The knower paradox states that the statement ‘We know that this statement is false’ leads to inconsistency. This article presents a fresh look at this paradox and some well-known solutions from the literature. Paul Égré discusses three possible solutions that modal provability logic provides for the paradox by surveying and comparing three different provability interpretations of modality, originally described by Skyrms, Anderson, and Solovay. In this article, some background is explained to clarify Égré’s solutions, all three of which hinge on (...) intricacies of provability logic and its arithmetical interpretations. To check whether Égré’s solutions are satisfactory, we use the criteria for solutions to paradoxes defined by Susan Haack and we propose some refinements of them. This article aims to describe to what extent the knower paradox can be solved using provability logic and to what extent the solutions proposed in the literature satisfy Haack’s criteria. Finally, the article offers some reflections on the relation between knowledge, proof, and provability, as inspired by the knower paradox and its solutions. (shrink)

Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola by outlining a pragmatic logic for assertions and hypotheses. On the (...) basis of this extension we analyse the standard logical opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses. We formulate a pragmatic square of oppositions for assertions and a hexagon of oppositions for hypotheses. Finally, we give a mixed hexagon of oppositions to point out the opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence.

Ambiguity occurs insofar as a reasoner lacks information about the relevant physical probabilities. There are objections to the application of standard Bayesian inductive logic and decision theory in contexts of significant ambiguity. A variety of alternative frameworks for reasoning under ambiguity have been proposed. Two of the most prominent are Imprecise Bayesianism and Dempster–Shafer theory. We compare these inductive logics with respect to the Ambiguity Dilemma, which is a problem that has been raised for Imprecise Bayesianism. We develop an agent-based (...) model comparison that isolates the difference between the two inductive logics in their updating methods. We find that Dempster–Shafer theory does not avoid the Ambiguity Dilemma. We discuss the implications of this result. (shrink)

Livro-texto de introdução à lógica, com (mais do que) pitadas de filosofia da lógica, produzido como uma versão revista e ampliada do livro Forallx: Calgary. Trata-se da versão de 13 de outubro de 2022. Comentários, críticas, correções e sugestões são muito bem-vindos.

Human behavior and thought often exhibit a familiar pattern of within group similarity and between group difference. Many of these patterns are attributed to cultural differences. For much of the history of its investigation into behavior and thought, however, cognitive science has been disproportionately focused on uncovering and explaining the more universal features of human minds—or the universal features of minds in general. -/- This entry charts out the ways in which this has changed over recent decades. It sketches the (...) motivation behind the cultural turn in cognitive science, and situates some of its central findings with respect to the questions that animate it and the debates that it has inspired. Woven throughout the entry are examples of how the cognitive science of culture, and especially its elevated concern with different forms of diversity and variation, continues to influence and be influenced by philosophers. -/- One cluster of philosophical work falls within the traditional subject matter of philosophy of science, in this case of the cognitive and social sciences. Philosophers have analyzed and assessed the methods and evidence central to the scientific study of cognition and culture, and have offered conceptual scrutiny, clarification, and synthesis. Research in a second vein sees philosophers themselves contributing more directly to cognitive scientific projects, (co)constructing theories, helping build computational models, even gathering empirical data. A third kind of work is naturalistic philosophy or philosophy of nature, wherein philosophers seek to use results from the cognitive science of culture to inform or transform debates over long-standing philosophical questions, including questions about the nature of philosophy and philosophical methodology itself. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the resources Thomas Aquinas provides for enquiries concerning the psychological abilities of nonhuman animals. I first look to Aquinas’s account of divine, angelic, human, and nonhuman animal naming, to help us articulate the contours of a ‘critical anthropocentrism’ that aims to steer clear of the mistakes of a na¨ıve anthropocentrism and misconceived avowals to entirely eschew anthropocentrism. I then address the need for our critical anthropocentrism both to reject the mental-physical dichotomy endorsed by ‘folk psychology’ (...) and to articulate a more adequate ‘commonsense psychology’ that acknowledges most embodied animal behavior is observable psychological behavior. Next, I argue that we can develop Aquinas’s doctrine of estimation and conation to formulate an account of nonhuman animal action that more adequately characterizes the purposeful behaviors of nonhuman animals. To do so, we first need to recognize a wider range of nonhuman animal behaviors that are captured by Aquinas’s ‘estimative sense’, and that all of these behaviors are specified by a finite variety of particular goods confined to the animals’ environmental niches. But we also need to supplement Aquinas’s account of human and nonhuman animal agency by exploring the ontogeny and ecology of how humans and other animals become attuned to affordances within these different environmental niches. I argue that we should look to Aquinas’s account of nonhuman animal capacities in ST I-II 6-17 for subtle insights that can expand our understanding of how nonhuman animals engage in purposeful behavior by exercising analogous nonrational and imperfectly voluntary forms of intention, deliberation, choice, execution, and enjoyment. I conclude with an outline for how future enquiry can seek to explain the nonrational purposeful problem-solving competencies of chimps, canines, corvids, cetaceans, cephalopods, and other nonhuman animal species. (shrink)

This article, the second of a two-part essay, outlines a solution to certain tensions in Thomist philosophical anthropology concerning the interaction of the human person’s immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous system. Continuing with where the first part left off, I argue that Thomists should not be tempted by strong emergentist accounts of mental operations that act directly on the brain, but should maintain, with Aquinas, that (...) noetic operations directly interact with psychosomatic operations. I develop a Thomist account of noetic–psychosomatic interactions that expands upon the first part’s rapprochement between the new mechanist philosophy of neuroscience and psychology and hylomorphic animalism. I argue that noetic–psychosomatic interactions are best understood as analogous to the way diverse higher and lower order psychosomatic powers interact by actualizing, coordinating, and directing the operations of other psychosomatic powers. I draw on James Ross’s arguments for the immateriality of intellectual operations as realizing definite pure functions in order to elucidate the way noetic operations uniquely actualize, coordinate, and direct the psychosomatic operations they interact with. I conclude with a conjectural sketch of how this presentation of Thomist philosophical anthropology understands the noetic and psychosomatic deficits brought about by damage to the nervous system. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas consistently defended the thesis that the separated rational soul that results from a human person’s death is not a person. Nevertheless, what has emerged in recent decades is a sophisticated disputed question between “survivalists” and “corruptionists” concerning the personhood of the separated soul that has left us with intractable disagreements wherein neither side seems able to convince the other. In our contribution to this disputed question, we present a digest of an unconsidered middle way: the separated soul is (...) an incomplete person. (shrink)

I am tasked with addressing philosophical hazards in the neuroscientific study of religion. As a philosopher concerned with the well-being of neuroscientists studying religion, I am inclined to begin with the philosophical hazards of philosophy. I am well aware of the extraordinary difficulties of both tasks, for the hazards are many and it is easy to miss the forest for the trees or the trees for the forest. Instead of focusing on one issue in great detail, I shall hang a (...) number of warning signs around a forest of issues that identify various philosophical hazards which deserve particular caution when it comes to neuroscience and religion. Since I am aiming for breadth over depth, my brief remarks on each issue shall be synoptic, non-exhaustive, contentious and suggestive for additional consideration and reflection. To redress such deficits, I have provided references for further reading. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the conceptual problems arising when using network analysis in person- centered care (PCC) in psychiatry. Personalized network models are potentially helpful tools for PCC, but we argue that using them in psychiatric practice raises boundary problems, i.e., problems in demarcating what should and should not be included in the model, which may limit their ability to provide clinically-relevant knowledge. Models can have explanatory and representational boundaries, among others. We argue that we can make more explicit (...) what kind of questions personalized network models can address in PCC, given their representational and explanatory boundaries, using perspectival reasoning. (shrink)

Is it necessary for all Christians – including Christians who are metaphysicians with demonstrative knowledge of God’s existence – to hold by faith that God exists? I shall approach this apparently straightforward question by investigating two opposing lines of interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’s own response to this question. I shall begin with two texts from Thomas that motivate two incompatible theses concerning Thomas’s doctrine of the harmony of faith and reason with respect to the existence of God. Next, I shall (...) clarify the salient points of disagreement between these two interpretations of faith and reason in Thomas Aquinas before examining dialectically a number of arguments in favor and against the respective theses of these two interpretations. In the final section I shall argue that the results of our dialectical inquiry reveal that the initial disagreement between the two positions is not irresolvable. Accordingly, I shall conclude by proposing two revised versions of the initial theses that emphasize the compatibility of these two interpretations of Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of the harmony of faith and reason. (shrink)

This paper will argue that the order and the unity of St. Thomas Aquinas’s five ways can be elucidated through a consideration of St. Thomas’s appropriation of an Avicennian insight that he used to order and unify the wisdom of the Aristotelian and Abrahamic philosophical traditions towards the existence of God. I will begin with a central aporia from Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Aristotle says that the science of first philosophy has three different theoretical vectors: ontology, aitiology, and theology. But how can (...) all three be united into a single Aristotelian science? In his Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna resolved the impasse by taking the ontological vector as the subject of metaphysics. He then integrated the question of the four first causes into the penultimate stage of his demonstration for the existence of God, thereby placing aitiological and theological questions among the ultimate concerns of a unified Aristotelian metaphysics. In the five ways, St. Thomas integrated Avicenna’s Aristotelian search for the first four causes into the last four of his five ways, by showing that each of the four aitiological orders terminate in an ultimate first cause that we call God. Finally, by appending the proof from the Physics to the beginning of the five ways, St. Thomas was able to show that the ultimate aim of both natural philosophy and metaphysics is the divine first principle, which is the beginning and subject of sacra doctrina. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss an abductive argument for the existence of God from the experience of awe at natural beauty. If God's creative work is a viable explanation for why we experience awe at natural beauty, and there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation for the origins of such experiences, then we have defeasible evidence that God exists. To evaluate the argument's tenability, we assess the merits of the two main theocentric frameworks that can be marshaled to answer the question (...) of why human beings experience awe at natural beauty: (1) taking the experience of natural beauty as resulting from God's design intentions and (2) conceiving experiences of natural beauty as religious experiences in themselves. We argue that the presence of phenomenological content the fine-grainedness of which exceeds our descriptive and conceptual capacities is better accounted for by the latter hypothesis: experiencing natural beauty amounts to experiencing divine attributes. We conclude that the argument's theological premise is tenable and, having previously argued for the empirical premise (Porcher & De Luca-Noronha, 2021), we conclude that awe at natural beauty is best explained by the existence of God. (shrink)

Contemporary debates about scientific institutions and practice feature many proposed reforms. Most of these require increased efforts from scientists. But how do scientists’ incentives for effort interact? How can scientific institutions encourage scientists to invest effort in research? We explore these questions using a game-theoretic model of publication markets. We employ a base game between authors and reviewers, before assessing some of its tendencies by means of analysis and simulations. We compare how the effort expenditures of these groups interact in (...) our model under a variety of settings, such as double-blind and open review systems. We make a number of findings, including that open review can increase the effort of authors in a range of circumstances and that these effects can manifest in a policy-relevant period of time. However, we find that open review’s impact on authors’ efforts is sensitive to the strength of several other influences. (shrink)

Resumen: La capacidad unificadora de una teoría científica es un rasgo usualmente contemplado a la hora de evaluar su adecuación. Kitcher ha elucidado satisfactoriamente tal noción mediante su enfoque de los patrones explicativos. Sin embargo, su perspectiva adolece de ciertas carencias. Concretamente, sostendremos que el requisito de rigurosidad de los patrones para evaluar la capacidad unificadora debe ser repensado, pues atenta contra la heterogeneidad característica de las diferentes aplicaciones de teorías unificadoras. A su vez, mostraremos cómo estas dificultades bien pueden (...) ser subsanadas desde el marco del estructuralismo metateórico sin por ello resignar ninguna de las acertadas intuiciones de Kitcher. -/- Palabras clave: Explicación, Kitcher, estructuralismo metateórico, unificación, unificación espuria. -/- Abstract: Kitcher has satisfactorily explicated unification using his particular approach to scientific explanation. However, we believe that his perspective has certain problems, which have been inherited by more recent approaches to the topic. Specifically, the requirement of stringency of patterns that Kitcher proposes to determine the unifying power of an explanatory pattern undermines the typical and peculiar heterogeneity we can find in different applications of unifying theories. We will show how this topic can be better addressed by the perspective built by metatheoretical structuralism without sacrificing any of Kitcher’s correct intuitions. -/- Keywords: Explanation, Kitcher, metatheoretical structuralism, spurious unification, unification. (shrink)

Divergências sobre o que existe são tão básicas que tendem a dificultar ou até bloquear o diálogo entre os antagonistas. As várias disputas entre crentes e ateus, ou realistas e nominalistas são apenas dois tipos de exemplos. Interessado em contribuir para a inteligibilidade do debate sobre ontologia, em 1939 W. V. Quine iniciou uma série de trabalhos em que apresenta a noção de compromisso ontológico e propõe um critério supostamente objetivo para identificar as condições exatas em que um discurso teórico (...) sinaliza uma suposição de existência. Pretendo apresentar o conceito de compromisso ontológico e o critério quineano, apresentar e avaliar algumas das muitas críticas que o critério recebeu e situá-lo no contexto da filosofia de Quine. Como produto destas análises, espero contribuir para a reflexão sobre a relevância e o lugar filosófico da noção de compromisso ontológico. (shrink)

El estudio evalúa los vínculos entre la transición energética existentes en América Latina y el Caribe y los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ods) relacionados con la innovación (ods 9), la igualdad (ods 10) y las instituciones (ods 16). El estudio sostiene que, si las opciones de tecnología energética en la región continúan siendo impulsadas por la racionalidad tecnoeconómica, muchas demandas impuestas a la transición energética seguirán sin satisfacerse, es decir, no se resuelven los desafíos preexistentes (ods 9, 10 y 16). (...) Por tanto, para que la transición energética sea equitativa y compatible con el clima, es necesario conceptualizar e implementar en la práctica nuevas formas de integrar y actuar sobre el conocimiento inter y transdisciplinario, lo que implica la creación de una interfaz entre las comunidades locales (conocimiento indígena y comunidad), comunidad de investigación (conocimiento local e internacional sobre clima-energía) y formuladores de políticas (conocimiento sobre políticas). (shrink)

In this paper I would like to give a brief account of self-creation in Nietzsche’s work, by employing some of Michel Foucault’s ideas. For Nietzsche, life should be lived like “a work of art without an author”. This phrase may sound at first strange, but it makes sense if we take a look at Foucault analysis on authorship. The author is not something given, a transcendental and external agent, but something that emerges in the process of writing. In the same (...) way, the subject is not an autonomous and absolute entity, but something that emerges in the process of subjectivation. If we understand this, then we can move forward to investigate some of Nietzsche’s most famous, yet intriguing concepts. Assuming this new account of the subject, ideas like “become who you are”, the dichotomy “master/slave”, “eternal recurrence of the same” etc. will bear new meanings that can give new answers to the old question: “How should one live?”. (shrink)

O livro reúne textos apresentados no II Workshop de Filosofia e Ensino, realizado na UFRGS em 2015, com a temática "Epistemologia e Currículo" -/- .

El presente artículo demuestra que el tránsito entre la naturaleza y la libertad —como es expuesto en la Introducción a la Crítica del Juicio— debe ser comprendido como un argumento teorético y práctico, cuyo propósito es demostrar la posibilidad del Sumo Bien en la naturaleza. Con este propósito, se reconstruye histórico-genéticamente el contexto en que aparece el tránsito dentro de la composición de la obra, justificando así su validez como sentido global de la Crítica. Después, se demuestra que el origen (...) de la exigencia sobre el tránsito proviene del proyecto arquitectónico, como es interpretado a partir de la Crítica de la razón pura, lo cual permite caracterizar las condiciones que debe cumplir para ser construido. Por último, se interpreta el tránsito desde el enfoque arquitectónico y se identifican los momentos de su construcción a lo largo de la crítica del Juicio estético y del teleológico, lo que demuestra su carácter argumental teorético y práctico. A partir de lo anterior, se pretende justificar la unidad del sentido de la Crítica del Juicio, así como la complementariedad entre sus dos momentos. (shrink)

This essay considers how scholarly approaches to the development of molecular biology have too often narrowed the historical aperture to genes, overlooking the ways in which other objects and processes contributed to the molecularization of life. From structural and dynamic studies of biomolecules to cellular membranes and organelles to metabolism and nutrition, new work by historians, philosophers, and STS scholars of the life sciences has revitalized older issues, such as the relationship of life to matter, or of physicochemical inquiries to (...) biology. This scholarship points to a novel molecular vista that opens up a pluralist view of molecularizations in the twentieth century and considers their relevance to current science. (shrink)

It is argued that the de Broglie wave is not the independent wave usually supposed, but the relativistically induced modulation of an underlying carrier wave that moves with the velocity of the particle. In the rest frame of the particle this underlying structure has the form of a standing wave. De Broglie also assumed the existence of this standing wave, but it would appear that he failed to notice its survival as a carrier wave in the Lorentz transformed wave structure. (...) Identified as a modulation, the de Broglie wave acquires a physically reasonable ontology, evidencing a more natural unity between matter and radiation than might otherwise be contemplated, and avoiding the necessity of recovering the particle velocity from a superposition of such waves. Because the Schrödinger and other wave equations for massive particles were conceived as equations for the de Broglie wave, this interpretation of the wave is also relevant to such issues in quantum mechanics as the meaning of the wave function, the nature of wave-particle duality, and the possibility of well-defined particle trajectories. (shrink)

Cet article se base sur des résultats d’enquête récents montrant que, chez des adolescents marocains âgés de dix à dix-huit ans, les manifestations de pensée critique dialogique se si-tuent majoritairement dans une « perspective épistémologique » appelée « relativisme » par un modèle développemental élaboré dans les quinze dernières années avec la méthode de la théorie ancrée. Pour comprendre ces résultats de recherche, qui contrastent avec ceux obte-nus auprès d’adolescents québécois et français appartenant aux mêmes groupes d’âge, nous décrivons, dans (...) un premier temps, le modèle développemental dans lequel ils prennent sens. Nous illustrons ensuite les manifestations de « perspective épistémologique relativiste » chez les adolescents marocains à l’aide d’extraits de verbatim. Les élèves ont tendance à se décen-trer de leur vécu personnel, à se représenter le point de vue d’autrui en général et à co-construire des points de vue convergents avec les pairs. Dans un deuxième temps, prenant appui sur une approche de la représentation sociale en tant que « scène », et sur la littérature touchant aux rôles des aînés dans les sociétés africaines, nous éclairons ces résultats de re-cherche par l’analyse d’une représentation sociale fréquemment mobilisée par les jeunes Ma-rocains interviewés : celle de la hiérarchie des âges et du devoir d’écoute envers les plus âgés. L’analyse de cette « scène » met en lumière des attitudes sociales inculquées aux adolescents en contexte culturel marocain, susceptibles de favoriser le développement d’une « perspective épistémologique relativiste » en matière de pensée critique dialogique. (shrink)

Este ensayo considera la estructura del sujeto ético que se encuentra en los últimos trabajos de Foucault sobre ética, y da cuenta de sus dos conceptos éticos fundamentales: “cuidado de sí” y “estética de la existencia”. El “cuidado de sí”, se argumenta, da a Foucault una manera de conceptualizar la ética que no depende de categorías jurídicas, y que no concibe al sujeto ético en el modelo de la sustancia. “El cuidado de sí” conlleva una comprensión del sujeto ético como (...) un proceso que siempre es relacional, especialmente en relación consigo mismo. Valiéndonos de su ensayo “Qué es un Autor”, se argumenta que al sujeto de la “estética de la existencia”, igual que al autor de un texto, se les entiende como totalmente inmanentes al “objeto”, que usualmente es considerado como opuesto y separado. En lugar de proponer una expresión verdadera de una sustancia interior “auténtica”, la “estética de la existencia” de Foucault se orienta más bien a las prácticas de “creatividad”, cuya forma no puede anticiparse. (shrink)

In this article, I use the expanded hohfeldian model presented by Wenar to argue that, according to Aristotle's theory of friendship, every bond of friendship that is based on utility or virtue creates duties and hohfeldian incidents between those who are friends. In section 1, I provide a quick presentation of Hohfeld's work and of Wenar's hohfeldian model. In section 2, I present my thesis about the creation of certain hohfeldian incidents and certain duties in virtue and utility friendships as (...) conceived by Aristotle. In section 3, I give a broad characterization of Aristotle's theory of friendship and of the three great kinds of friendship that he recognizes. In section 4, I defend the thesis that it is only in virtue and utility friendships that duties are created. In section 5, I specify what are the hohfeldian incidents created by these two kinds of friendship. In section 6, I specify the two ways in which, according to Aristotle, these incidents and duties might be created. In section 7, I conclude with a brief recapitulation of the argument. En este artículo utilizo el modelo hohfeldiano extendido, presentado por Wenar, para argumentar que, según la teoría de la amistad de Aristóteles, todo lazo de amistad basado en la utilidad o la virtud crea deberes e incidentes hohfeldianos entre aquellos que son amigos. En la sección 1 proporciono una presentación rápida de la obra de Hohfeld y del modelo hohfeldiano de Wenar. En la sección 2 presento mi tesis sobre la creación de ciertos incidentes hohfeldianos y ciertos deberes en las amistades basadas en la virtud y la utilidad tal como fueron concebidos por Aristóteles. En la sección 3 ofrezco una caracterización general de la teoría de la amistad de Aristóteles y de los tres grandes tipos de amistad que reconoce. En la sección 4 defiendo la tesis de que los deberes se crean solamente en las amistades basadas en la virtud y la utilidad. En la sección 5 especifico cuáles son los incidentes hohfeldianos creados por estos dos tipos de amistad. En la sección 6 especifico las dos maneras en que, según Aristóteles, podrían crearse estos incidentes y deberes. En la sección 7 concluyo con una breve recapitulación de la argumentación. (shrink)

(Original French text followed by English version.) For Berkeley, mathematical and scientific issues and concepts are always conditioned by epistemological, metaphysical, and theological considerations. For Berkeley to think of any thing--whether it be a geometrical figure or a visible or tangible object--is to think of it in terms of how its limits make it intelligible. Especially in De Motu, he highlights the ways in which limit concepts (e.g., cause) mark the boundaries of science, metaphysics, theology, and morality.

Egal was der heutige Tag auch bringen mag, der 1. April 2063 wird zumindest als der Tag in die Geschichte des Wissenschaftsjournalismus eingehen, der die bisher aufwändigste Berichterstattung erfahren hat. So viele Kamerateams, wie hier vor den Toren der Australian National University in Canberra, hat bisher kein wissenschaftliches Experiment anziehen können. Selbst der Knüller des Vorjahres, als es einer 48jährigen Hausfrau in einem Vorort von London gelang, mit einfachsten Küchenutensilien einen kleinen Kalte-Fusion-Reaktor herzustellen, der den Staubsauger und die Mikrowelle zuverlässig (...) mit sauberer Energie versorgte, hatte bei weitem nicht ein solches Echo in der Wissenschaftspresse erfahren. Es war zwar noch nichts über den Experimentausgang zu erfahren, trotzdem wurde freilich seit drei Tagen ununterbrochen live auf fast allen Kanälen aus Canberra darüber berichtet, dass nun zwar noch nichts zu erfahren sei, dass es aber ja sehr bald soweit sein müsse. Das Experiment, dessen Ausgang man hier so gespannt erwartete, war schon im Vorfeld hitzig diskutiert worden und überhaupt nur durch einen Sonderbeschluss der Vereinten Nationen zustande gekommen. Immerhin läuft die Vorbereitung bereits seit fast 30 Jahren, als sich mehrere Philosophen und Bürgerinitiativen zusammenschlossen, die UNO um eine endgültige Klärung einer der ältesten Fragen der Menschheit zu bitten: Was ist Bewusstsein? Und insbesondere: Ist Bewusstsein etwas anderes als physikalisch beschreibbare Zustände unseres Gehirns, oder sind alle Tatsachen letztlich physikalische Tatsachen? Dass diese Fragen trotz ihres Ehrfurcht einflößenden Alters zunehmend auf den Nägeln brannten, hatte nicht zuletzt die jüngste Entwicklung der Computertechnologie befördert. Nachdem die KI in den letzten Jahrzehnten einen großen Schritt vorwärts gemacht hatte, war man in Sorge, dass ohne endgültige begriffliche Klärung dieser Fragen unser zukünftiger Umgang mit unseren elektronischen Helfern auf moralisch unsicherem Boden stehen könne. Man hatte sich daher nach langer Abwägung der ethischen Aspekte dieses Experiments dazu entschieden, ein gerade neugeborenes Waisenkind in einem völlig schwarz-weiß-grauen Raum groß werden zu lassen, sorgsam darum bemüht, dass die kleine Mary (so hatte man das Mädchen in Anlehnung an die Protagonistin einer fiktiven philosophischen Geschichte genannt) keine Farben zu Gesicht bekommt.. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy, there is a widespread distinction between authenticity as self-discovery (which is an essentialist model, inspired by Rousseau, Herder and the Romantic tradition) and authenticity as self-creation (an existentialist model, inspired mainly by Kierkegaard and Sartre). In this paper, I would like to propose a threefold classification, which ads another model of authenticity, irreducible to any of the previous two. This third model is authenticity as self-reinvention, that could be reconstructed from Nietzsche’s philosophy. The self-reinvention model rests on (...) three different, yet interrelated, ideas: 1) Vitalism: The authentic individual wholeheartedly embraces every aspect of his existence, even pain and sufferings, thus proving he truly owns himself. 2) Perspectivism: The authentic individual is able to reinterpret his mental states in the utmost personal manner, through the transvaluation of values (Umwertung aller Werte) and the spiritualization (Vergeistingung) of his drives. 3) Experimentalism: Authenticity is an incessant play, a constant process of identity formation, which corresponds to Nietzsche’s hypothesis of “the subject as multiplicity” and to his ideal of existence as a work of art or of becoming the poet of your life. (shrink)

A través del presente artículo se realiza una lectura crítica de la conferencia de Gadamer Platón como retratista de 1988, con el propósito de exponer los rasgos esenciales de la hermenéutica del autor que en ese texto operan, a saber, los que determinan el quehacer hermenéutico como fenomenología del entendimiento, comprendiendo por este una estructura que involucra conocimiento teorético y práctico. Asimismo, lo anterior pretende extraer críticamente los mencionados elementos desde el dinamismo de la actividad hermenéutica presentes en la conferencia, (...) a la vez que señalar la influencia que Sócrates y Platón tuvieron sobre el pensamiento gadameriano. (shrink)

The idea of Culture led by Social Sciences presents emotions as if they were difficult to measure, and consequently, from the point of view of the interpretation of Cultural Practices, bothering. The secondarysation (and even, the marginalisation) of emotions among the interpretaive arguments, is linked to a linear and diachronical perspective on the social fact, more than to a forgotten aspect. The traditional ethnographer’s incapacity on including emotional worlds in their reaserches produces traces of a fake objectivity and it is (...) the source of important inexactitudes (or even falsations). -/- Along three reaserches about Urban Culture, introduced in the context of the Sociocultural Process Workshop of the La Universidad del Zulia (“The Affective Dispositifs of Hugo Chávez’ Phenomenom”, “The Opprobium Laberynth: Sexual Chanceros in Maracaibo” and “Walking Throught the Night, Things Get Confused. Reflections about Transgendered, Body and Power in Maracaibo”), it is possible to see conditions for resolving some aspects obout meaning/sense and emotions/intellect tensions, using the body as an emotional territory and as an ethnographical resource. Those reaserches try to evaluate the affective consistence of the urban territory, from the transgendered’s street fronteers, from chanceros and from the “no deviated” society, until the Chávez’ phenomenom, throught the corporal imago between the subjects and the reaserchers. -/- At the end, it is possible to conclude about some useful principles of the idea of Culture that sees the body as a bridge to the missed subjectivity of knowledge. (shrink)

In this article we intend to characterize the issue of the so-called naturalistic fallacy and to evaluate how John Searle approaches it. To do this, we will briefly approach the arguments of David Hume and G. E. Moore and then analyze how Searle's objections to the alleged fallacy relate to such approaches and if have been successful.

Der Einfluss der Lehre vom gerechten Krieg bzw. der Idee des gerechten Friedens auf den Umgang mit heutigen Konflikten lässt sich besonders gut anhand der so genannten „humanitären Interventionen“ und dem aus dieser Praxis entwickelten neuen Ansatz der „Responsibility to Protect“ (RtoP/ R2P) bzw. Schutzverantwortung zeigen. Bei der Be- gründung als humanitär erachteter Interventionen seit den 1990er Jahren wurde und wird auf die Kriterien des gerechten Krieges bzw. gerechten Friedens zurückgegriffen. Nachfolgend spielten diese auch bei der Formulierung des Prinzips der (...) Schutzverantwor- tung eine wichtige Rolle und sind so erneut für die Ausbildung völkerrechtlicher Normen herangezogen worden. Im Folgenden soll zunächst kurz das Kernproblem humanitär begründeter Interventionen skizziert werden und in einem zweiten Schritt dann gezeigt werden, wie die Konzepte von gerechtem Krieg und gerechtem Frieden in der Denkweise und den Prinzipien der Schutzverantwortung verankert sind. (shrink)

Este capítulo se propõe a analisar os fundamentos utilizados por Aristóteles (2006) para justificar a escravidão. Para isso, é tomada como chave de leitura a categorização das atividades humanas fundamentais proposta por Hannah Arendt (2008). A escravidão no mundo grego antigo era tida como uma forma de liberar o cidadão dos afazeres domésticos e do trabalho para que pudesse ter ócio e, assim, dedicar-se às atividades entre seus iguais, sobretudo à política.

Preface to the Thematic Volume: Models and Theories in Biology.

Octavio Paz conceives of authentic philosophical reflection as ‘thinking a la intemperie’. This conception involves his idea that our contemporary historical and philosophical situation is one of intemperie espiritual. Based on the dual sense of the term intemperie for Paz, I propose that ‘thinking a la intemperie’ means: (i) Exposing our beliefs to the weathering effects of our vital, concrete experience; and (ii) apprehending reality in communion with others through poetic experience of the ever-flowing present. That is, authentic philosophical reflection (...) means making our home thinking and living without rigid, stifling ideological systems, in communion with our neighbors and with our places, here and now, in the unity of present place and present time that we create together. This mode of reflection belongs within a broad American tradition of philosophizing and, for Paz, responds to concerns compatible with those of the pragmatists. (shrink)

Unified theories of de se attitudes and de dicto attitudes, along the lines of David Lewis’s proposal, face a problem. Whether or not they are adequate for representing beliefs, they can misrepresent the content of many of our desires, which rank possible outcomes in which the agent with the desire does not exist. These desires are shown to play a role in the rational explanation of action, and recognising them is important in our understanding of ourselves. Lewis’s account of attitudes (...) de dicto and de se is shown to be unsatisfactory, and the lessons learned are applied more broadly. (shrink)

El presente artículo ofrece una interpretación de la totalidad de la filosofía kantiana como reforma al concepto de filosofía de acuerdo con la naturaleza metafísica y moral de la razón. Para ello se articulan los elementos que sirven a la reforma, a saber, la comprensión de la filosofía bajo el concepto escolástico y bajo el cósmico, este último desprendido de la teleología racional expresada en la consideración histórica de la filosofía. Después, se construye la interpretación de la metodología arquitectónica que (...) utiliza la reforma, primero demostrando que la pregunta crítica sobre los juicios sintéticos a priori sirve para determinar los conocimientos posibles; posteriormente, argumentando que la pregunta se subsume a los intereses racionales de los seres humanos para vincular los conocimientos con el fin de la razón, lo cual corresponde a la estructuración de la filosofía según la Sabiduría a la que tiende. Por último, se propone cuál es la labor que cada Crítica tiene dentro de todo el proyecto de reforma. La interpretación, por tanto, recupera las intenciones eminentemente metafísicas y morales de la empresa kantiana, permitiendo abordarla en su conjunto. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à élucider la fonction du concept de constitution dans la théorie idéaliste transcendantale des Ideen I de Husserl. Après avoir établi que le concept de constitution renvoie toujours dans la phénoménologie statique de Husserl à la propriété fondamentale qu’a la conscience intentionnelle de produire le sens de l’objet (Seinssinn), l’article se concentre par la suite à montrer que le projet général que poursuit les Ideen I est celui de comprendre la manière particulière par laquelle le réal arrive (...) à se manifester à la conscience. En passant par la théorie du noème, on arrive, à travers cette compréhension du concept de constitution, à montrer en quel sens l’objet réal se constitue par et dans la conscience comme un « X identique », un objet purement « formel », marqué par l’absence de toute détermination, et comme un « centre unificateur » grâce auquel les différents sens « objectifs » s’y greffent à titre de « prédicats ». C’est alors qu’on comprendra in fine que le concept de constitution joue pour la phénoménologie des Ideen I une fonction épistémologico-phénoménologique. (shrink)