Results for ' Phenomenal Externalism of Enactivist Provenance'

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  1. Brain Patterns Shaping Embodied Activities of Their Bodily Limbs in Perception and Cognition.de Sá Pereira Roberto horácio, Farias Sérgio & Barcellos Victor - 2023 - Qeios.
    This essay aims to expose the metaphysical underpinnings of enactivism. While enactivism relies heavily on rejecting the traditional mind-body problem by excluding the familiar thought experiments that favor phenomenal dualism, the crucial point that is overlooked is instead the brain-body problem, specifically the crucial interaction between the brain and the bodily limbs in their embodied activities of perception and cognition. If enactivism is correct, differences in sensory experience necessarily entail differences in embodied activity—this is the metaphysical core of enactivism, (...)
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  2. Por que somos o nosso cérebro: O Enativismo Posto em Questão.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira, Sergio Farias de Souza Filho & Victor Machado Barcellos - 2023 - Trans/Form/Ação 46:517-554.
    In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent (organisms and bodies can vary, as can even the spaces they occupy in the same experience vary), 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- (...)
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  3. Phenomenal Externalism's Explanatory Power.Peter W. Ross - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):613-630.
    I argue that phenomenal externalism is preferable to phenomenal internalism on the basis of externalism's explanatory power with respect to qualitative character. I argue that external qualities, namely, external physical properties that are qualitative independent of consciousness, are necessary to explain qualitative character, and that phenomenal externalism is best understood as accepting external qualities while phenomenal internalism is best understood as rejecting them. I build support for the claim that external qualities are necessary (...)
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  4. The Real Trouble for Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal Externalism.Adam Pautz - 2014 - In Mark Sprevak & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 153-181.
    I criticize some armchair arguments against phenomenal externalism due to Block, Hawthorne, Kriegel, Levine, Shoemaker and others. I conclude by discussing an overlooked armchair argument: the argument from phenomenal localism.
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  5. The real trouble for phenomenal externalists: New empirical evidence (with reply by Klein&Hilbert).Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Dordrecht: Springer Studies in Brain and Mind. pp. 237-298.
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  6. The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification.Declan Smithies - 2014 - In Mark Sprevak & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 98-124.
    In this chapter, I argue for the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the basis of epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue for the thesis of phenomenal mentalism, according to which epistemic facts about which doxastic attitudes one has justification to hold are determined by non-epistemic facts about one’s phenomenally individuated mental states. I begin by providing intuitive motivations for phenomenal mentalism and then proceed to sketch a more theoretical line of argument according to which phenomenal mentalism (...)
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  7. The Problem of Intuitive Presence.Miguel Egler - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.
    The historically-influential perceptual analogy states that intuitions and perceptual experiences are alike in many important respects. Phenomenalists defend a particular reading of this analogy according to which intuitions and perceptual experiences share a common phenomenal character. The phenomenalist thesis has proven highly influential in recent years. However, insufficient attention has been given to the challenges that the phenomenalist thesis raises for theories of intuitions. In this paper, I first develop one such challenge. I argue that if we take seriously (...)
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  8. Predictive processing and extended consciousness: why the machinery of consciousness is (probably) still in the head and the DEUTS argument won’t let it leak outside.Marco Facchin & Niccolò Negro - 2023 - In Mark-Oliver Casper & Giuseppe Flavio Artese (eds.), Situated Cognition Research: Methodological Foundations. Springer Verlag.
    Consciousness vehicle externalism is the claim that the material machinery of a subject’s phenomenology partially leaks outside a subject’s brain, encompassing bodily and environmental structures. The DEUTS argument is the most prominent argument for CVE in the sensorimotor enactivists’ arsenal. In a recent series of publications, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein have deployed such an argument to claim that a prominent view of neural processing, namely predictive processing, is fully compatible with CVE. Indeed, in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s view, a proper understanding (...)
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  9. Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):602-627.
    According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal relations, linguistic meanings, and moral properties. An important dialectical tool in the debate between Rich and Sparse theorists (...)
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  10. What Constitutes Phenomenal Character?Murat Aydede - manuscript
    [Working Draft — Comments are welcome! — March 2024] Reductive strong representationalists accept the Common Kind Thesis about subjectively indistinguishable sensory hallucinations, illusions, and veridical experiences. I show that this doesn’t jibe well with their declared phenomenal externalism and argue that there is no sense in which the phenomenal character of sensory experiences is constituted by the sensible properties represented by these experiences, as representationalists claim. First, I argue that, given general representationalist principles, no instances of a (...)
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  11. Colour hallucination: In defence of externalist representationalism.Elisabeth Lucia Waczek & Wolfgang Barz - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):3-7.
    In a recent paper, Gow raised a new and interesting problem for externalist representationalism, the conclusion of which is that its proponents are unable to provide an acceptable account of the phenomenal character of colour hallucination. In contrast to Gow, we do not believe that the problem is particularly severe – indeed, that there is any problem at all. Thus our aim is to defend externalist representationalism against the problem raised by Gow. To this end, we will first reconstruct (...)
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  12. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition.Michael Huemer - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.
    Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.
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  13. Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders.Joel Krueger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):365-389.
    Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called “direct social perception” : the idea that we (...)
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  14. The Explanatory Status of the Sensorimotor Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness, and Its Appeal to Cognition.Kevin O'Regan - 2014 - In A. Martin (ed.), Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics. Springer Verlag. pp. 23-35.
    This paper starts by providing a succinct overview of the sensorimotor approach to phenomenal consciousness, describing its two parts: the part that concerns the quality of sensations, and the part that concerns whether or not such qualities are (consciously) experienced. The paper goes on to discuss the explanatory status of the approach, claiming that the approach does not simply “explain away” qualia, but that on the contrary, it provides a way of thinking about qualia that explains why they are (...)
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  15. The geometry of visual space and the nature of visual experience.Farid Masrour - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1813-1832.
    Some recently popular accounts of perception account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in terms of the qualities of objects. My concern in this paper is with naturalistic versions of such a phenomenal externalist view. Focusing on visual spatial perception, I argue that naturalistic phenomenal externalism conflicts with a number of scientific facts about the geometrical characteristics of visual spatial experience.
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  16. Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure (...)
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  17. Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception.Simon Prosser - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):475-513.
    Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is wholly determined by, or even reducible to, its representational content. In this essay I put forward a version of intentionalism that allows (though does not require) the reduction of phenomenal character to representational content. Unlike other reductionist theories, however, it does not require the acceptance of phenomenal externalism (the view that phenomenal character does not supervene on the internal state of the subject). (...)
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  18. Stained Glass as a Model for Consciousness.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):90-103.
    Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although (...)
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  19. Phenomenal intentionality without compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external (...)
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  20. Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Nathan Hanna - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
    Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in (...)
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  21. Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt072.
    According to social externalism, it is possible to possess a concept not solely in virtue of one’s intrinsic properties but also in virtue of relations to one’s linguistic community. Derek Ball (2009) argues, in effect, that (i) social externalism extends to our concepts of colour experience and (ii) this fact undermines both the knowledge argument against physicalism and the most popular physicalist response to it, known as the phenomenal concept strategy. I argue that Ball is mistaken about (...)
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  22. Defeating phenomenal conservatism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.
    According to the phenomenal conservatives, beliefs are justified by non-doxastic states we might speak of as ‘appearances’ or ‘seemings’. Those who defend the view say that there is something self-defeating about believing that phenomenal conservatism is mistaken. They also claim that the view captures an important internalist insight about justification. I shall argue that phenomenal conservatism is indefensible. The considerations that seem to support the view commit the phenomenal conservatives to condoning morally abhorrent behavior. They can (...)
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  23. Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):929-946.
    This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam Pautz, I (...)
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  24. Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.
    Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, (...)
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  25. Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? Vehicle externalism and dynamical explanations.Michael Madary - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing.
    Vehicle externalists hold that the physical substrate of mental states can sometimes extend beyond the brain into the body and environment. In a particular variation on vehicle externalism, Susan Hurley (1998) and Alva Noë (2004) have argued that perceptual states, states with phenomenal qualities, are among the mental states that can sometimes spread beyond the brain. Their vehicle externalism about perceptual states will be the main topic of this article. In particular, I will address three strong objections (...)
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  26. Phenomenal Conservatism, Reflection and Self-Defeat.Julien Beillard - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2): 187-199.
    Huemer defends phenomenal conservatism (PC) and also the further claim that belief in any rival theory is self-defeating (SD). Here I construct a dilemma for his position: either PC and SD are incompatible, or belief in PC is itself self-defeating. I take these considerations to suggest a better self-defeat argument for (belief in) PC and a strong form of internalism.
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  27. Metameric surfaces: the ultimate case against color physicalism and representational theories of phenomenal consciousness.Zoltan Jakab - manuscript
    In this paper I argue that there are problems with the foundations of the current version of physicalism about color. In some sources laying the foundations of physicalism, types of surface reflectance corresponding to (veridical) color perceptions are characterized by making reference to properties of the observer. This means that these surface attributes are not objective (i.e. observer-independent). This problem casts doubt on the possibility of identifying colors with types of surface reflectance. If this identification cannot be maintained, that in (...)
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  28. Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2018 - Phenomenology and Mind 14:56-67.
    In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also (...)
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  29. Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.
    Phenomenal intentionality is a singular form of intentionality. Science shows it is internally-determined. So standard externalist models for reducing intentionality don't apply to it.
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  30. (1 other version)Outline for an Externalist Psychiatry (1): Or, How to Fully Realize the Biopsychosocial Model.Giulio Ongaro - 2024 - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 31 (3):269-284.
    The biopsychosocial (BPS) model in psychiatry has come under fire for being too vague to be of any practical use in the clinic. For many, its central flaw consists in lack of scientific validity and philosophical coherence: the model never specified how biological, psychological and social factors causally integrate with one another. Recently, advances in the cognitive sciences have made great strides towards meeting this very ‘integration challenge.’ The paper begins by illustrating how enactivist and predictive processing frameworks propose (...)
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  31. There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
    It has long been widely agreed that some concepts can be possessed only by those who have undergone a certain type of phenomenal experience. Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that these phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents, and in particular offer an explanation of Mary’s predicament in the situation exploited by Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. I reject the orthodox view; I deny that there are phenomenal concepts. (...)
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  32. Spread Mind and Causal Theories of Content.Krystyna Bielecka - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):87-97.
    In this paper, I analyze a type of externalist enactivism defended by Riccardo Manzotti. Such radical versions of enactivism are gaining more attention, especially in cognitive science and cognitive robotics. They are radical in that their notion of representation is purely referential, and content is conflated with reference. Manzotti follows in the footsteps of early causal theories of reference that had long been shown to be inadequate. It is commonly known that radical versions of externalism may lead to difficulties (...)
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  33. Lessons from the Void: What Boltzmann Brains Teach.Bradford Saad - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Some physical theories predict that almost all brains in the universe are Boltzmann brains, i.e. short-lived disembodied brains that are accidentally assembled as a result of thermodynamic or quantum fluctuations. Physicists and philosophers of physics widely regard this proliferation as unacceptable, and so take its prediction as a basis for rejecting these theories. But the putatively unacceptable consequences of this prediction follow only given certain philosophical assumptions. This paper develops a strategy for shielding physical theorizing from the threat of Boltzmann (...)
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  34. (1 other version)A Simple View of Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
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  35. Attention, Gestalt Principles, and the Determinacy of Perceptual Content.Ben White - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1133-1151.
    Theories of phenomenal intentionality have been claimed to resolve certain worries about the indeterminacy of mental content that rival, externalist theories face. Thus far, however, such claims have been largely programmatic. This paper aims to improve on prior arguments in favor of phenomenal intentionality by using attention and Gestalt principles as specific examples of factors that influence the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in ways that thereby help determine perceptual content. Some reasons are then offered for rejecting (...)
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  36. "Мыследействие" как основа умственной работы.Andrew Simsky - 2018 - Вопросы Культурологии (8,9):28-40.
    Профессиональная деятельность вполне развитого образованного человека, использующего по максимуму свой интеллект и знания на работе, остается, как правило, вне круга интересов современной философии сознания, которая анализирует главным образом элементарные мысли и действия. В данной работе предлагается единый подход к описанию как простейших, так и чрезвычайно сложных действий на основе синтетического концепта «мыследействие», объединяющего как ментальные, так и внешние аспекты действий. Генезис нового понятия рассматривается в свете холистических парадигм экстернализма и энактивизма. Professional activity of a fully developed educated individual getting the (...)
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  37. The Epistemology of Religion.Martin Smith - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):135-147.
    The epistemology of religion is the branch of epistemology concerned with the rationality, the justificatory status and the knowledge status of religious beliefs – most often the belief in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and loving God as conceived by the major monotheistic religions. While other sorts of religious beliefs – such as belief in an afterlife or in disembodied spirits or in the occurrence of miracles – have also been the focus of considerable attention from epistemologists, I shall (...)
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  38. Consciousness meets Lewisian interpretation theory: A multistage account of intentionality.Adam Pautz - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. OUP.
    In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. Then I sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. If we start with Karl's conscious experiences, we can appeal to Lewisian ideas to explain his other intentional states. This account develops (...)
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  39. Tying the Knot: Why Representationalists should Endorse the Sensorimotor Theory of Conscious Feel.David Silverman - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):pqv097.
    The sensorimotor theory of perception and consciousness is frequently presented as a variety of anti-representationalist cognitive science, and there is thus a temptation to suppose that those who take representation as bedrock should reject the approach. This paper argues that the sensorimotor approach is compatible with representationalism, and moreover that representationalism about phenomenal qualities, such as that advocated by Tye, would be more complete and less vulnerable to criticism if it incorporated the sensorimotor account of conscious feel. The paper (...)
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  40. Metaphysics and Contemporary Science: Why the question of the synthetic a priori shouldn’t not be abandoned prematurely.Kay Herrmann - 2020 - Philosophie.Ch. Swiss Portal for Philosophy (07.10.2020).
    The problem of synthetic judgements touches on the question of whether philosophy can draw independent statements about reality in the first place. For Kant, the synthetic judgements a priori formulate the conditions of the possibility for objectively valid knowledge. Despite the principle fallibility of its statements, modern science aims for objective knowledge. This gives the topic of synthetic a priori unbroken currency. This paper aims to show that a modernized version of transcendental philosophy, if it is to be feasible at (...)
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  41. Overview of Work-Life Balance Discourse and Its Relevance in Current Economic Scenario.Pranav Naithani - 2010 - Asian Social Science 6 (6):148-155.
    During the second half of 20th century, with work demands increasingly encroaching on family and personal time at a faster pace, employers acknowledged the need of work-life balance programmes to facilitate employees maintain a healthy balance between the conflicting demands of their work and personal life. Availability of work-life balance facilities to employees witnessed a phenomenal growth between the late eighties of the 20th century and early years of the 21st century. This growth has been abruptly interrupted by the (...)
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  42. Epistemology and Ontology of the Quality. An Introduction to the Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2016 - Humana Mente (31):1-19.
    The concept of quality points at a significant philosophical problem. The issue of the ontological status of the qualities of experience and reality leads us to discuss the issues of naturalism and reductionism in philosophy of mind. I argue that a transcendental version of the enactive approach is able to address these issues, thanks to its conception of the relation between subject and object as dependent co-origination. In this way, the enactive approach constitutes an alternative to both the internalism and (...)
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  43. Dretske’s Naturalistic Representationalism and Privileged Accessibility Thesis.Manas Kumar Sahu - 2022 - Philosophia 51:933-955.
    The objective of the current paper is to provide a critical analysis of Dretske's defense of the naturalistic version of the privileged accessibility thesis. Dretske construed that the justificatory condition of privileged accessibility neither relies on the appeal to perspectival ontology of phenomenal subjectivity nor on the functionalistic notion of accessibility. He has reformulated introspection (which justifies the non-inferentiality of the knowledge of one's own mental facts in an internalist view) as a displaced perception for the defense of naturalistic (...)
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  44. Whose Consciousness? Reflexivity and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Christian Coseru - 2020 - In Mark Siderits, Ching Keng & John Spackman (eds.), Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness: Tradition and Dialogue. Boston: Brill | Rodopi. pp. 121-153.
    If I am aware that p, say, that it is raining, is it the case that I must be aware that I am aware that p? Does introspective or object-awareness entail the apprehension of mental states as being of some kind or another: self-monitoring or intentional? That is, are cognitive events implicitly self-aware or is “self-awareness” just another term for metacognition? Not surprisingly, intuitions on the matter vary widely. This paper proposes a novel solution to this classical debate by reframing (...)
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  45. Alva Noë, Out of Our Heads. Why You Are Not Your Brain and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness, Hill and Wang, New York, 2009. [REVIEW]Pietro Salis - 2011 - Aphex 4:246-264.
    Ita La recensione presenta la prospettiva enattivista difesa da Alva Noë, e ne discute alcuni aspetti specifici. Il pensiero, la coscienza e la cognizione non sono pienamente comprensibili, secondo l’enattivismo di Noë, senza un’adeguata considerazione del ruolo ricoperto dal corpo e dall’ambiente. Sarebbe quindi sbagliato continuare a pensare che il cervello da solo sia responsabile dei processi cognitivi umani: il programma che ricerca i correlati neurali della coscienza sarebbe quindi destinato al fallimento dal principio, perché tralascia in partenza corpo e (...)
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  46. DIDEROT AND MATERIALIST THEORIES OF THE SELF.Charles T. Wolfe - 2015 - Journal of Society and Politics 9 (1):37-52.
    The concept of self has preeminently been asserted (in its many versions) as a core component of anti-reductionist, antinaturalistic philosophical positions, from Descartes to Husserl and beyond, with the exception of some hybrid or intermediate positions which declare rather glibly that, since we are biological entities which fully belong to the natural world, and we are conscious of ourselves as 'selves', therefore the self belongs to the natural world (this is characteristic e.g. of embodied phenomenology and enactivism). Nevertheless, from Cudworth (...)
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  47. Mathematics embodied: Merleau-Ponty on geometry and algebra as fields of motor enaction.Jan Halák - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-28.
    This paper aims to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to an embodied-enactive account of mathematical cognition. I first identify the main points of interest in the current discussions of embodied higher cognition and explain how they relate to Merleau-Ponty and his sources, in particular Husserl’s late works. Subsequently, I explain these convergences in greater detail by more specifically discussing the domains of geometry and algebra and by clarifying the role of gestalt psychology in Merleau-Ponty’s account. Beyond that, I explain how, for Merleau-Ponty, (...)
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  48. The Body and the Experience of Presence.Joerg Fingerhut - 2012 - In Jörg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive. De Gruyter. pp. 8--167.
    We experience our encounters with the world and others in different degrees of intensity – the presence of things and others is gradual. I introduce this kind of presence as a ubiquitous feature of every phenomenally conscious experience, as well as a key ingredient of our ‘feeling of being alive’, and distinguish explanatory agendas that might be relevant with regard to this phenomenon (1 – 3). My focus will be the role of the body-brain nexus in realizing these experiences and (...)
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  49. Necessities and ways of combating dissatisfactions at workplaces against the Job-Hopping Generation Y employees.M. D. Mahamudul Hassan, Manimekalai Jambulingam, Elangkovan Narayanan Alagas, Md Uzir Hossain Uzir & Hussam Al Halbusi - 2020 - Global Business Review 26:1.
    The vital role of the private sector in the overall development of a country is crucial as proven by private tertiary industries. Despite its phenomenal success all over the world, private sectors are facing enormous challenges due to the frequent turnover of Generation Y (Gen Y). Such phenomena cause massive overt and covert losses. Gen Y workers are optimistic, practical and often have attrition tendencies at workplaces. Extensive literature indicates the turnover problem of Gen Y remains unresolved. Frustration acts (...)
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  50. Embodied higher cognition: insights from Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of motor intentionality.Jan Halák - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (2):369-397.
    This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s original account of “higher-order” cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case (...)
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