As a way to make medical decisions, Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) has failed. EBM's failure arises from not being founded on real-world decision-making. EBM aspires to a scientific standard for the best way to treat a disease and determine its cause, but it fails to recognise that the scientific method is inapplicable to medical and other real-world decision-making. EBM also wrongly assumes that evidence can be marshaled and applied according to an hierarchy that is determined in an argument by authority to (...) the method by which it has been obtained. If EBM had valid theoretical, practical or empirical foundations, there would be no hierarchy of evidence. In all real-world decision-making, evidence stands or falls on its inherent reliability. This has to be and can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis applying understanding and wisdom against the background of all available facts—the "factual matrix." EBM's failure is structural and was inevitable from its inception. EBM confuses the inherent reliability and probative value of evidence with the means by which it is obtained. -/- EBM is therefore an ad hoc construct and is not a valid basis for medical decision-making. This is further demonstrated by its exclusion of relevant scientific and probative real-world decision-making evidence and processes. It draws upon a narrow evidence base that is itself inherently unreliable. It fails to take adequate account of the nature of causation, the full range of evidence relevant to its determination, and differing approaches to determining cause and effect in real-world decision-making. EBM also makes a muddled attempt to emulate the scientific method and it does not acknowledge the role of experience, understanding and wisdom in making medical decisions. (shrink)

Medicine, like law, is a pragmatic, probabilistic activity. Both require that decisions be made on the basis of available evidence, within a limited time. In contrast to law, medicine, particularly evidence-based medicine as it is currently practiced, aspires to a scientific standard of proof, one that is more certain than the standards of proof courts apply in civil and criminal proceedings. But medicine, as Dr. William Osler put it, is an "art of probabilities," or at best, a "science of uncertainty." (...) One can better practice medicine by using other evidentiary standards in addition to the "scientific." To employ only the scientific standard of proof is inappropriate, if not impossible; furthermore, as this review will show, its application in medicine is fraught with bias. Evidence is information. It supports or undermines a proposition, whether a hypothesis in science, a diagnosis in medicine, or a fact or point in question in a legal investigation. In medicine, physicians marshal evidence to make decisions on how to best prevent, diagnose, and treat disease, and improve health. In law, courts decide the facts and render justice. Judges and juries assess evidence to establish liability, to settle custody and medical issues, and to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Abstract Most modern knowledge is not science. The physical sciences have successfully validated theories to infer they can be used universally to predict in previously unexperienced circumstances. According to the conventional conception of science such inferences are falsified by a single irregular outcome. And verification is by the scientific method which requires strict regularity of outcome and establishes cause and effect. -/- Medicine, medical research and many “soft” sciences are concerned with individual people in complex heterogeneous populations. These populations (...) cannot be tested to demonstrate strict regularity of outcome in every individual. Neither randomised controlled trials nor observational studies in medicine are science in the conventional conception. Establishing and using medical and other “soft science” theories cannot be scientific. It requires conceptually different means: requiring expert judgement applying all available evidence in the relevant available factual matrix. -/- The practice of medicine is observational. Prediction of outcomes for the individual requires professional expertise applying available medical knowledge and evidence. Expertise in any profession can only be acquired through experience. Prior cases are the fundament of knowledge and expertise in medicine. Case histories, studies and series can provide knowledge of extremely high reliability applicable to establishing reliable general theories and falsifying others. Their collation, study and analysis should be a priority in medicine. Their devaluation as evidence, the failure to apply their lessons, the devaluation of expert professional judgement and the attempt to emulate the scientific method are all historic errors in the theory and practice of modern medicine. (shrink)

Scholarly processes play a pivotal role in discovering, challenging, improving, advancing, synthesizing, codifying, and disseminating knowledge. Since the 17th Century, both the quality and quantity of knowledge that scholarship has produced has increased tremendously, granting academic research a pivotal role in ensuring material and social progress. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is poised to enable a new leap in the creation of scholarly content. New forms of engagement with AI systems, such as collaborations with large language models like GPT-3, offer affordances that (...) will change the nature of both the scholarly process and the artifacts it produces. (shrink)

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

Given W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s extensive agreement about much of the philosophy of language and mind, and the obvious methodological parallels between Quine’s radical translation and Davidson’s radical interpretation, many—including Quine and Davidson—are puzzled by their occasional disagreements. I argue for the importance of attending to these disagreements, not just because doing so deepens our understanding of these influential thinkers, but because they are in fact the shadows thrown from two distinct conceptions of philosophical inquiry: Quine’s “naturalism” and (...) what I call Davidson’s “humanism.” The clash between Quine and Davidson thus provides valuable insight into the history of analytic naturalism and its malcontents. (shrink)

Contemporary natural-language semantics began with the assumption that the meaning of a sentence could be modeled by a single truth condition, or by an entity with a truth-condition. But with the recent explosion of dynamic semantics and pragmatics and of work on non- truth-conditional dimensions of linguistic meaning, we are now in the midst of a shift away from a truth-condition-centric view and toward the idea that a sentence’s meaning must be spelled out in terms of its various roles in (...) conversation. This communicative turn in semantics raises historical questions: Why was truth-conditional semantics dominant in the first place, and why were the phenomena now driving the communicative turn initially ignored or misunderstood by truth-conditional semanticists? I offer a historical answer to both questions. The history of natural-language semantics—springing from the work of Donald Davidson and Richard Montague—began with a methodological toolkit that Frege, Tarski, Carnap, and others had created to better understand artificial languages. For them, the study of linguistic meaning was subservient to other explanatory goals in logic, philosophy, and the foundations of mathematics, and this subservience was reflected in the fact that they idealized away from all aspects of meaning that get in the way of a one-to-one correspondence between sentences and truth-conditions. The truth-conditional beginnings of natural- language semantics are best explained by the fact that, upon turning their attention to the empirical study of natural language, Davidson and Montague adopted the methodological toolkit assembled by Frege, Tarski, and Carnap and, along with it, their idealization away from non-truth-conditional semantic phenomena. But this pivot in explana- tory priorities toward natural language itself rendered the adoption of the truth-conditional idealization inappropriate. Lifting the truth-conditional idealization has forced semanticists to upend the conception of linguistic meaning that was originally embodied in their methodology. (shrink)

Imagine both that (1) S1 is deliberating at t about whether or not to x at t' and that (2) although S1’s x-ing at t' would not itself have good consequences, good consequences would ensue if both S1 x's at t' and S2 y's at t", where S1 may or may not be identical to S2 and where t < t' ≤ t". In this paper, I consider how consequentialists should treat S2 and the possibility that S2 will y at (...) t". At one end of the spectrum, consequentialists would hold that, in deciding whether or not to x at t', S1 should always treat S2 as a force of nature over which she has no control and, thus, treat the possibility that S2 will y at t" as she would the possibility that a hurricane will take a certain path. On this view, S1 is to predict whether or not S2 will y and act accordingly. At the other end of the spectrum, consequentialists would hold that S1 should always treat S2 as someone available for mutual cooperation and, thus, treat the possibility that S2 will y at t" as something to be relied upon. On this view, S1 is to rely on S2’s cooperation and so play her part in the best cooperative scheme involving the two of them. A third and intermediate position would be to hold that whether S1 should treat S2 as a force of nature or as someone available for mutual cooperation depends on whether S1 can see to it that S2 will y at t" by, say, having the right set attitudes. I’ll argue for this third position. As we’ll see, an important implication of this view is that consequentialists should be concerned not just with an agent’s voluntary actions but also with their involuntary acquisitions of various mental attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Indeed, I will argue that consequentialists should hold both that (1) an agent’s most fundamental duty is to have all those attitudes that she has decisive reason to have and only those attitudes that she has sufficient reason to have and that (2) she has a derivative duty to perform an act x if and only if her fulfilling this fundamental duty ensures that she x’s. Thus, I argue (as Donald Regan did before me) that consequentialism should not be exclusively act-orientated – that it should require agents not only to perform certain voluntary actions but also to have certain attitudes. In the process, I develop a new version of consequentialism, which I call attitude-consequentialism. (The latest version of this paper can always be found at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/14740340/Consequentialism%20and%20Coordination%20Problems.pdf) -/- . (shrink)

Monografia ta traktuje o ograniczaniu konfliktów w relacjach między segmentami społecznymi (takimi jak grupy etniczne, wspólnoty religijne), w których członkostwo opiera się na podstawach askryptywnych i kulturowych, a także między nimi a władzą centralną w Nigerii i Indonezji. Państwa te mają burzliwą historię niepodległego bytu, ogromne wieloetniczne i wieloreligijne populacje, duże gospodarki oraz zasoby surowców energetycznych. Jak wskazują liczne raporty, będą wkrótce należeć do najważniejszych w świecie. W Nigerii i Indonezji funkcjonują systemy polityczne oparte na tzw. power-sharing (współrządzeniu), tj. takie, (...) które za pomocą specyficznych formalnych i nieformalnych instytucji (rozumianych jako zespoły reguł) dopuszczają do udziału we władzy elity polityczne wywodzące się z różnych segmentów etnicznych i religijnych. Celem instytucji power-sharing jest budowanie pokoju i stabilności politycznej. Autor badań, których owocem jest ta praca, dokonał identyfikacji, wyjaśnienia i analizy roli oraz genezy najistotniejszych z nich, dowodząc zarazem, że w Nigerii i Indonezji współistnieją instytucje dwóch głównych modeli power-sharing, tj. konsocjonalizmu i centrypetalizmu. W konsekwencji wykazał, że międzysegmentowe współrządzenie w obu państwach ma charakter hybrydowy. Jest to poszerzenie empirycznej teorii power-sharing. Jej klasycy, Arend Lijphart (konsocjonalista) i Donald L. Horowitz (centrypetalista), nie przywiązywali większej wagi do możliwości implementacji instytucji dwóch modeli w ramach tego samego systemu politycznego. Tymczasem w Nigerii i Indonezji łączenie instytucji centrypetalnych i konsocjonalnych przyczyniło się do ograniczenia konfliktów. (shrink)

Burton Dreben taught a generation of scholars the value of closely attending to the recent philosophical past. But the few papers he authored do little to capture his philosophical voice. In this article, I turn instead to an unpublished transcript of Dreben in conversation with his contemporaries. In addition to yielding insights into a transitional period in W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s thought, I argue that this document showcases Dreben in his element, revealing the way that he shaped the (...) views of key analytic philosophers. More broadly, I argue that by writing conversationalists like Dreben into our histories we can capture the collaborative nature of philosophy. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I explore the work of Donald Davidson, reveal an inconsistency in it, and resolve that inconsistency in a way that complements a debate in philosophy of science. In Part One, I explicate Davidson's extensional account of meaning; though not defending Davidson from all objections, I nonetheless present his seemingly disparate views as a coherent whole. In Part Two, I explicate Davidson's views on the dualism between conceptual schemes and empirical content, isolating four seemingly different arguments that (...) Davidson makes against the dualism; I demonstrate that, though the arguments fail, each is ultimately meant to rely on his account of meaning. ;In Part Three, I show that Davidson's extensional account of meaning gives rise to the analytic-synthetic distinction, while simultaneously needing to reject it. I then propose a resolution to Davidson's dilemma. Rather than treating interpretation of meaning as continuous with the holistic enterprise of science, as Quine treats translation, one should treat it as conceptually prior to science, as Kant treats epistemology. Nonetheless I recognize four reasons why Davidson himself would reject doing so. I therefore propose a view called 'transcendental semantics', based on Davidson's, that accepts my resolution. Further, transcendental semantics, like Kant's own transcendental idealism, posits a single conceptual scheme; nonetheless Kant's is concerned with Newtonian physics, transcendental semantics' with interpretation. ;Finally, in Part Four, I show how positing such a scheme allows transcendental semantics to complement a promising neo-Carnapian account of theory confirmation in science proposed by Michael Friedman. Scientists are first and foremost interpreters, a fact that allows transcendental semantics to help Friedman establish the possibility of rational continuity through scientific revolutions. In fact, transcendental semantics, by complementing Friedman's project, reunites two of Carnap's own concerns, philosophy of language and philosophy of science. I conclude that philosophy of language without philosophy of science is empty , while philosophy of science without philosophy of language is blind. (shrink)

According to the philosophical tradition, translation is successful when one has substituted words and sentences from one language with those from another by cross-linguistic synonymy. Moreover, according to the orthodox view, the meaning of expressions and sentences of languages are determined by their basic or systematic role in a language. This makes translating normative and evaluative discourse puzzling for two reasons. First, as languages are syntactically and semantically different because of their peculiar cultural and historical influences, and as values and (...) norms differ across cultures, it is unlikely that languages will have synonymous evaluative and normative expressions. If translation is only successful by cross-linguistic synonymy, it would seem that we will not be able to translate the value theoretic claims of persons from radically different cultures. But it is with such persons that dialogue on evaluative matters is imperative, to resolve ethical and axiological differences that could be the root of conflict. Second, as the orthodox account of meaning renders it linguistically relative, it is unlikely that expressions across languages will be cross-linguistically synonymous. Thus, on the Orthodox account of translation, translation is indeterminate (as W.V.O. Quine has argued) or impossible (as Jacques Derrida has argued). In this dissertation I argue for a novel theory of meaning and translation based on innovations in the translation studies literature and my prior work in cross cultural research, which I call Text-Type Semantics or TTS. TTS explains how translation is successful while affirming radical cultural and linguistic diversity. It treats disciplinary concerns as the neutral criteria to calibrate translation. On the basis of TTS I argue that we need what I call the “Quasi-Indexical” account of thick and thin concepts (or QI) to translate normative and evaluative discourse. I argue that QI and TTS succeed where competing accounts in the moral semantics literature (such as Non-Analytic Naturalism and Expressivism) fail. The argument also shows that the relativization of truth (in philosophy and beyond) to languages and cultures is mistaken. (shrink)

Davidson has famously argued that conceptual relativism, which, for him, is based on the content-scheme dualism, or the “third dogma” of empiricism, is either unintelligible or philosophically uninteresting and has accused Quine of holding onto such a dogma. For Davidson, there can be found no intelligible ground for the claim that there may exist untranslatable languages: all languages, if they are languages, are in principle inter-translatable and uttered sentences, if identifiable as utterances, are interpretable. Davidson has also endorsed the Quinean (...) indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction. The early Quine, as well as the later Quine, believe that the indeterminacy of translation casts serious doubt on the existence of facts of the matter about correct translation between languages. In this paper, I will argue that Quine cannot be the target of Davidson’s argument against conceptual relativism, and that Davidson’s argument is in conflict, among others, with his endorsement of the Quinean indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction. I will show how this conflict results in a radical departure from Quine with respect to the matter of factualism about fine-grained meanings. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Lin Qiuwu, and others advocated a Buddhism that was radical in two respects. Firstly, they adopted a more or less naturalist stance with respect to Buddhist doctrine and related matters, rejecting karma or other supernatural beliefs. And secondly, they held political and economic views that were radically anti-hegemonic, anti-capitalist, and revolutionary. Taking the idea of such a “radical Buddhism” seriously, A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism asks (...) whether it is possible to develop a philosophy that is simultaneously naturalist, anti-capitalist, Buddhist, and consistent. Rather than a study of radical Buddhism, then, this book is an attempt to radicalize it. The foundations of this “radicalized radical Buddhism” are provided by a realist interpretation of Yogācāra, elucidated and elaborated with some help from thinkers in the broader Tiantai/Tendai tradition and American philosophers Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine. A key implication of this foundation is that only this world and only this life are real, from which it follows that if Buddhism aims to alleviate suffering, it has to do so in this world and in this life. Twentieth-century radical Buddhists (as well as some engaged Buddhists) came to a similar conclusion, often expressed in their aim to realize “a Buddha land in this world.” Building on this foundation, but also on Mahāyāna moral philosophy, this book argues for an ethics and social philosophy based on a definition of evil as that what is or should be expected to cause death or suffering. On that ground, capitalism should be rejected indeed, but utopianism must be treated with caution as well, which raises questions about what it means – from a radicalized radical Buddhist perspective – to aim for a Buddha land in this world. (shrink)

This papers assesses the possibility of an empiricism without dogmas. It advances an argument against Quine's conceptions regarding philosophy of language and tries to expand the Davidsonian semantics and epistemic program.

This is a work in Kantian conceptual geography. It explores issues in analytic epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics by appealing to theses drawn from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

Providing the most thorough coverage available in one volume, this comprehensive, broadly based collection offers a wide variety of selections in four major genres, and also includes a section on film. Each of the five sections contains a detailed critical introduction to each form, brief biographies of the authors, and a clear, concise editorial apparatus. Updated and revised throughout, the new Fourth Edition adds essays by Margaret Mead, Russell Baker, Joan Didion, Annie Dillard, and Alice Walker; fiction by Nathaniel Hawthorne, (...) Ursula K. LeGuin, Anton Chekov, James Joyce, Katherine Mansfield, F. Scott Fitzgerald, William Faulkner, Alice Walker, Louise Erdrich, Donald Barthelme, and James McPherson; poems by John Donne, Robert Browning, Walt Whitman, Edwin Arlington Robinson, e.e. cummings, Langston Hughes, W.H. Auden, Philip Levine, and Louise Gluck; and plays by August Wilson, Marsha Norman, Wendy Wasserstein, and Vaclav Havel. The chapter devoted to film examines the relation of film to literature and gives the complete screenplay for Citizen Kane plus close analysis of a scene from the film. With its innovative structure, comprehensive coverage, and insightful and stimulating presentation of all kinds of literature, this is an anthology readers will turn to again and again. (shrink)

The Indeterminacy of Translation and Radical Interpretation The indeterminacy of translation is the thesis that translation, meaning, and reference are all indeterminate: there are always alternative translations of a sentence and a term, and nothing objective in the world can decide which translation is the right one. This is a skeptical conclusion because what it … Continue reading The Indeterminacy of Translation and Radical Interpretation →.

‘Low-Quality Democracy’ - The Validity of the Notion and D.L. Horowitz’s Exemplification: The Case of Indonesia. This article discusses problems relating to terms used to define former authoritarian states, which are already called democratic, although some undemocratic features still characterize them. The latest English language literature on political science relating to this subject uses three terms that seem similar in meaning: ‘illiberal democracy,’ ‘flawed democracy,’ and ‘low-quality democracy.’ They have not been conceptualized so far. This means that there has been (...) no transition from the stage of ideas or views on their content, i.e., pre-theoretical notions to theorized concepts. Consequently, the terms cannot be understood unequivocally. The term ‘low-quality democracy’ has been recently propagated by Donald L. Horowitz, a renowned American political scientist. This researcher uses the term primarily to name the type of political regime that was formed after 1998 in Indonesia – the third largest democratic country in terms of population in the world. Not only does Horowitz use this term, but he also tries to explain its importance using the example of the imperfections that characterize the young Indonesian democracy. The aim of this article is to answer three questions: firstly, what is – according to Horowitz – the content of the term ‘low-quality democracy’ exemplified by the Indonesian democracy?; secondly, what problems of low-quality democracy has Horowitz identified on the example of Indonesia?; and thirdly, should this term be used in political science literature if similar terms such as ‘illiberal democracy’ and ‘flawed democracy’ are also used? Artykuł traktuje o problemach dotyczących pojęć stosowanych do określania byłych państw autorytarnych, które choć zaliczane są już do demokratycznych, to nadal charakteryzują się pewnymi niedemokratycznymi cechami. W najnowszym anglojęzycznym piśmiennictwie politologicznym odnoszącym się do tego zagadnienia rywalizują ze sobą głównie trzy zbliżone znaczeniowo terminy: „demokracja nieliberalna” (illiberal democracy), „demokracja wadliwa” (flawed democracy) i „demokracja o niskiej jakości” (low-quality democracy). Nie doczekały się one dotąd konceptualizacji. Oznacza to, że w żadnym ze wskazanych przypadków nie nastąpiło przejście od stadium wyobrażenia, czy też poglądów na temat ich treści, a zatem od pojęć przed-teoretycznych (ang. notions) na poziom pojęć steoretyzowanych (ang. concepts). W konsekwencji nie mogą być i nie są rozumiane w sposób jednoznaczny. Termin demokracja o niskiej jakości zyskał niedawno propagatora w osobie uznanego amerykańskiego politologa Donalda L. Horowitza. Badacz ten stosuje przedmiotowy termin przede wszystkim w celu nazwania rodzaju reżimu politycznego, który został wykształcony po 1998 r. w Indonezji – trzecim największym pod względem wielkości populacji demokratycznym państwie świata. Horowitz nie tylko jednak używa tego terminu, ale również próbuje wytłumaczyć jego znaczenie na przykładzie niedoskonałości, które charakteryzują młodą demokrację indonezyjską. Artykuł ma na celu wyjaśnienie trzech kwestii: po pierwsze, jaka jest treść terminu demokracja o niskiej jakości, którego egzemplifikacją – w opinii Horowitza – jest demokracja indonezyjska; po drugie, jakie problemy demokracji o niskiej jakości zidentyfikował Horowitz na przykładzie Indonezji; i po trzecie, czy zasadne jest stosowanie tego pojęcia w piśmiennictwie politologicznym w sytuacji, gdy w użyciu pozostają takie zbliżone znaczeniowo terminy jak demokracja nieliberalna i demokracja wadliwa. (shrink)

Blackburn and Searle have argued that Quine‘s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation results in a denial of the sort of first-person authority that we commonly concede we have over our mental and semantical content. For, the indeterminacy thesis implies that there is no determinate meaning to know at all. And, according to Quine, the indeterminacy holds at home too. For Blackburn, Quine must constrain the domain of indeterminacy to the case of translation only. Searle believes that Quine has no (...) other choice but to give up on his behaviorism. Hylton, however, has attempted to defend Quine against these objections, by arguing that Quine‘s naturalistic claim that speaking a language is nothing but possessing certain dispositions to act in specific ways would enable him to accommodate first-person authority. I will argue that the objections from Blackburn and Searle, as well as Hylton‘s solution, are all problematic when seen from within Quine‘s philosophy. I will introduce a sort of Strawsonian-Wittgensteinian conception of first-person authority and offer that it would be more than compatible with Quine‘s naturalistic philosophy. (shrink)

HISTÓRIA DA SOCIOLOGIA: O DESENVOLVIMENTO DA SOCIOLOGIA I -/- A SOCIOLOGIA BRASILEIRA -/- HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY I -/- THE BRAZILIAN SOCIOLOGY -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE. E-mails: [email protected] e [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399. -/- PREMISSA -/- Como na França de Émile Durkheim, os primeiros passos da Sociologia no Brasil, em termos institucionais, ocorreram a partir de iniciativas para a inclusão dessa disciplina no ensino secundário (hoje, ensino médio). A primeira tentativa ocorreu (...) em 1890, logo após a proclamação da República, com a reforma educacional de Benjamin Constant, que defendia o ensino laico em todos os níveis. O ensino secundário tinha por objetivo a formação intelectual dos jovens fora do contexto religioso, então predominante. Mas, sem nunca ter sido de fato incluída nos currículos escolares, a Sociologia foi expurgada pela Reforma Epitácio Pessoa, em 1901. Somente em 1925 a Sociologia retornou ao currículo do ensino secundário por meio da Reforma de Rocha Vaz, que tinha os mesmos objetivos da de Benjamin Constant. Em decorrência dessa reforma, o Colégio Pedro II, na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, implantou a Sociologia regularmente no seu currículo. Em 1928, a disciplina foi introduzida nas escolas de vários estados brasileiros, notadamente em São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Pernambuco. -/- Desde 1925, podem-se destacar alguns intelectuais que contribuíram para o ensino de Sociologia no ensino secundário, lecionando e escrevendo manuais para esse nível: Fernando de Azevedo (1894-1974), Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987), Carneiro Leão (1887-1966) e Delgado de Carvalho (1884-1980), em São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Recife. Eles tinham por objetivo preparar intelectualmente os jovens das elites dirigentes, elevando o conhecimento daqueles que chegavam às escolas médias. Esses autores, em sua maioria, foram influenciados pela Sociologia desenvolvida na Europa e nos Estados Unidos. -/- Em 1931, a reforma de Francisco Campos, no governo de Getúlio Vargas, introduziu a Sociologia nos cursos preparatórios ao ensino superior nas faculdades de Direito, Ciências Médicas, Engenharia e Arquitetura, além de mantê-la nos cursos normais (de formação de professores). -/- No final do Estado Novo, em 1942, o governo de Getúlio Vargas, através de seu ministro da Educação, Gustavo Capanema, implantou a Reforma Capanema, que excluiu a Sociologia do ensino secundário brasileiro. Assim, a Sociologia fez parte do currículo do ensino secundário por 18 anos (1925-1942). Ela, contudo, permaneceu como matéria obrigatória do currículo das Escolas Normais, de nível secundário, destinadas à formação de professores do antigo ensino primário (o que corresponderia aos atuais 2º a 5º anos). -/- 1. A SOCIOLOGIA NO ENSINO SUPERIOR: INÍCIO DO SÉCULO XX -/- Nas primeiras décadas do século XX, a Sociologia no ensino superior estava presente de forma embrionária em vários estados brasileiros (Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo) e principalmente nos cursos de Direito. Desenvolveu-se de forma mais consistente, contudo, nos estados que passavam por um processo de industrialização e urbanização crescente desde o final da década de 1910. -/- Essas transformações da estrutura econômica e social repercutiram nas esferas culturais e educacionais, propiciando um crescente interesse pelos estudos científicos da realidade social da época. -/- Em decorrência disso, foram publicados importantes trabalhos que contribuíram para o desenvolvimento das ciências sociais no Brasil. Uma das preocupações dos pensadores daquele período era a busca do entendimento do Brasil por meio de seus componentes históricos, tendo por base as muitas vertentes europeias e estadunidenses das ciências humanas. -/- Esses pensadores defendiam a ideia de que havia uma ligação entre o passado colonial e a configuração social em que viviam. Para eles, esse condicionamento do passado deveria ser superado para que o país saísse do atraso. As preocupações desses pensadores giravam em torno do futuro do Brasil e das possibilidades de mudança social e das resistências a elas. Entre outros, podem ser citados: Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna (1883 -1951), Caio da Silva Prado Júnior (1907-1990), Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1902-1982), Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987) e Fernando de Azevedo (1894-1974). -/- Pode-se afirmar que foi entre as décadas de 1920 e 1940 que a Sociologia fincou alicerces no Brasil. Nesse período, procuraram-se definir mais claramente as fronteiras entre a Sociologia e as áreas do conhecimento afins, como a Literatura, a História e a Geografia, e institucionalizou-se o curso de Sociologia e/ou Ciências Sociais em faculdades e universidades. Foram fundadas a Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política (ELSP) em São Paulo, em 1933, e as Universidades de São Paulo (USP) e do Distrito Federal (UDF), esta no Rio de Janeiro, respectivamente em 1934 e 1935, nas quais foram instituídos cursos de Ciências Sociais. -/- Vários professores estrangeiros vieram ao Brasil para trabalhar nessas universidades e contribuíram de modo significativo para o desenvolvimento da Sociologia no Brasil. Entre outros, podem ser citados: Donald Pierson (1900-1995), Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955), Claude Lévi -Strauss (1908-2009), Georges Gurvitch (1894-1965), Roger Bastide (1898-1974), Charles Morazé (1913-2003) e Paul-Arbousse Bastide (1901-1985). -/- A revista Sociologia, da Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política, foi um exemplo da produção sociológica da época. Criada em 1939 e publicada até 1981, em São Paulo, constituiu um verdadeiro marco de estudo, pesquisa e divulgação das Ciências Sociais no Brasil. -/- 1.1 De 1940 a 1960: disseminação da Sociologia na universidade -/- A partir do final da Segunda Guerra Mundial até meados da década de 1960, disseminaram-se as Faculdades de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras no Brasil, em universidades ou fora delas, e a Sociologia passou a fazer parte do currículo dos cursos de Ciências Sociais ou a apresentar-se como disciplina obrigatória em outros cursos. -/- Uma nova geração de cientistas sociais passou a ter presença marcante no Brasil. Entre eles, podem ser citados: Florestan Fernandes (1920-1995), Antonio Candido (1918-2017), Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz (1918-2018), Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes (1925-2011), Alberto Guerreiro Ramos (1915-1982), Luiz Aguiar da Costa Pinto (1920-2002) e Hélio Jaguaribe (1923-2018), que influenciaram muitos cientistas sociais em todo o território nacional. -/- Os principais temas de pesquisas, análises e discussões nesse período foram: imigração e colonização, estudos de comunidades, educação, folclore, questão rural e urbana, teoria e método das Ciências Sociais, estratificação e mobilidade sociais e sociologia da arte e da literatura. Cabe um destaque para o tema das relações étnico-raciais envolvendo a questão do negro no Brasil, graças a um projeto de pesquisa financiado pela Unesco. -/- Nesse período, a Sociologia tornou-se disciplina hegemônica no quadro das Ciências Sociais no Brasil, e a primeira a formar uma “escola” ou uma “tradição” em São Paulo, tendo em Florestan Fernandes um dos seus mentores. -/- 1.2 De 1960 a 1980: consolidação da Sociologia no Brasil -/- Mesmo sob a ditadura civil-militar no Brasil, a partir de 1964, a Sociologia começou a se expandir, principalmente nos grandes centros urbanos, e a se relacionar com outros campos das ciências humanas. As discussões sobre o processo de industrialização crescente no país foram o centro das atenções. -/- Um dos temas de discussão era o desenvolvimento, incluindo as teorias da dependência e da modernização. Outros temas de debates e pesquisas da época foram o trabalho industrial e o sindicalismo, a formação da classe trabalhadora, a urbanização crescente e as transformações no campo, os problemas da marginalidade social, a presença do capital estrangeiro e a indústria nacional. A questão educacional também esteve presente, pois de alguma forma os problemas sociais estavam vinculados à precariedade do setor. Foram bastante debatidos, ainda, o autoritarismo, principalmente depois do golpe militar de 1964, e o planejamento, criando-se uma interface com a ciência política. Além disso, destacaram-se, nesse momento, os estudos sobre a América Latina. -/- Em razão desses debates, foram incluídas nas universidades disciplinas como: Sociologia do Desenvolvimento, Sociologia Urbana, Sociologia Rural, Sociologia Industrial e do Trabalho (incluindo a questão sindical), Sociologia do Planejamento, Sociologia da Educação e da Juventude e Sociologia da Arte e Literatura. -/- Muitos foram os estudiosos que, em diferentes áreas do pensamento sociológico, desenvolveram pesquisas nessas décadas. Alguns dos que formaram a segunda geração de sociólogos no Brasil são: Octavio Ianni (1926-2004), Marialice M. Foracchi (1929-1971), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1931-), Leôncio Martins Rodrigues (1934-), Heleieth Saffioti (1934-2010), Maurício Tragtenberg (1929-1998), Francisco de Oliveira (1933-), Luiz Pereira (1933-1985), Luiz Eduardo W. Wanderley (1935-), José de Souza Martins (1938-), Gabriel Cohn (1938-), Roberto Schwarz (1938-), Elide Rugai Bastos, Luiz Werneck Vianna (1938-) e Simon Schwartzman (1939-). -/- 1.3 Diversificação da Sociologia no Brasil -/- A partir da década de 1980, ampliam-se os cursos de graduação e pós-graduação (mestrado e doutorado) em Ciências Sociais e, em particular, de Sociologia em todo o território nacional, elevando o nível, em número e em qualidade, das pesquisas e do ensino da área. Os estudos sociológicos passaram a ser mais específicos, ocorrendo uma fragmentação dos temas/objetos, como: violência, gênero e sexualidade, corpo e saúde, religião, cotidiano, comunicação e informação, indústria cultural, representações sociais, consumo, cidadania, direitos humanos, questão ambiental, globalização, ciência e tecnologia, urbanização, juventude, família, trabalho, classes e mobilidade social, questões étnico-raciais, Estado e sociedade civil. -/- Novas gerações de sociólogos se formam nas universidades em quase todos os estados da federação, e há centros de ensino e pesquisa na maioria das universidades, disseminando-se assim a formação de sociólogos, sob diversas influências teóricas. A formação em Sociologia, que havia se estabelecido a partir de São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro, na década de 1930, expandiu-se para todo o território nacional em pouco mais de 50 anos. -/- 1.4 O retorno da Sociologia ao ensino médio -/- Oficialmente extinta do currículo do ensino médio em 1942, a Sociologia voltou a marcar presença em um ou outro estado da federação, de modo intermitente, a partir da década de 1980, com os primeiros ensaios de democratização da sociedade brasileira, conforme diz o sociólogo brasileiro Amaury C. Moraes, na esteira de mudanças na legislação educacional realizadas pelo governo ditatorial pós-1964. A Lei n° 7.044/82 flexibilizou o ensino médio (então 2º grau) e profissionalizante, abrindo espaço para a presença da Sociologia, não em caráter obrigatório, mas por escolha das escolas. Nesse sentido, ela começou a ter uma presença crescente nos currículos escolares. -/- Aqui cabe citar as Orientações Curriculares para o ensino médio, (p. 104-105). -/- Há uma interpretação corrente que (...) deve ser bem avaliada criticamente; ela afirma que a presença ou a ausência da Sociologia no currículo está vinculada a contextos democráticos ou autoritários, respectivamente. No entanto, se se observar bem, pelo menos em dois períodos isso não se confirma, ou se teria de rever o caráter do ensino de Sociologia para entender sua presença ou ausência. Entre 1931 e 1942, especialmente após 1937, a Sociologia está presente e é obrigatória no currículo em um período que abrange um governo que começa com esperanças democratizantes e logo se tinge de autoritarismo, assumindo sua vocação ditatorial mais adiante. Em outro momento, em plena democracia, o sentido do veto do Presidente da República (2001) à inclusão da Sociologia como disciplina obrigatória traz uma certa dificuldade para essa hipótese. O que se entende é que nem sempre a Sociologia teve um caráter crítico e transformador, funcionando muitas vezes como um discurso conservador, integrador e até cívico – como aparece nos primeiros manuais da disciplina. Não se pode esquecer que a Sociologia chegou ao Brasil de mãos dadas com o positivismo. No caso recente, deve-se entender que a ausência da disciplina se prende mais a tensões ou escaramuças pedagógico-administrativas que propriamente a algum conteúdo ideológico mais explícito (BRASIL/MEC, 2006). -/- Paralelamente, algumas associações de sociólogos, em diferentes estados brasileiros – mas principalmente em São Paulo –, iniciaram um movimento pela volta da Sociologia ao ensino médio, almejando a ampliação de espaço de trabalho para os formandos dos cursos de Ciências Sociais. Apesar de não haver a obrigatoriedade da disciplina, os cursos de Ciências Sociais continuavam a formar professores de Sociologia. Em alguns estados brasileiros, ao longo dos anos, foram abertos concursos para professores de Sociologia. -/- Com a Constituição de 1988 e a consequente formulação das constituições estaduais, sociólogos em todo o país passaram a reivindicar a presença da Sociologia no ensino médio. Assim, leis estaduais de alguns estados e as constituições estaduais do Rio de Janeiro e de Minas Gerais tornaram a Sociologia obrigatória no ensino médio. -/- A partir do ano 2000, organizações representativas de sociólogos (sindicatos e associações de sociólogos e de cientistas sociais) de várias tendências, assim como pequenos grupos nas universidades do país, começaram a desenvolver um movimento em defesa da obrigatoriedade do ensino da Sociologia no nível médio, considerando que os conteúdos dessa disciplina contribuíam para melhor formação do jovem estudante. -/- O movimento estendeu-se ao início do século XXI, conquistando o apoio de instituições de ensino, associações científicas, intelectuais, sindicatos e associações de categorias profissionais. Finalmente, pela Lei n° 11.684, de 2 de junho de 2008, que alterou a Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional, a Sociologia retornou oficial e obrigatoriamente ao currículo do ensino médio brasileiro. -/- A título de conclusão, e ainda refletindo sobre a Sociologia e sua contribuição para a formação dos estudantes, é importante destacar o que as Orientações Curriculares para o ensino médio afirmam com muita clareza: -/- A presença da Sociologia no currículo do ensino médio tem provocado muita discussão. Além dessa justificativa que se tornou slogan ou clichê – “formar o cidadão crítico” –, entende-se que haja outras mais objetivas decorrentes da concretude com que a Sociologia pode contribuir para a formação do jovem brasileiro, quer aproximando esse jovem de uma linguagem especial que a Sociologia oferece, quer sistematizando os debates em torno de temas de importância dados pela tradição ou pela contemporaneidade. A Sociologia, como espaço de realização das Ciências Sociais na escola média, pode oferecer ao aluno, além de informações próprias do campo dessas ciências, resultados das pesquisas as mais diversas, que acabam modificando as concepções de mundo, a economia, a sociedade e o outro, isto é, o diferente – de outra cultura, “tribo”, país etc. Traz também modos de pensar (...) ou a reconstrução e desconstrução de modos de pensar. É possível, observando as teorias sociológicas, compreender os elementos da argumentação – lógicos e empíricos – que justificam um modo de ser de uma sociedade, classe, grupo social e mesmo com unidade. Isso em termos sincrônicos ou diacrônicos, de hoje ou de ontem. -/- Um papel central que o pensamento sociológico realiza é a desnaturalização das concepções ou explicações dos fenômenos sociais. Há uma tendência sempre recorrente a se explicarem as relações sociais, as instituições, os modos de vida, as ações humanas, coletivas ou individuais, a estrutura social, a organização política etc. com argumentos naturalizadores. Primeiro, perde -se de vista a historicidade desses fenômenos, isto é, que nem sempre foram assim; segundo, que certas mudanças ou continuidades históricas decorrem de decisões, e essas, de interesses, ou seja, de razões objetivas e humanas, não sendo fruto de tendências naturais (BRASIL/MEC, 2006). -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- BRASIL. Secretaria de Educação Básica. Orientações curriculares para o ensino médio: ciências humanas e suas tecnologias. Brasília: Ministério da Educação/Secretaria de Educação Básica, 2006. -/- FILHO, E. D. L. A sociologia no Brasil: história, teorias e desafios. Sociologias , Porto Alegre, n. 14, p. 376-437, dezembro de 2005. -/- MARTINS, C. B.; MICELI, S. (Org.). Sociologia brasileira hoje. São Paulo: ateliê editorial, 2017. -/- SILVA, A. Sociologia em movimento. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016. -/- -/- SBS - Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia PUCRS - PPG em Ciências Sociais Avenida Ipiranga, 6681 - Partenon CEP: 90619-900 - Porto Alegre, RS [email protected] -/- Estimule a criatividade, respeite o direito autoral. -/- ©2019 - Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva. (shrink)

The article considers pros and cons for a theoretic-measurement analogy, proposed by some philosophers as an illustration of semantic indeterminacy. Within this analogy ascribing of meanings to a certain linguistic expressions is compared with attribution of numbers according to a certain theory of measurement. Donald Davidson used this analogy in order to extend W.V.O. Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation to the interpretation of all human behavior. In other words, not only linguistic meanings, but all mental states are considered (...) as indeterminate. The article explains the failure of some counter-arguments put forward against Davidson's use of this analogy and against the thesis of indeterminacy on the whole. Particularly, instrumentalist version of the analogy is rejected for there is no direct relation between indeterminacy and underdetermination of theories by empirical evidences. The article concludes that the semantic indeterminacy is largely based on indeterminacy of rationality. (shrink)

This book is a translation of W.V. Quine's Kant Lectures, given as a series at Stanford University in 1980. It provide a short and useful summary of Quine's philosophy. There are four lectures altogether: I. Prolegomena: Mind and its Place in Nature; II. Endolegomena: From Ostension to Quantification; III. Endolegomena loipa: The forked animal; and IV. Epilegomena: What's It all About? The Kant Lectures have been published to date only in Italian and German translation. The present book is filled out (...) with the translator's critical Introduction, "The esoteric Quine?" a bibliography based on Quine's sources, and an Index for the volume. (shrink)

This chapter reviews the work and influence of Donald Davidson across all the areas to which he contributed.

This book is an introduction to and interpretation of the philosophy of language devised by Donald Davidson over the past 25 years. The guiding intuition is that Davidson's work is best understood as an ongoing attempt to purge semantics of theoretical reifications. Seen in this light the recent attack on the notion of language itself emerges as a natural development of his Quinian scepticism towards "meanings" and his rejections of reference-based semantic theories. Linguistic understanding is, for Davidson, essentially dynamic, (...) arising only through a continuous process of theory construction and reconstruction. The result is a conception of semantics in which the notion of interpretation and not the notion of knowing a language is fundamental. In the course of his book Bjorn Ramberg provides a critical discussion of reference-based semantic theories, challenging the standard accounts of the principle of charity and elucidating the notion of radical interpretation. The final chapter on incommensurability ties in with the discussions of Kuhn's work in the philosophy of science and suggests certain links between Davidson's analytic semantics and hermeneutic theory. (shrink)

Catalan translation, introductory study and notes on W. K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”. Published in Clifford, W.K. “L’ètica de la creença”. Quaderns de Filosofia, vol. III, n. 2 (2016), pp. 129–150. // Catalan translation, introductory study and notes on William James’s “The Will to Believe”. Published in James, William. “La voluntat de creure”. Quaderns de Filosofia, vol. III, n. 2 (2016), pp. 151–172. [Introductory study published in Oya, Alberto. “Introducció. El debat entre W. K. Clifford i William James”. Quaderns (...) de Filosofia, vol. III, n. 2 (2016), pp. 123–127]. (shrink)

The article shows that Donald Trump used three distinct but mutually supportive strategies to ascent to power in the 2016 elections. It argues that sovereignty in general uses these three strategies to justify its power. But it is only one of them, the one linked to a biopolitical conception of sovereignty, that allows for lack of authority. Trump used this strategy to great effect in 2016, but the article argues that it will be hard to pursue the same strategy (...) from the Oval Office. (shrink)

Faced with the choice between creating a risk of harm and taking a precaution against that risk, should I take the precaution? Does the proper analysis of this trade-off require a maximizing, utilitarian approach? If not, how does one properly analyze the trade-off? These questions are important, for we often are uncertain about the effects of our actions. Accordingly, we often must consider whether our actions create an unreasonable risk of injury — that is, whether our actions are negligent.

There is more than one way to say that composition is identity. Yi has distinguished the Weak Composition thesis from the Strong Composition thesis and attributed the former to David Lewis while noting that Lewis associates something like the latter with me. Weak Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is closely analogous to identity. Strong Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is identity. Yi is (...) right that Strong Composition does not fully reflect my view. We must recognize further what, borrowing Lewis's characterization, could be called the "stronger, and stranger" Composition thesis, or what I'll call the Stronger Composition thesis for short. On Strong Composition, it is only collectively that the parts are identical with the whole. On Stronger Composition, they are individually identical with it as well. I will explain and motivate this thesis. (shrink)

Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus (Political-Philosophical Treatise) of W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz proposes a new idea-system. Ideas concerning different topics related to politics are introduced. The work aims to establish the principles of good governance and of a happy society, and to open up new directions for the future development of humankind. It is also in part a critique of the epistemology of early Wittgenstein as presented in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that one can speak about politics and ethics with sense, and that (...) political philosophy is still a viable enterprise for us. This explanation is provided in response to the review of Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus by Katarzyna Heremska and a critical note of Pawel Kloczowski that were both published in Argument 6(1), 2016. (shrink)

Confucius gave counsel that is notoriously hard to follow: "What you do not wish for yourself, do not impose on others" (Huang 1997: 15.24). People tend to be concerned with themselves and to be indifferent to most others. We are distinct from others so our self-concern does not include them, or so it seems. Were we to realize this distinctness is merely apparent--that our true self includes others--Confucius's counsel would be easier to follow. Concern for our true self would extend (...) concern beyond the narrow selves we appear to be. The neo-Confucians held just such a view. They espoused an identity with the universe and everything in it, arguing that this identity explains a natural concern for everyone and everything, not just for our narrow selves. However, many things in the universe differ from each other, that is, some have qualities others lack. If they are all one and the same thing then that one thing differs from itself. I will suggest that the objection can be answered with some metaphysical innovation. I will address the objection by sketching a theory--call it the theory of aspects--that explains how numerically identical things can differ qualitatively. (shrink)

How is it possible for David Hume to be both withering skeptic and constructive theorist? I recommend an answer like the Pyrrhonian answer to the question how it is possible to suspend all judgment yet engage in active daily life. Sextus Empiricus distinguishes two kinds of assent: one suspended across the board and one involved with daily living. The first is an act of will based on appreciation of reasons; the second is a causal effect of appearances. Hume makes the (...) same distinction, only he extends the sort of assent involved in daily life to theoretical matters as well. He is a skeptic both in finding no reason to grant the first sort of assent and in being subject to the second. (shrink)

This chapter reviews the major contributions of Donald Davidson to philosophy in the 20th century.

Hume's Treatise arguments concerning space, time, and geometry, especially ones involving his denial of infinite divisibility; have suffered harsh criticism. I show that in the section "Of the ideas of space and time," Hume gives important characterizations of his skeptical approach, in some respects Pyrrhonian, that will be developed in the rest of the Treatise. When that approach is better understood, the force of Hume's arguments can be appreciated, and the influential criticisms of them can be seen to miss the (...) mark. (shrink)

This essay is my short, critical review of Donald Livingston’s anthology, Rethinking the American Union for the Twenty-First Century. The contributors of this anthology all argue for secession as a legal and proper tool for calling the Federal government down in size and power. I critically examine the arguments of the contributors.

This essay constitutes an attempt to probe the very idea of a saying/showing distinction of the kind that Wittgenstein advances in the Tractatus—to say what such a distinction consists in, to say what philosophical work it has to do, and to say how we might be justified in drawing such a distinction. Towards the end of the essay the discussion is related to Wittgenstein’s later work. It is argued that we can profitably see this work in such a way that (...) a saying/showing distinction arises there too. In particular, in the final sub-section of the essay, it is suggested that we can see in Wittgenstein’s later work an inducement to say what we are shown. (shrink)

The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget contends that children below the age of 12 see no necessity for the logical law of non-contradiction. I argue this view is problematic. First of all, Piaget's dialogues with children which are considered supportive of this position are not clearly so. Secondly, Piaget underestimates the necessary nature of following the logical law of non-contradiction in everyday discourse. The mere possibility of saying something significant and informative at all presupposes that the law of non-contradiction is enforced.

The concept of metaphor as primarily a vehicle for conveying ideas, even if unusual ones, seems to me as wrong as the parent idea that a metaphor has a special meaning. I agree with the view that metaphors cannot be paraphrased, but I think this is not because metaphors say something too novel for literal expression but because there is nothing there to paraphrase. Paraphrase, whether possible or not, inappropriate to what is said: we try, in paraphrase, to say it (...) another way. But if I am right, a metaphor doesn't say anything beyond its literal meaning. This is not, of course, to deny that a metaphor has a point, nor that that point can be brought out by using further words.... My disagreement is with the explanation of how metaphor works its wonders. To anticipate: I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise. Donald Davidson is University Professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. He is the author of many important essays, including "Actions, Reasons and Causes," "Causal Relations," and "Truth and Meaning," coauthor of Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach, and coeditor of Words and Objections, Semantics of Natural Language, and The Logic of Grammar. (shrink)

ABSTRACT According to David Lewis, alteration is "qualitative difference between temporal parts of something." It follows that moments, since they are simple and lack temporal parts, cannot alter from future to present to past. Here then is another way to put McTaggart's paradox about change in tense. I will appeal to my theory of Aspects to rebut the thought behind this rendition of McTaggart. On my theory, it is possible that qualitatively differing things be numerically identical. I call these differing, (...) numerically identical things "aspects." I will argue that alteration can be a qualitative difference between temporal aspects of something that lacks temporal parts. So a moment can alter in tense. By rejecting Lewis's assumption my theory can solve this version of McTaggart's paradox. (shrink)

This essay interprets Butler’s distinction between identity in the loose and popular sense and in the strict and philosophical sense. Suppose there are different standards for counting the same things. Then what are two distinct things counting strictly may be one and the same thing counting loosely. Within a given standard identity is one-one. But across standards it is many-one. An alternative interpretation using the parts-whole relation fails, because that relation should be understood as many-one identity. Another alternative making identity (...) relative to sort fails, because whole and parts can be of the same sort. (shrink)

Neo-Humean instrumentalist theories of reasons for acting have been presented with a dilemma: either they are normatively trivial and, hence, inadequate as a normative theory or they covertly commit themselves to a noninstrumentalist normative principle. The claimed result is that no purely instrumentalist theory of reasons for acting can be normatively adequate. This dilemma dissolves when we understand what question neo-Humean instrumentalists are addressing. The dilemma presupposes that neo-Humeans are attempting to address the question of how to act, 'simpliciter'. Instead, (...) they are evaluating actions from the agent's normative perspective. (shrink)

_Groups in Conflict_ addresses the conflict and tensions that exist between impartiality and partiality in political philosophy, ordinary thought, and practice by setting theoretical arguments in the context of contemporary issues such as immigration and public policy. Donald Franklin asserts that two camps of ethicists—those concerned with political philosophy and those concerned with personal morality—have been ignoring the implications of inconsistency in their mutual approaches. Far more than just exposing these irreconcilable differences, Franklin also proposes the modifications necessary to (...) approach the nature of human equality. (shrink)

According to perdurantism, objects persist by being spread out over time, just as composite three-dimensional objects are spread out over space. Just as a composite three-dimensional object is spread out over space by having spatial parts, objects persist, according to perdurantism, by having temporal parts. Perdurantism can be stated more precisely by saying what exactly a temporal part is. In the sequel, Theodore Sider's definition of "instantaneous temporal part" shall be assumed: x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at (...) instant t =df. x exists at, but only at, t; x is part of y at t; and x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t. Much more could be and has been said about how perdurantism should be formulated. Though interesting in their own right, nothing of importance here turns on these matters of formulation. (shrink)

An essay on the compatibility of Jewish and Muslim aspirations for the Land that argues that a vision of peaceful coexistence to provide a spur to the settling of grievances, but that this vision must respect the deeply felt aspirations of both communities, including in particular those underpinned by religious lore. Existing formulations of the aims of each community are blatantly inconsistent; it is time to attempt to characterise the just and religiously authentic goals of each community in ways that (...) are compatible. I argue that there religious and personal dimensions of the conflict that have been displaced by less deep-seated political goals, but which can be addressed more readily. I outline a tiered constitutional settlement that could address legitimate aspirations by avoiding the anathema of partition. (shrink)

Construing the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of my theory of aspects resolves the basic mystery of this "non-relational tie", and gives theoretical unity to the four characteristics of instantiation discerned by Armstrong. Taking aspects as distinct in a way akin to Scotus's formal distinction, I suggest that instantiation is the sharing of an aspect by a universal and a particular--a kind of partial identity. This approach allows me to address Plato's multiple location and One over (...) Many problems, Bradley's problem concerning the instantiation of relations, and the problem of change. (shrink)

I argue that an individual has aspects numerically identical with it and each other that nonetheless qualitatively differ from it and each other. This discernibility of identicals does not violate Leibniz's Law, however, which concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects. They are not in its domain of quantification. To argue that there are aspects I will appeal to the internal conflicts of conscious beings. I do not mean to imply that aspects are confined to such cases, but (...) the best way to start is to recognize them experientially. We can feel the conflicts within ourselves. In doing so we can feel some of our aspects. I will try to enhance our understanding of the concept of aspect by listing and formalizing some principles for its use. After that I will argue that all sorts of individual things have aspects, not just people who are conflicted. (shrink)

Philosophically engaged fiction often employs ideas in ways that reflect the exploitation-exploration dilemma in developmental psychology: by exploiting well articulated theories by enacting their conflicts, or by exploring the uncertainties of puzzling ontologies or moral complexities. We can see this in action in many works, but some novels of ideas seek to defy such categorization, with lessons for readers and writers. This paper analyzes two recent works – The Overstory by Richard Powers (2018) and Elizabeth McKenzie’s The Portable Veblen (2016) (...) – to show how they deal with related concerns and settings through very different approaches. While Powers offers an enactment, its complexity seeks to evade the book becoming a simple polemic. McKenzie’s protagonist explores her muddled identity, philosophy and much else while flirting with the enactment of ideas when she does not comprehend. (shrink)