This article considers friendship as a channel for education and as one of its objectives, as it is a necessary ingredient for a fulfilled life. This requires an initial study of interpersonal relationships in the postmodern context, considering their opportunities and risks. Our aim is to draw a topography of these relationships by analysing texts by major thinkers of the last four decades. The result of this analysis is the core of the article, namely, that there are four categories which (...) seem to give a proper account of the characteristics of interpersonal relationships in postmodernity and are relevant in education: 1) the questioning of the individual; 2) the appearance of the internet; 3) the recoveryof emotions; and, finally; 4) the extension of the feminine space. As a conclusion, they may all be said to have an ambivalent character that requires central issues in education to be reconsidered: the awareness and emotional regulation; the new constitution of identity and intimacy on the internet; education for male-female relationships, which now exist outside the sexual sphere, and preventing violence in these relationships; as well as how to educate for cooperation in an individualistic society. (shrink)

Altruism and solidarity are concepts that are closely related to organ donation for transplantation. On the one hand, they are typically used for encouraging people to donate. On the other hand, they also underpin the regulations in force in each country to different extents. They are often used indistinctly and equivocally, despite the different ethical implications of each concept. This paper aims to clarify to what extent we can speak of altruism and solidarity in the predominant models of organ donation. (...) It also raises the ethical question of whether these categories are adequate as a basis for such models, bearing in mind that organs are a scarce resource and that a shortage of them may mean that fewer lives are saved or improved. (shrink)

We aim to map out the points of confluence between phronesis and emotion, as well as the nature of this confluence. We do so based on philosophical and psychological explanations of emotions and phronesis. Making sound decisions, which requires phronesis, is an important matter, but its relationship with emotions has only just begun to be studied. We propose that the interplay between phronesis and emotion is possible (rather than inevitable) because both have a cognitive-behavioural structure and because emotions are hierarchical. (...) In the case of emotion, there are no gaps between the cognitive and behavioural dimensions, while phronetic acts can only manifest if cognitive and behavioural aspects are activated simultaneously. The confluence we identify is bidirectional and involves mutual enrichment in this dual dimension. On the one hand, phronesis enriches emotion because it involves extra subjective knowledge and allows emotion to be directed towards higher goals. On the other hand, emotions enrich phronesis because phronesis makes decisions based on sensitive preferences and because emotions confirm correctness in the context of moral decision making. Methodologically, this study is theoretical and interdisciplinary, as our approach is both philosophical and psychological. Philosophy helps us to improve the conceptual foundation of the construct, while psychology provides an analysis of the emotional process, allowing philosophy to understand how emotional evaluation-assessment and motivation lead to decision making. (shrink)

Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others’ emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich knowledge of the empathic experience of pain by using an experimental phenomenological method. Method: (...) Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person’s painful experience involves four main-themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. Temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant’s own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory for non-interactive social experience. (shrink)

This article aims to theoretically analyse so-called character friendship from the perspective of emotions. From this angle, our research enables us to distinguish different types of emotions, and we propose a conceptual model of the hierarchy of the emotions of character friendship and their influence on social behaviour. With this model in hand, the article discusses whether other-oriented emotions fully explain the emotional underpinnings of character friendship. We find other-oriented emotions to be ambiguous because they may or may not be (...) selfless. Thus we question whether these emotions can adequately explain the bonding content of character friendship. We conclude that there is a higher affective tier related to moral emotions and moral behaviour, which we have labelled the ‘bonding feeling’. This feeling is described with reference to its historical precedents (Rof Carballo’s ‘affective warp’), thus explaining its particularity. (shrink)

This fourteenth volume of Collected Papers is an eclectic tome of 87 papers in Neutrosophics and other fields, such as mathematics, fuzzy sets, intuitionistic fuzzy sets, picture fuzzy sets, information fusion, robotics, statistics, or extenics, comprising 936 pages, published between 2008-2022 in different scientific journals or currently in press, by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 99 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 26 countries: Ahmed B. Al-Nafee, Adesina Abdul Akeem Agboola, Akbar Rezaei, Shariful Alam, Marina Alonso, Fran Andujar, (...) Toshinori Asai, Assia Bakali, Azmat Hussain, Daniela Baran, Bijan Davvaz, Bilal Hadjadji, Carlos Díaz Bohorquez, Robert N. Boyd, M. Caldas, Cenap Özel, Pankaj Chauhan, Victor Christianto, Salvador Coll, Shyamal Dalapati, Irfan Deli, Balasubramanian Elavarasan, Fahad Alsharari, Yonfei Feng, Daniela Gîfu, Rafael Rojas Gualdrón, Haipeng Wang, Hemant Kumar Gianey, Noel Batista Hernández, Abdel-Nasser Hussein, Ibrahim M. Hezam, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Muthusamy Karthika, Nour Eldeen M. Khalifa, Madad Khan, Kifayat Ullah, Valeri Kroumov, Tapan Kumar Roy, Deepesh Kunwar, Le Thi Nhung, Pedro López, Mai Mohamed, Manh Van Vu, Miguel A. Quiroz-Martínez, Marcel Migdalovici, Kritika Mishra, Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Mohamed Talea, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohammed Alshumrani, Mohamed Loey, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Shabir, Mumtaz Ali, Nassim Abbas, Munazza Naz, Ngan Thi Roan, Nguyen Xuan Thao, Rishwanth Mani Parimala, Ion Pătrașcu, Surapati Pramanik, Quek Shio Gai, Qiang Guo, Rajab Ali Borzooei, Nimitha Rajesh, Jesús Estupiñan Ricardo, Juan Miguel Martínez Rubio, Saeed Mirvakili, Arsham Borumand Saeid, Saeid Jafari, Said Broumi, Ahmed A. Salama, Nirmala Sawan, Gheorghe Săvoiu, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Seok-Zun Song, Shahzaib Ashraf, Jayant Singh, Rajesh Singh, Son Hoang Le, Tahir Mahmood, Kenta Takaya, Mirela Teodorescu, Ramalingam Udhayakumar, Maikel Y. Leyva Vázquez, V. Venkateswara Rao, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Gabriela Vlădeanu, Michael Voskoglou, Yaser Saber, Yong Deng, You He, Youcef Chibani, Young Bae Jun, Wadei F. Al-Omeri, Hongbo Wang, Zayen Azzouz Omar. (shrink)

FISIOLOGIA DA REPRODUÇÃO BOVINA -/- 3 – GESTAÇÃO -/- -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- -/- O estabelecimento da gestação é o objetivo fundamental dos programas reprodutivos. Após a fertilização, o zigoto se divide e dá origem a embriões de duas, quatro, oito, dezesseis células, e no sétimo dia o embrião tem mais de 80 células. Entre os dias 16 e 18 do ciclo estral, o embrião se alonga e atinge 15 cm de comprimento. O estabelecimento da gestação depende da supressão da secreção (...) de PGF2α pelo embrião, que é realizada por meio da secreção de interferon-τ. Em vacas leiteiras, uma alta proporção de embriões morre antes do reconhecimento materno da gravidez. -/- Para evitar perdas embrionárias, é importante conhecer a fisiologia da gestação. Este capítulo descreve os principais processos fisiológicos que levam ao estabelecimento e manutenção da gestação e ao manejo da vaca prenhe. -/- -/- 3.1 Transporte de gametas -/- -/- Os gametas, óvulo e esperma, são definidos como células germinativas maduras que possuem um número haploide (n = 23) de cromossomos que, quando unidos, dão origem a um novo indivíduo geneticamente diferente de ambos os pais. -/- -/- 3.1.1 Transporte dos espermatozoides -/- -/- Os espermatozoides obtidos diretamente do testículo são funcionalmente imaturos, incapazes de fertilizar o óvulo. Durante sua permanência no epidídimo, os espermatozoides sofrem alterações na morfologia, mobilidade e metabolismo, o que lhes dá a capacidade de fertilização. No entanto, eles terão que passar algum tempo no trato genital feminino para que adquiram o estado ideal para fertilizar; processo conhecido como capacitação. -/- Durante a monta natural, a ejaculação ocorre na vagina e são depositados cerca de 5 x 109 de espermatozoides (volume ejaculado de três a cinco ml e concentração espermática de 1 x 109 a 1,2 x 109 por ml) suspensos no plasma seminal, este é basicamente constituído pelas secreções das vesículas seminais e da próstata. Após a ejaculação, o transporte dos espermatozoides é favorecido pelas contrações uterinas e vaginais que ocorrem durante e após a relação sexual. Nos primeiros minutos após a cópula, os espermatozoides já podem ser encontrados no oviduto, o que se deve às contrações do trato genital. Durante o transporte dos espermatozoides, a mobilidade individual é importante, já que apenas os espermatozoides com essa capacidade chegam ao local da fertilização. -/- O primeiro local para o estabelecimento de uma população de espermatozoides é a cérvix do útero, principalmente nas criptas, onde permanecem protegidos da fagocitose. É importante observar que apenas os espermatozoides móveis permanecem nas criptas; aqueles que estão mortos ou sem movimento são eliminados pelos fagócitos ou pelo movimento do muco cervical em direção a vagina. Embora uma população temporária de espermatozoides seja estabelecida no colo do útero, o reservatório funcional de espermatozoides está localizado na região distal do istmo. -/- As características do muco cervical são importantes para o transporte dos espermatozoides; assim, durante o estro e a ovulação, o muco fica mais aquoso, o que favorece a migração dos espermatozoides, enquanto na fase lútea o muco torna-se mais viscoso, dificultando sua movimentação. -/- Já no útero, o transporte de espermatozoides depende principalmente das contrações uterinas. Aqui, os espermatozoides ficam suspensos nas secreções uterinas, cuja função é promover sua viabilidade e transporte. As secreções uterinas contêm fagócitos que removem os espermatozoides mortos e imóveis, embora os espermatozoides normais também sejam removidos por esse meio. Algumas substâncias, como prostaglandinas e ocitocina, promovem o transporte. -/- O oviduto desempenha um papel muito importante no transporte e maturação dos gametas, bem como na fertilização e desenvolvimento embrionário inicial. As características das secreções do oviduto variam de acordo com a região do oviduto e o estágio do ciclo estral. Uma vez que os espermatozoides atingem o oviduto, eles são distribuídos em dois lugares. Alguns espermatozoides são imediatamente transportados para a região da ampola; esses são os primeiros que encontram o ovócito, mas sua capacidade de fertilização é limitada. O outro local de distribuição é a região caudal do istmo; aqui eles permanecem até que a ovulação seja iminente. Para que a fertilização ocorra, é necessário que o espermatozoide se estabeleça neste local por um período de seis a oito horas, antes da ovulação. Uma a duas horas, antes da ovulação, um movimento ativo do espermatozoide é observado em direção à região da ampola. -/- No oviduto, o transporte de espermatozoides depende de seu movimento, do fluido ovidutal e das contrações musculares. É comum que alguns espermatozoides continuem seu movimento e saiam pela fímbria. A viabilidade do espermatozoide de uma ejaculação varia de 24 a 48 horas. -/- -/- 3.1.2 Transporte do ovócito -/- -/- A ovulação é o processo pelo qual o ovócito é liberado. Este evento é desencadeado pela secreção de LH conhecida como pico de LH ovulatório ou pré-ovulatório. -/- Devido ao efeito de LH o cúmulos descola-se da parede folicular e começa a observar-se um adelgaçamento em uma pequena área da parede folicular, causada pela isquemia e pela ação de enzimas proteolíticas. Mais tarde, nesta área, uma pequena vesícula protuberante (estigma) se forma e eventualmente se quebra. Depois que o estigma é quebrado, o cúmulos que contém o ovócito junto com as células da granulosa. O ovócito é capturado pela fimbria; processo apoiado por movimentos dos cílios da mucosa e por contrações das pregas desta estrutura. Assim que o oócito é capturado, ele é transportado para a ampola. -/- 3.8 Manejo da vaca seca -/- -/- Em programas de manejo anteriores, a vaca seca recebia comida de pior qualidade e permanecia no esquecimento até o parto ocorrer. No entanto, os resultados dos estudos mostram que o período de seca é decisivo para que a vaca atinja um nível ótimo de produção e tenha um bom desempenho reprodutivo pós-parto. Por outro lado, o manejo correto no período seco reduz a incidência de doenças metabólicas no puerpério. O objetivo do período de seca é oferecer um descanso à vaca antes do parto, durante o qual o tecido mamário se regenera, o feto atinge seu crescimento máximo e a vaca atinge uma condição corporal adequada para enfrentar uma nova lactação. A duração recomendada do período de seca é de seis a oito semanas (60 dias). A involução do tecido da glândula mamária leva de duas a três semanas e um período semelhante é necessário para reiniciar a síntese do leite antes do parto. Assim, um período de seca de 60 dias é suficiente; entretanto, a duração desse período é questionada e tempos mais curtos foram propostos. Provavelmente, nos próximos anos, mais informações estarão disponíveis para apoiar a redução do período de seca. -/- Em termos de produção, o objetivo do manejo durante o período de seca é levar a vaca ao pico de lactação cinco a seis semanas após o parto, com produção máxima de leite. Estima-se que para cada kg de leite que aumenta no pico da lactação, ocorre um aumento de 120 kg ao longo da lactação. Para atingir este objetivo é necessário que a vaca tenha um consumo adequado de matéria seca após o parto; porém, três semanas antes do parto, a vaca reduz seu consumo em até 30%, para o qual é necessário estabelecer um manejo eficaz para promover um alto consumo de matéria seca durante a parte final do período de seca e durante as três primeiras semanas pós-parto (período de transição: três semanas antes e três após o parto). -/- A falta de capacidade de consumir as necessidades de matéria seca após o parto obriga a vaca a mobilizar suas reservas de gordura. Praticamente todas as vacas após o parto mobilizam suas reservas de gordura e perdem a condição corporal. A mobilização da gordura corporal causa degeneração gordurosa do fígado e é responsável por distúrbios metabólicos e retardo da atividade ovariana pós-parto. O grau de degeneração da gordura está relacionado à magnitude da mobilização da gordura corporal, que é diretamente dependente da capacidade de consumir matéria seca. Dessa forma, vacas com alto consumo de matéria seca no pós-parto, mobilizam menos gordura e, portanto, o dano ao fígado é menor. -/- O período de secagem é dividido em duas partes, a primeira compreende desde a secagem até duas semanas antes do parto; a segunda parte inclui as últimas duas semanas de gestação e é conhecida como período de desafio. -/- O período de desafio é decisivo para o desempenho produtivo e reprodutivo. Durante este período, uma dieta semelhante em ingredientes e forma deve ser oferecida à dieta que farão após o parto. Para facilitar esse manejo, as vacas deste grupo devem ser separadas do restante das vacas secas. -/- No período de seca, atenção especial deve ser dada para que as vacas não alcancem escores de condição corporal de quatro ou mais, uma vez que o excesso de gordura causa problemas metabólicos durante o puerpério, que afetam negativamente o comprometimento uterino e início da atividade ovariana pós-parto (figura 8). -/- -/- -/- Figura 8: Estágios fisiológicos e reprodutivos da vaca leiteira. Período de espera voluntário (PVE). -/- -/- 3.9 O período de transição -/- -/- O período de transição na vaca leiteira é três semanas antes e três após o parto (também conhecido como periparto). Nos últimos anos, esse tema tem merecido muitas pesquisas, pois o que for bem ou mal feito durante ele terá impacto na eficiência reprodutiva e na produção de leite. Durante o período de transição, a glândula mamária se prepara para a lactogênese, o feto cresce exponencialmente, a resposta imune é suprimida e o consumo de matéria seca diminui; além disso, o rúmen deve se adaptar à dieta recebida pelas vacas in natura (primeiras três semanas pós-parto), dieta caracterizada por alto teor de energia na forma de grãos. -/- Muitos distúrbios que se manifestam nas duas primeiras semanas pós-parto (hipocalcemia clínica e subclínica, cetose, retenção placentária, prolapso uterino, metrite, mastite, deslocamento do abomaso etc.), como os que se apresentam posteriormente (laminite, cistos ovarianos , endometrite e anestro) têm sua origem nos erros cometidos durante o período de transição. Em grande parte, os problemas estão relacionados à diminuição do consumo de matéria seca durante o período de transição; assim, o consumo diminui cerca de 30% durante as últimas três semanas de gestação, mas a maior parte da redução ocorre cinco a sete dias antes do parto. O manejo correto do período de transição tem como objetivo manter a normocalcemia, fortalecer o sistema imunológico, adaptar o rúmen a uma dieta rica em energia e aumentar a ingestão de matéria seca. Algumas recomendações gerais de manejo durante o período de transição são: separar as novilhas das vacas, ter comedouro suficiente para todos os animais, ter as mesmas características dos comedouros de vacas frescas e a dieta deve estar disponível 24 horas por dia (figuras 9 e 10). -/- -/- -/- Figura 10: O desempenho produtivo e reprodutivo das vacas depende em grande parte da condição corporal no momento do parto. Nesta fotografia são mostradas vacas recém-paridas, com uma condição corporal ideal (3,5). -/- Figura 9: Vacas no curral do desafio. Recomenda-se separar as novilhas das vacas, ter espaço suficiente com comedouro e a dieta deve estar disponível 24 horas por dia. -/- -/- RESUMO -/- -/- Cerca de 5 bilhões de espermatozoides são depositados em a genitália da vaca durante a cópula. Os espermatozoides devem permanecer no istmo e na região da junção útero-tubária por seis a oito horas antes da ovulação para obter uma alta taxa de fertilização. A viabilidade dos espermatozoides no útero é de 24 a 48 horas. A polispermia é efetivamente bloqueada nas primeiras 10 horas após a ovulação. Os blastômeros de embriões de duas, quatro e oito células são pluripotentes. A eclosão do embrião ocorre no oitavo dia. O tempo que o embrião leva para chegar ao útero é de três a quatro dias. Entre os dias 16 e 18 do ciclo, o embrião produz interferon-t, para bloquear a secreção de PGF2α. Entre os dias 17 e 18, o embrião se fixa ao endométrio. A medição da progesterona entre os dias 20-24 pós-infecção é 100% precisa na identificação de vacas não gestantes. A vaca deve atingir seu pico de lactação entre cinco e seis semanas após o parto. Para cada kg de leite que é aumentado no pico da lactação, um aumento de 120 kg é alcançado na lactação de 305 dias. Três semanas antes do parto, a vaca reduz seu consumo em até 30%. O período de transição inclui três semanas antes e três após o parto. As vacas ao parto não devem ter mais do que quatro pontos de condição corporal. A proporção de vacas secas deve ser de 15% (12,5% de vacas secas e 2,5% de novilhas). -/- -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- -/- BEARDEN, Henry Joe et al. Applied animal reproduction. Reston Publishing Company, Inc., 1984. -/- Endocrinologia da Reprodução Animal. Recife, UFRPE, 2020. -/- Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Fecundação e Gestação. Recife: UFRPE, 2020. -/- HAFEZ, Elsayed Saad Eldin; HAFEZ, Bahaa. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. -/- HIDALGO, Galina et al. Reproducción de animales domésticos. México: Limusa, 2008. -/- HOLY, Lubos; MARTÍNEZ JÚSTIZ, G. Colab. Biología de la reproducción bovina. Havana: Revolucionária, 1975. -/- HOPPER, Richard M. (Ed.). Bovine reproduction. John Wiley & Sons, 2014. -/- LEBLANC, Stephen. Monitoring metabolic health of dairy cattle in the transition period. Journal of reproduction and Development, v. 56, n. S, p. S29-S35, 2010. -/- SARTORI, Roberto; BASTOS, Michele R.; WILTBANK, Milo C. Factors affecting fertilisation and early embryo quality in single-and superovulated dairy cattle. Reproduction, Fertility and Development, v. 22, n. 1, p. 151-158, 2009. -/- SENGER, Phillip L. et al. Pathways to pregnancy and parturition. Current Conceptions, Inc., 1615 NE Eastgate Blvd., 1997. -/- VIVEIROS, Ana Tereza de Mendonça. Fisiologia da reprodução de bovinos. Lavras: UFLA, p. 62, 1997. (shrink)

Reseña al libro de María Rosa Palazón Mayoral titulado "La estética en México. Siglo XX. Diálogo entre filósofos". El libro reseñado es de gran importancia al compilar las propuestas teóricas sobre el tema de pensadores tan destacados como Antonio Caso, José Vasconcelos, Alfonso Reyes, Samuel Ramos, Eduardo Nicol, María Zambrano, Ramón Xirau, Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, Joaquín Sánchez Mcgrégor, Bolívar Echeverría, Néstor García Canclini, María Noël Lapoujade, Ana María Martínez de la Escalera, Silvia Durán Payán y muchos otros.

It is often claimed that fear has an important epistemological function in making us aware of danger. Reactive theories challenge this view. According to them, fear is a response to real or apparent danger. In other words, real or apparent danger is the reason for which we experience fear. Thus, fear depends on awareness of danger instead of making us aware of danger. Proponents of the reactive theory have appealed to phenomenological and, most prominently, linguistic observations to support their views. (...) In particular, they argue that how we talk about the objects of fear supports the view that fear is a response (rather than a perception), and that how we talk about reasons for fear supports the view that reasons for fear are necessarily evaluative (about danger). Building on systematic linguistic observations in the form of corpus analyses and survey data, we argue that how we talk about the objects of fear and how we talk about reasons for fear do not support the reactive theory. Indeed, these linguistic considerations undermine the reactive theory. Most importantly, they suggest that there are non-evaluative reasons for fear. This is good news for rival theories, like perceptual theories, which hold that emotions have epistemic value in contributing to knowledge of evaluative properties such as danger. (shrink)

Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to involve special descriptive/informational content (however conveyed), and those which understand them to encode special emotive/expressive content. Our view is that both offer essential insights, but that part of what sets slurs apart is use-theoretic content. In particular, we urge that slurring words belong at the intersection of a number of categories in a sociolinguistic register taxonomy, one that usually includes [+slang] and [+vulgar] and always (...) includes [-polite] and [+derogatory]. Thus, e.g., what distinguishes ‘Chinese’ from ‘chink’ is neither a peculiar sort of descriptive nor emotional content, but rather the fact that ‘chink’ is lexically marked as belonging to different registers than ‘Chinese’. It is, moreover, partly such facts which makes slurring ethically unacceptable. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is still (...) used to support Embodied theories of emotion. Proponents of Disembodied theories, however, have different intuitions regarding the role of bodily changes in the experience of emotion. In order to advance this debate, I conducted a series of studies testing people’s intuitions regarding the Subtraction Argument. Results show that, against James’ claims, most people consider that their hypothetical (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) emotions persist in the absence of bodily feelings. Furthermore, Study 1 found that participants’ responses were not related to individual differences in reflection or interoceptive awareness. These results pose a problem for Embodied theories of emotion and challenge extant explanations for the persistence of emotional experience in cases of impaired interoception. (shrink)

In emotion research, both conceptual analyses and empirical studies commonly rely on emotion reports. But what do people mean when they say that they are angry, afraid, joyful, etc.? Building on extant theories of emotion, this paper presents four new studies (including a pre-registered replication) measuring the weight of cognitive evaluations, bodily changes, and action tendencies in people’s use of emotion concepts. The results of these studies suggest that the presence or absence of cognitive evaluations has the largest impact on (...) people’s emotion attributions, and that bodily changes and action tendencies are considered to depend on cognitive evaluations. Implications for theories of emotion (concepts) and the interpretation of emotion reports are discussed. (shrink)

Emergency situations require individuals to make important changes in their behavior. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, official recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus include costly behaviors such as self-quarantining or drastically diminishing social contacts. Compliance (or lack thereof) with these recommendations is a controversial and divisive topic, and lay hypotheses abound regarding what underlies this divide. This paper investigates which cognitive, moral, and emotional traits separate people who comply with official recommendations from those who don't. In (...) four studies (three pre-registered) on both U.S. and French samples, we found that individuals' self-reported compliance with official recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic was partly driven by individual differences in moral values, disgust sensitivity, and psychological reactance. We discuss the limitations of our studies and suggest possible applications in the context of health communication. (shrink)

Abstract: Introspection reveals that one is frequently conscious of some form of inner speech, which may appear either in a condensed or expanded form. It has been claimed that this speech reflects the way in which language is involved in conscious thought, fulfilling a number of cognitive functions. We criticize three theories that address this issue: Bermúdez’s view of language as a generator of second-order thoughts, Prinz’s development of Jackendoff’s intermediate-level theory of consciousness, and Carruthers’s theory of inner speech as (...) a rehearsal of action-schemata. We contend they have problems to account for those cases in which inner speech is fragmentary, and for the difference with those instances in which it appears as more sentence-like. In addition, we present verbal overshadowing as a phenomenon that neither of them can easily explain. Finally, we propose an account in which inner speech is fundamentally silent outer speech and argue that it is more explanatory than the alternatives. (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of types is most often associated with his account of perception. Here, types operate as pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception of objects. In this paper, I will argue that Husserl’s theory of types is also central to his account of intersubjectivity. More specifically, I will show that a foundational kind of typical subjectivity is entailed by his discussion of the sphere of ownness. It is by way of this type that even a solitary subject can (...) tacitly anticipate the possibility of other subjects. It is also this type that is enriched through interactions between actual subjects. (shrink)

Although Husserlian phenomenology appears to require that practitioners bracket all metaphysical questions and claims, this requirement runs against the evidence of experience in which objects themselves are presented as constituents of experience. Moreover, to completely bracket metaphysical considerations would suggest that phenomenology is compatible with metaphysical views it should in principle deny. Nonetheless, permitting metaphysical claims threatens to contravene the critical limits of phenomenology, to invite claims that would require a perspective different in kind than our own to verify. These (...) tensions raise an important question, namely, what are the metaphysical implications of the phenomenologically intuitive claim that objects themselves are constituents of experience? To answer this question, I draw on a broad swath of thought on transcendental idealism and phenomenology. I argue that a modest metaphysics of appearance is warranted within the critical limits of Husserlian phenomenology. Through discussing and addressing the problems that typically plague transcendental arguments, I show that Husserlian phenomenology permits stronger claims about objects of experience than deflationary accounts allow but does not permit claims about intrinsic properties allowed by some forms of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

There has been much discussion of so-called teleosemantic approaches to the naturalization of content. Such discussion, though, has been largely confined to simple, innate mental states with contents such as ?There is a fly here.? Even assuming we can solve the issues that crop up at this stage, an account of the content of human mental states will not get too far without an account of productivity: the ability to entertain indefinitely many thoughts. The best-known teleosemantic theory, Millikan's biosemantics, offers (...) an account of productivity in thought. This paper raises a basic worry about this account: that the use of mapping functions in the theory is unacceptable from a naturalistic point of view. (shrink)

This paper addresses the relationship between logic and phenomenology at a historical moment that precedes the big divide between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. In analysing alternative derivations of phenomenological logic, the discussion focuses on the case of two notorious neo-Kantian Mexican philosophers from the first half of the XXth century: Adalberto García de Mendoza and Francisco Larroyo. It is argued that both García de Mendoza and Larroyo made an original contribution to the discussion on the relationship between phenomenology and logic. (...) Further, this paper attempts to present a charitable portrait of both García de Mendoza and Larroyo in contrast to underrating approaches to both Mexican philosophers. In so doing, this paper adopts a historical—though not strictly biographical— perspective. While it is true that neither García de Mendoza nor Larroyo could be considered “phenomenologists” or “Husserl scholars” according to contemporary standards it is worth noticing that they engage in the discussion of phenomenological logic. Both authors had the project of developing a grounding logic for science and, as the article argues, both attempts could be even linked. Their project, however, was unfinished. The plan of this paper is as follows. The first section addresses the problem of the relationship between logic and phenomenology. The second one focuses on García de Mendoza’s contributions. The third one elaborates on Larroyo’s Logic of Sciences. And, finally, the fourth section elaborates on these Mexican philosophers’ contributions to education, making as well further observations concerning the similarities and differences between both authors. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objeto llevar a cabo un estudio pragmático y analítico sobre la acción de valoración, el valor y los valores a la luz de la ciencia semiótica y de la ciencia cibernética. Por ello, se desarrollará un proceso axiológico que ilustre cómo sucede el ingreso, la transición y la salida de códigos morales en función de un esquema cognitivo. Así pues, el proceso axiológico se postula, primero, en fundamento de tres sistemas: de mentalidad, de valores y (...) de biomoralidad y, segundo, conforme a la teoría de la información y de la teoría general de sistemas. (shrink)

We explore the contribution made by oscillatory, synchronous neural activity to representation in the brain. We closely examine six prominent examples of brain function in which neural oscillations play a central role, and identify two levels of involvement that these oscillations take in the emergence of representations: enabling (when oscillations help to establish a communication channel between sender and receiver, or are causally involved in triggering a representation) and properly representational (when oscillations are a constitutive part of the representation). We (...) show that even an idealized informational sender–receiver account of representation makes the representational status of oscillations a non-trivial matter, which depends on rather minute empirical details. (shrink)

The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates (...) in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’ (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2017). (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como propósito criticar y reformular la teoría de valores del autor y filósofo argentino Risieri Frondizi. Para ello, se someterán a falsacionismo las tesis según las cuales la cualidad estructural es, primero, estructuralista y no analítica y, segundo, empírica, de acuerdo con la metodología holista de la ciencia. La crítica, así, se desarrollará a partir de los siguientes interrogantes. Inicialmente, ¿el autor acude al holismo o al reduccionismo como enfoques metodológicos de desarrollo? Finalmente, ¿cuál es la (...) distinción lógica entre el valor como cualidad sui géneris y el valor como cualidad estructural? (shrink)

Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between organisms. The Lewis–Skyrms framework should be equally applicable to intra-organismic signaling. We present a Lewis–Skyrms signaling-game model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is predominantly imperative. We address several objections to the account, concluding that our model gives a productive framework within which to consider internal signaling.

Entre las virtudes de la explicación de Gewirth, destaca su potencial para delimitar el objeto de los derechos humanos y contener la expansión incontrolada del discurso de los derechos. Al ceñirse al contexto de la acción y a los rasgos necesarios para la agencia intencional, dicha explicación proporciona un fundamento basado en la autonomía y libertad de los agentes intencionales prospectivos, tan solo limitadas por aquellas exigencias racionales derivadas de la igual consideración del status moral de todos los demás agentes (...) intencionales prospectivos quienes, en última instancia, se identifican con la humanidad en su conjunto mediante las ideas implícitas de reciprocidad y responsabilidad moral por los actos propios. En definitiva, el argumento de Gewirth desemboca en el PCG para proporcionar un fundamento racional de los derechos humanos limitado a la estructura normativa de la acción, la agencia intencional prospectiva potencial o actual de todos los seres humanos y los bienes necesarios para la acción intencional: la libertad y el bienestar. (shrink)

In this study, we examine the philosophical bases of one of the leading clinical psychological methods of therapy for anxiety, anger, and depression, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). We trace this method back to its philosophical roots in the Stoic, Buddhist, Taoist, and Existentialist philosophical traditions. We start by discussing the tenets of CBT, and then we expand on the philosophical traditions that ground this approach. Given that CBT has had a clinically measured positive effect on the psychological well-being of individuals, (...) it becomes important to study the philosophical foundations on which this therapy is based. (shrink)

Human emotional expressions can communicate the emotional state of the expresser, but they can also communicate appeals to perceivers. For example, sadness expressions such as crying request perceivers to aid and support, and anger expressions such as shouting urge perceivers to back off. Some contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) systems can mimic human emotional expressions in a (more or less) realistic way, and they are progressively being integrated into our daily lives. How should we respond to them? Do we have reasons (...) to reply to the appeals made by AI emotional expressions? In this paper, we examine the conditions under which AI emotional expressions could give us prudential or even moral reasons to change our behavior. We argue that these conditions do not depend on whether the emotional expression is genuine or not, but rather on the presence of features some of which can be implemented in emotive AI given our current level of technological development. We extract recommendations and warnings for the development of emotive AI. (shrink)

I explore some of the connections between Grahek's model of asymbolic pain, as developed in Feeling Pain and Being in Pain, and the contemporary intentionalist discussion over evaluativist and imperativist models of pain. I will sketch a Grahekian version of imperativism that is both true to his main insights and better at confronting some of the challenges that his theory has faced since its publication.

Se aplicó el asistente de prueba Tree Proof Generator (TPG) para determinar la corrección lógica de la primera vía tomista sobre la existencia de Dios, así como la corrección de algunas relaciones conceptuales en metafísica modal (necesidad y posibilidad), en epistemología (conocimiento) y en la formulación estructural del árbol de Porfirio. La investigación procura no solo abordar las tesis en cuestión desde el punto de vista computacional, sino que ofrece un marco reflexivo sobre tres condiciones necesarias para una filosofía asistida (...) por computadora; en tal sentido, la investigación se compromete con la idea de que la filosofía es análisis conceptual y argumentación, que pensar filosóficamente no supone un privilegio epistémico o cognitivo y que se requiere de un lenguaje formalmente especificable para ‘hacer’ filosofía. (shrink)

We present a dynamic model of the evolution of communication in a Lewis signaling game while systematically varying the degree of common interest between sender and receiver. We show that the level of common interest between sender and receiver is strongly predictive of the amount of information transferred between them. We also discuss a set of rare but interesting cases in which common interest is almost entirely absent, yet substantial information transfer persists in a *cheap talk* regime, and offer a (...) diagnosis of how this may arise. -/- . (shrink)

Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this can explain why (...) speakers are given different degrees of credibility depending on their group identity. For example, if people assume that women are more emotional than men, they will systematically give less credibility to women’s claims. This explanation involves three empirical claims: people assume that women are more emotional than men, people assume that emotionality hinders credibility, and people give less credibility to women’s claims. While extant studies provide some support for and, no study to date has directly tested. In two different studies, we tested all these three claims. The results from both studies provide support for, as we found significant negative correlations between emotionality and credibility attributions. However, in contrast to what some accounts of folk psychology posit, we did not find any significant difference in people’s attributions of emotionality and credibility towards women versus men speakers. We hope that our studies here pave the way for further empirical studies testing the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in a context-sensitive way, in order to have a better understanding of the conditions in which testimonial injustices are likely to happen. (shrink)

The general aim of this article is to carry out a reconstruction of the theory of Population Dynamics (DP) in Ecology, according to Castle’s (2001) general stance with regard to the semantic view of theories, but doing it within the framework of metatheoretical structuralism. Thus, we will first identify Population Dynamics’ basic theory-element: its core K(DP) – with the class of potential models, the class of models (through the identification of its fundamental law) and the class of partial potential models (...) (though leaving aside the identification of its constraints and its intertheoretical links) –, and its domain of intended applications I(DP). Then, we will establish the general guiding lines of its theory-net, developing in some detail one of its main lines of specialization – namely, that related to the so-called “continuous growing” of the considered populations –, with DP’s principal “models”, and leave developing of the other of its main lines of specialization – namely, that related to the so-called “discrete growing” of the considered populations – for a further publication. (shrink)

This chapter analyses the prospects of using neuroimaging methods, in particular functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for philosophical purposes. To do so, it will use two case studies from the field of emotion research: Greene et al. (2001) used fMRI to uncover the mental processes underlying moral intuitions, while Lindquist et al. (2012) used fMRI to inform the debate around the nature of a specific mental process, namely, emotion. These studies illustrate two main approaches in cognitive neuroscience: Reverse inference and (...) ontology testing, respectively. With regards to Greene et al.’s study, the use of Neurosynth (Yarkoni 2011) will show that the available formulations of reverse inference, although viable a priori, seem to be of limited use in practice. On the other hand, the discussion of Lindquist et al.’s study will present the so far neglected potential of ontology-testing approaches to inform philosophical questions. (shrink)

Imperativism is the view that the phenomenal character of the affective component of pains, orgasms, and pleasant or unpleasant sensory experience depends on their imperative intentional content. In this paper I canvass an imperativist treatment of pains as reason-conferring states.

What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orientation, are socially constructed? Many scholars claim that social constructionism about a kind is a version of realism about that kind, according to which the corresponding kind is a social construction, that it, it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructionism, then, is a version of realism about a kind that asserts that the kind is real, and puts forward a particular view about (...) the nature of the kind, namely, that it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructivists about human kinds such as gender, race and sexual orientation often make an additional claim, namely, that these kinds are social constructions but they are typically believed to be biological kinds (that is, people are typically wrong about the nature of these kinds). Ron Mallon (2017) calls social constructions that are (falsely) taken to be biological kinds covert social constructions. This paper is about how we could have terms in our natural language that come to refer to covert social constructions. (shrink)

Are emotions bodily feelings or evaluative cognitions? What is happiness, pain, or “being moved”? Are there basic emotions? In this chapter, I review extant empirical work concerning these and related questions in the philosophy of emotion. This will include both (1) studies investigating people’s emotional experiences and (2) studies investigating people’s use of emotion concepts in hypothetical cases. Overall, this review will show the potential of using empirical research methods to inform philosophical questions regarding emotion.

I respond to an objection recently formulated by Barlassina and Hayward against first-order imperativism about pain, according to which it cannot account for the self-directed motivational force of pain. I am going to agree with them: it cannot. This is because pain does not have self-directed motivational force. I will argue that the alternative view—that pain is about dealing with extramental, bodily threats, not about dealing with itself—makes better sense of introspection, and of empirical research on pain avoidance. Also, a (...) naturalistic theory of body-involving commands falls straightforwardly out of our most prominent naturalistic metasemantic accounts, while the token-reflexive contents that would underlie self-directed motivation are more problematic. (shrink)

Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of this paper is to make explicit an ambiguity in usual formulations of intentionalism, and to argue in favor of one way to disambiguate it. It concerns whether perceptual phenomenology depends on the content of one and only one representation (often construed as being identical to a certain perceptual experience), or instead depends on a collection of many different representations throughout the perceptual system. We argue in favor (...) of the latter option. Intentionalism so conceived can make better sense of contemporary neuroscience of perception, and is better equipped to confront several influential objections to traditional intentionalism. (shrink)

The syllogism and the predicate calculus cannot account for an ontological argument in Descartes' Fifth Meditation and related texts. Descartes' notion of god relies on the analytic-synthetic distinction, which Descartes had identified before Leibniz and Kant did. I describe how the syllogism and the predicate calculus cannot explain Descartes' ontological argument; then I apply the analytic-synthetic distinction to Descartes’ idea of god.

In the first part of the paper, I present a framework for the description and evaluation of teleosemantic theories of intentionality, and use it to argue that several different objections to these theories (the various indeterminacy and adequacy problems) are, in a certain precise sense, manifestations of the same underlying issue. I then use the framework to show that Millikan's biosemantics, her own recent declarations to the contrary notwithtanding, presents indeterminacy. In the second part, I develop a novel teleosemantic proposal (...) which makes progress in the treatment of this family of problems. I describe a procedure to derive a (unique) homeostatic property cluster [HPC] from facts having to do with the properties that a certain indicator relied on, in the events leading to its fixation in a certain population. This HPC is the one that should figure in the content attribution to the indicator in question. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions on cognition (ranging from computational and representational approaches to the 4E fra-mework), on the one hand, and those on sound and auditory per-ception, on the other, have hitherto remained apart. In this paper, the author addresses the concept of “auditory cognition”. While committing to the conceptual analysis of the latter, the author in-troduces the discussion of modality-specif ic approaches. Since the contributions made so far in the domain of the philosophy of sound and auditory perception are prone to (...) favor computational-repre-sentational approaches —e.g., the perceptual coherence model (Méndez-Martínez, 2022)—, the exploration of 4E possibilities will lay down a series of questions aimed to encourage future developers from that viewpoint. In that sense, the author explores conceptual entailments and connections between the genealogy of theories within the philosophy of sound and auditory perception, and the hypothesis of the extended cognition (EX). (shrink)

In his genetic phenomenology, Husserl introduces types, pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception and cognition of objects. In this essay, I argue that there are two types that are functionally almost identical to Kant’s schemata. To support this conclusion, I first present an interpretation of Kant’s discussion of schemata. I argue that we must see schemata as pure, a priori cognitions that involve only pure intuition, pure concepts of the understanding, and the imagination. I offer two analogies to (...) explain how schemata function to subsume objects under concepts and to anticipate possible objects of experience before moving on to discuss the schema of substance. Next, I present a brief explanation of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, organizing my presentation around the idea of apperception. This paves the way for a demonstration of how the fundamental type is best understood as standing at the center of a cluster of concepts, including apperception, passive belief, natural bodies, and the one spatio-temporal horizon of experience. I argue that the fundamental type is central to Husserl’s attempt to ground logic in pre-predicative experience. Finally, I compare two specific types with schemata on the grounds cultivated in the previous sections. The first of these types, the fundamental type, functions to pre-predicatively anticipate objects of possible experience, just as schemata do. The second of these types, which is implied by but never discussed in Husserl’s work, serves to mediate between a formal system of rules and an intuitive grasp of the world, just as schemata do. (shrink)

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents’ moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people’s actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants’ moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs (...) themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation. (shrink)

A recent quarrel over faultless disagreements assumes that disputes over evaluative sentences should be understood as regular, factual disagreements. Instead, I propose that evaluative disagreements should be understood in Lewisian terms. Language use works like a rule-governed game. In it, the assertion of an evaluative sentence is an attempt to establish one value as default in the conversation; its rejection, in turn, is in most cases the refusal to accept this move.

It is widely held that it is unhelpful to model our epistemic access to modal facts on the basis of perception, and postulate the existence of a bodily mechanism attuned to modal features of the world. In this paper I defend modalizing mechanisms. I present and discuss a decision-theoretic model in which agents with severely limited cognitive abilities, at the end of an evolutionary process, have states which encode substantial information about the probabilities with which the outcomes of a certain (...) Bernoulli process occur. Thus, in the model, a process driven by very simple, thoroughly naturalistic mechanisms eventuates in modal sensitivity. (shrink)

Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver.

I sketch and defend an imperativist treatment of the phenomenology associated with disgusting smells. This treatment, I argue, allows us to make better sense than other intentionalist alter-natives both of the neuroanatomy of olfaction, and of a natural pre-theoretical stance regarding the sense of smell.

Evaluative judgments imply positive or negative regard. But there are different ways in which something can be positive or negative. How do we tell them apart? According to Evaluative Sentimentalism, different evaluations (e.g., dangerousness vs. offensiveness) are grounded on different emotions (e.g., fear vs. anger). If this is the case, evaluation differentiation requires emotional awareness. Here, we test this hypothesis by looking at alexithymia, a deficit in emotional awareness consisting of problems identifying, describing, and thinking about emotions. The results of (...) Study 1 suggest that high alexithymia is not only related to problems distinguishing emotions, but also to problems distinguishing evaluations. Study 2 replicated this latter effect after controlling for individual differences in attentional impulsiveness and reflective reasoning, and found that reasoning makes an independent contribution to evaluation differentiation. These results suggest that emotional sensibilities play an irreducible role in evaluative judgment while affording a role for reasoning. (shrink)