The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the (...) sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content. (shrink)

This paper is a defense of the so-called phenomenal-concept strategy, based on a new view of phenomenal concepts as special de re modes of presentation of the phenomenal character of experience. Phenomenal concepts can be explained in physical terms as mental particulars (as phenomenal files) created in the individual’s mind to pick out the phenomenal character of experience by representing certain physical properties as those represented by the experiences themselves (metarepresentation). They are individuated by two fundamental relations: the perceptual (...) (acquaintance) relation the creature bears to the physical properties represented by its own experience and the relation the creature bears to itself (self-acquaintance) as the subject undergoing those experiences. Mary’s newly acquired phenomenal file presents the phenomenal character of her new experience of red by means of the new relation she bears to herself as the creature standing in the experiential relation to the color red. (shrink)

I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the (...) second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation. (shrink)

Representationalists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious representational state with content, something which is accurate or inaccurate in certain conditions. The most common version of Representationalism takes perceptual content to be singular in the object-place and otherwise consisting of attribution of properties (Singularism/Attributionism). Schellenberg has recently developed a version on which perceptual content is singular even in the property-place in containing a de re mode of presentation of a property-instance (Particularism). In this paper, I show that Particularism (...) faces a version of the problem of the Unity of Perceptual Content. Namely, its supporters haven’t told us how objects can be bound together with property-instances into a content such that it represents them and has accuracy-conditions. Furthermore, I argue that Particularists face an in-principle obstacle in solving it. In contrast, Attributionists can solve the problem and that establishes their view as the only game in town. (shrink)

We show how some model-theoretical devices (local reasoning, modes of presentation, an additional accessibility relation) can be combined in first-order modal logic to formalize the consequence relation that includes de dicto and de re contradictory beliefs. Instead of special ``sense objects'', appearances of objects in an agent's belief are introduced and presented as ordered pairs consisting of an object and an individual constant. A non-classical identity relation is applied. A relation S on the set of possible worlds is introduced, (...) which models possible distortions in an agent's picture of a (real) world. The application of such models in deontic logic is illustrated by a characteristic example. (shrink)

I argue that we can understand the de se by employing the subjective mode of presentation or, if one’s ontology permits it, by defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or facts. I do this in the context of a discussion of Cappelen and Dever’s recent criticisms of the de se. Then, I discuss the distinctive role of the first personal perspective in discussions about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding, and develop a way to frame the problem (...) of lacking prospective access to your future self as a problem with your capacity to imaginatively empathize with your future selves. (shrink)

De se thoughts have traditionally been seen to be exceptional in mandating a departure from orthodox theories of attitudes. Against this, skeptics about the de se have argued that the de se phenomena demand no more of our theories of attitudes than traditional Frege cases. In this camp one view is that the de se can be accounted for by MOPs in the same way that MOPs can account for how it can be rational to believe, for instance, ”Hesperus is (...) shining” while also believing ”Phosphorus is shining.” This paper formulates some minimal conditions that de se MOPs must have in order to explain the relevant de se phenomena. Some potential replies are answered. I conclude that de se MOPs are not exceptional. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer a critical review of the recent nonconceptualist reading of the Kantian notion of sensible intuition. I raise two main objections. First, nonconceptualist readers fail to distinguish connected but different anti-intellectualist claims in the contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Second, I will argue that nonconceptual readings fail because Kan- tian intuitions do not possess a representational content of their own that can be veridical or falsidical in a similar way to how the content of propositional (...) attitudes is true or false. In this paper, I will support my own reading that sensible intuition is better seen as what Evans and McDowell have called a de re sense, whose main characteristic is object dependence. In this sense, Kantian sensible intuitions can be seen as a sensible mode of donation of objects. In my reading, the Kantian opposition between intuitions and concepts is best seen as the opposition between the objectual de re perception of something and the propositional de dicto apperception that something is the case rather than the opposition between nonconceptual and conceptual contents. However, if Kantian sensible intuition is not a mental state with nonconceptual content, it is certainly in the general anti-intellectualist neighborhood. (shrink)

Huckleberry Finn believes that by helping Miss Watson’s slave Jim escape to freedom, he is doing something wrong. But Huck does it anyway—and many want to give him moral credit for this choice. If Huck is to be worthy of such moral esteem, however, it seems there must be some implicit way of appreciating and responding to considerations as moral reasons that does not involve explicitly believing that those considerations are moral reasons. This chapter argues that an agent like Huck (...) can implicitly appreciate a consideration as a moral reason to φ by presenting it under the light of a particular phenomenologically-mediated mode of presentation: one that presents that consideration via the light of a felt directive force “pointing” towards φ-ing—lending weight to it, or soliciting it—in a particular authoritative way. Thus, I suggest, Huck may be understood on analogy with a young jazz piano virtuoso. As she may appreciate that the G-seventh chord having been played just so constitutes an aesthetic reason for her to ease into the C-major-seventh chord just so by virtue of experiencing the former as pointing or directing her to the latter, so also, I propose, Huck may appreciate the considerations speaking in favor of helping Jim as moral reasons to help Jim by virtue of experiencing them as pointing or directing him to help Jim. The chapter also examines and rejects four alternative proposals for how to account for implicit reasons-appreciation: first, a de re account of appreciation and then three additional accounts of appreciation derived from major theories of mental representation (inferentialist, causal tracking, and functionalist theories). (shrink)

The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). The (...) nonconceptual content of the mental states induced when one uses a perceptual demonstrative constitutes the mode of presentation of the perceptual demonstrative that individuates but does not identify the object of perceptual awareness and allows reference to it. On that account, perceptual demonstratives put us in a de re relationship with objects in the world through the non-conceptual information retrieved directly from the objects in the environment. (shrink)

In recent years non-conceptual content theorists have taken Kant as a reference point on account of his notion of intuition (§§ 1-2). The present work aims at exploring several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the role of the intuition as an indexical representation (§ 3), whereas the second applies to the presence of a few epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (§ 4). (...) This work intends to dismiss the possibility that intuition may have an autonomous function of de re knowledge in support of an interpretative reading which can be labelled as weak conceptualism. To this end, the exploration will be conducted from a strictly transcendental perspective – i.e., by referring to the so called theory of the “concept of a transcendental object”. (shrink)

In the middle of the last century, it was common to explain the notion of necessity in linguistic terms. A necessary truth, it was said, is a sentence whose truth is guaranteed by linguistic rules. Quine famously argued that, on this view, de re modal claims do not make sense. “Porcupettes are porcupines” is necessarily true, but it would be a mistake to say of a particular porcupette that it is necessarily a porcupine, or that it is possibly purple. Linguistic (...) theories of necessity fell out of favour with the publication of Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, and Quine’s arguments were put aside. In her recent book, Norms and Necessity, Amie Thomasson presents her modal normativism, which is an updated version of the mid-century theories just described. Quine’s arguments are thus relevant once again. We recapitulate Quine’s central argument, in the context of modal normativism. We then criticise Amie Thomasson’s discussion of de re modality. We finish by briefly presenting an alternative account of de re modal statements, which is compatible with modal normativism. (shrink)

In this research clipping, we present aspects of the audio-visual research Aquilomba Filomove carried out as collaborative action research by the Research Group Filomove: Philosophy, Arts and Latin América Aesthetics in 2018, together with Maria de Tie and the Comunidade Quilombola de Souza, in Chapada of Araripe, Municipality of Porteiras in the south of Ceará, Brazil. The coconut as an intertwined dance, tambourine touch and singing show the body techniques, rhythmic cells and compositional strategies that were part of the reconstruction (...) process of Afro-descendant manifestations, producing spaces of identification for the group. We guide action research towards the critical-reflective rescue of Latin American African American material and immaterial cultural heritage. -/- Neste recorte de pesquisa, apresentamos aspectos da pesquisa audiovisual Aquilomba FiloMove: O processo de re(criar) a tradição na trajetória da Mestra Maria de Tie e a Comunidade Quilombola de Souza realizada como pesquisa ação colaborativa pelo Grupo de Pesquisa FiloMove: Filosofias, Artes e Estéticas da América Latina em 2018, em conjunto com Maria de Tie e a Comunidade Quilombola de Souza, na Chapada de Araripe, Município de Porteiras, no sul do Ceará. O coco, dança entrelaçada, toque do pandeiro e canto, mostra técnicas corporais, células rítmicas e estratégias composicionais que fizeram parte do processo de reconstrução das manifestações afrodescendentes, produzindo espaços de identificação e reconhecimento para o grupo. Orientamos a pesquisa-ação para o resgate crítico-reflexivo do patrimônio cultural material e imaterial afro latino americano. (shrink)

During the last few decades, the historical turn within the tradition of the analytic tradition has experienced growing enthusiasm concerning the procedure of rational reconstruction, whose validity or importance, despite its paradigmatic examples in Frege and Russell, has not always enjoyed a consensus. Among the analytic philosophers who are the frontrunners of this movement, Robert Brandom is one of a kind: his work on Hegel as well as on German Idealism has been increasing interest in, as well as awareness of, (...) Hegel´s possible contributions to some current problems in that tradition, and connecting Hegel scholars to current questions. Thus, this work aims to explore Brandom´s methodology of rational reconstruction, as well as his dialogue with history of Philosophy, mainly exposed in his Tales of the mighty dead (2002). As we will see, Brandom´s distinction between a de dicto and a de re approach intends to present a way of identifying and analyzing a given philosopher´s theoretical (hidden) commitments that can be useful to improve the quality of the dialogue with past philosophers. From such methodological exposition, I to turn to Kierkegaard in order to make explicit some of his ontological commitments and presenting Brandom’s approach as a valuable tool for doing history of philosophy. (shrink)

Against the background of revolutionary digital technologies, mobile learning and the crisis of conventional paradigms in mass societies, the present study shows how innovative and multidisciplinary research capable of both observing and interpreting reality as well as consolidating a pedagogical model open to intercultural dialogue with faith and ethics will allow different cultures to re-appropriate the scientific, pedagogic, ethical and linguistic methodologies necessary for the formation of the ‘human being’. The post-modern condition of the ‘liquid society’, where only transient values (...) are given, with the consequence of uncertainty and dissatisfaction, is the right time to return to the true moral values, i.e. those described by the classical philosophy and the Christian religion that fully realize the human being. This inspiration enables Pedagogy to overcome the uncertainties that afflict subjects in education; overcome the absence of languages and shared ethics; overcome the paroxysmal defense of freedom of thought and action; respond to the lack of model teachers who can have a positive influence on their students; discourage marked and more widespread individualism. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new interpretation of Kant’s notion of consciousness of oneself as a Subject on behalf of a polemic with a recent reading suggested by Longuenesse. My central aim is to provide a systematic interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of consciousness in general. I present and defend new interpretations for four capital Kant’s notions. First, I present a reading of Kant’s sensible intuition as a de re form of mental representation without conceptual content and any structure. It (...) makes the subject aware only in the limited sense of demonstratively representing what appears to him. In the sequence, I present a reading of empirical consciousness as the result of a first-order representation. The important introduction of §16 of the first Critique is construed here as expressing what is known today as the access consciousness. Lastly, I propose a new reading for the transcendental Apperception as an intransitive form of consciousness. (shrink)

This paper is the twin of (Duží and Jespersen, in submission), which provides a logical rule for transparent quantification into hyperprop- ositional contexts de dicto, as in: Mary believes that the Evening Star is a planet; therefore, there is a concept c such that Mary be- lieves that what c conceptualizes is a planet. Here we provide two logical rules for transparent quantification into hyperpropositional contexts de re. (As a by-product, we also offer rules for possible- world propositional contexts.) One (...) rule validates this inference: Mary believes of the Evening Star that it is a planet; therefore, there is an x such that Mary believes of x that it is a planet. The other rule validates this inference: the Evening Star is such that it is believed by Mary to be a planet; therefore, there is an x such that x is believed by Mary to be a planet. Issues unique to the de re variant include partiality and existential presupposition, sub- stitutivity of co-referential (as opposed to co-denoting or synony- mous) terms, anaphora, and active vs. passive voice. The validity of quantifying-in presupposes an extensional logic of hyperinten- sions preserving transparency and compositionality in hyperinten- sional contexts. This requires raising the bar for what qualifies as co-denotation or equivalence in extensional contexts. Our logic is Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. The syntax of TIL is the typed lambda calculus; its highly expressive semantics is based on a procedural redefinition of, inter alia, functional abstraction and application. The two non-standard features we need are a hyper- intension (called Trivialization) that presents other hyperintensions and a four-place substitution function (called Sub) defined over hy- perintensions. (shrink)

I argue for a transformative revival or actualization of the very core of an integrative, methodologically secured form of intellect‑mystical asceticism. This approach draws on traditional sources that are re‑examined from a systematic—synthetic and transcultural—philosophical perspective and in light of the multi‑civilizational global environment of the 21st century. The main traditional points of reference in this paper are provided by Nicolaus de Cusa and Ibn Sīnā, and I refer toa few others, such as Attar of Nishapur, in passing. I begin (...) by developing a basic concept of intellect‑mystical asceticism. It is distinguished from mystification, science, scientism, and modes of everyday communication and cognition. Then, I make the case for an updated, transcultural approach to intellect‑mysticism that can foster the internal (social) and external (environmental) reintegration of the human noosphere and technosphere in future planetary development. In this context, a modern intellect‑mystical philosophical notion of “knowing non‑knowing” (wissendes Nichtwissen, docta ignorantia) is developed. It is inspired by Nicolaus de Cusa and contextualized from a systematic transcultural angle at the same time. Finally, I discuss the problem of the practical, or rather ascetic, realization of the related possibilities of intellect‑mystical self‑enfolding. Here, the preceding steps of the reflection are mapped onto an outline regarding distinct developmental stages of such a transformative intellect‑mystical practice in Ibn Sīnā’s Remarks and Admonitions (al‑Ishārāt wat‑Tanbīhāt). (shrink)

In the ontology of the artwork and its regimes of existence, Gérard Genette gives but little room to the theory and practice of restoration. However, restoration is seen in relation to the identity of the work itself and to its material and pragmatic temporality and anachronism. In the wake of Nelson Goodman, it is also understood as a form of actuation and implementaion of the aesthetic experience. Starting from these premises, the present essay intends to examine the relationship between Genette’s (...) and Daniel Arasse’s reflections on restoration and the history of art, highlighting their similarities and differences with Cesare Brandi’s theory of restoration and, therefore, pointing out their as yet undischarged debts to Sartre’s phenomenology of image. (shrink)

In this chapter, I contend that Nietzsche’s robust critiques of human exceptionalism and the “humanization of nature [Vermenschlichung der Natur]”, as well as his positive, proto-ecocentric vision of the “naturalization of humanity [Vernatürlichung des Menschen]”, afford contemporary environmental philosophy a novel perspective from which to critique anthropocentric conservation ideologies (according to which nature conservation ought to be motivated by the interests and aims of humanity, especially economic development and prosperity). Importantly, I also argue that Thus Spoke Zarathustra is the work (...) in which Nietzsche’s positive vision appears most conspicuously, as suggested by Zarathustra’s relationship to the natural world and exhortations to “remain faithful to the earth.” -/- As Nietzsche’s critique of anthropocentrism reinforces his positive project, I will begin by detailing Nietzsche’s rejection of human exceptionalism (section 1). In addition, I will analyze Nietzsche’s critique of the “humanization of nature” (KSA 10:10[43]; 10:13[20]; 12:1[29]), emphasizing specific pernicious projections of human values onto the other-than-human world. Although these themes appear throughout Nietzsche’s body of work, they are central to Zarathustra. -/- After describing Nietzsche’s critical project, I present his positive, proto-ecocentric vision for humanity’s re-naturalization, one he most emphatically endorses and fleshes out in Zarathustra (section 2). This positive vision can be found in his calls for the human being to become more natural and to cultivate a noble reverence and gratitude for the natural world so that we may learn from it about ourselves—rather than falsifying it for our ends and then insisting that we are part of this other, falsified nature. Only when we can see ourselves as natural beings—specifically, as living beings willing power, embedded in a world with other living beings who do the same—can we identify tasks and pursue aims that empower and strengthen us. In Nietzsche’s view, this recognition results only from an attunement to the other-than-human world. Finally, after adding a few important caveats to proto-ecocentric strains in Nietzsche’s thought, I briefly explain the contributions his thought might make to contemporary environmental philosophy and policy (section 3). (shrink)

RESUMO A alimentação é o fator que mais onera um sistema de produção animal. Assim, a utilização de diferentes estratégias de alimentação dos animais ainda é o grande desafio da nutrição animal, principalmente, levando em consideração as exigências nutricionais de diferentes categorias de ruminantes, em especial bovinos em regiões tropicais, haja vista que a sazonalidade na produção de forragens afeta diretamente a produção bovina, promovendo inadequação no atendimento das exigências nutricionais dos animais principalmente em minerais e vitaminas. Uma alimentação que (...) não atenda as exigências nutricionais dos ruminantes gera prejuízos no sistema de produção, além de, em casos mais graves, ocasionar a perda do animal. Estudos que abordam o efeito e a importância de vitaminas e minerais na nutrição bovina são escassos e necessários. Recentemente a National Research Council (NRC) apresentou novos registros das exigências nutricionais das vitaminas e minerais. Essas alterações proporcionam um impacto econômico significativo em relação à nutrição animal. Nesse sentido, objetivou-se com esta revisão trazer informações acerca de vitaminas e minerais na nutrição de bovinos em pastejo. -/- Palavras-chave: Alimentação animal; forragem; pastagem; requerimentos nutricionais; ruminantes; vitaminas lipossolúveis (Source: AGROVOC). -/- ABSTRACT Animal feed is the factor that most burdens a production system. Thus, the use of different animal feeding strategies is still the great challenge of animal nutrition, taking into account the nutritional requirements of different categories of ruminants, especially cattle in tropical regions, given that seasonality in forage production directly affects cattle production, promoting inadequacy in meeting the nutritional requirements of animals, mainly in minerals and vitamins. A diet that does not meet the nutritional requirements of ruminants generates losses in the production system, in addition to, in more serious cases, causing the loss of the animal. Studies that address the effect and importance of vitamins and minerals in bovine nutrition are scarce and necessary. Recently the National Research Council (NRC) presented new records of the nutritional requirements of vitamins and minerals. These changes provide a significant economic impact on animal nutrition. In this sense, the objective of this review was to bring information about vitamins and minerals in the nutrition of grazing cattle. -/- Keywords: Animal feeding; fat soluble vitamins; forage; nutritional requirements; pasture feeding; ruminants (Source: AGROVOC). -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- 1. Cavalcanti CPL, Silva e Macedo TJ, Gois GC, Menezes VG, Monte APO, Silva AD, Silva DJM, Silva EO, Araújo GGL, Rodrigues RTS, Wischral A, Matos MHT, Queiroz MAA. 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HORMÔNIOS E SISTEMA ENDÓCRINO NA REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL -/- OBJETIVO -/- As glândulas secretoras do corpo são estudadas pelo ramo da endocrinologia. O estudante de Veterinária e/ou Zootecnia que se preze, deverá entender os processos fisio-lógicos que interagem entre si para a estimulação das glândulas para a secreção de vários hormônios. -/- Os hormônios, dentro do animal, possuem inúmeras funções; sejam exercendo o papel sobre a nutrição, sobre a produção de leite e sobre a reprodução, os hormônios desempenham um primordial papel (...) quanto ao funcionamento do animal. -/- Nesse capítulo, o estudante identificará os hormônios relevantes para o controle reprodutivo, suas características e o uso clínico dos mesmos. -/- -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- A endocrinologia é a ciência que se encarrega do estudo do sistema endócrino: um sistema de comunicação entre as células de um organismo; esse trabalho de comunicação é compartilhado com o sistema nervoso já que ambos sistemas possuem características distintas que lhes permite complementar-se para alcançar uma adequada coordenação das funções. Em algumas ocasiões o sistema nervoso e o sistema endócrino interagem direta-mente na transmissão de uma mensagem, pelo qual se conhece como sistema neuroendó-crino. -/- -/- OS HORMÔNIOS -/- A endocrinologia é a ciência que se encarrega do estudo dos hormônios e seus e-feitos. De maneira tradicional os hormônios são considerados como “substâncias secreta-das em direção a circulação pelas glândulas especializadas, e que exercem uma função sobre um órgão branco”. Essa definição, no entanto, é limitada e imprecisa. É necessário ser mais pontual, já que os hormônios não são produzidos em qualquer célula da glândula, senão nas células específicas. Por exemplo, o hormônio luteinizante (LH) é produzido pelos gonadotropos da adenohipófise e não por qualquer outro tipo de célula hipofisária. Da mesma maneira, falar de um “órgão branco” não é exato, já que os hormônios atuam somente nas células que tenham receptores específicos para esse hormônio, e não outras células do mesmo órgão; logo, falar de uma “célula branca” é mais apropriado que falar de um “órgão branco”. As células brancas do LH no testículo são as células de Leydig e as células brancas do hormônio folículo estimulante (FSH) no mesmo órgão são as células de Sertoli. -/- Mediante o supracitado, uma definição mais apropriada de hormônio é a seguinte: “Os hormônios são reguladores biológicos, produzidos e secretados em quantidades pe-quenas pelas células vivas, que depois de viajar pelo meio extracelular atuam sobre as cé-lulas brancas, onde exercem uma ação específica”. -/- É importante levar em conta que os hormônios somente regulam (estimulam ou inibem) funções que já existem na célula branca. Ademais, os hormônios são extraordina-riamente potentes, pelo qual se requerem quantidades muito pequenas para induzir uma resposta na célula. As concentrações circulantes da maioria dos hormônios estão na ordem de nanogramas (10-9 g) ou pictogramas (10-12 g) por mililitro. -/- Etimologicamente o termo “endócrino” significa “secretar em direção adentro”, já que os hormônios são secretados em direção ao interior do organismo (o sangue ou o espaço intracelular), em diferença das secreções exócrinas (em direção ao exterior), que são secretadas em direção a luz de um órgão, como o intestino no caso das enzimas pan-creáticas. -/- Algumas substâncias, sem deixar de ser hormônios, recebem uma classificação adicional em relação ao seu local de ação, ao tipo de células que lhes produzem, ou a al-guma outra característica. Agora, serão descritas algumas dessas características (figura 1). -/- -/- Parahormônio ou hormônio local -/- A maioria dos hormônios são transportados pela circulação desde seu local de se-creção até a célula branca. No entanto, alguns hormônios exercem seu efeito em células adjacentes aquelas que foram produzidos, ao qual não é necessário seu transporte através da circulação geral. Esse tipo de substâncias são chamadas de parahormônios ou hormô-nios locais, e sua liberação é denominada como secreção parácrina. Um exemplo é a pros-taglandina F2 alfa (PGF₂α), que é produzida no epitélio uterino (endométrio) e provoca as contrações nas células musculares do mesmo órgão (miométrio). Deve-se tomar em conta que a mesma substância poderia se comportar em outros casos como um hormônio clássico, atuando em um órgão distinto ao local de sua produção; é o caso da mesma PGF₂α de origem endometrial quando atua sobre as células do corpo lúteo do ovário, pro-vocando sua regressão. A classificação de uma substância como hormônio ou parahormô-nio não depende de sua estrutura química, senão da relação espacial existente entre a célu-la que o produz e a célula branca. -/- -/- Neurohormônio -/- A maioria dos hormônios são produzidos pelas células de origem epitelial, porém, muitos deles são produtos pelos neurônios, logo denominados como neurohormônios. To-dos os neurônios segregam alguma substância, porém tratam-se dos neurohormônios quando o neurônio que os produz despeja-os diretamente em direção a circulação geral, através da qual chegam aos órgãos para exercer seu efeito, sejam na indução, inibição ou estimulação do mesmo. -/- Esse processo é diferente dos neurotransmissores, os quais também são secretados por um neurônio, mas exercem seu efeito em uma célula adjacente com o qual o neurônio estabelece uma sinapse (neuroma com neurônio, neurônio com célula muscular, neurônio com célula glandular). A classificação de uma substância como hormônio ou como neuro-hormônio não depende de sua estrutura química, senão do tipo de célula que o produz. Uma mesma substância é um hormônio quando ele é produzido por uma célula epitelial e um neurohormônio se é produzido por um neurônio. A ocitocina, por exemplo, é secre-tada na neurohipófise por neurônios hipotalâmicos, nesse caso se trata de um neurohor-mônio, mas também é secretada por células do corpo lúteo dos ruminantes, e se trata nesse caso, de um hormônio. A distinção entre um neurohormônio e um hormônio é um neuro-transmissor, da mesma forma, não depende de sua estrutura química, e sim do local onde é secretado. Por exemplo, a dopamina atua como neurotransmissor quando se libera em sinapse da substância negra do mesencéfalo z mas atua como neurohormônio quando é liberada por neurônios hipotalâmicos em direção a circulação do eixo hipotálamo-hipofisário. -/- -/- Pré-hormônio -/- Em alguns casos, os hormônios são secretados em forma inativa (pré-hormônio), que requer uma transformação posterior para converter-se na forma ativa de hormônio. O angiotensinógeno circulante somente cobrará atividade biológica ao se transformar em angiotensina por ação da enzima renina. Algumas substâncias podem atuar como hormô-nios m alguns casos e como pré-hormônios em outros. A testosterona, por exemplo, atua como hormônio nas células musculares, aos quais possui um efeito anabólico direto. O certo é que para a testosterona induzir a masculinização dos órgãos genitais externos em um efeito macho é necessário que seja transformada previamente em 5α-di-hidrotes-tosterona pela enzima 5α-redutase presente nas células de tecido branco, por onde, nesse caso a testosterona é um pré-hormônio de di-hidrotestosterona. -/- -/- Feromônio -/- Os hormônios são mensagens químicas que comunicam a células distintas dentro do mesmo organismo, embora existam casos aos que requerem uma comunicação quími-ca entre organismos diferentes, em geral da mesma espécie. As substâncias empregadas para esse fim denominam-se feromônios. Essas substâncias devem possuir a capacidade de dispersão sobre o ambiente, pelo que nos organismos terrestres geralmente trata-se de substâncias voláteis, enquanto que os feromônios de organismos aquáticos geralmente são substâncias hidrossolúveis. Embora muitos feromônios possuam uma função sexual ou reprodutiva como é o caso de muitas espécies como a canina em que a fêmea em cio dispersa grandes quantidades de feromônios que são captados de longe pelos machos, todavia esse não é sempre o caso, e eles podem ser utilizados para outros tipos de comunicação, como é o caso dos feromônios utilizados pelas formigas para sinalização da rota em direção a fonte de alimentação. E como as abelhas no sentido de orientação da fonte de pólen até a colmeia. Muitos desses feromônios podem ser artificializados, isto é, elaborados pelo homem em laboratório para o estudo ou manipulação de algum animal. -/- -/- O SISTEMA ENDÓCRINO COMO UM SISTEMA DE COMUNICAÇÃO -/- O sistema endócrino é um sistema de comunicação que tem como objetivo coor-denar as funções das células de diferentes órgãos para mantença da homeostase do orga-nismo e promover seu desenvolvimento, crescimento e reprodução. Também ajuda os or-ganismos a adaptarem-se as mudanças de ambiente e ao habitat. O sistema endócrino representa um sistema de comunicação do tipo sem fio, diferentemente do sistema nervo-so que é um sistema de comunicação com fio. -/- Em todo o sistema de comunicação existe uma série de elementos que são necessá-rios para a realização da comunicação de forma efetiva. Esses elementos incluem o emis-sor, a mensagem, o sinal, o meio de transporte do sinal, o receptor, o efetor, a resposta e o feedback ou retroalimentação (figura 1). Todos os elementos são igualmente importan-tes e uma deficiência em qualquer deles pode interromper ou alterar a comunicação. -/- -/- Figura 1: componentes do sistema endócrino de comunicação. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- -/- Emissor ou transmissor -/- É o elemento responsável pela transmissão de uma mensagem; poderíamos com-pará-lo com a redação de notícias de um canal de televisão. Antes de decidir quais serão as notícias que serão transmitidas esse dia, em que ordem se apresentarão e que ênfase lhes darão, as pessoas da redação analisa rodas as informações disponíveis: provenientes de seus repórteres, de agências de notícias internacionais, publicada em jornais do dia, a existente na internet ou disponíveis através de redes sociais; isso significa que as mensa-gens transmitidas pelo emissor não são aleatórias, e sim respondem a uma análise respon-sável das necessidades de informação. -/- No sistema endócrino o emissor é a célula que produz e secreta um hormônio. Co-mo todo emissor responsável, a mesma célula analisa toda a informação relevante dispo-nível, tal como a concentração de diversos metabólitos no sangue, a concentração de ou-tros hormônios, e as mensagens que recebem por via nervosa, antes de decidir se secretará seu hormônio, em que quantidade o fará e com que frequência. Por essa razão, ao estudar o sistema endócrino não somente devemos conhecer a célula transmissora, e sim qual é a informação que a célula pode receber, e como a analisa e a prioriza para construir sua mensagem. -/- -/- Mensagem -/- É a informação transmitida pelo emissor. No caso de um sistema de notícias tele-visivas a mensagem é a notícia, por exemplo “Vaca dá a luz trigêmeos, um caso raro no Brasil”. No sistema endócrino a mensagem que se transmite é uma instrução para que em outra célula se realize determinadas ações. Por exemplo, os neurônios produtores de GnRH no hipotálamo de uma coelha, ao analisar as concentrações de estradiol circulantes e a informação nervosa procedente de neurônios sensoriais nós órgãos genitais da fêmea, podem “saber” que nos ovários existam folículos lisos para ovularem e que a coelha está copulando, pelo qual decidem transmitir a mensagem “Solicita-se os gonadotropos da adenohipófise a liberação de LH em quantidade suficiente para provocar a ovulação”. -/- -/- Sinal -/- É a forma a qual se codifica a mensagem para permitir sua difusão. No caso de um jornal, a mensagem (por exemplo a notícia da vaca que deu a luz trigêmeos) se codifi-ca em forma de ondas de rádio de uma determinada frequência, amplitude e intensidade; no caso do sistema endócrino a mensagem (a necessidade de realizar uma função celular) é codificada em forma de hormônio secretado em determinada quantidade, frequência e amplitude. Para o exemplo descrito supra, a mensagem se codifica na forma de uma grande elevação nas concentrações de GnRH no sangue do sistema porta hipotálamo-hipofisário. -/- É necessário tomar em conta que o emissor codifica a mensagem de forma tal que quando o receptor decifre o sinal obtenha a informação originalmente contida na mensa-gem. No entanto, o sinal pode ser interpretado de diferentes formas por receptores distintos, o que pode provocar respostas contrárias as esperadas. A notícia transmitida por um jornal de rádio, por exemplo, poderia estar codificada em forma de ondas de rádio que, casualmente, para o sistema eletrônico de um avião signifiquem “baixe a altitude e acelere”, razão pela qual é proibido utilizar aparelhos eletrônicos durante a decolagem e aterrissagem desses aparelhos. -/- Do mesmo modo, a mensagem codificada na forma de secreção de estradiol por parte dos ovários pode ser interpretado pelo sistema nervoso de uma ovelha como uma ordem para apresentar conduta de estro, pelas células do folículo ovariano como uma instrução para sofrer mitose e secretar o líquido folicular, pelos gonadotropos como uma ordem para a secreção de um pico pré-ovulatório de LH, e pelas células do endométrio como uma instrução para sintetizar receptores para a ocitocina. Dessa forma, o mesmo sinal (secreção de estradiol) pode conter diferentes mensagens para diferentes células do organismo. -/- Em alguns casos, pode-se apresentar uma resposta patológica devido as diversas formas de interpretação de uma mensagem, por exemplo, a repetição da secreção de adrenalina em um indivíduo estressado pode resultar no desenvolvimento de um proble-ma de hipertensão arterial. Por isso é necessário conhecer a maneira em que cada célula endócrina codifica suas mensagens, assim como a forma em que esses sinais podem ser interpretados em diferentes órgãos e tecidos, em diferentes momentos da vida do animal, em animais com diferentes antecedentes de espécies diferentes. -/- -/- Meio de transporte do sinal -/- O sinal tem que viajar ou difundir-se desde o emissor até o receptor, e em seu ca-minho pode ser modificado de diversas formas. Os sinais de rádio, por exemplo, viajam através da atmosfera e durante esse trajeto podem ser bloqueados por uma barreira física (como ocorre com as ondas de rádio AM em um túnel), ampliadas por uma estação repeti-dora, alteradas por um campo eletromagnético (uma aspiradora funcionando ao lado da sala de transmissão), entre outros. Da mesma forma, os sinais endócrinos que geralmente viajam no sangue, podem ser modificados ao longo do seu caminho. -/- A PGF₂α é inativada ao passar pelo pulmão, o angiotensinógeno é ativado pela re-nina na circulação, e a testosterona pode ser transformada em di-hidrotestosterona nas células da pele e na próstata, ou em estrógenos nos adipócitos e nos neurônios. Por tudo isso, o sinal que finalmente chega ao receptor pode ser diferente do transmitido pelo emissor. -/- Portanto, ao estudar qualquer sistema hormonal devemos conhecer as possíveis modificações que o hormônio pode sofrer desde o momento em que é secretado até que se uma ao seu receptor na célula branca. -/- -/- Receptor -/- É o elemento que recebe o sinal e interpreta a mensagem contida nele. No caso de um jornal de TV, o receptor é o canal correspondente (por exemplo o canal 2) em um aparelho de televisão. É importante ressaltar que um aparelho de TV possui muitos canais distintos, mas somente receberá mensagens se estiver ligado e sintonizado no canal que está transmitindo a mensagem de interesse. Ou seja, o receptor tem que estar ativo. -/- No caso das mensagens endócrinas os receptores são moléculas específicas nas células brancas. Essas moléculas são proteínas membranais ou citoplasmáticas (segundo o tipo de hormônio), que possui uma alta afinidade por seu hormônio, o que lhes permite registrar a mensagem apenas das baixíssimas concentrações em que os hormônios circu-lam. Os receptores possuem uma alta especificidade, o que significa que somente se unem a seu próprio hormônio, e não a outras substâncias. Em algumas ocasiões um receptor pode receber diversos hormônios do mesmo tipo; por exemplo o receptor de andrógenos pode unir testosterona, androstenediona, di-hidrotestosterona e diversos andrógenos sin-téticos. Apesar disso, cada um desses hormônios pode possuir uma afinidade diferente pelo receptor, pelo qual alguns serão mais potentes que outros para estimulação. -/- Em geral existe um número limitado de moléculas receptoras em cada célula, logo diz-se que os receptores são “saturáveis”, o qual significa que uma vez que todos sejam ocupados a célula não pode receber mais moléculas desse hormônio. Por essa razão a magnitude da resposta de um determinado hormônio vai aumentando conforme se aumen-tam suas concentrações, porém ao saturar-se os receptores alcançam um ponto em que a resposta já não aumenta embora sigam incrementando as concentrações hormonais já que os receptores não permanecem livres para unirem-se ao excesso de moléculas do hormô-nio. -/- As células, em contrapartida, podem regular tanto o número de receptores presen-tes como a afinidade destes por seu hormônio; isso significa que a magnitude da resposta antes um determinado sinal endócrino pode ser distinta em diferentes momentos da vida de um animal; depende do estado dos receptores presentes nos tecidos, pelo qual é impor-tante conhecer quais são os fatores que podem aumentar ou reduzir o número de recepto-res em uma célula, assim como aqueles que podem aumentar ou diminuir a afinidade des-ses receptores por seus hormônios. -/- -/- Efetor -/- É o elemento encarregado de responder a uma mensagem realizando uma ação, e é um elemento diferente do receptor. Vale ressaltar que no caso de uma transmissão de televisão o receptor é o aparelho sintonizado no canal de interesse, porém o efetor é o te-lespectador que está exposto as notícias. Esse telespectador sofrerá mudanças que podem resultar em uma ação. A mudança pode ser evidente (e auxiliar as vítimas de um desastre), ou simplesmente uma mudança potencial (ao se inteirar de uma notícia não se pode produ-zir nenhuma mudança aparente até que alguém lhe pergunte: já se interessou?, E nesse caso a resposta será: “sim” em lugar do “não”). Deve-se tomar em conta que o efetor pode estar ausente embora o receptor esteja presente (um televisor ligado em uma sala vazia). O efetor também pode estar inativado (o telespectador encontra-se dormindo); quando assim ocorre não irá produzir uma resposta embora o receptor esteja presente. -/- No sistema endócrino o efetor é, em geral, um sistema celular encarregado de rea-lizar uma determinada função. Na maioria dos casos trata-se de sistemas enzimáticos cuja função é estimulada pela união do hormônio ao seu receptor. Alguns hormônios, por exemplo, atuam através do sistema AMP cíclico (AMPc) logo, a união do hormônio ao seu receptor resulta na ativação de uma proteína chamada Proteína Gs, que ativa a enzima Adenil-ciclase (ou adenilato ciclase), a qual transforma ATP em AMPc. A presença de AMPc resulta na ativação de uma enzima cinese de proteínas que fosforiza outras enzi-mas, o que pode ativá-las ou inativá-las; nesses casos, é gerada uma cascata de eventos que resulta em uma mudança na atividade celular; por exemplo, a cadeia de eventos que produz-se em resposta ao AMPc quando a célula de Leydig do testículo é estimulada pela união do LH a seu receptor resulta na produção de testosterona, enquanto que a estimula-ção de um adipócito provocada pela união da adrenalina a seu receptor, que também atua através do sistema AMPc, resulta em uma série de eventos que provocam, finalmente, a liberação de ácidos graxos livres em direção a circulação. -/- Nos exemplos supra, o AMPc é considerado um mensageiro intracelular, já que o receptor capta o sinal (hormônio) no exterior da célula, o que resulta na produção de um novo sinal (mudança nas concentrações de AMPc) no interior da célula. Embora o sistema AMPc seja utilizado por muitos hormônios, não é um sistema universal; existem outros sistemas mensageiros intracelulares que também são utilizados para responder os hormô-nios que não entram nas células, por exemplo o sistema cálcio-calmodulina, ou os siste-mas baseados em receptores com atividade de cineses de tirosina. Nos casos que os hor-mônios possa atravessar livremente a membrana celular, como acontece com os hormôni-os esteroides, o hormônio se une a receptores presentes no citoplasma, que depois ingres-sam ao núcleo celular para intervir na regulação da transcrição do genoma. -/- De maneira independente ao mecanismo de ação de um determinado hormônio, sua presença finalmente desencadeará mudanças em um ou mais sistemas efetores da célula, o que permitirá que a mesma responda a mensagem que o emissor transmitiu originalmente. É evidente que para compreender a ação de qualquer hormônio é indispensável conhecer seu mecanismo de ação, o papel dos mensageiros intracelulares e as característi-cas dos sistemas efetores. Deve-se conhecer também quais são os fatores que afetam a transdução da mensagem já que uma célula pode regular seus sistemas efetores e dessa forma ter uma resposta maior, menor ou alterada ante a mesma mensagem. -/- -/- Resposta -/- Como mencionado, qualquer mensagem provoca uma resposta (embora somente seja potencial) sobre o efetor que a recebe. No sistema endócrino, as mensagens hormonais viajam constantemente pelo organismo e são captadas por todas as células que possuem receptores ativos para um determinado hormônio. Uma única célula pode ter receptores para diferentes hormônios, pelo qual pode estar recebendo diversas mensagens simultaneamente, e cada uma dessas mensagens pode afetar a resposta de outras mensagens. Por exemplo, a presença de progesterona pode alterar a resposta das células endometriais ao estradiol. Ademais, as células podem estar recebendo ao mesmo tempo uma informação não hormonal, como as concentrações de diversos metabólitos na circulação, ou a recebida pelo sistema nervoso. A célula analisa toda essa informação e com base nela decide se deve responder a mensagem hormonal que está recebendo como deve responder, com que intensidade e durante quanto tempo. A resposta final pode ser uma resposta física imediata (contração, secreção de um hormônio armazenado previa-mente), uma modificação bioquímica a curto prazo (síntese de um determinado hormônio ou outra substância), ou o início de uma série de mudanças que levam a uma mudança a longo prazo (divisão celular, diferenciação celular, crescimento, morte celular). -/- -/- Feedback ou retroalimentação -/- Quando em um sistema de comunicação se produz uma resposta, em muitos casos essa resposta engloba a geração de informação que vai retornar ao emissor, e que agora constituirá um ou mais dos elementos que o emissor tomará em conta antes de transmitir uma nova mensagem. Assim, se um jornal transmite uma mensagem “menina pobre necessita de doação de roupas”, a resposta de alguns efetores (telespectadores) que virão a doar roupas será conhecida pelo emissor, que assim saberá que já não será mais neces-sário voltar a transmitir a mensagem, o que o fará tomar a decisão de transmitir uma mensagem diferente como “menina pobre já não necessita de roupas, porém requer de ali-mentos para sua família”. Essa modificação da mensagem provocada pela resposta do efetor é conhecida como retroalimentação. -/- De forma análoga, no sistema endócrino a resposta da célula efetora geralmente é reconhecida pelo emissor, que em consequência modifica sua mensagem. Na maioria dos casos se produz uma retroalimentação negativa, que consiste em que a resposta do efetor provoca uma redução na intensidade da mensagem transmitida pelo emissor. Quando os gonadotropos de uma vaca secretam hormônio folículo estimulante (FSH), as células da granulosa de seus folículos ovarianos respondem realizando diversas funções, uma das quais é a secreção de inibina. A elevação nas concentrações circulantes de inibina é capta-da pelos gonadotropos, que logo sabem que o FSH já transmitiu sua mensagem, pelo que reduzem a secreção deste hormônio. A retroalimentação negativa é muito importante em qualquer sistema endócrino já que permite manter as concentrações hormonais dentro de limites aceitáveis. -/- A retroalimentação negativa pode ser de onda ultracurta, curta ou longa. A onda ultracurta é quando o hormônio produzido por uma célula pode inibir sua própria secre-ção. A retroalimentação negativa de onda curta é quando o hormônio produzido por uma célula pode inibir a de um órgão imediatamente superior na hierarquia (por exemplo, quando a progesterona produzida pelo corpo lúteo do ovário inibe a secreção de LH pelos gonadotropos da hipófise). O feedback negativo de onda longa sucede quando o hormônio produzido por uma célula inibe a uma célula de um órgão que está dois ou mais níveis por cima na escala hierárquica, por exemplo, quando a testosterona produzida pelas células de Leydig do testículo inibe diretamente os neurônios produtores de GnRH, saltando as células produtoras de LH e adenohipófise. -/- Existe também a retroalimentação positiva, da qual o primeiro hormônio estimula a secreção de um segundo hormônio, o que por sua vez estimula o primeiro, com o que se estabelece um círculo progressivo de estimulação. Um exemplo de retroalimentação positiva é a que se produz pouco antes da ovulação entre o LH hipofisário e o estradiol de origem folicular. Os dois hormônios se estimulam mutuamente até que alcancem níveis elevados de LH que provoca a ovulação. O círculo de feedback positivo termina quando o pico pré-ovulatório de LH mudanças sobre o folículo que incluem a perda da capacidade de produção de estrógenos. Todo o sistema de retroalimentação positiva deve ter um final abrupto sobre o qual se rompe o ciclo de estimulação mútua, já que não mais deverá ser produzida quantidades elevadas dos hormônios, até que todos os recursos do organismo sejam utilizados para esse fim. -/- -/- CLASSIFICAÇÃO QUÍMICA DOS HORMÔNIOS -/- Do ponto de vista químico e sobre o estudo da Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal, existem quatro grupos principais de hormônios: polipeptídios, esteroides, aminas e prostaglandinas; dentro de cada grupo, por sua vez, existem mais grupos de inúmeros outros hormônios dispostos em subdivisões. -/- -/- Hormônios polipeptídios -/- Os polipeptídios são cadeias de aminoácidos. Quando uma dessas cadeias está constituída por poucos aminoácidos é denominada simplesmente de polipeptídios, mas quando uma cadeia de aminoácidos é longa e adquire uma configuração espacial de três dimensões o polipeptídio é denominado proteína (figura 2). Muitos neurohormônios hipo-talâmicos são polipeptídios, como o liberador de gonadotropinas (GnRH), constituído por 10 aminoácidos, o hormônio liberador de tirotropina (TRH), formado por 3 aminoácidos, o somatostatina, constituído por 14 aminoácidos, a ocitocina que é formada por 8 aminoá-cidos etc. O sistema nervoso central e a hipófise produzem peptídeos opioides. -/- Entre os hormônios polipeptídios que por seu tamanho são considerados proteínas encontramos a prolactina, o hormônio do crescimento, os lactogênios placentários, a relaxina, a insulina e fatores de crescimento parecidos com a insulina (IGFs). Existe outro grupo de hormônios polipeptídios classificados como glicoproteínas. Trata-se de proteí-nas que possuem carboidratos unidos a alguns de seus aminoácidos. -/- -/- Figura 2: classificação dos hormônios polipeptídios. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- -/- Há um grupo de hormônios glicoproteicos que constituem uma família de molécu-las similares entre si, dentro das quais estão o hormônio luteinizante (LH), o hormônio folículo estimulante (FSH), o hormônio estimulante da tireoide (TSH), a gonadotropina coriônica humana (hCG) e a gonadotropina coriônica equina (eCG); todos estão formados pela subunidade alfa que é idêntica para os hormônios de uma determinada espécie animal, e por uma subunidade beta específica para cada hormônio. As duas subunidades mantém-se unidas através de ligações dissulfeto. Deve-se mencionar que os carboidratos associados as glicoproteínas podem ser distintos em diferentes idades, épocas do ano ou estados fisiológicos; esse processo é conhecido como microheterogenicidade, e recente-mente têm-se dado grande importância a seu estudo, já que é reconhecido fatores tais como a vida média de um hormônio ou sua atividade biológica podem ser modificados de acordo com o tipo de carboidratos presentes na molécula. -/- Existe outra família de hormônios glicoproteicos, que incluem a inibina A, a B, e a activina A, AB e B. Todos os hormônios polipeptídios possuem algumas características comuns. Em primeiro lugar, trata-se de moléculas hidrossolúveis que não conseguem atravessar as membranas celulares pelo qual se unem a receptores transmembranais que flutuam sobre a parede externa da membrana da célula branca e requerem de um segundo mensageiro intracelular, como o cálcio ou o AMPc, para levar sua mensagem ao interior da célula. -/- Os hormônios desse grupo, não podem ser administrados por via dérmica, oral, retal ou intravaginal, já que não podem atravessar a pela ou as mucosas intestinais, retais ou vaginais. Os polipeptídios são digeridos no estômago, o que também impede sua admi-nistração oral. Outra característica que deve-se tomar em conta é que as proteínas (embora não os polipeptídios pequenos) podem se desnaturalizar por fatores como o calor (são termolábeis), a congelação, ou mudanças de pH m a desnaturalização consiste em uma mudança na forma natural da proteína, o que leva a perda de sua função. Por essa razão, ao trabalhar com hormônios proteicos devem-se tomar cuidados especiais durante seu manejo para evitar a exposição a fatores desnaturalizantes. -/- -/- Hormônios esteroides -/- São moléculas derivadas do colesterol; a célula esteroidogênica pode sintetizar o colesterol, obtê-lo de reservas intracelulares ou da circulação. Na célula esteroidogênica existem diversas enzimas que atuam sequencialmente sobre a molécula de colesterol, provocando mudanças sucessivas até obter o hormônio final que será secretado, ao qual dependerá das enzimas que estão presentes e ativas na célula. -/- Existem cinco grupos principais de hormônios esteroides; os progestágenos, os estrógenos, os glicocorticoides e os mineralocorticoides (figura 3). -/- Os progestágenos são hormônios que favorecem o desenvolvimento da gestação; seus efeitos incluem, entre outros, a estimulação da secreção endometrial de substâncias nutritivas para o embrião, a estimulação do desenvolvimento embrionário e placentário, a inibição das contrações uterinas, bem como fazer com que a cérvix fique fechada. O principal hormônio natural desse grupo é a progesterona, mas existem uma grande quantidade de progestágenos sintéticos utilizados na medicina veterinária, tais como o acetato fluorogestona (FGA), o acetato de melengestrol (MGA), o altrenogest e o norgestomet. -/- Os estrógenos são os hormônios femininos responsáveis, entre outras funções, dos sinais do estro ou receptividade sexual nas fêmeas. A maior parte de seus efeitos estão no alcance da fertilização do ovócito. Os estrógenos, além de estimular a conduta sexual feminina, favorecem, entre outras coisas, a abertura da cérvix para permitir a passagem do espermatozoide, e as contrações uterinas para impulsionar o sêmen em direção aos ovidutos. O principal estrógeno natural é o estradiol 17β, outros membros naturais do grupo são a estrona, a equilina e a equilenina, esses dois últimos presentes exclusivamente em éguas gestantes. Também existem numerosos estrógenos sintéticos, tais como o valerato de estradiol, o benzoato de estradiol e o cipionato de estradiol. -/- Os andrógenos são hormônios masculinos. Possuem uma grande quantidade de efeitos encaminhados a alcançar o êxito reprodutivo do macho, como estimular a conduta sexual, estimular a produção de espermatozoides e estimular as secreções das glândulas sexuais acessórias. O andrógeno principal é a testosterona, outros andrógenos naturais incluem a androstenediona e a di-hidrotestosterona. Existe também inúmeros andrógenos sintéticos. -/- Os glicocorticoides ou corticosteroides possuem funções principalmente metabó-licas e de adaptação ao estresse. O principal corticosteroide na maioria das espécies é o cortisol, enquanto que nos ratos e outros roedores é a corticosterona. Na reprodução, os corticosteroides desempenham um papel relevante, em particular durante o parto e a lac-tação. -/- Os mineralocorticoides, como a aldotestosterona, se encarregam da regulação do balanço de líquidos e eletrólitos no organismo. -/- -/- Figura 3: subgrupos dos hormônios esteroides. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- -/- Os hormônios esteroides como grupos são hidrossolúveis, pelo qual podem atra-vessar livremente as membranas celulares, por essa razão utilizam receptores intracelula-res que se encontram no citoplasma da célula branca; também pode-se administrar por via oral, pela pele, e através das mucosas retal ou vaginal. São moléculas termoestáveis e não são digeridas no estômago, embora algumas possas sofrer modificações na pH ácido, alterando sua função. -/- -/- Aminas -/- São moléculas derivadas de um aminoácido que se modifica pela ação de enzimas específicas. Existem dois tipos de hormônios aminas: as catecolaminas e as indolaminas (figura 4). As catecolaminas derivam do aminoácido tirosina, e incluem a dopamina, a a-drenalina e a noradrenalina. As indolaminas derivam-se do triptofano, e incluem a seroto-nina e a melatonina. -/- As aminas são moléculas hidrossolúveis que não podem atravessar as membranas celulares e portanto atuam através de receptores membranais e segundos mensageiros intracelulares. -/- -/- Figura 4: classificação dos hormônios peptídicos. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- -/- Prostaglandinas -/- São substâncias derivadas do ácido araquidônico. A principal fonte desse ácido graxo são os fosfolipídios da membrana celular, a partir dos quais se podem liberar o ácido araquidônico mediante a ação da enzima fosfolipase A2. O ácido araquidônico se transforma em prostaglandina H mediante a ação da enzima ciclo-oxigenase (ou sintetase de prostaglandinas), que mais adiante se transforma em diferentes prostaglandinas especí-ficas pela ação de diversas enzimas. O tipo de prostaglandina produzido por cada célula dependerá do complemento de enzimas presentes. -/- A prostaglandina mais importante na reprodução é a PGF2α, a qual é responsável pela destruição do corpo lúteo na maioria das espécies; também provoca contrações uteri-nas, pelo qual é importante para o parto, e o transporte dos espermatozoides e a involução uterina depois do parto. Na prática veterinária a PGF2α natural (dinoprosr) ou seus seme-lhantes sintéticos (cloprostenol, luprostiol etc.) são utilizados para a sincronização do ciclo estral, para a indução do parto e para tratar diversas patologias. Outra prostaglandina com algumas ações relacionadas com a reprodução é a prostaglandina E2 (PGE2). -/- As prostaglandinas são substâncias anfipáticas (com propriedades hidrossolúveis e lipossolúveis), pelo qual podem atravessar as membranas celulares. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- AUSTIN, Colin Russell; SHORT, R. Reproduction in mammals. Cambridge, 1972. -/- BEARDEN, Henry Joe et al. Reproducción animal aplicada. México: Manual Moderno, 1982. -/- BECKER, Jill B. et al. (Ed.). Behavioral endocrinology. Mit Press, 2002. -/- BITTAR, Edward (Ed.). Reproductive endocrinology and biology. Elsevier, 1998. -/- BURNSTEIN, Kerry L. (Ed.). Steroid hormones and cell cycle regulation. Kluwer Academic Pub., 2002. -/- CUNNINGHAM, James. Tratado de fisiologia veterinária. Elsevier Health Sciences, 2011. -/- CUPPS, Perry T. (Ed.). Reproduction in domestic animals. Elsevier, 1991. -/- DUKES, Henry Hugh; SWENSON, Melvin J.; REECE, William O. Dukes fisiologia dos animais domésticos. Editora Guanabara Koogan, 1996. -/- FELDMAN, Edward C. et al. Canine and feline endocrinology-e-book. Elsevier health sciences, 2014. -/- FUSCO, Giuseppe; MINELLI, Alessandro. The Biology of Reproduction. Cambridge University Press, 2019. -/- GILBERT, Scott F. Biologia del desarrollo. Ed. Médica Panamericana, 2005. -/- GORE, Andrea C. GnRH: the master molecule of reproduction. Springer Science & Business Media, 2002. -/- HAFEZ, Elsayed Saad Eldin; HAFEZ, Bahaa. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. -/- HERNÁNDEZ PARDO, Blanca. Endocrinología: Lo esencial de un vistazo. México: Panamericana, 2016. -/- HYTTEL, Poul; SINOWATZ, Fred; VEJLSTED, Morten. Embriologia veterinária. São Paulo: Elsevier Brasil, 2012. -/- ILLERA MARTIN, Mariano. Endocrinología veterinaria y fisiología de la reproducción. Madrid: COLIBAC, 1984. -/- JOHNSON, Martin H. Essential reproduction. Nova Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2018. -/- MANDOKI, Juan José et al. Hormone multifunctionalities: a theory of endocrine signaling, command and control. Progress in biophysics and molecular biology, v. 86, n. 3, p. 353-377, 2004. -/- MANDOKI, Juan José et al. Reflections on the mode of functioning of endocrine systems. Archives of medical research, v. 41, n. 8, p. 653-657, 2010. -/- MCKINNON, Angus O. et al. (Ed.). Equine reproduction. Nova Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2011. -/- MELMED, Shlomo (Ed.). The pituitary. Londres: Academic press, 2010. -/- NORRIS, David O.; LOPEZ, Kristin H. (Ed.). Hormones and reproduction of vertebrates. Academic Press, 2010. -/- PARHAR, Ishwar S. (Ed.). Gonadotropin-releasing hormone: molecules and receptors. Elsevier, 2002. -/- PIMENTEL, C. A. Fisiologia e endocrinologia da reprodução da fêmea bovina. I Simpósio de Reprodução de Bovinos, Porto Alegre, RS, 2002. -/- PINEDA, Mauricio H. et al. McDonald's veterinary endocrinology and reproduction. Iowa state press, 2003. -/- RAMOS DUEÑAS, J. I. Endocrinología de la reproducción animal. 2018. -/- SALISBURY, Glenn Wade et al. Physiology of reproduction and artificial insemination of cattle. WH Freeman and Company., 1978. -/- SANDERS, Stephan. Endocrine and reproductive systems. Elsevier Health Sciences, 2003. -/- SORENSEN, Anton Marinus. Reproducción animal: principios y prácticas. México, 1982. -/- SQUIRES, E. James. Applied animal endocrinology. Cambridge: Cabi, 2010. -/- YEN, Samuel SC; JAFFE, Robert B.; BARBIERI, Robert L. Endocrinología de la Reproducción. Fisiología, fisiopatología y manejo clínico. Madrid: Ed. Médica Panamericana, 2001. -/- ZARCO, L. Endocrinología. In. PORTA, L. R.; MEDRANO, J. H. H. Fisiología reproductiva de los animales domésticos. Cidade do México: FMVZ-UNAM, 2018. (shrink)

A description of consciousness leads to a contradiction with the postulation from special relativity that there can be no connections between simultaneous event. This contradiction points to consciousness involving quantum level mechanisms. The Quantum level description of the universe is re- evaluated in the light of what is observed in consciousness namely 4 Dimensional objects. A new improved interpretation of Quantum level observations is introduced. From this vantage point the following axioms of consciousness is presented. Consciousness consists of two distinct (...) components, the observed U and the observer I. The observed U consist of all the events I is aware of. A vast majority of these occur simultaneously. Now if I were to be an entity within the space-time continuum, all of these events of U together with I would have to occur at one point in space-time. However, U is distributed over a definite region of space-time (region in brain). Thus, I is aware of a multitude of space-like separated events. It is seen that this awareness necessitates I to be an entity outside the space-time continuum. With I taken as such, a new concept called concept A is introduced. With the help of concept A a very important axiom of consciousness, namely Free Will is explained. Libet s Experiment which was originally seen to contradict Free will, in the light of Concept A is shown to support it. A variation to Libet s Experiment is suggested that will give conclusive proof for Concept A and Free Will. (shrink)

What is it for two people to think of an object, natural kind or other entity under the same mode of presentation (MOP)? This has seemed a particularly difficult question for advocates of the Mental Files approach, the Language of Thought, or other ‘atomistic’ theories. In this paper I propose a simple answer. I first argue that, by parallel with the synchronic intrapersonal case, the sharing of a MOP should involve a certain kind of epistemic transparency between the (...) token thoughts of the two thinkers. I then explain how shared words help bring about this transparency. Finally, I show how this account can be extended for thoughts expressed using demonstratives or indexicals. (shrink)

Content nonconceptualism and State conceptualism are motivated by different readings of what I want to call here Bermúdez’s conditions on content-attribution (2007). In one read- ing, what is required is a neo-Fregean content to solve problems of cognitive significance at the nonconceptual level (Toribio, 2008; Duhau, 2011). In the other reading, what is required is a neo-Russellian or possible-world content to account for how conspecifics join attention and cooperate, contemplating the same things from different perspectives in the same perceptual field. (...) The solution to this apparent contradiction is the rejection of the real content view and the adherence to what I call here Content-pragmatism: there is no such thing as the content of experience. According to content pragmatism, “proposition” is not as real as a mental state, but rather, it is a term of art that semanticists use, as a matter of theoretical convenience, to classify mental states. What follows from Content-pragmatism is Content- pluralism: there are so many contents that are required to meet Bermúdez’s condition on content attribution. Because both criticism and the defense of State conceptualism overlook the real scope of Bermúdez’s condition on content attribution, they are ineffective. In this paper, I will argue that the opposition between State and Content nonconceptualism is a real one, but only a relative one, that is, relative to the opposite constraints to be met. If we want to solve the problems of cognitive significance, the best we can do is to let the content of experience be modeled as neo-Fregean content, namely, a compound of nonconceptual modes of presentation of objects and properties. In this case, Content-nonconceptualism prevails. In contrast, if we want to account for how conspecifics join attention to the same entities in the same perceptual field from different perspectives, the best we can do is let the content of experience be modeled either as a structured Russellian proposition or as a function from possible worlds to truth-values. In this case, State-nonconceptualism prevails. (shrink)

A description of consciousness leads to a contradiction with the postulation from special relativity that there can be no connections between simultaneous event. This contradiction points to consciousness involving quantum level mechanisms. The Quantum level description of the universe is re- evaluated in the light of what is observed in consciousness namely 4 Dimensional objects. A new improved interpretation of Quantum level observations is introduced. From this vantage point the following axioms of consciousness is presented. Consciousness consists of two distinct (...) components, the observed U and the observer I. The observed U consist of all the events I is aware of. A vast majority of these occur simultaneously. Now if I were to be an entity within the space-time continuum, all of these events of U together with I would have to occur at one point in space-time. However, U is distributed over a definite region of space-time (region in brain). Thus, I is aware of a multitude of space-like separated events. It is seen that this awareness necessitates I to be an entity outside the space-time continuum. With I taken as such, a new concept called concept A is introduced. With the help of concept A a very important axiom of consciousness, namely Free Will is explained. (shrink)

Philosophy of religion is often regarded as a philosophical discipline in which irrelevant influences, such as upbringing and education, play a pernicious role. This paper presents results of a qualitative survey among academic philosophers of religion to examine the role of such factors in their work. In light of these findings, I address two questions: an empirical one (whether philosophers of religion are influenced by irrelevant factors in forming their philosophical attitudes) and an epistemological one (whether the influence of irrelevant (...) factors on our philosophical views should worry us). My answer to the first question is a definite yes, my answer to the second, a tentative yes. (shrink)

The aim of this master’s thesis is to analyse and highlight the interaction between science, politics and law. More precisely, our research question concerns the use of scientific arguments in social spheres (notably in politics and law) instead of legal or political arguments. In fact, we want to raise the way in which certain actors invoke scientific arguments to impose "objective" elements of fact in debate and, in this way, refrain from politically and "subjectively" discussing these same elements (or, at (...) least, their social consequences). This Master’s thesis will adopt an interdisciplinary theoretical framework (chapter 1) mobilising philosophy of science, philosophy of law, sociology of law, legal technique and analytical theories. Then, we will apply it to a case study: the European regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) after the European Court of Justice (CJEU) ruling of 25 July 2015 (chapter 2). The first chapter will provide theoretical elements to rethink the interaction between science, politics and law. The first section will propose a 'state of the art’ of the philosophical literature on the relationship between science (as a regime of truth) and politics. This master’s thesis will assess a truth under construction rather than a transcendental truth. Section 2 anticipates authoritarian claims based on science by considering the relationship science can have with power (Foucault). A solid review of philosophical, sociological and legal literature highlights the risks of giving decision-making power to an all-powerful science. Notably, the use of science to justify discriminatory policies is emphasised as these policies could not be challenged because, at the time, it was considered an objective scientific truth. Finally, section 3 offers a critique of the narratives of neutral and objective science, through the approach of science in action. This sociological approach presented all the doubts and subjectivity of science in action. The second chapter will propose a case study to illustrate the theoretical framework. We have chosen GMOs because they constitute a hybrid 'event', marked by scientific controversies, and with major socio-economic implications. The legal framework of GMOs in the European Union will be presented in the first section. In addition, the legal status of new breeding techniques (NBTs) will be examined. The second section will analyse the ruling of the European Court of Justice which made NBTs subject to GMO regulation. Finally, the third section will propose a reflection on the philosophy of law on the modes of existence of scientific, legal and political disciplines. (shrink)

This paper delves into the character concept as applied to reproduction. Our argument is that the prevailing functional-adaptationist perspective falls short in explaining the evolution of reproductive traits, and we propose an alternative organismal-relational approach that incorporates the developmental and interactive aspects of reproduction. To begin, we define the functional individuation of reproductive traits as evolutionary strategies aimed at enhancing fitness, and we demonstrate how this perspective influences the classification of reproductive characters and modes, the comprehension of shared traits as (...) resulting from conflicts of evolutionary interest between individuals, and the explanation of reproductive diversity. After outlining the shortcomings of this framework, we introduce an organismal-relational approach grounded in evolutionary developmental studies of reproduction. This view provides a revised classification for reproductive characters and modes and offers a new understanding of interorganismal traits that takes into account their inherently relational nature. Lastly, we present the research agenda that emerges from this approach, which addresses the core explanatory gaps left by the adaptationist perspective, including the explanation of reproductive homologies and homoplasies, the developmental constraints associated with the evolution of reproductive modes, and the evolvability of reproductive characters. (shrink)

Some have defended a Fregean view of perceptual content. On this view, the constituents of perceptual contents are Fregean modes of presentation (MOPs). In this paper, I propose that perceptual MOPs are best understood in terms of object files. Object files are episodic representations that store perceptual information about objects. This information is updated when sensory conditions change. On the proposed view, when a subject perceptually represents some object a under two distinct MOPs, then the subject initiates two object (...) files that both refer to a. My defense of this view appeals to its satisfaction of four constraints that I argue theories of perceptual MOPs should satisfy. Furthermore, I show that some existent accounts of perceptual MOPs fail to satisfy them. The defended constraints also indicate what is unique about perceptual, as opposed to linguistic or cognitive, MOPs. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Peacocke (2001) continues an ongoing debate with McDowell and others, providing renewed arguments for the view that perceptual experiences and some other mental states have a particular kind of content, nonconceptual content. In this article I want to object to one of the arguments he provides. This is not because I side with McDowell in the ongoing debate about nonconceptual content; on the contrary, given the way I understand it, my views are closer to Peacocke’s, and (...) have been strongly influenced by him. It is just that I am not persuaded by the particular argument I will be questioning here. (shrink)

While not ignored, the question of the role of mothers in the schema of political rule in Hobbes is not often taken up. Distinct from his contemporaries, Hobbes acknowledges only minimal differences between men and women, and argues that, because maternal protection and nourishment are necessary for its survival, the mother dominates the infant in the state of nature. How to explain that the mother loses this power of domination in the social or political order? Hobbes does not explicitly say. (...) However, some possibilities can be extracted from his texts. -/- Here, I will attempt to explain the loss of maternal power by examining Hobbes's discourse on the different modes of dominion and political rule in "De Cive" and "Leviathan." I will concentrate on their differences, drawing from Yves Charles Zarka's reading of them. Then I will approach the question of the mother and her position in the hierarchy of servitude in each of these texts, appealing to Carole Pateman's analyses as well as Zarka's. Finally, I will present what role the mother's dominion over her children plays in Hobbes's schema. (shrink)

The words we call slurs are just plain vanilla descriptions like ‘cowboy’ and ‘coat hanger’. They don't semantically convey any disparagement of their referents, whether as content, conventional implicature, presupposition, “coloring” or mode of presentation. What distinguishes 'kraut' and 'German' is metadata rather than meaning: the former is the conventional description for Germans among Germanophobes when they are speaking in that capacity, in the same way 'mad' is the conventional expression that some teenagers use as an intensifier when (...) they’re emphasizing that social identity. That is, racists don’t use slurs because they’re derogatory; slurs are derogatory because they’re the words that racists use. To use a slur is to exploit the Maxim of Manner (or Levinson’s M-Principle) to signal one’s affiliation with a group that has a disparaging attitude towards the slur’s referent. This account is sufficient to explain all the familiar properties of slurs, such as their speaker orientation and “nondetachability,” with no need of additional linguistic mechanisms. It also explains some features of slurs that are rarely if ever explored; for example the variation in tone and strength among the different slurs for a particular group, the existence of words we count as slurs, such as 'redskin', which almost all of their users consider to be respectful, and the curious absence in Standard English of any commonly used slurs—by which I mean words used to express a negative attitude toward an entire group—for Muslims and women. (shrink)

Saul Kripke once noted that there is a tight connection between computation and de re knowledge of whatever the computation acts upon. For example, the Euclidean algorithm can produce knowledge of which number is the greatest common divisor of two numbers. Arguably, algorithms operate directly on syntactic items, such as strings, and on numbers and the like only via how the numbers are represented. So we broach matters of notation. The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between (...) the notations acceptable for computation, the usual idealizations involved in theories of computability, flowing from Alan Turing’s monumental work, and de re propositional attitudes toward numbers and other mathematical objects. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to survey a number of features which are constitutive of the Millian account of attitude-ascription and which I take to be irremediably defective. The features in question, some of which have not been fully appreciated, relate mainly to the failure of that account to accommodate certain fundamental aspects of our ordinary practise of attitude attribution. I take it that one’s definitive method of assessment of a given semantical theory consists in checking out whether or (...) not the theory is able to accommodate our pre-theoretical linguistic intuitions; to use Keith Donnellan’s phrase, such intuitions are the bottom line in philosophical argumentation about language. And I argue that the Millian appeal to modes of presentation taken both as semantically irrelevant and external to the singular contents believed, known, etc., as well as the associated pragmatic strategy employed to discard our ground-floor judgements, are insufficient to palliate the manifest implausibility of a number of Millian descriptions of our attitudes, especially descriptions of our second-order attitudes. (shrink)

Desires matter. How are we to understand their intentionality? According to the main dogma, a desire is a disposition to act. In this article, I propose an alternative to this functionalist picture, which is inspired by the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, desire involves a specific manner of representing the world: deontic mode. Desiring a state of affairs, I propose, is representing it as what ought to be or, if one prefers, as what should be. Firstly, I present three (...) principles of the semantics of desires that pertain to their satisfaction conditions, their world-to-mind direction of fit, and the idea that we desire what, we think, is not actual. Secondly, I examine the functionalist view in light of these features. Finally, I argue for the deontic mode conception: desire and ought-to-be fit like hand in glove. Consequently, desire’s intentionality is irreducible to desire’s functional role and calls for a first-person perspective taking modes seriously. (shrink)

Perceptual modalities have been traditionally considered the product of dedicated biological systems producing information for higher cognitive processing. Psychological and neuropsychological evidence is offered which undermines this point of view and an alternative account of modality from the enactive approach to understanding cognition is suggested. Under this view, a perceptual modality is a stable form of perception which is structured not just by the biological sensitivities of the agent, but by their goals and the set of skills or expertise which (...) they are deploying at a given time. Such a view suggests that there is no such thing as an experience that is purely visual, auditory, or otherwise modal and that our attempts to understand consciousness and the mind must be conducted within a framework that provides an account of embodied, goal-directed adaptive coping with the world. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, in order to make (T1) and (T2) compatible within a Fregean approach, we must reject the view that all modes of presentation are senses. (T1) There is a diversity of ways in which Venus may be presented to each subject, and which are associated with the name ‘Venus’. (T2) There is only one Fregean thought expressed by the sentence ‘Venus is a planet’. Modes of presentation are essentially psychological and have causal powers (...) on minds. The mind of a subject is sensitive to differences in modes of presentation, so that if an object is presented to a subject under different modes of presentation and she has no reason to believe that they are modes of presentation of one and the same object, then she may take opposing attitudes involving those different modes of presentation. In contrast, senses are essentially semantic. For this reason, I propose that they be understood as certain ways of determining the reference of terms, and either are given by the semantic rules for those terms or are identical to those semantic rules. I agree with McDowell that an interpretive truth-theory for a language L gives us a theory of sense for L, and that something like (V) ‘Venus’ refers to Venus will give us the axiom which assigns the semantic value for ‘Venus’ within such a theory, and which is necessary in order to derive the interpretive truth-conditions of a sentence like ‘Venus is a planet’. An axiom like ‘Venus’ refers to Hesperus will not do within a theory of sense. Nonetheless, it will do within a theory of reference, a truth-theory which delivers not interpretive truth-conditions, but purely referential truth conditions. The purely referential truth-conditions for an indicative atomic sentence are, I claim, those which are specified by specifying those features in the world (objects, properties, etc.) to which the meaningful parts of the sentence refer, representing them as related in a certain way. For the specification of such truth-conditions, the difference in cognitive value between two sentences will not matter, whereas it will matter for the specification of interpretive truth-conditions. Now, senses are introduced to allow for an explanation of the difference in cognitive value between sentences with the same purely referential truth-conditions. An indication of when two sentences differ in cognitive value is when it is possible for a subject who is rational and understands the language in question to take opposing attitudes to those sentences (or their contents —whatever those contents are); and if there is in fact such a subject who takes opposing attitudes to those sentences, then those sentences differ in their cognitive value. Given this connection between cognitive value and a subject’s attitudes, and given the purpose for which senses are introduced, we must suppose that a subject’s mind must be sensitive to differences in senses, and so, that senses must be psychologically relevant. My proposal, which aims to establish some kind of identity between some modes of presentation under certain conditions and those ways of determination which are senses, is as follows: A psychological mode of presentation M is a way of determination which is a sense relative to a particular expression e in a public language L which aids in expressing propositional attitude P if and only if i the subject who has M and who is sufficiently competent in L knows (or realizes) that M goes with e in L; ii no other proposition e′ in L is more adequate for reporting the subject’s propositional attitude P; iii M is crucial in the subject’s rational failure to make certain identifications; and iv M is an appropriate function to an appropriate reference. Only the mode of presentation associated with ‘Venus’ that satisfies conditions i-iv relative to ‘Venus’ which aids in expressing a propositional attitude like the belief that Venus is a planet, will be the sense of ‘Venus’. I argue that only the mode of presentation of Venus as Venus will do, and that such mode of presentation is implicit in the way of determination shown by (V). Other modes of presentation of Venus as being big or appearing in the sky in the evenings or being the second planet in proximity to the sun will not satisfy conditions i–iv. Thus, although a subject may have all these modes of presentation of Venus and associate them with ‘Venus’ (i.e. (T1)), only the mode of presentation of Venus as Venus will do as the sense of ‘Venus’. Hence, only one thought will be expressed by a sentence like ‘Venus is a planet’ (i.e. (T2)). (shrink)

This paper argues for an account of the relation between thought ascription and the explanation of action according to which de re ascriptions and de dicto ascriptions of thought each form the basis for two different kinds of action explanations, nonrationalizing and rationalizing ones. The claim that de dicto ascriptions explain action is familiar and virtually beyond dispute; the claim that that de re ascriptions are explanatory of action, however, is not at all familiar and indeed has mostly been denied (...) by philosophers. I explain how de re ascriptions enter into non-rationalizing explanations of action and how attention to their distinctive explanatory nature reveals flaws in an alternative “dual-component” view about action explanation. (shrink)

This paper argues that perception is a mode of engagement with individuals and their determinate properties. Perceptual content involves determinate properties in a way that relies on our conceptual capacities no less than on the properties. The “richness” of perceptual experience is explained as a distinctive individual and property involving content. This position is developed in three steps: (i) novel phenomenological description of lived experience; (ii) detailed reconstruction of Gareth Evans’ proposal that we are capable of genuinely singular thought (...) that involves individuals under modes of presentation; (iii) re-consideration of the re-identification condition on conceptual contents. (shrink)

I Alderdommen (1970) fremsetter Simone de Beauvoir en filosofisk analyse av alderdom og eldre menneskers situa- sjon, og hevder at behandlingen de får er «skandaløs»; samfunnet «returnerer dem som en vare det ikke lenger er bruk for». Hun tilkjennegir et like stort engasjement mot den urett som eldre utsettes for som hun gjør i Det annet kjønn (1949) når det gjelder undertrykkelsen av kvinner. Likevel påstår Beauvoir at alderdommen først og fremst er et problem for mannen, og det har blitt (...) hevdet at Alderdommen er et verk om aldersdiskriminering hvor mannens aldringsprosess gjøres til norm – ikke et feministisk verk på linje med Det annet kjønn. I denne artikkelen argumen- terer Tove Pettersen for at det nettopp er den feministiske filosofien Beauvoir utvikler i Det annet kjønn som ligger til grunn for hennes undersøkelser av undertrykkelse og diskriminering av eldre. I tillegg demonstrerer Beauvoirs omfattende analyse av alderdommen at hverken alder eller kjønn kan studeres uavhengig av hverandre. Alder og kjønn virker sammen, og må ses i lys av den situasjon disse fenomenene fremtrer i hvor også klasse er av stor betydning. Alderdommen kan derfor leses som et verk hvor Beauvoir viser hvordan ulike former for undertrykkelse virker sammen og bidrar til marginalisering og diskriminering av eldre. Nøkkelord: Simone de Beauvoir, Alderdommen, Det annet kjønn, feministisk filosofi, Den andre, aldersdiskriminering, alderisme******* -/- In The Coming of Age (1970), Simone de Beauvoir presents a philosophical analysis of old age and the elderly’s situa- tion, and claims that the treatment they receive is “scandalous”; society ‘returns them as a commodity that is no longer needed.’ She exhibits the same level of commitment regarding the injustice to which the elderly are exposed as she does in The Second Sex (1949) when it comes to the oppression of women. Nevertheless, Beauvoir claims that old age first and foremost is a problem for men, and it has been argued that The Coming of Age is a work on age discrim- ination where the male aging process is made the norm – not a feminist work on par with The Second Sex. In thisarticle, Tove Pettersen argues that it is precisely the feminist philosophy that Beauvoir develops in The Second Sex that enables her to analyze the oppression and discrimination of the elderly. Additionally, Beauvoir's comprehensive analysis of old age demonstrates that neither age nor gender can be studied independently. Age and gender intersect, and must be be seen in light of the situation in which class is of great importance. Thus, The Coming of Age can be read as a work in which Beauvoir shows how different forms of oppression work together and contribute to the mar- ginalization and discrimination of the elderly. Keywords: Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming of Age, The Second Sex, Feminist Philosophy, The Other, Age Discrimination, Ageism. (shrink)

Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, several changes have been forcibly made and observed in various fields and areas of society, one of which include the field of education; the foundation of the formation of intellect and knowledge. After two years of studying indoors and private educational institutions holding virtual classes, the time has finally come for students to be re- adjusted once more to the blended mode of learning; a combination of virtual and in-person classes. Thus, this study aimed (...) to investigate the development of students’ study habits and how these habits could potentially affect the students’ academic achievement or performance. The study utilized a descriptivecorrelational design to examine the impact of study habits to the academic performance of 137 senior high school students. The study made use of the Palsane and Sharma’s Study Habits Inventory, or also known as PSSHI, and using this instrument, the study has been able to procure sufficient results that will answer the present study’s problems. Using linear regression analysis, the present study found that there was a significance between the study habits and academic performance of the senior high school students, thus the study’s null hypothesis was eventually rejected. (shrink)

Symmetry is not an inherent characteristic of mathematical proofs; instead, it is a property that arbitrarily manifests in different modes of presentation. This arbitrariness leads to the conclusion that symmetry cannot be part of the defining or essential properties that characterize proofs. Consequently, contrary to some authors’ claims, symmetry does not significantly contribute to the validity, accuracy, or soundness of mathematical proofs. What is more, it does not even play any critical role in heuristic aspects such as explanatory power. (...) The examples developed in this paper constitute compelling evidence supporting these claims. (shrink)

In a first part I present the results of the philosophy of scientific explanation with an attempt to apply them to the case of the theory of evolution. Then I observe that the requirements of modelization of phenomena with the help of inductive logic do not capture efficiently the pertinent factors and fail just as much to exclude those which end up being neutral as explanatory premises. I then query in the direction of confirmation theory, and show that probabilistic reasoning (...) does not possess the syntactic means of testing evolutionary hypotheses in a way that would rely on a valid mode of inference. In a second part, I try to show how biology has oscillated between two privileged modes of explanation, the first one being through form of which I suggest here that it has never been replaced and that it has known a forgotten vitality in the middle and latter part of the 19th Century, and the second one being through function here evaluated critically alongside that of tinkering. Finally, some limits are seen to hold against the pretence to epistemological exclusivism of those two outlooks on the biological object. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Spinoza and the Theory of Organism HANS JONAS I CARTESIANDUALISMlanded speculation on the nature of life in an impasse: intelligible as, on principles of mechanics, the correlation of structure and function became within the res extensa, that of structure-plus-function with feeling or experience (modes of the res cogitans) was lost in the bifurcation, and thereby the fact of life itself became unintelligible at the same time that the explanation (...) of its bodily performance seemed to be assured. The impasse became manifest in Occasionalism : its tour de force of an extraneous, divine "synchronization" of the outer and the inner world (the latter denied to animals) not only suffered from its extreme artificiality, the common failing of such ad hoc constructions, but even at so high a cost failed to accomplish its theoretical purpose by its own terms. For the animal machine, like any machine, raises beyond the question of the "how" that of the "what for" of its functioning---of the purpose for which it had thus been constructed by its maker.1 Its performance, however devoid of immanent teleology, must serve an end, and that end must be someone's end. This end may (directly) be itself, as indeed Descartes had implied when declaring self-preservation to be the effect of the functioning of the organic automaton. In that case the existence as such of the machine would be its end--either terminally, or in turn to benefit something else. In the former case, the machine would have to be more than a machine, for a mere machine cannot enioy its existence. But since, by the rigorous conception of the res extensa, it cannot be more than a machine, its function and/or existence must serve something other than itself. Automata in Descartes ' time were mainly for entertainment (rather than work). But the raison d'etre of the living kingdom could not well be seen in God's indulging his mechanical abilities or in the amusement of celestial spectators--especially since mere complexity of arrangement does not create new quality and thus add something to the unrelieved sameness of the simple substratum that might enrich the spectrum of being. For quality, beyond the primitive determinations of the extended per se, is the subjective creature of sensation, the confused representation of quantity in a mind; and thus organisms cannot harbor it because as mere machines they lack mentality, and pure spirits cannot because they lack sensuality, or the privilege of confusion and thereby of illusion with its possible enjoyment. And as to their intellectual enjoyment, even that, deprived of the thrill of discovery by the same token, would pale in the contemplation of what to sufficiently large The concept of "machine," adopted for its strict confinementto efficientcause, is still a finalisticconcept,even thoughthe final cause is no longer internal to the entity, as a mode of its own operation,but external to it as antecedent design. [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY intellects is nothing but the ever-repeated exemplification of the same few, elementary (and ultimately trivial) truths. There remained, then, the time-honored--Stoic as well as Christian--idea that plants and animals are for the benefit of Man. Indeed, since the existence of a living world is the necessary condition for the existence of any of its members, the self-justifying nature of at least one such member (= species) would justify the existence of the whole. In Stoicism, Man provided this end by his possession of reason, which makes him the culmination of a terrestrial scale of being that is also self-justifying throughout all its grades (the end as the best of many that are good in degrees) ; in Christianity, by his possession of an immortal soul, which makes him the sole imago Dei in creation (the end as the sole issue at stake) ; and Cartesian dualism radicalized this latter position by making man even the sole possessor of inwardness or "soul" of any kind, thus the only one of whom "end" can meaningfully be predicated as he alone can entertain ends. All other life then, the product of physical necessity, can be considered his means. However, this traditional idea, in its anthropocentric vanity never a... (shrink)

How do we know ourselves? When it comes to our states of mind, it might seem that self-knowledge enjoys a privilege: I know what I'm thinking because I have immediate access to my mind. Inspired by Sartre, two American philosophers, Richard Moran and Charles Larmore, have argued that this idea fails to account for our singular relationship with our own minds. In addition to knowing ourselves through theoretical reflection, we are also capable of practical reflection. We can answer the question (...) of what we think in a practical way: through a decision or a commitment, rather than a self-interpretation. But what is the relationship between these two types of self-reflection? What should we do when they conflict? This book seeks to answer these questions. In so doing, it shows the importance of another path to self-knowledge hitherto left aside by analytic authors: phenomenological reflection on our experience of the world. -/- Comment se connaît-on soi-même ? Concernant nos états d’esprit, il peut sembler que la connaissance de soi jouisse d’un privilège : je sais ce que je pense parce que j’ai un accès immédiat à mon esprit. S’inspirant de Sartre, deux philosophes américains, Richard Moran et Charles Larmore, ont soutenu que cette idée ne rend pas compte de notre rapport singulier à notre propre esprit. En plus de se connaître par une réflexion théorique, on est aussi capable d’une réflexion pratique. On peut répondre de façon pratique à la question de savoir ce qu’on pense : par une décision ou un engagement, plutôt qu’une interprétation de soi. Mais quel est le rapport entre ces deux types de réflexion sur soi ? Que faire lorsqu’elles entrent en conflit ? Ce livre cherche à répondre à ces questions. Ce faisant, il montre l’importance d’une autre voie vers la connaissance de soi jusqu’à présent laissée de côté par les auteurs analytiques : la réflexion phénoménologique sur notre expérience du monde. (shrink)

This essay presents a philosophical and computational theory of the representation of de re, de dicto, nested, and quasi-indexical belief reports expressed in natural language. The propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about these reports. In particular, quasi-indicators (indexical expressions occurring in intentional contexts and representing uses of indicators by another speaker) pose problems for natural-language representation and reasoning systems, because--unlike pure indicators--they cannot be replaced by coreferential NPs without changing the meaning of the (...) embedding sentence. Therefore, the referent of the quasi-indicator must be represented in such a way that no invalid coreferential claims are entailed. The importance of quasi-indicators is discussed, and it is shown that all four of the above categories of belief reports can be handled by a single representational technique using belief spaces containing intensional entities. Inference rules and belief-revision techniques for the system are also examined. (shrink)

This essay presents a point of view for looking at `free will', with the purpose of interpreting where exactly the freedom lies. For, freedom is what we mean by it. It compares the exercise of free will with the making of inferences, which usually is predominantly inductive in nature. The making of inference and the exercise of free will, both draw upon psychological resources that define our ‘selves’. I examine the constitution of the self of an individual, especially the involvement (...) of personal beliefs, personal memories, affects, emotions, and the hugely important psychological value-system, all of which distinguish the self of one individual from that of another. The foundational position that adopted in this essay is that all psychological processes are correlated with corresponding ones involving large scale neural aggregates in the brain, communicating with one another through wavelike modes of excitation and de-excitation. Of central relevance is the value-network around which the affect system is organized, the latter, in turn, being the axis around which is assembled the self, with all its emotional correlates. The self is a complex system. I include a brief outline of what complexity consists of. In reality all systems are complex, for complexity is ubiquitous, and certain parts of nature appear to us to be ‘simple’ only in certain specific contexts. It is in this background that the issue of determinism is viewed in this essay. Instead of looking at determinism as a grand principle entrenched in nature independent of our interpretation of it, I look at our ability to explain and to predict events and phenomena around us, which is made possible by the existence of causal links running in a complex course that set up correlations between diverse parts of nature, in this way putting the stamp of necessity on these events. However, the complexity of systems limits our ability to explain and to predict to within certain horizons defined by contexts. Our ability to explain and predict in matters relating to acts of free will is similarly limited by the operations of the self that remain hidden from our own awareness. The aspects of necessity and determinism appear to us in the form of reason and rationality that explain and predict only within a limited horizon, while the rest depends on the complex operation of self-linked psychological resources, where the latter appear as contingent in the context of the exercise of free will. The hallmark of complex systems is the existence of amplifying factors that operate as destabilizing ones, along with inhibiting or stabilizing factors as well that generally limit the destabilizing influences to local occurrences, while preserving the global integrity of a system. This complex interplay of destabilizing and stabilizing influences lead to the possibility of an enormous number of distinct modes of behavior that appear as emergent phenomena in complex systems. Looking at the particular case of the self of an individual that guide her actions and thoughts, it is the operation of our emotions, built around the psychological value-system, that provide for the amplifying and inhibiting factors mentioned above. The operation of these self-linked factors stamps our actions and thoughts as contingent ones that do not fit with our concepts of reason and rationality. And this is what provides the basis of our idea of free will. Free will is not ‘free’ in virtue of exemption from causal links running through all our self-based processes - ones that remain hidden from our awareness, but is free of what is perceived to be ‘reason and rationality’ based on knowledge and the common pool of beliefs and principles associated with a shared world-view. When we speak of the choice involved in an act of exercise of free will what we actually refer to is the commonly observed fact that various different individuals of a similar disposition respond differently when placed under similar circumstances. In other words, free will is ‘free’ precisely because it is not subject to constraints of a commonly accepted and shared set of principles, beliefs, and values. While it is possible that, in an exercise of free will, the self-linked psychological resources are brought into action when a number of alternatives are presented to the self by the operation of the ingredients of a commonly shared world-view, it seems likely that, that set of alternatives is not of primary relevance in the final response that the mind produces, since the latter is primarily a product of the operation of the self-based psychological resources. What is of greater relevance here is the operation of emotion-driven processes, guided by the psychological value-system based on the activity of the so-called reward-punishment network in the brain. These processes lead the individual to a response that appears to be free from the shackles of determinism precisely because their mechanisms, which are hidden from us, do not conform to commonly accepted and shared rules and principles. In contrast, inductive inference is a process that is based on the ‘cognitive face’ of self, where the self-based psychological resources play a supportive role to the commonly shared world-view of an individual. There is never any freedom from the all-pervading causal links representing correlations among all objects, entities, and events in nature. In the midst of all this, the closest thing to freedom that we can have in our life comes with self-examination and self-improvement. The possibility of self-examination appears in the form of specific conjunctions between our complex self-processes and the ceaseless changes of scenario in our external world. This actually makes the emergent phenomenon of self-examination a matter of chance, but one that keeps on appearing again and again in our life. Once realized, self examination creates possibilities that would not be there in the absence of it, and these possibilities include the enhancement of further self-enrichment and further diversity in the exercise of our free will. (shrink)

In this article, I first show in what way Augustine's 'De doctrina Christiana' actually concerns liberal education, or at least includes it within its scope. Second, I articulate the new 'modus' of education, its new “mode” or “measure,” presented in 'De doctrina'. Third, I exemplify the modification of education by briefly considering Augustine’s treatment of rhetoric in Book IV of 'De doctrina'. Fourth and finally, I conclude with general remarks that attempt to situate the sort of education of which (...) Augustine speaks in 'De doctrina' among some current alternatives with which we are familiar. (shrink)

Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued in the 1960’s and 1970’s that thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts – require special treatment, and advanced different accounts. In this paper I discuss Ernest Sosa’s approach to these matters. I first present his approach to singular or de re thought in general in the first section. In the second, I introduce the data that need to be explained, Perry’s and Lewis’s proposals, and Sosa’s own account, in relation to Perry’s, Lewis’s, (...) and his own views on de re thought. In the third section I present the account I prefer – a “token-reflexive” version of Perry’s original account that Perry himself came to adopt in reaction to Stalnaker’s criticisms. In the final section I take up Recanati’s recent arguments, from a viewpoint on de se thought very similar to Sosa’s, to the effect that such an account is in a good position to explain the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I argue there that that is not the case, and I conclude by suggesting that the token-reflexive account fits better both with the data and with Sosa’s Fregean take on de re thought in general. (shrink)