, to rethink the idea of civil disobedience and the political value of the myth from standpoint of utopia. // Resumen: En 1934 Gadamer pronunció la conferencia Plato und die Dichter,cuyo tema central era la relación entre poesía, filosofía y política en el pensamiento platónico. Allí desarrolló una original investigación fenomenológica sobre la filosofía ético-política de Platón y el lugar que el arte ocupaba en ella, en la que la dimensión del lenguaje y el significado de la utopía son estructurales para sus argumentaciones. El presente artículo se propone, en primer lugar, elucidar algunos aspectos de la dimensión política de Plato und die Dichter. Para ello, se realizará una revisión crítica de las lecturas contemporáneas de estos aspectos por parte de Donatella Di Cesare y Dennis Schmidt. En las conclusiones, tras analizar brevemente en el tercer apartado la relación entre phrónēsis, aretḗ y andreía en los diálogos platónicos, intentaré demostrar cómo estas nociones alumbran la cuestión de la seducción del poder (descuidada por Schmidt en su lectura del Platón gadameriano), así como la inseparabilidad de este problema con respecto a la concepción dialéctica de la utopía. A partir de esto último se sugerirá que es posible, a partir y más allá de la lectura gadameriana de Platón, repensar la idea de “desobediencia civil” y el valor político del mito desde el punto de vista de la utopía. (shrink)

El presente estudio procura establecer una serie de considerandos a propósito de las concomitancias y desavenencias entre el pensamiento de Plotino de Licópolis y Levinas de Kaunas, el desafío deviene a partir de la aparente relación entre el Uno plotiniano y el Infinito levinasiano, a su vez se considera la posibilidad de acceso del ser humano, entidad particular, al punto originador, llámese este Uno o Infinito. Summary: This study aims to establish a series of ideas about the similarities and disagreements (...) between the thought of Plotinus of Lycopolis and Levinas of Kaunas, the challenge becomes apparent from the relationship between the " One " Plotinian and " Infinity " Levinas, in turn, considers the accessibility of human beings, particular entity, the originator point, call it: One or Infinite. El presente estudio se circunscribe dentro del área de la metafísica. Si bien se ha realizado algunas investigaciones al respecto, por ejemplo en Schroeder y Benso (2008), esta pesquisa resulta innovadora en el ámbito castellano. Huelga indicar que el texto mencionado se convierte en un importante pilar para el desarrollo del texto en cuestión. (shrink)

El presente artículo explora la lingüística y en particular la fonética de forma transdisciplinar y su relación con otras ciencias a través del pensamiento complejo. Se incluye una revisión sobre los conceptos fundamentales de la lingüística y la complejidad, orientados a un público no especializado. En la esfera contemporánea de la lingüística, el estudio de los sistemas complejos proporciona una perspectiva innovadora que permite comprender los matices del lenguaje y su funcionamiento en contextos sociales. Este análisis no solo se centra (...) en las estructuras lingüísticas, sino que también considera las interacciones dinámicas y evolutivas entre diferentes elementos, pasando por temas como la adquisición del lenguaje, entre otros. La transdisciplinariedad, como enfoque metodológico, ayuda a superar confusiones y malentendidos comunes en la aplicación de conceptos de complejidad y pensamiento complejo, enriqueciendo así nuestra comprensión del lenguaje como fenómeno. A través de esta interrelación, se revela cómo la relevancia de los sistemas complejos transforma nuestra visión del lenguaje y su papel en la sociedad contemporánea. -/- Abstract: -/- This article explores linguistics, particularly phonetics, from a transdisciplinary perspective, examining its relationship with other sciences through complex thought. It includes a review of fundamental concepts in linguistics and complexity, aimed at a non-specialist audience. In the contemporary field of linguistics, the study of complex systems provides an innovative perspective that enables a deeper understanding of language and its function in social contexts. This analysis goes beyond linguistic structures to consider the dynamic and evolving interactions between different elements, addressing topics such as language acquisition, among others. Transdisciplinarity, as a methodological approach, helps to overcome common misunderstandings and confusions in the application of complexity and complex thought concepts, thereby enriching our understanding of language as a phenomenon. Through this interrelation, the significance of complex systems reveals how they transform our view of language and its role in contemporary society. (shrink)

Por medio de un contraste con el pensamiento heideggeriano, el estudio desarrolla la concepción gadameriana de la alteridad, el lugar que ocupa este tema en la propuesta hermenéutica de Verdad y Método y la reformulación que ello supone de la manera como Heidegger concibe la aperturidad de la existencia humana y el acontecimiento mismo del ser. El trabajo inicia planteando la crítica de Gadamer al reconocimiento ontológico del otro por parte de Heidegger; muestra enseguida la oposición que se presenta entre (...) el “ser-para-la-muerte” y el “ser-para-la-historia”, la relevancia que tiene en Gadamer la vida práctica y la idea de diálogo como modelo de la comprensión. Se concluye mostrando la oposición que se da entre ambos autores en la manera de considerar el modo de ser del lenguaje y el acontecimiento del ser que en éste tiene lugar. [/] -/- In permanent contrast with Heidegger’s thought, this study develops Gadamer’s conception of otherness, its place in the hermeneutic project of Truth and Method and the reformulation that all this entails of human existence disclosedness and the event of being itself. Work starts raising Gadamer’s critique to the ontological [42] recognition of the others by Heidegger; it shows then the opposition between the “being-towards-death” and “being-for-history”, and the relevance of practical life and the idea of dialogue as a model of understanding in Gadamer’s philosophy. It concludes by showing the opposition between both authors regarding language’s essence and the event of being that takes place on it. (shrink)

Dans 'Godel’s Way', trois éminents scientifiques discutent de questions telles que l’indécidabilité, l’incomplétude, le hasard, la calculabilité et la paraconsistence. J’aborde ces questions du point de vue de Wittgensteinian selon lesquelles il y a deux questions fondamentales qui ont des solutions complètement différentes. Il y a les questions scientifiques ou empiriques, qui sont des faits sur le monde qui doivent être étudiés de manière observationnelle et philosophique quant à la façon dont le langage peut être utilisé intelligiblement (qui incluent certaines (...) questions en mathématiques et en logique), qui doivent être décidés en regardant un comment nous utilisons réellement des mots dans des contextes particuliers. Lorsque nous obtenons clair sur le jeu de langue que nous jouons, ces sujets sont considérés comme des questions scientifiques et mathématiques ordinaires comme les autres. Les idées de Wittgenstein ont rarement été égalées et jamais dépassées et sont aussi pertinentes aujourd’hui qu’elles l’étaient il y a 80 ans lorsqu’il a dicté les Livres Bleus et Brown. Malgré ses défauts, vraiment une série de notes plutôt qu’un livre fini, c’est une source unique du travail de ces trois savants célèbres qui travaillent aux confins de la physique, des mathématiques et de la philosophie depuis plus d’un demi-siècle. Da Costa et Doria sont cités par Wolpert (voir ci-dessous ou mes articles sur Wolpert et mon examen de Yanofsky 'The Outer Limits of Reason') depuis qu’ils ont écrit sur le calcul universel, et parmi ses nombreuses réalisations, Da Costa est un pionnier dans la paraconsistence. -/- Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux système peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 » 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se concentra en el debate acerca de los alcances de la providencia que tuvo lugar entre las escuelas estoica, platónica y peripatética entre las siglos I y III de nuestra era. En ese contexto, analiza el problema del status ontológico de los singulares en Orígenes de Alejandría y Nemesio de Émesa. Influidos primariamente por la síntesis filoniana entre las distintas teorías griegas de providencia y la de las Escrituras, estos autores fundan la consistencia de los singulares en (...) la tesis de una acción directa del principio divino sobre cada uno de ellos. Frente a una cierta tendencia universalista y necesitarista del pensamiento clásico, los Padres griegos intentaron rescatar el valor metafísico del individuo en cuanto tal. -/- The present paper focuses on the debate over the scope of Providence that took place among the Stoic, Platonic and Peripatetic schools between the first and the third centuries AD. In that context, it deals with the problem of the ontological status of the singulars in the thought of Origen of Alexandria and Nemesius of Emesa. Influenced primarily by the Philonian synthesis of the different Greek theories of Providence with that of the Scriptures, Origen and Nemesius ground the consistency of individual beings on the thesis of a direct divine action intended for each of them. Faced with the universalistic and necessitarian tendencies of classical thought, the Greek Fathers tried to rescue the metaphysical value of individuals as such. (shrink)