We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem (...) of Content targets computationalism that relies on semantic notion of computation, claiming that it cannot account for the natural origins of content. The Intentionality Problem is targeted against computationalism using non-semantic accounts of computation, arguing that it fails in explaining intentionality. Theion Problem claims that causal interaction between concrete physical processes and abstract computational properties is problematic. We argue that these a... (shrink)

When interpreting the meanings of visual features in information visualizations, observers have expectations about how visual features map onto concepts (inferred mappings.) In this study, we examined whether aspects of inferred mappings that have been previously identified for colormap data visualizations generalize to a different type of visualization, Venn diagrams. Venn diagrams offer an interesting test case because empirical evidence about the nature of inferred mappings for colormaps suggests that established conventions for Venn diagrams are counterintuitive. Venn diagrams represent classes (...) using overlapping circles and express logical relationships between those classes by shading out regions to encode the concept of non-existence, or none. We propose that people do not simply expect shading to signify non-existence, but rather they expect regions that appear as holes to signify non-existence (the hole hypothesis.) The appearance of a hole depends on perceptual properties in the diagram in relation to its background. Across three experiments, results supported the hole hypothesis, underscoring the importance of configural processing for interpreting the meanings of visual features in information visualizations. (shrink)

How does microbiota research impact our understanding of biological individuality? We summarize the interdisciplinary summer school on "Microbiota, Symbiosis and Individuality: Conceptual and Philosophical Issues" (July 2019), which was supported by a European Research Council starting grant project "Immunity, DEvelopment, and the Microbiota" (IDEM). The summer school centered around interdisciplinary group work on four facets of microbiota research: holobionts, individuality, causation, and human health. The conceptual discussion of cutting-edge empirical research provided new insights into microbiota and highlights the value of (...) incorporating into meetings experts from other disciplines, such as philosophy and history of science. (shrink)

Theoretical arguments and empirical investigations indicate that a high proportion of published findings do not replicate and are likely false. The current position paper provides a broad perspective on scientific error, which may lead to replication failures. This broad perspective focuses on reform history and on opportunities for future reform. We organize our perspective along four main themes: institutional reform, methodological reform, statistical reform and publishing reform. For each theme, we illustrate potential errors by narrating the story of a fictional (...) researcher during the research cycle. We discuss future opportunities for reform. The resulting agenda provides a resource to usher in an era that is marked by a research culture that is less error-prone and a scientific publication landscape with fewer spurious findings. (shrink)

The precarious rights of senior citizens, especially those who are highly educated and who are expected to counsel and guide the younger generations, has stimulated the creation internationally of advocacy associations and opinion leader groups. The strength of these groups, however, varies from country to country. In some countries, they are supported and are the focus of intense interest; in others, they are practically ignored. For this is reason we believe that the creation of a network of all these associations (...) is essential. The proposed network would act as a support for the already-existing policies of the United Nations’ High Commission for Human Rights, of independent experts, and of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Older People. All three have long ago recommended the creation of a recognized instrument for uniting presently scattered efforts. The proposed network, therefore, will seek to promote the international exchange of relevant expertise, and it will reinforce the commitments and actions that single countries are currently taking to meet these objectives. For example, informative public events can be organised to promote particular support initiatives and to provide an opportunity for new members of the network to be presented. The network will promote health for senior citizens, disease prevention, senior mobility, safe free time for seniors, alimentary education, protection against new risks and dangers, as well as equity in the services necessary for seniors to adopt new information and communication technologies. In the case of retired academic members, the network will promote equality with respect to continuing use of digital technologies (particularly email), continuing access to research libraries, and the guaranteed ability for seniors to fund their own research programs and to deliver free seminars. (shrink)

In the paper, I pose the question of how, on artistic, aesthetic, and philosophical levels, decoration and domestic handicrafts as subversive strategies enable the undermining and breakdown of class-based and patriarchal divisions into high and low, objective and subjective, public and private, masculine and feminine. I explore whether handicrafts, in accordance with feminist postulates, are transgressive, transformative, and inclusive. I link handicrafts with the feminist perspective, since, in the second half of the twentieth century, it was precisely the feminist movement (...) that initiated significant changes in the social and cultural perception of women, femininity, and gender relations. Thus I apply this perspective in the first place to the analysis of selected works of contemporary art in which handicrafts is used not only as a means of artistic expression but also as a subversive aesthetic strategy. I also demonstrate how the world of fashion transforms and aesthetizes handicrafts, whose presence in fashion makes it an area in which, in addition to imperatives and aesthetic values, social attitudes, ethical values, and world views are shaped. Finally, referring to the works of selected feminist authors (Mary Field Belenky, Mary Daly, Evelyn Fox-Keller, Donna Haraway), I show how these researchers have metaphorically interpreted handicrafts as specifically feminine ways of creating and developing knowledge. (shrink)

Mimesis can refer to imitation, emulation, representation, or reenactment - and it is a concept that links together many aspects of ancient Greek Culture. The Western Greek bell-krater on the cover, for example, is painted with a scene from a phlyax play with performers imitating mythical characters drawn from poetry, which also represent collective cultural beliefs and practices. One figure is shown playing a flute, the music from which might imitate nature, or represent deeper truths of the cosmos based upon (...) Pythagorean views (which were widespread in Western Greece at the time). The idea that mimesis should be restricted to ideals was made famous by Plato (whose connections to Pythagoreanism and Siracusa are well-known), and famously challenged by his student Aristotle (not to mention by the mimetic character of Plato’s own poetry). This volume gathers essays not only on the philosophical debate about mimesis, but also on its use in architecture, drama, poetry, history, music, ritual, and visual art. The emphasis is on examples from Hellenic cities in Southern Italy and Sicily, but the insights apply far beyond – even to modern times. Contributors include: Thomas Noble Howe, Francisco J. Gonzalez, Gene Fendt, Guilherme Domingues da Motta, Jeremy DeLong, Carolina Araújo, Marie-Élise Zovko, Lidia Palumbo, Sean Driscoll, Konstantinos Gkaleas, Anna Motta, Jure Zovko, Alexander H. Zistakis, Christos C. Evangeliou, Dorota Tymura, Iris Sulimani, Elliott Domagola, Jonah Radding, Giulia Corrente, Laura Tisi, Ewa Osek, Argyri G. Karanasiou, Rocío Manuela Cuadra Rubio, Jorge Tomás García, Aura Piccioni, and José Miguel Puebla Morón. (shrink)

PRINCÍPIOS DA DIGESTÃO DOS ALIMENTOS NOS BEZERROS -/- -/- E. I. C. da Silva -/- Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim -/- Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE sede -/- -/- PRINCÍPIOS DA DIGESTÃO DOS ALIMENTOS NOS BEZERROS -/- -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- Se todos os bezerros pudessem ser criados por suas mães, haveria pouca necessidade de inúmeros livros, artigos e trabalhos, como esse, sobre a criação e o manejo básico desses animais. A maioria das vacas desempenha um ótimo papel (...) na criação dos seus descendentes, desde que sejam tomados os devidos cuidados com relação a alimentação, saúde e a outros aspectos relativos à criação desses neonatos. A essência da pecuária bovina relativa à criação de bezerros é manter esses animais vivos e aptos o suficiente para desempenhar atividades produtivas de grande importância na propriedade. Para tanto, os criadores necessitam entender o desenvolvimento do trato digestivo do bezerro e os conceitos básicos da digestão dos alimentos por ele, e é isso que pretendo aclarar de forma clara e concisa com esse trabalho. -/- -/- 1.1 O TRATO DIGESTIVO DO BEZERRO -/- Um animal adulto necessita de quatro estômagos funcionais para dar-lhe a capacidade de utilizar a ampla gama de alimentos disponíveis. -/- O retículo e o rúmen abrigam milhões de micróbios que fermentam e digerem o material vegetal, em especial às presentes nas forragens. O omaso permite a absorção de água do conteúdo do intestino. O abomaso, ou quarto estômago, é o verdadeiro estômago, comparável ao dos humanos, e permite a digestão ácida dos alimentos. -/- O bezerro muito jovem não desenvolve a capacidade de digerir o pasto, sendo assim o abomaso é o único estômago funcional ao nascer. Tanto os animais recém-nascidos como os adultos têm um intestino delgado funcional que permite a digestão alcalina dos alimentos. -/- A figura 1 ilustra a anatomia dos estômagos e intestino delgado de um bezerro recém-nascido. Esse diagrama esquemático mostra as dimensões relativas dos quatro estômagos, o sulco esofágico, que vai do esôfago até o abomaso, e o esfíncter pilórico ou válvula no fundo do abomaso, que controla a velocidade de movimento do conteúdo do intestino no duodeno. -/- O omaso e o abomaso representam cerca de 70% da capacidade total do estômago no bezerro recém-nascido. Por outro lado, nas vacas adultas, eles compõem apenas 30% da capacidade total do estômago (figura 2). -/- A digestão dos alimentos é auxiliada pela secreção de certos produtos químicos denominados enzimas, que estão presentes nas várias partes do intestino. Por exemplo, os bezerros produzem a enzima renina na parede do abomasal para auxiliar na digestão das proteínas do leite, enquanto a lactase é produzida na parede do duodeno para a digestão do açúcar do leite (lactose). Estas enzimas operam mais eficazmente em diferentes níveis de acidez no conteúdo do intestino, ácido no abomaso e alcalino no duodeno. Para conseguir isso, o bezerro segrega eletrólitos, ou sais minerais, com as enzimas, para mudar o conteúdo do intestino de um tipo para outro. -/- Os produtos finais da digestão dos diferentes componentes dos alimentos são absorvidos através da parede do intestino, mediante as vilosidades intestinais, para a corrente sanguínea, onde são levados para as diferentes partes do corpo para o crescimento e desenvolvimento do animal. -/- -/- 1.2 O BEZERRO ALIMENTADO COM LEITE -/- O Leite ou substituto do leite, quer seja apreendido através de uma teta ou bebido de um balde, é canalizado do esôfago através do sulco esofágico para o abomaso. Este sulco é um pequeno canal na parede do rúmen que é controlado por músculos que permitem que os líquidos sejam diretamente enviados para o abomaso e que não entrem no rúmen. O sulco é ativado em resposta a diferentes estímulos. Funciona bem quando os bezerros amamentam-se através das tetas das mães, mas às vezes não funciona quando bebem de um balde. Essa parece ser uma condição psicológica em resposta aos bezerros separados de suas mães. A maioria dos bezerros podem ser treinados pelo tratador para beber o leite do balde rapidamente e bem, a metodologia empregada é a da persuasão do animal, ao qual o mesmo possa responder positivamente à nova rotina diária e à mãe substituta na forma do criador do bezerro. Quando o leite ou o substituto do leite entra no abomaso, forma um coágulo firme dentro de alguns minutos sob a influência das enzimas renina e pepsina. Este é o mesmo processo envolvido na fabricação de queijo ou junket, usando renina para coagular a proteína do leite. A coagulação do leite retarda a taxa em que flui para fora do abomaso, permitindo assim uma liberação constante de nutrientes alimentares em todo o intestino e, eventualmente, para a corrente sanguínea. Pode levar de 12 a 18 horas para que a coalhada de leite seja totalmente digerida. -/- As enzimas que atuam nas proteínas do leite requerem um ambiente ácido e esse é fornecido pela secreção do ácido clorídrico no abomaso. No entanto, até que a digestão ácida esteja operando de forma eficiente, e isso pode levar até sete dias, a única forma de proteína que pode ser digerida é a caseína. Não há substituto para a caseína no bezerro muito jovem. Os substitutos do leite que contêm outras formas de proteína não podem ser devidamente digeridos até que os bezerros sejam mais velhos. Logo, é necessário muito cuidado para não fornecer substitutos ou sucedâneos que contenham fontes proteicas que não possam ser digeridas pelo estômago do animal, para que não ocasione complicações gastrintestinais. -/- A digestão do leite pode ser melhorada com a inclusão de coalho, que pode ser obtido a partir de fábricas de queijo ou aditivos comerciais de leite de bezerro para a primeira semana ou mais. Esses produtos comerciais podem fornecer ácidos adicionais para reduzir o pH abomasal e incrementar a quantidade de enzimas e bactérias específicas para aumentar a taxa de degradação da coalhada de leite. Tais aditivos são chamados probióticos, na medida em que ajudam nos processos digestivos normais. A pesquisa nem sempre os encontrou para melhorar o desempenho e a saúde dos bezerros, e eles são mais propensos a ser benéficos quando os bezerros estão sofrendo de problemas de saúde. Além disso, a sua eficácia, em termos de custo-benefício é, por vezes, questionada. -/- Qualquer leite de uma alimentação anterior está envolvido neste coágulo recém-formado. As proteínas líquidas de soro de leite e a lactose são rapidamente separadas da coalhada de leite e passam para o abomaso. A gordura do leite contida na coalhada de leite é decomposta por outra enzima, a lipase. Esta é secretado na boca pela saliva e incorporada quando o leite é engolido. A alimentação pelas tetas em vez da alimentação através do balde parece produzir mais saliva e, portanto, mais lipase. A digestão adicional da proteína do leite e da gordura ocorre no duodeno com a ajuda das enzimas produzidas no pâncreas. -/- A lactose, que é rapidamente liberada da coalhada de leite no abomaso, é dividida em glicose e galactose e estas são absorvidas na corrente sanguínea para formar a principal fonte de energia para os bezerros jovens. -/- As gorduras são divididas em ácidos graxos e glicerol para absorção e uso como energia, enquanto as proteínas são divididas em aminoácidos e peptídeos para absorção e uso como fontes de proteína corporal. -/- O amido de cereais, por exemplo, é uma importante fonte de energia em bezerros mais velhos, mas esses animais, nas suas primeiras semanas de vida, não conseguem digerir o amido. -/- O abomaso não é ácido até que o bezerro tenha 1-2 dias de idade e isso apresenta vantagens e desvantagens. A principal vantagem é que as proteínas imunes no colostro não podem ser digeridas nesse compartimento estomacal, por isso são absorvidas na corrente sanguínea na mesma forma quando produzidas pela vaca. Isso garante o seu papel como anticorpos para proteger contra as doenças e infecções. A baixa acidez do conteúdo abomasal no bezerro recém-nascido constitui um risco potencial das bactérias (e provavelmente vírus) tomadas através da boca. Estes não serão mortos pela digestão ácida, sendo assim podem passar para os intestinos, onde podem fazer mal ao bezerro recém-nascido. -/- Todos os bezerros pegam bactérias nos primeiros dias de vida e isso é essencial para o desenvolvimento normal do rúmen (flora microbiana). No entanto, a primeira bactéria a colonizar o intestino também pode causar danos. Desde que o bezerro tenha bebido colostro, os anticorpos maternos podem controlar a propagação dessas bactérias mais nocivas. -/- O bezerro alimentado com leite deve, então, produzir uma digestão ácida no abomaso e uma digestão alcalina no duodeno. Isto é conseguido pela produção de eletrólitos na parede do intestino. -/- Bezerros que sofrem de escoriações devido a distúrbios nutricionais ou infecções bacterianas podem perder grandes quantidades de água e eletrólitos em suas fezes. Estes devem ser reabastecidos como parte do tratamento para as escoriações. -/- O colostro é o primeiro leite produzido por vacas recém-paridas. Além de fornecer nutrientes essenciais para a alimentação animal, fornece anticorpos maternos que permitem a transferência passiva de imunidade contra doenças. As recomendações para a alimentação com colostro serão abordadas brevemente em outro trabalho. -/- -/- 1.3 DESENVOLVIMENTO DO RÚMEN E O PROCESSO DE DESMAME -/- Quando os bezerros são desmamados, o custo da criação diminui acentuadamente. Os custos de alimentação são mais baixos, os insumos de trabalho são reduzidos e a incidência de problemas de saúde é menor. No sentido econômico, faz sentido desmamar os bezerros assim que for razoável. No entanto, o bezerro é forçado a sofrer várias mudanças dramáticas, a saber: -/-  A fonte primária de nutrientes muda de líquido para sólido. -/-  A quantidade de matéria seca que o bezerro recebe é reduzida. -/-  O bezerro deve adaptar-se de um tipo monogástrico a um ruminante de digestão, que inclui a fermentação de alimentos. -/-  Mudanças na habitação e no manejo muitas vezes ocorrem em torno do desmame, o que pode aumentar o estresse. -/- Ao nascer, o rúmen é uma parte pequena e estéril do intestino que, ao desmame deve se tornar o compartimento mais importante dos quatro estômagos. Deve aumentar em tamanho, atividade metabólica interna e fluxo sanguíneo externo. Os cinco requisitos para o desenvolvimento ruminal são: -/-  Estabelecimento de bactérias. -/-  Líquido. -/-  Saída de material (ação muscular). -/-  Capacidade absortiva do tecido. -/-  Substrato para permitir o crescimento bacteriano, tais como minerais reciclados, bem como nutrientes para alimentação. -/- Antes do consumo de alimentos sólidos, as bactérias existentes fermentam o cabelo ingerido, o estrato e o leite que flui do abomaso para o rúmen. A maior parte da água que entra no rúmen provém da água livre (água real não contida no leite ou na solução substituta do leite). O leite contornará o rúmen através do sulco esofágico, enquanto a água livre não. -/- O rúmen se desenvolve a partir de um órgão muito pequeno em bezerros recém-nascidos (1-2 L) para a parte mais importante do intestino (25-30 L) por 3 meses de idade. Ele pode aumentar muito rapidamente durante as primeiras semanas de vida, dado o manejo da alimentação direita. -/- O crescimento do rúmen ocorre apenas sob a influência dos produtos finais da digestão no mesmo, que resultam da fermentação de alimentos sólidos pelos micróbios presentes nesse compartimento. O desenvolvimento ocorre em grande parte através do crescimento das papilas ruminais (figura 5 e 6) na parede ruminal (estruturas semelhantes a folhas na superfície interna), que aumentam a área superficial do rúmen e, portanto, a sua capacidade de absorver estes produtos finais de digestão. Portanto, os concentrados favorecem melhor o desenvolvimento dessas papilas ruminais. Para tanto, é necessário, com um tempo, ir incrementando a dieta sólida gradativamente para que esses animais deixem de consumir o leite das vacas produtoras e possam alimentar-se de ração e pastagens, que é a finalidade da criação de bovinos, ou seja, criar animais com menor custo possível e engordá-los através de ração, mas principalmente de pastagens. -/- A capacidade do rúmen e a ingestão de alimentos sólidos estão intimamente relacionadas. O desenvolvimento do rúmen é muito lento em bezerros alimentados com grandes quantidades de leite. O leite satisfaz seus apetites para que eles não tenham fome suficiente para comer qualquer alimento sólido. Logo, é necessário diminuir paulatinamente o fornecedor do leite para esses animais, favorecendo a ingestão de alimentos sólidos e desenvolvendo o rúmen, estômago que digere as fibras das forragens e que os tona animais peculiares. -/- A ruminação pode ocorrer com cerca de 2 semanas de idade e é uma boa indicação de que o rúmen está se desenvolvendo. Alimentos sólidos, bem como a ruminação, estimulam a produção de saliva e isso fornece nutrientes como ureia e bicarbonato de sódio para produzir os substratos para o crescimento e desenvolvimento da flora bacteriana. -/- No desmame precoce, é importante limitar a quantidade de leite oferecida e a sua disponibilidade durante todo o dia. Também é essencial fornecer alimentos sólidos. Os grosseiros (de baixa ou alta qualidade) devem ser oferecidos em combinação com concentrados de alta qualidade. -/- O criador deve tomar cuidado com o fornecimento de alimentos como a ração farelada, uma vez que essa ração pode entrar pelas vias nasais e ocasionar complicações respiratórias; há alguns relatos de bezerros mortos após a ingestão de ração farelada, na autópsia de um dos casos foi diagnosticada uma morte por esses grãos farelados presentes no pulmão. Portanto, para evitar complicações o ideal é que se forneça uma ração denominada peletizada. -/- Os alimentos grosseiros (volumosos) estimulam o desenvolvimento do rúmen, enquanto os concentrados fornecem nutrientes para a alimentação animal que não são fornecidos pelas quantidades limitadas de leite oferecidas. Sem os concentrados, o crescimento dos bezerros é lento, mas o rúmen ainda se desenvolve, resultando em animais barrigudos. -/- A ureia fornece nitrogênio para os micróbios, enquanto o bicarbonato de sódio atua como um tampão ruminal, ajudando a manter um pH estável no conteúdo do rúmen. Isso é, particularmente, importante quando os bezerros comem grandes quantidades de grãos de cereais na vida adulta, pois os micróbios do rúmen podem produzir muito ácido lático durante a fermentação desse material. -/- Envenenamento por grãos ou acidose ocorre quando os níveis de ácido lático são excessivamente elevados e tornam-se tóxicos para os micróbios do rúmen e, eventualmente, para o animal. Assim como os produtos finais que são absorvidos através da parede do rúmen, a fermentação microbiana produz os gases dióxido de carbono e metano e estes são normalmente exalados. Quando algo impede a fuga destes gases do rúmen, o inchaço pode se manifestar em qualquer fase da vida, diz-se do animal estufado. -/- -/- 1.4 O PAPEL DA FORRAGEM NO PROCESSO DE DESMAME -/- Existem inúmeras controvérsias acerca do papel da forragem no processo de desmame. Pesquisas realizadas na década de 1980 indicaram claramente que a forragem era benéfica, enquanto pesquisas da década de 1990 descobriram que nem sempre era necessário o fornecimento da forragem para que os bezerros fossem desmamados e que não sofresse estresse e nem apresentasse baixa eficiência produtiva e reprodutiva no futuro. Na maioria das pesquisas anteriores, os bezerros eram desmamados com a oferta de concentrados moídos como pellets com ou sem a presença de feno longo ou palha. Porém, a inclusão de forragens na dieta melhorou a ingestão e o desempenho, além de permitir o desmame precoce. -/- Na pesquisa posterior, os bezerros geralmente alimentavam-se de concentrados grosseiramente moídos, além de alguns volumosos, enquanto alguns até incluíam volumosos picados finos na mistura (às vezes chamados de mistura muesli por apresentar o capim e a ração). Nesses estudos, verificou-se que a inclusão de feno ou palha adicional teve pouco efeito no desempenho pré-desmame. -/- Os sistemas de criação de bezerros australianos frequentemente diferem dos demais, especialmente em áreas de parto sazonais. Um número excessivo elevado de bezerros precisam ser criados de uma só vez para lhes fornecer, a todos, currais individuais durante todo o seu período de amamentação. Consequentemente, os bezerros são criados em grupos. Além disso, os ingredientes da maioria dos concentrados para esses animais são finamente moídos. Nessas situações, descobriu-se que a palha limpa é um alimento útil e que deve ser incluso no período pré-desmame. Alguns agricultores preferem feno de boa qualidade, porém estes agricultores geralmente têm bezerros em grupos muito pequenos, muitas vezes um ou dois, por isso possuem maior controle sobre a ingestão de forragem. -/- Figura 7: A alimentação volumosa de bezerros alimentados com leite é uma questão controversa. Imagem cedida pelo IPA -/- É difícil e, portanto, mais caro que os produtores de rações incorporem feno picado nas refeições dos bezerros. Os pellets são muito mais fáceis, pois eles vão fluir para silos. Por fim, os produtores de leite devem incluir o componente volumoso no regime alimentar pré-desmame. A pastagem não é a fonte ideal de forragem volumosa para os bezerros alimentados com leite, uma vez que possui muito pouca fibra e uma baixa densidade de energia alimentar. O seu elevado teor de água limita a sua capacidade de fornecer energia alimentar adequada aos animais em crescimento. Para ingerir a pastagem a capacidade ruminal deveria ser maior, bezerros jovens simplesmente não conseguem comer pasto suficiente, a menos que seja de alta em qualidade. -/- Os bezerros criados com leite e fornecimento gradual de concentrados apresentam uma boa função ruminal às 3 semanas de vida, além de possuírem uma suficiente capacidade ruminal para o desmame entre às 4-6 semanas de idade. No entanto, se a dieta for baseada em leite restrito e pastagem de alta qualidade, a capacidade do rúmen pode não ser suficiente para o desmame até às 8-10 semanas de vida. Mesmo assim, as taxas de crescimento seriam menores em bezerros desmamados com base alimentar somente à pasto, uma vez que a ingestão de energia é insuficiente devido às limitações físicas da capacidade ruminal. -/- Se a qualidade for muito boa e produza apetite, os bezerros preferem volumosos ao invés do concentrado, o que leva a uma ingestão reduzida de nutrientes durante alimentação, tendo como efeito um crescimento mais lento. Quando volumosos e concentrados fornecem apetite no animal, juntamente com o leite limitado, os bezerros podem comer cerca de 10% de palha e 90% de concentrados. Sem o volumoso e a ruminação resultante, o desenvolvimento do rúmen será mais lento devido à falta de saliva e produtos finais da digestão de fibras presentes na parede celular das forragens. -/- -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- -/- BEN ASHER, Aharon. Manual de cría de becerras. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1999. -/- BITTAR, Carla Maris Machado; PORTAL, Rafaela Nunes Sanchez; PEREIRA, Anna Carolina Fett da Cunha. Criação de bezerras leiteiras. Piracicaba: EDUSP, 2018. -/- BLUM, J. W. Nutritional physiology of neonatal calves. Journal of animal physiology and animal nutrition, v. 90, n. 1‐2, p. 1-11, 2006. -/- CAMPOS, OF de. Criação de bezerros até a desmama. Coronel Pacheco: EMBRAPA/CNPGL, 1985. -/- COELHO, S. G. Criação de bezerros. II Simpósio Mineiro de Buiatria, Anais., Belo Horizonte, 2005. -/- DAVIS, Carl L. et al. The development, nutrition, and management of the young calf. Iowa State University Press, 1998. -/- DE OLIVEIRA, Juliana Silva; DE MOURA ZANINE, Anderson; SANTOS, Edson Mauro. Fisiologia, manejo e alimentação de bezerros de corte. Arquivos de Ciências Veterinárias e Zoologia da UNIPAR, v. 10, n. 1, 2007. -/- DRACKLEY, James K. Calf nutrition from birth to breeding. Veterinary Clinics of North America: Food Animal Practice, v. 24, n. 1, p. 55-86, 2008. -/- FERREIRA, Lucas Silveira et al. Desempenho animal e desenvolvimento do rúmen de bezerros leiteiros aleitados com leite integral ou sucedâneo. Boletim de Indústria Animal, v. 65, n. 4, p. 337-345, 2008. -/- GUILLOTEAU, P.; ZABIELSKI, R.; BLUM, J. W. Gastrointestinal tract and digestion in the young ruminant: ontogenesis, adaptations, consequences and manipulations. J Physiol Pharmacol, v. 60, n. Suppl 1, p. 37-46, 2009. -/- HUBER, J. T. Development of the digestive and metabolic apparatus of the calf. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 52, n. 8, p. 1303-1315, 1969. -/- LONGENBACH, J. I.; HEINRICHS, Arlyn Judson. A review of the importance and physiological role of curd formation in the abomasum of young calves. Animal feed science and technology, v. 73, n. 1-2, p. 85-97, 1998. -/- LOPES, Marcos Aurélio; VIEIRA, P. de F. Criação de bezerros leiteiros. Jaboticabal: Funep, 1998. -/- LUCCI, Carlos de Sousa. Bovinos leiteiros jovens: nutrição, manejo, doenças. São Paulo: Nobel, 1989. -/- ROY, James Henry Barstow et al. The calf. Boston: Butterworths., 1980. -/- SAVAGE, E. S.; MCCAY, C. M. The nutrition of calves; A review. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 25, n. 7, p. 595-650, 1942. -/- THIVEND, P.; TOULLEC, R.; GUILLOTEAU, P. Digestive adaptation in the preruminant. In: Digestive physiology and metabolism in ruminants. Springer, Dordrecht, 1980. p. 561-585. (shrink)

På mange måter er dette en bok som blir utgitt alt for sent. Det er den første antologien av sitt slag, og retter fokus på kvinnelige metafysikere som virket i den tidlige moderne perioden (16. og tidlig 17. århundre). Redaktør Emily Thomas skriver i introduksjonen at til tross for at flere antologier om moderne metafysikk allerede finnes, er kvinnelige filosofer fortsatt underrepresentert og den filosofiske kanon mannsdominert. De ni filosofene som blir omtalt i totalt 13 kapitler var alle originale og (...) velkjente tenkere i sin samtid, men har blitt glemt i filosofihistoriens løp. (shrink)

This paper identifies, develops, and argues for an interpretation of Mary Astell’s understanding of self-government. On this interpretation, what is essential to self-government, according to Astell, is an agent’s responsiveness to her own reasoning. The paper identifies two aspects of her theory of self-government: an ‘authenticity’ criterion of what makes our motives our own and an account of the capacities required for responsiveness to our own reasoning. The authenticity criterion states that when our motives arise from some external source without (...) validation by our own understanding of the reasons supporting them, then they are not our own. The capacities requisite for responsiveness to our own reasoning are those of examining and evaluating our own motives and of resisting the social pressure to conform to others’ opinions. An upshot of this interpretation of Astell’s theory of self-government is that it reveals her insights into the ways ‘custom’ can undermine an individual’s ability to govern oneself. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate composition models of incarnation, according to which Christ is a compound of qualitatively and numerically different constituents. We focus on three-part models, according to which Christ is composed of a divine mind, a human mind, and a human body. We consider four possible relational structures that the three components could form. We argue that a ‘hierarchy of natures’ model, in which the human mind and body are united to each other in the normal way, and (...) in which they are jointly related to the divine mind by the relation of co-action, is the most metaphysically plausible model. Finally, we consider the problem of how Christ can be a single person even when his components may be considered persons. We argue that an Aristotelian metaphysics, according to which identity is a matter of function, offers a plausible solution: Christ's components may acquire a radically new identity through being parts of the whole, which enables them to be reidentified as parts, not persons. (shrink)

Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)

It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a priori, if and when they are justified at all. In this paper I defend this view — ‘rationalism’ — against a recent objection by Timothy Williamson. I argue that his objection fails on multiple grounds, but the reasons why it fails are instructive. Williamson argues from a claim about the semantics of intuitive judgements, to a claim about their psychological underpinnings, to the denial of rationalism. (...) I argue that the psychological claim — that a capacity for mental simulation explains our intuitive judgements — does not, even if true, provide reasons to reject rationalism. (More generally, a simulation hypothesis, about any category of judgements, is very limited in its epistemological implications: it is pitched at a level of explanation that is insensitive to central epistemic distinctions.) I also argue that Williamson’s semantic claim — that intuitive judgements are judgements of counterfactuals — is mistaken; rather, I propose, they are a certain kind of metaphysical possibility judgement. Several other competing proposals are also examined and criticized. (shrink)

Do the new sciences of well-being provide knowledge that respects the nature of well-being? This book written from the perspective of philosophy of science articulates how this field can speak to well-being proper and can do so in a way that respects the demands of objectivity and measurement.

This book surveys research in quantification starting with the foundational work in the 1970s. It paints a vivid picture of generalized quantifiers and Boolean semantics. It explains how the discovery of diverse scope behavior in the 1990s transformed the view of quantification, and how the study of the internal composition of quantifiers has become central in recent years. It presents different approaches to the same problems, and links modern logic and formal semantics to advances in generative syntax. A unique feature (...) of the book is that it systematically brings cross-linguistic data to bear on the theoretical issues, discussing French, German, Dutch, Hungarian, Russian, Japanese, Telugu (Dravidian), and Shupamem (Grassfield Bantu), and pointing to formal semantic literature involving quantification in around thirty languages. -- -/- 1. What this book is about and how to use it; 2. Generalized quantifiers and their elements: operators and their scopes; 3. Generalized quantifiers in non-nominal domains; 4. Some empirically significant properties of quantifiers and determiners; 5. Potential challenges for generalized quantifiers; 6. Scope is not uniform and not a primitive; 7. Existential scope versus distributive scope; 8. Distributivity and scope; 9. Bare numeral indefinites; 10. Modified numerals; 11. Clause-internal scopal diversity; 12. Towards a compositional semantics of quantifier words. (shrink)

Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge we have by being directly aware of our phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I argue that introspective knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis kind of knowledge: it is irreducible to any sort of propositional knowledge and is wholly constituted by a relationship of introspective acquaintance. My main argument is that this is the best explanation of some epistemic facts about phenomenal consciousness and introspection. In particular, it best explains the epistemic asymmetry between (...) a subject who has never had a certain phenomenal state and one who has. I also consider two theoretical objections to my claim: an objection from disunity and an objection from mysteriousness. I show that these objections can be answered and that introspective knowledge by acquaintance being sui generis remains a live option on the table. (shrink)

The psychological reality of an inner awareness built into conscious experience has traditionally been a central element of philosophy of consciousness, from Aristotle, to Descartes, Brentano, the phenomenological tradition, and early and contemporary analytic philosophy. Its existence, however, has recently been called into question, especially by defenders of so-called transparency of experience and first-order representationalists about phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I put forward a defense of inner awareness based on an argument from memory. Roughly, the idea is that since (...) we can only recall something if we were aware of it at the time of its occurrence, and since we can recall our own experiences, we must be aware of our own experiences at the time of their occurrence. The argument is far from new: it goes back to the Buddhist tradition and has been revived more recently in Buddhist Scholarship but also in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, in particular by Uriah Kriegel. However, I believe that, since it is the best extant argument for inner awareness, it deserves more extensive treatment. My goal is to strengthen the memory argument by making some conceptual distinctions as to the exact thesis about inner awareness that the argument is supposed to support, considering different ways the argument may be reconstructed depending on the exact thesis to be supported, and defending the argument from a new objection, raised very recently by Daniel Stoljar. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a new version of the acquaintance view of the nature of introspection of phenomenal states. On the acquaintance view, when one introspects a current phenomenal state of one's, one bears to it the relation of introspective acquaintance. Extant versions of the acquaintance view neglect what I call the phenomenal modification problem. The problem, articulated by Franz Brentano in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, is that drawing introspective attention to one's current conscious experience may modify (...) its phenomenology. Failing to take phenomenal modification into account affects the adequacy of extant versions of the acquaintance view. The purpose of this paper is to develop a better version, the integration account, that meets the phenomenal modification challenge while preserving the merits of other versions. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the (...) hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project. (shrink)

Positive polarity items (PPIs) are generally thought to have the boring property that they cannot scope below negation. The starting point of the paper is the observation that their distribution is significantly more complex; specifically, someone/something-type PPIs share properties with negative polarity items (NPIs). First, these PPIs are disallowed in the same environments that license yet type NPIs; second, adding any NPI-licenser rescues the illegitimate constellation. This leads to the conclusion that these PPIs have the combined properties of yet-type and (...) ever-type NPIs: what appears to be a prohibition is nothing but “halfway licensing”. The paper goes on to propose a unification of the analyses of rescuable PPIs, NPIs, and negative concord, and questions the grounding of polarity sensitivity in the scalar or the referential semantics of the items involved. (shrink)

Difficulty is often treated as blame-mitigating, and even exculpating. But on some occasions difficulty seems to have little or no bearing on our assessments of moral responsibility, and can even exacerbate it. In this paper, I argue that the relevance (and irrelevance) of difficulty with regard to assessments of moral responsibility is best understood via Quality of Will accounts. I look at various ways of characterising difficulty – including via sacrifice, effort, skill and ‘trying’ – and set out to demonstrate (...) that these factors are only blame-mitigating where, and to the extent that, they complicate ascriptions of insufficient concern. Matters become more complex, however, when we turn to difficult circumstances that seem to generate such objectionable attitudes. This is arguably the case with epistemic difficulty and certain instances of moral ignorance. Here I argue that certain difficult circumstances diminish the sense in which false moral beliefs are genuinely revelatory of the agents who hold them. In particular, I draw on the distinction between difficulty that generates objectionable attitudes, and objectionable attitudes that generate difficulty. I argue that the former, but not the latter, can plausibly be viewed as blame mitigating, and that this would apply to (limited) cases of moral ignorance. (shrink)

The debate over the objects of episodic memory has for some time been stalled, with few alternatives to familiar forms of direct and indirect realism being advanced. This paper moves the debate forward by building on insights from the recent psychological literature on memory as a form of episodic hypothetical thought (or mental time travel) and the recent philosophical literature on relationalist and representationalist approaches to perception. The former suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic memory will (...) have to be a special case of an account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought more generally. The latter suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought will have to combine features of direct realism and representationalism. We develop a novel pragmatist-inspired account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought that has the requisite features. (shrink)

Thick concepts, namely those concepts that describe and evaluate simultaneously, present a challenge to science. Since science does not have a monopoly on value judgments, what is responsible research involving such concepts? Using measurement of wellbeing as an example, we first present the options open to researchers wishing to study phenomena denoted by such concepts. We argue that while it is possible to treat these concepts as technical terms, or to make the relevant value judgment in-house, the responsible thing to (...) do, especially in the context of public policy, is to make this value judgment through a legitimate political process that includes all the stakeholders of this research. We then develop a participatory model of measurement based on the ideal of co-production. To show that this model is feasible and realistic, we illustrate it with a case study of co-production of a concept of thriving conducted by the authors in collaboration with a UK anti-poverty charity Turn2us. (shrink)

Richard Bradley and others endorse Reverse Bayesianism as the way to model awareness growth. I raise a problem for Reverse Bayesianism—at least for the general version that Bradley endorses—and argue that there is no plausible way to restrict the principle that will give us the right results. To get the right results, we need to pay attention to the attitudes that agents have towards propositions of which they are unaware. This raises more general questions about how awareness growth should be (...) modelled. (shrink)

Ways of Scope Taking is concerned with syntactic, semantic and computational aspects of scope. Its starting point is the well-known but often neglected fact that different types of quantifiers interact differently with each other and other operators. The theoretical examination of significant bodies of data, both old and novel, leads to two central claims. (1) Scope is a by-product of a set of distinct Logical Form processes; each quantifier participates in those that suit its particular features. (2) Scope interaction is (...) further constrained by the semantics of the interacting operators. The arguments are developed using Minimalist syntax, Generalized Quantify theory, Discourse Representation Theory, and algebraic semantics. The contributors (Beghelli, Ben-Shalom, Doetjes, Farkas, Gutiérrez Rexach, Honcoop, Stabler, Stowell, Szabolcsi and Zwarts) make tightly related theoretical assumptions and focus on related empirical phenomena, which include the direct and inverse scope of quantifiers, distributivity, negation, modal and intensional contexts, weak islands, event-related readings, interrogatives, wh/quantifier interactions, and Hungarian syntax. An introduction to the formal semantics background is provided. Audience: Linguists, philosophers, computational and psycholinguists; advanced undergraduates, graduate students and researchers in these fields. (shrink)

This article investigates the challenges posed by the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology and its connection to reality. Neurophenomenological research seeks to understand the intricate relationship between human consciousness, cognition, and the underlying neural processes. However, the subjective nature of conscious experiences presents unique epistemic challenges in determining the reliability of the knowledge generated in this research. Personal factors such as beliefs, emotions, and cultural backgrounds influence subjective experiences, which vary from individual to individual. On the other hand, scientific knowledge (...) aims to uncover universal truths based on empirical observations and objective principles. Reconciling the subjective and objective realms presents a significant challenge in determining the reliability of knowledge generated through neurophenomenological research. This article aims to examine the inherent limitations and challenges of neurophenomenological research to shed light on the complexities involved in understanding the nature of knowledge itself. This article highlights that the ontological implications of the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology arise from the question of how subjective experiences relate to objective reality. Understanding the neural correlates and mechanisms behind subjective experiences can provide insight into the underlying ontological nature of consciousness. (shrink)

The concept of ‘pareto superiority’ plays a central role in ethics, economics, and law. Pareto superiority is sometimes taken as a relation between outcomes, and sometimes as a relation between actions—even where the outcomes of the actions are uncertain. Whether one action is classed as (ex ante) pareto superior to another depends on the prospects under the actions for each person concerned. I argue that a person’s prospects (in this context) can depend on how that person is designated. Without any (...) constraints on acceptable designators, then, the concept of pareto superiority is ill defined and gives inconsistent results. I consider various ways of completing the definition and draw out some surprising implications. (shrink)

In this paper, we identify some key features of what makes something a disease, and consider whether these apply to pregnancy. We argue that there are some compelling grounds for regarding pregnancy as a disease. Like a disease, pregnancy affects the health of the pregnant person, causing a range of symptoms from discomfort to death. Like a disease, pregnancy can be treated medically. Like a disease, pregnancy is caused by a pathogen, an external organism invading the host’s body. Like a (...) disease, the risk of getting pregnant can be reduced by using prophylactic measures. We address the question of whether the ‘normality’ of pregnancy, its current necessity for human survival, or the value often attached to it are reasons to reject the view that pregnancy is a disease. We point out that applying theories of disease to the case of pregnancy, can in many cases illuminate inconsistencies and problems within these theories. Finally, we show that it is difficult to find one theory of disease that captures all paradigm cases of diseases, while convincingly excluding pregnancy. We conclude that there are both normative and pragmatic reasons to consider pregnancy a disease. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is introspection of phenomenal states, i.e. the distinctively first-personal method through which one can form beliefs about the phenomenology of one’s current conscious mental states. I argue that two different kinds of phenomenal state introspection should be distinguished: one which involves recognizing and classifying the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of a certain experience type, and another which does not involve such classification. Whereas the former is potentially judgment-like, the latter is not. I call (...) them, respectively, reflective introspection and primitive introspection. The purpose of this paper is to argue that primitive introspection is a psychologically real phenomenon. I first introduce the distinction and provide some preliminary motivation to accept it (§1). After some set-up considerations (§2), I present my central argument for the existence of a non-classificatory kind of introspective state (§3), what I call the ‘argument from phenomenal-concept acquisition’. Finally, I briefly present some reasons why my distinction may be important for various philosophical debates (§4). (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, virtual and augmented reality, (semi-)autonomous ve- hicles, autoregulatory weapon systems, enhancement, reproductive technologies and human- oid robotics – these technologies (and many others) are no longer speculative visions of the future; they have already found their way into our lives or are on the verge of a breakthrough. These rapid technological developments awaken a need for orientation: what distinguishes hu- man from machine and human intelligence from artificial intelligence, how far should the body be allowed to (...) be changed and what are the dangers and opportunities presented by these technologies? Many of these questions are also addressed to theology. For example, questions about the image of humanity, the understanding of creation, the ethics of technological body interventions or the moral status of robots. What does theology have to say about these technological developments? It is the right time for theology to scientifically explore tech- nologization and AI and to formulate answers. As technology changes the various areas of human life, society and the world around us, the places and topics of theology are also undergoing transformation. Puzio, Anna: Theology Meets AI: Examining Perspectives, Tasks, and Theses on the Intersection of Technology and Religion. In: Puzio, Anna/Kunkel, Nicole/Klinge, Hendrik (Hg.): Alexa, How Do You Feel About Religion? Theological Approaches to Technology and Artificial Intelligence (Theology and AI 1). Darmstadt: wbg 2023, S. 29–41. DOI: 10.53186/1030373. (shrink)

On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we (...) are permitted to do so. In arguing for that, I defend an epistemic teleological position that is radical in nature. It involves no commitment to aiming at the truth. I conclude by dispelling some worries that have been raised about my position. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between a prominent version of the relational view of memory and recent work on forms of unsuccessful remembering or memory errors. I argue that unsuccessful remembering poses an important challenge for the relational view. Unsuccessful remembering can be divided into two kinds: misremembering and confabulating. I discuss each of these cases in light of a recent relational account, according to which remembering is characterized by an experiential relation to past events, and I argue that experiential (...) relations do not adequately distinguish between remembering and unsuccessful remembering. This is because there are, on the one hand, cases of remembering that do not instantiate the relevant experiential relations, and, on the other hand, cases of confabulation and misremembering that do instantiate the relevant experiential relations. I conclude by suggesting that any successful relationalist attempt to explain remembering needs to come to grips with unsuccessful remembering. (shrink)

Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by a probability range than by a single number. I show that in such cases an agent will have unstable betting behaviour, and so will behave in an unpredictable way. I use this point to argue against a range of responses to the ‘two bets’ argument for sharp probabilities.

In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative (...) judgments? Are experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgments? (3) Questions about Value Theory and Evaluative Perception: Is the existence of evaluative experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of value experience? (shrink)

Mit den Fortschritten in Generativer Künstlicher Intelligenz, Large Language Models, Brain-Computer Interfaces und genetischen Eingriffen gewinnt auch der Transhumanismus an Relevanz. Der Transhumanismus ist ein beliebtes Thema der Medien und wird in Tages- und Wochenzeitungen sowie im Fernsehen gerne aufgegriffen. Außerdem gibt es inzwischen viele Filme, die den Transhumanismus thematisieren, z. B. die Dokumentation „Endlich unendlich“ (2021, Regie: Stephan Bergmann). Der Transhumanismus wurde in Österreich auch Gegenstand einer Verschwörungserzählung, über die der Bayrische Rundfunk aufgeklärt hat. Auf den Wahlplakaten der „Partei (...) für Gesundheitsforschung“ ist der Transhumanist Aubrey de Grey abgebildet, der ein in Cambridge lebender Brite ist, aber auf Plakaten in Deutschland dargestellt wird. Diese und weitere Entwicklungen machen es notwendig, sich mit dem Transhumanismus aus wissenschaftlicher Perspektive auseinanderzusetzen. Was ist der Transhumanismus? Alle sprechen von Transhumanismus, aber was der Transhumanismus letztlich ist, bleibt häufig unklar. Der Transhumanismus (TH) ist eine philosophisch-technologische Bewegung des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts, die es sich zum Ziel setzt, mittels neuer Technologien den Menschen grundlegend zu transformieren. Wichtig ist dabei, dass sich der TH nicht mit den Optimierungsbestrebungen in der Gesellschaft oder technologischem Fortschritt gleichsetzen lässt. Vielmehr verstehe ich unter TH die Gruppe, die sich um die Organisation Humanity+ in Kalifornien versammelt und die Personen, die sich explizit alsVertreter*innen des TH verstehen. Der TH hat eine ganz eigene Agenda, eigene Institutionen, Organisationen und Publikationsorgane.4 Zu den Themen und Visionen gehören die Lebensverlängerung von mehreren Hundert Jahren bis zur Unsterblichkeit, Kryonik (das Einfrieren des Körpers, der wieder aufgetaut werden soll, wenn nach transhumanistischer Vorstellung Unsterblichkeit ermöglicht werden kann), umfassendes Enhancement und die Verschmelzung von Körper und Technik sowie Beseitigung allen Leids, aller Krankheiten und Aufhebung des Alterns. Der TH strebt danach, mittels Technik neue Sinnesfähigkeiten zu erlangen und neue (virtuelle) Erfahrungswelten zu erschließen. Außerdem wird von vielen Transhumanist*innen auch die hochspekulative Vision des Mind Uploading vertreten, die streng genommen dem Posthumanismus zugeordnet werden muss Gemäß dieser Vision soll durch das maschinelle Lesen des Gehirns der ganze Mensch auf ein externes Medium hochgeladen werden können. Die Vision des Mind Uploadings ist aus naturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive hochumstritten, ist aber ein sehr beliebtes Motiv, das auch außerhalb des TH Wirkung zeigt und in viele Science-Fiction- Filme Eingang gefunden hat (z.B. die Amazon Serie „Upload“, 2020, Regie: Greg Daniels). Das Bestreben des TH, den Menschen grundlegend zu transformieren, wirft zunächst die Frage auf, wie der TH den Menschen überhaupt versteht. Dieser Frage nach dem Menschenverständnis des TH habe ich mich in meinem Buch „Über-Menschen. Philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit der Anthropologie des Transhumanismus“ gewidmet. Philosophische Anthropologie bezeichnet die wissenschaftlichen, philosophischen Reflexionen auf den Menschen. Welches Menschenverständnis vertritt der TH und lässt sich unsere Anthropologie auf dieser Grundlage weiterentwickeln? Das Buch gliedert sich in drei Teile: Teil 1 führt zuerst in die Bewegung des TH ein, worauf Teil II aufbaut, der sich mit dem Menschenverständnis des TH beschäftigt. Teil III betrachtet schließlich heutige Optimierungsbestrebungen in der Gesellschaft sowie neue Ansätze für die Technikanthropologie (z. B. Kritischer Posthumanismus und Neuer Materialismus). Die nachfolgenden Kapitel dieses Aufsatzes sind ein Ausschnitt aus Teil II, der Untersuchung des transhumanistischen Menschenverständnisses. Dieser Aufsatz widmet sich dem „genetisch codierten Menschen“ im TH, also der transhumanistischen Sicht auf den Menschen als jemanden, die*der vollständig von ihren*seinen Genen bestimmt ist. Der genetische Diskurs ist nur einer von fünf im TH dominanten Diskursen, die das transhumanistische Menschenverständnis ausmachen. Zu den anderen Diskursen bzw. transhumanistischen Bestimmungen des Menschen gehören: der Diskurs um die „Natur des Menschen“, der Maschinendiskurs – die Bestimmung des Menschen als Maschine –, der neurowissenschaftliche Diskurs – die Gleichsetzung des Menschen mit dem Gehirn bzw. Neuronalem und zuletzt die metaphysischen Verhältnisbestimmungen von Geist und Körper (PUZIO, Über-Menschen, Kap. 4). Diese transhumanistischen Bestimmungen des Menschen werden am Ende ausgewertet. Ohne die Ergebnisse dieses Kapitels im Detail vorwegnehmen zu wollen, kann für die Gesamtuntersuchung des TH gesagt werden, dass das transhumanistische Menschenverständnis sich als hochproblematisch erweist. Die transhumanistischen Argumentationsstrukturen sind nicht tragfähig und der TH behauptet sich auf die Naturwissenschaften zu berufen, widerspricht allerdings den aktuellen Ergebnissen der Naturwissenschaften. Dies wird in den nachfolgenden Kapiteln gut deutlich werden. Der TH hat ein reduktionistisches Menschenverständnis und reduziert den Menschen beispielsweise auf „Information“. Viele Ausführungen sind diskriminierend z. B. gegenüber Kranken, Alternden und Menschen mit Behinderungen und letztendlich wird sogar jeder Mensch, auch der gesunde junge Mensch, gegenüber der Maschine abgewertet, die aus transhumanistischer Sicht den Menschen weit übertrifft. Im weiteren Verlauf der Arbeit werden sogar „ideologische Elemente“ im TH identifiziert. Daher wird in der Arbeit abgelehnt, den TH als Grundlage für die Weiterentwicklung der Anthropologie zu verwenden und stattdessen werden im letzten Teil der Arbeit alternative Ansätze für die Technikanthropologie präsentiert. Wie bereits erwähnt, richtet sich die Kritik am TH jedoch nicht gegen die heutige Optimierung in der Gesellschaft, die ebenfalls im letzten Teil der Arbeit diskutiert wird. Optimierungsbestrebungen hat es schon immer gegeben und sie werden nun durch neue Technologien weiter verändert, sie sind aber nicht mit der Bewegung des TH gleichzusetzen. Das Kapitel ist eingebettet zwischen dem Maschinendiskurs (Mensch als Maschine) mit seinen Ausführungen zu Information und Kybernetik und dem neurowissenschaftlichen Diskurs („Der Mensch ist ihr*sein Gehirn“). Es wird im Folgenden der genetische Diskurs im TH untersucht, also wie der TH den Menschen vollständig auf Gene zurückführt, und dies schließlich kritisch geprüft. Sind „gute Gene“ alles? Kann der Mensch vollständig über ihre*seine Gene bestimmt werden? Und was hat es mit der trügerischen „genetischen Information“ auf sich? Zunächst wird der genetische Diskurs im TH dargestellt, also die genetischen Ausführungen des TH präsentiert (Kap. 2), danach wird der Blick auf den Gebrauch der genetischen Metaphern im TH gerichtet (Kap. 3) und zuletzt werden die genetischen Vorstellungen des TH kritisiert (Kap. 4). Der Aufsatz schließt in Kap. 5mit einer (vorläufigen) Zusammenführung der Ergebnisse und einem Ausblick. (shrink)

One of David Rosenthal’s many important contributions to the philosophy of mind was his clear and unshirking account of introspection. Here we argue that while there is a kind of introspection (we call it “reflective introspection”) that Rosenthal’s account may be structurally fit to accommodate, there is also a second kind (“primitive introspection”) that his account cannot recover. We introduce Rosenthal’s account of introspection in §1, present the case for the psychological reality of primitive introspection in §2, and argue that (...) Rosenthal’s account lacks the resources to accommodate it in §3. (shrink)

Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker’s (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker’s words from constituting evidence for the hearer’s belief? By clarifying this point, it will be possible to (...) address two more general issues concerning the nature of prejudice: its resistance to counterevidence and the steps involved in overcoming prejudice. I propose a hinge account of prejudice, based on the recent perspective of hinge epistemology, to help clarify these aspects. According to the hinge account, prejudices share a fundamental feature with hinges: they work as norms of evidential significance, and as such, they determine what can and cannot count as evidence for belief. (shrink)

Wie verändern sich Mensch und Körper durch Technik? Und welches Menschenverständnis vertritt der Transhumanismus? Anna Puzio befasst sich in der ersten philosophischen Studie zur Anthropologie des Transhumanismus mit führenden Personen des Feldes, u. a. mit Nick Bostrom, David Pearce und Natasha Vita-More. Neben Körperoptimierung und Medizintechnologien beleuchtet sie auch Alltagstechnologien wie Wearables. Dabei entwickelt sie einen neuen Ansatz zur Technikanthropologie und ein neues inklusives Menschen- und Körperverständnis im Anschluss an Donna Haraway und den Kritischen Posthumanismus im amerikanischen Raum.

New technological developments have fundamentally transformed human life. Throughout this process, fundamental questions about human beings have once again been posed. The paper examines how technological change affects understandings of human beings and their bodies, thereby requiring new approaches to anthropology. First, Section 2 illustrates how the use of technology has changed the understanding of human beings and their bodies. A new connection between the human being or the body and technology has emerged. Section 3 then moves onto considering the (...) increasing blurring of the boundaries between organisms and machines, showing how the understanding of humans and bodies is constantly being renegotiated in relation to machines. Based on this, Section 4 explores how the understanding of the human being and the body can be redesigned in the context of modern technology. To this end, approaches for a contemporary anthropology can be derived from critical posthumanism. Section 5 addresses concrete practice and examines the construction of identity in social media platforms such as Instagram. The paper argues that technological processes and social media are places where theology is constructed and appeals for a responsible theological co-creation of these places. It advocates that technology offers the opportunity to question traditional anthropological concepts and to renegotiate understandings of the human being and the body. -- Puzio, Anna: Digital and Technological Identities – In Whose Image? A philosophical-theological approach to identity construction in social media and technology. In: Cursor (2021). (shrink)

What forms of consciousness can the subject have of her body in action? This is a recurrent issue in contemporary research on skilled movement and expertise, and according to a widespread view, the body makes itself inconspicuous in performance in favour of the object or goal that the activity is directed to. However, this attitude to consciousness in bodily performance seems unsatisfying for an understanding of skilled action, and the work of several researchers can be seen as responding to this (...) view: Montero, Legrand, Ravn and others in the philosophy of expertise and of dance have developed various notions of consciousness and cognition to account for the mindful processes at play in performance. Two related questions can be distinguished here: 1. Is there an inherent conflict between skilled action and at least more than marginal awareness of that action, or is it possible – and even desirable – to reflect on our own performance without considerably impeding on it? 2. What forms of consciousness pertaining to the body in action must we distinguish in order to answer the first question? This paper gives an overview of this discussion, focusing on the second issue, although the first will come into play in so far as it is linked with the latter question. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of bodily reflection and on dancers’ descriptions, I show that there is, in phenomenological terms, a bodily level of reflection: a fully conscious and exploratory activity that is led by the skilled body, and that is explicitly aimed at by many performers. (shrink)

One of the major divides in contemporary philosophy of consciousness is on whether phenomenal consciousness requires some form of self-consciousness. The disagreement revolves around the following principle (or something in the vicinity): : For any subject S and phenomenally conscious mental state C of S, C is phenomenally conscious only if S is aware of C. We may call the relevant awareness of one’s own mental states “inner awareness” and the principle “Inner Awareness Principle” (IA). In a paper recently published (...) in this Journal, Stoljar (2021) puts forward a massive theoretical criticism of IA. He addresses many extant arguments for IA, and argues, for each of them, that it is unpersuasive. In this paper, I focus on what strike me as the two most compelling arguments in Stoljar’s list: the argument from memory and the argument from attention. I argue that Stoljar’s objections to them can be rebutted; accordingly, those arguments promise to constitute the steadiest theoretical ground for IA. (shrink)

In many languages, the same particles that form quantifier words also serve as connectives, additive and scalar particles, question markers, roots of existential verbs, and so on. Do these have a unified semantics, or do they merely bear a family resemblance? Are they aided by silent operators in their varied roles―if yes, what operators? I dub the particles “quantifier particles” and refer to them generically with capitalized versions of the Japanese morphemes. I argue that both MO and KA can be (...) assigned a stable semantics across their various roles. The specific analysis I offer is motivated by the fact that MO and KA often combine with just one argument; I propose that this is their characteristic behavior. Their role is to impose semantic requirements that are satisfied when the immediately larger context is interpreted as the meet/join of their host’s semantic contribution with something else. They do not perform meet/join themselves. The obligatory vs. optional appearance of the particles depends on whether the meet/join interpretations arise by default in the given constellation. I explicate the proposal using the toolkit of basic Inquisitive Semantics. (shrink)

Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of common sense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that they are typically based on introspection and introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue that such reasoning must guard against a potential conflation between two distinct introspective phenomena, which we call fact-introspection (...) and thing -introspection; arguments for the unreliability of introspection typically target only the former, leaving the reliability of the latter untouched. In addition, we propose a theoretical framework for understanding thing -introspection that may have a surprising consequence: thing -introspection is not only reliable, but outright infallible. This points at a potential line of defense of phenomenal-belief justification, which here we only sketch very roughly. (shrink)

The question of the unity of consciousness is often treated as the question of how different conscious experiences are related to each other in order to be unified. Many contemporary views on the unity of consciousness are based on this bottom-up approach. In this paper I explore an alternative, top-down approach, according to which (to a first approximation) a subject undergoes one single conscious experience at a time. From this perspective, the problem of unity of consciousness becomes rather the problem (...) of how we can distinguish a multiplicity of goings-on within our conscious experience at any time, given that it is unique. I will present three possible top-down approaches to unity of consciousness, which I call Priority unity monism, Existence unity monism, and Brentanian unity monism. Priority monism and Existence monism are defined in analogy with the homonymous metaphysical theories of object constitution. Brentanian monism retraces Franz Brentano’s view on unity of consciousness, and is defined by appeal to some of his mereological ideas. I will argue that the latter is the best top-down approach to unity of consciousness. (shrink)