In the contemporary life sciences more and more researchers emphasize the “limits of reductionism” (e.g. Ahn et al. 2006a, 709; Mazzocchi 2008, 10) or they call for a move “beyond reductionism” (Gallagher/Appenzeller 1999, 79). However, it is far from clear what exactly they argue for and what the envisioned limits of reductionism are. In this paper I claim that the current discussions about reductionism in the life sciences, which focus on methodological and explanatory issues, leave the concepts of a reductive (...) method and a reductive explanation too unspecified. In order to fill this gap and to clarify what the limits of reductionism are I identify three reductive methods that are crucial in the current practice of the life sciences: decomposition, focusing on internal factors, and studying parts in isolation. Furthermore, I argue that reductive explanations in the life sciences exhibit three characteristics: first, they refer only to factors at a lower level than the phenomenon at issue, second, they focus on internal factors and thus ignore or simplify the environment of a system, and, third, they cite only the parts of a system in isolation. (shrink)

We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.

Leuridan (2011) questions whether mechanisms can really replace laws at the heart of our thinking about science. In doing so, he enters a long-standing discussion about the relationship between the mech-anistic structures evident in the theories of contemporary biology and the laws of nature privileged especially in traditional empiricist traditions of the philosophy of science (see e.g. Wimsatt 1974; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bogen 2005; Darden 2006; Glennan 1996; MDC 2000; Schaffner 1993; Tabery 2003; Weber 2005). In our view, Leuridan (...) misconstrues this discussion. His weak positive claim that mechanistic sciences appeal to generalizations is true but uninteresting. His stronger claim, that all causal claims require laws, is unsupported by his arguments. Though we proceed by criticizing Leuridan’s arguments, our greater purpose is to embellish his arguments in order to show how thinking about mechanisms enriches and transforms old philosophical debates about laws in biology and provides new insights into how generalizations afford prediction, explanation and control. (shrink)

Mechanisms are said to consist of two kinds of components, entities and activities. In the first half of this chapter, I examine what entities and activities are, how they relate to well-known ontological categories, such as processes or dispositions, and how entities and activities relate to each other (e.g., can one be reduced to the other or are they mutually dependent?). The second part of this chapter analyzes different criteria for individuating the components of mechanisms and discusses how real the (...) boundaries of mechanisms are. (shrink)

What are the conditions under which one biological object is a part of another biological object? This paper answers this question by developing a general, systematic account of biological parthood. I specify two criteria for biological parthood. Substantial Spatial Inclusionrequires biological parts to be spatially located inside or in the region that the natural boundary of t he biological whole occupies. Compositional Relevance captures the fact that a biological part engages in a biological process that must make a necessary contribution (...) to a condition that is minimally sufficient to one or more of the characteristic behaviors of the biological whole. Instead of emphasizing the diversity of part-whole relations in the biological world, this paper asks what biological part-whole relations have in common and what constrains their existence, in general. After presenting the two criteria for biological parthood I discuss in how far my account can cope with hard cases (e.g., redundant parts) and I reveal the merits and limits of monism. (shrink)

The question of ontological foundation has undergone a noteworthy revival in recent years: metaphysicians today quarrel about how exactly to understand the asymmetrical and hyperintensional relationship of grounding. One of the reasons for this revival is that the old quantificationalist meta-ontology inherited from Quine has been effectively criticised by leading philosophers favourable to a meta-ontology, the aim of which is to come to know “which facts/items ground (constitute the base of) which other facts/items”, thus to examine the relation of ontological (...) dependence between beings (e.g. chemical properties depend on physical properties, the economic situation on the behaviour of individuals etc.), i.e. to explore the hierarchical structure of reality. I shall not discuss here the relationship of grounding in itself, but make some historical-formal remarks on the properties of the ultimate ontological foundational item itself and its aporetic nature. To do so I explore various more or less exotic philosophical ecosystems in the following order: Heidegger (Seyn), Plato (ἕν), Wáng Bi (道, dào). On the way I shall propose a new interpretation both of certain hypotheses in the Parmenides and of the nature of the opposition between Wáng Bì and Guō Xiàng in regard to the logical grammar of the expression “nothing (無, wú)” (transl. J. Dudley). (shrink)

Rule-following is a normative doing and therefore needs to be reconsidered in a metaethical framework. Rule-following will be discussed in the light of cognitivism and non-cognitivism. It will be shown that neither cognitivism nor non-cognitivism are sufficiently good accounts for conceptualizing rule-following, because they are held captive by a quasi-mechanistical picture of rule-following. This idea stems from Stanley Cavell´s and John McDowell´s approach to rule-following. McDowell appeals to the idea that we participate in “shared forms of life” and therefore are (...) able to follow rules correctly. I believe that his quietist view can be amplified by conceptualizing different modes of following a rule. We can also follow a rule e.g. ironically and still grasp the conceptual content of the rule adequately. (shrink)

We take the potentialities that are studied in the biological sciences (e.g., totipotency) to be an important subtype of biological dispositions. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, we want to provide a detailed understanding of what biological dispositions are. We claim that two features are essential for dispositions in biology: the importance of the manifestation process and the diversity of conditions that need to be satisfied for the disposition to be manifest. Second, we demonstrate that the concept of (...) a disposition (or potentiality) is a very useful tool for the analysis of the explanatory practice in the biological sciences. On the one hand it allows an in-depth analysis of the nature and diversity of the conditions under which biological systems display specific behaviors. On the other hand the concept of a disposition may serve a unificatory role in the philosophy of the natural sciences since it captures not only the explanatory practice of biology, but of all natural sciences. Towards the end we will briefly come back to the notion of a potentiality in biology. (shrink)

The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. -/- Wittgenstein’s writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein’s return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these (...) works indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein’s few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. -/- Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The God Experiment – Let there be Light -/- The question “What is real?” can be traced back to the shadows in Plato’s cave. Two thousand years later, Rene Descartes lacked knowledge about arguing against an evil´ deceiver feeding us the illusion of sensation. Descartes’ epistemological concept later led to various theories of what our sensory experiences actually are. The concept of ”illusionism”, proposing that even the very conscious experience we have – our qualia – is an illusion, is not (...) only a red-pill scenario found in the 1999 science fiction movie ”The Matrix” but is also a philosophical concept promoted by modern tinkers, most prominently by Daniel Dennett. He describes his argument against qualia as materialistic and scientific. Reflection upon a possible simulation and our perceived reality was beautifully visualized in “The Matrix”, bringing the old ideas of Descartes to coffee houses around the world. Irish philosopher Bishop Berkeley was the father of what has later been coined as “subjective idealism”, basically stating that “what you perceive is real” (e.g., ”The Matrix” is real because its population perceives it). Berkeley then argued against Isaac Newton’s absolutism of space, time, and motion in 1721, ultimately leading to Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein’s respective views. Several neuroscientists have rejected Dennetts’ perspective on the illusion of consciousness, and idealism is often dismissed as the notion that people want to pick and choose the tenets of reality. Even Einstein ended his life on a philosophical note, pondering the very foundations of reality. With the advent of quantum technologies based on the control of individual fundamental particles, the question of whether our universe is a simulation isn’t just intriguing. Our ever-advancing understanding of fundamental physical processes will likely lead us to build quantum computers utilizing quantum effects for simulating nature quantum-mechanically in all complexity, as famously envisioned by Richard Feynman. Finding an answer to the simulation question will potentially alter our very definition and understanding of life, reshape theories on the evolution and fate of the universe, and impact theology. No direct observations provide evidence in favor or against the simulation hypothesis, and experiments are needed to verify or refute it. In this paper, we outline several constraints on the limits of computability and predictability in/of the universe, which we then use to design experiments allowing for first conclusions as to whether we participate in a simulation chain. We elaborate on how the currently understood laws of physics in both complete and small-scale universe simulations prevent us from making predictions relating to the future states of a universe, as well as how every physically accurate simulation will increase in complexity and exhaust computational resources as global thermodynamic entropy increases. Eventually, in a simulation in which the computer simulating a universe is governed by the same physical laws as the simulation and is smaller than the universe it simulates, the exhaustion of computational resources will halt all simulations down the simulation chain unless an external programmer intervenes or isn’t limited by the simulation’s physical laws, which we may be able to observe. By creating a simulation chain and observing the evolution of simulation behavior throughout the hierarchy taking stock of statistical relevance, as well as comparing various least complex simulations under computability and predictability constraints, we can gain insight into whether our universe is part of a simulation chain. -/- Index Terms—Simulation, simulation hypothesis, quantum computing, universe, life, intelligence. (shrink)

In the 20th century among the greatest philosophers and literates there was an ample, ideal, wide ranging forum on the question of Europe to which, following a run already started by F. Nietzsche, M. Heidegger, E. Husserl, P. Valéry, Ortega y Gasset, Nikolaj Berdjaev, and after the second world war G. Gadamer, J. Habermas, J. Derrida and others offered meaningful contributions. The questions were: What will be of the spirit of Europe? What will be of Europe? Europe: quo vadis? The (...) aim of this paper is to articulate the meaningful stages of this historical forum through some essays of mentioned philosophers and literates. The first essay is the conference "Europa und die deutsche Philosophie”, delivered by Heidegger in Rome 1936 at the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut, the same year of the publication of Husserl’s Krisis. Thereafter, with the purpose of marking a clear discontinuity between the debate of the first half of the century and the second, I comment on Gadamer’s essay “Europa und die oikoumene”, published half a century after the conference of Heidegger, then the Gadamer’s essay "Das Erbe Europas”, 1989, in which Gadamer deduces on the existential condition of Europeans, today. At the end, I analyze Derrida’s pamphlet "L'autre cap suivi de la démocratie ajournie", English version “The Other Heading: Reflection on Today’s Europe”, that opens with the provocative and heretical Derridean gesture: To which concept, to what real individual, to what entity can we confer today the name of Europe? (shrink)

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): A Philosophy of the Exact Sciences -/- Shortened version of the article of the same name in: Tabula Rasa. Jenenser magazine for critical thinking. 6th of November 1994 edition -/- 1. Biography -/- Jakob Friedrich Fries was born on the 23rd of August, 1773 in Barby on the Elbe. Because Fries' father had little time, on account of his journeying, he gave up both his sons, of whom Jakob Friedrich was the elder, to the Herrnhut Teaching (...) Institution in Niesky in 1778. Fries attended the theological seminar in Niesky in autumn 1792, which lasted for three years. There he (secretly) began to study Kant. The reading of Kant's works led Fries, for the first time, to a deep philosophical satisfaction. His enthusiasm for Kant is to be understood against the background that a considerable measure of Kant's philosophy is based on a firm foundation of what happens in an analogous and similar manner in mathematics. -/- During this period he also read Heinrich Jacobi's novels, as well as works of the awakening classic German literature; in particular Friedrich Schiller's works. In 1795, Fries arrived at Leipzig University to study law. During his time in Leipzig he became acquainted with Fichte's philosophy. In autumn of the same year he moved to Jena to hear Fichte at first hand, but was soon disappointed. -/- During his first sojourn in Jenaer (1796), Fries got to know the chemist A. N. Scherer who was very influenced by the work of the chemist A. L. Lavoisier. Fries discovered, at Scherer's suggestion, the law of stoichiometric composition. Because he felt that his work still need some time before completion, he withdrew as a private tutor to Zofingen (in Switzerland). There Fries worked on his main critical work, and studied Newton's "Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica". He remained a lifelong admirer of Newton, whom he praised as a perfectionist of astronomy. Fries saw the final aim of his mathematical natural philosophy in the union of Newton's Principia with Kant's philosophy. -/- With the aim of qualifying as a lecturer, he returned to Jena in 1800. Now Fries was known from his independent writings, such as "Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling" (1st edition in 1803), and "Systems of Philosophy as an Evident Science" (1804). The relationship between G. W. F. Hegel and Fries did not develop favourably. Hegel speaks of "the leader of the superficial army", and at other places he expresses: "he is an extremely narrow-minded bragger". On the other hand, Fries also has an unfavourable take on Hegel. He writes of the "Redundancy of the Hegelistic dialectic" (1828). In his History of Philosophy (1837/40) he writes of Hegel, amongst other things: "Your way of philosophising seems just to give expression to nonsense in the shortest possible way". In this work, Fries appears to argue with Hegel in an objective manner, and expresses a positive attitude to his work. -/- In 1805, Fries was appointed professor for philosophy in Heidelberg. In his time spent in Heidelberg, he married Caroline Erdmann. He also sealed his friendships with W. M. L. de Wette and F. H. Jacobi. Jacobi was amongst the contemporaries who most impressed Fries during this period. In Heidelberg, Fries wrote, amongst other things, his three-volume main work New Critique of Reason (1807). -/- In 1816 Fries returned to Jena. When in 1817 the Wartburg festival took place, Fries was among the guests, and made a small speech. 1819 was the so-called "Great Year" for Fries: His wife Caroline died, and Karl Sand, a member of a student fraternity, and one of Fries' former students stabbed the author August von Kotzebue to death. Fries was punished with a philosophy teaching ban but still received a professorship for physics and mathematics. Only after a period of years, and under restrictions, he was again allowed to read philosophy. From now on, Fries was excluded from political influence. The rest of his life he devoted himself once again to philosophical and natural studies. During this period, he wrote "Mathematical Natural Philosophy" (1822) and the "History of Philosophy" (1837/40). -/- Fries suffered from a stroke on New Year's Day 1843, and a second stroke, on the 10th of August 1843 ended his life. -/- 2. Fries' Work Fries left an extensive body of work. A look at the subject areas he worked on makes us aware of the universality of his thinking. Amongst these subjects are: Psychic anthropology, psychology, pure philosophy, logic, metaphysics, ethics, politics, religious philosophy, aesthetics, natural philosophy, mathematics, physics and medical subjects, to which, e.g., the text "Regarding the optical centre in the eye together with general remarks about the theory of seeing" (1839) bear witness. With popular philosophical writings like the novel "Julius and Evagoras" (1822), or the arabesque "Longing, and a Trip to the Middle of Nowhere" (1820), he tried to make his philosophy accessible to a broader public. Anthropological considerations are shown in the methodical basis of his philosophy, and to this end, he provides the following didactic instruction for the study of his work: "If somebody wishes to study philosophy on the basis of this guide, I would recommend that after studying natural philosophy, a strict study of logic should follow in order to peruse metaphysics and its applied teachings more rapidly, followed by a strict study of criticism, followed once again by a return to an even closer study of metaphysics and its applied teachings." -/- 3. Continuation of Fries' work through the Friesian School -/- Fries' ideas found general acceptance amongst scientists and mathematicians. A large part of the followers of the "Fries School of Thought" had a scientific or mathematical background. Amongst them were biologist Matthias Jakob Schleiden, mathematics and science specialist philosopher Ernst Friedrich Apelt, the zoologist Oscar Schmidt, and the mathematician Oscar Xavier Schlömilch. Between the years 1847 and 1849, the treatises of the "Fries School of Thought", with which the publishers aimed to pursue philosophy according to the model of the natural sciences appeared. In the Kant-Fries philosophy, they saw the realisation of this ideal. The history of the "New Fries School of Thought" began in 1903. It was in this year that the philosopher Leonard Nelson gathered together a small discussion circle in Goettingen. Amongst the founding members of this circle were: A. Rüstow, C. Brinkmann and H. Goesch. In 1904 L. Nelson, A. Rüstow, H. Goesch and the student W. Mecklenburg travelled to Thuringia to find the missing Fries writings. In the same year, G. Hessenberg, K. Kaiser and Nelson published the first pamphlet from their first volume of the "Treatises of the Fries School of Thought, New Edition". -/- The school set out with the aim of searching for the missing Fries' texts, and re-publishing them with a view to re-opening discussion of Fries' brand of philosophy. The members of the circle met regularly for discussions. Additionally, larger conferences took place, mostly during the holidays. Featuring as speakers were: Otto Apelt, Otto Berg, Paul Bernays, G. Fraenkel, K. Grelling, G. Hessenberg, A. Kronfeld, O. Meyerhof, L. Nelson and R. Otto. On the 1st of March 1913, the Jakob-Friedrich-Fries society was founded. Whilst the Fries' school of thought dealt in continuum with the advancement of the Kant-Fries philosophy, the members of the Jakob-Friedrich-Fries society's main task was the dissemination of the Fries' school publications. In May/June, 1914, the organisations took part in their last common conference before the gulf created by the outbreak of the First World War. Several members died during the war. Others returned disabled. The next conference took place in 1919. A second conference followed in 1921. Nevertheless, such intensive work as had been undertaken between 1903 and 1914 was no longer possible. -/- Leonard Nelson died in October 1927. In the 1930's, the 6th and final volume of "Treatises of the Fries School of Thought, New Edition" was published. Franz Oppenheimer, Otto Meyerhof, Minna Specht and Grete Hermann were involved in their publication. -/- 4. About Mathematical Natural Philosophy -/- In 1822, Fries' "Mathematical Natural Philosophy" appeared. Fries rejects the speculative natural philosophy of his time - above all Schelling's natural philosophy. A natural study, founded on speculative philosophy, ceases with its collection, arrangement and order of well-known facts. Only a mathematical natural philosophy can deliver the necessary explanatory reasoning. The basic dictum of his mathematical natural philosophy is: "All natural theories must be definable using purely mathematically determinable reasons of explanation." Fries is of the opinion that science can attain completeness only by the subordination of the empirical facts to the metaphysical categories and mathematical laws. -/- The crux of Fries' natural philosophy is the thought that mathematics must be made fertile for use by the natural sciences. However, pure mathematics displays solely empty abstraction. To be able to apply them to the sensory world, an intermediatory connection is required. Mathematics must be connected to metaphysics. The pure mechanics, consisting of three parts are these: a) A study of geometrical movement, which considers solely the direction of the movement, b) A study of kinematics, which considers velocity in Addition, c) A study of dynamic movement, which also incorporates mass and power, as well as direction and velocity. -/- Of great interest is Fries' natural philosophy in view of its methodology, particularly with regard to the doctrine "leading maxims". Fries calls these "leading maxims" "heuristic", "because they are principal rules for scientific invention". -/- Fries' philosophy found great recognition with Carl Friedrich Gauss, amongst others. Fries asked for Gauss's opinion on his work "An Attempt at a Criticism based on the Principles of the Probability Calculus" (1842). Gauss also provided his opinions on "Mathematical Natural Philosophy" (1822) and on Fries' "History of Philosophy". Gauss acknowledged Fries' philosophy and wrote in a letter to Fries: "I have always had a great predilection for philosophical speculation, and now I am all the more happy to have a reliable teacher in you in the study of the destinies of science, from the most ancient up to the latest times, as I have not always found the desired satisfaction in my own reading of the writings of some of the philosophers. In particular, the writings of several famous (maybe better, so-called famous) philosophers who have appeared since Kant have reminded me of the sieve of a goat-milker, or to use a modern image instead of an old-fashioned one, of Münchhausen's plait, with which he pulled himself from out of the water. These amateurs would not dare make such a confession before their Masters; it would not happen were they were to consider the case upon its merits. I have often regretted not living in your locality, so as to be able to glean much pleasurable entertainment from philosophical verbal discourse." -/- The starting point of the new adoption of Fries was Nelson's article "The critical method and the relation of psychology to philosophy" (1904). Nelson dedicates special attention to Fries' re-interpretation of Kant's deduction concept. Fries awards Kant's criticism the rationale of anthropological idiom, in that he is guided by the idea that one can examine in a psychological way which knowledge we have "a priori", and how this is created, so that we can therefore recognise our own knowledge "a priori" in an empirical way. Fries understands deduction to mean an "awareness residing darkly in us is, and only open to basic metaphysical principles through conscious reflection.". -/- Nelson has pointed to an analogy between Fries' deduction and modern metamathematics. In the same manner, as with the anthropological deduction of the content of the critical investigation into the metaphysical object show, the content of mathematics become, in David Hilbert's view, the object of metamathematics. -/-. (shrink)

Abstract of of the anthology: Digitalisation encompasses all areas of life and is thus also relevant for theology and the Church. This is not just about the possible uses of social media; in this anthology, digitalisation is understood as a phenomenon that shapes society, the Church and theology with the help of various technologies, such as artificial intelligence. In this context, theology and the Church represent places of digitalisation on the one hand, and, at the same time, the discourse on (...) digitalisation can be advanced with the help of theological thinking on the other. This anthology is both theologically ecumenical and is anchored in an international context. The editors' research focus is on ethics. -/- With contributions by: Aaron J. Butler, Heide A. Campbell, Michael Fuchs, Stephen Garner, David J. Gunkel, Florian Höhne, Markus Huppenbauer, Peter G. Kirchschläger, Birte Platow, Raphael Salvi, Thomas Schlag, Peter Seele, Gotlind Ulshöfer, Joachim Wiemeyer and Lukas Zapf. (shrink)

SOCIOLOGIA: TRANSFORMAÇÕES SOCIAIS E POLÍTICAS -/- SOCIOLOGY: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE - [email protected] e [email protected] e WhatsApp:(82)98143-8399 -/- -/- 1. PREMISSA -/- Muitas foram as transformações sociais e políticas vividas em nossa sociedade. Algumas foram violentas e transformaram radicalmente as sociedades. Outras levaram à independência do jugo colonial ou neocolonial. Há também aquelas que brotaram de acordos entre classes dominantes ou que se constituíram movimentos liderados pela burguesia ascendente. -/- (...) Merecem destaque aquelas que eclodiram no século XX, consideradas populares por terem registrado significativa participação do povo nos países onde ocorreram. -/- 2. TRANSFORMAÇÕES LENTAS E GRADUAIS -/- As transformações em algumas sociedades foram lentas e graduais, permeadas por acordos, conciliações, reformas. Em alguns momentos houve até atos violentos, coordenados por quem estava no poder e sempre em acordo com as novas classes dominantes e os grupos mais poderosos dos momentos históricos precedentes. -/- São exemplos desse tipo de mudança social o que aconteceu na Inglaterra, no Japão e na Alemanha. -/- A Revolução Inglesa foi um movimento em que uma parcela dos senhores de terras e comerciantes se insurgiu contra o poder absoluto do rei e de seus associados (principalmente a nobreza e o clero, que nada produziam). Iniciada em 1642, tinha como objetivo limitar e condicionar esse poder a determinadas funções, impedindo o controle do comércio e da indústria e a criação de impostos pelo rei sem autorização do Parlamento. Após prolongado conflito civil, as forças políticas que lutavam contra o absolutismo derrubaram a monarquia, em 1649, e proclamaram a república. Esse movimento tornou possível a eliminação dos últimos laços que prendiam os ingleses a uma sociedade feudal. -/- A monarquia foi restaurada em 1660, mas o rei e os nobres perderam os poderes anteriores. O Parlamento havia adquirido força política e dividia o poder com a monarquia. Era o grande passo para que o mercantilismo se expandisse e, como consequência, o processo de industrialização se desenvolvesse a partir do século seguinte. O fundamental nesse processo foi a implantação de uma série de direitos que hoje são considerados universais. Mas foi um movimento em um único país e alterou substancialmente a situação apenas em uma sociedade. Só posteriormente teve repercussão maior. -/- A Inglaterra pode ser considerada o paradigma das transformações lentas e graduais mesmo tendo passado por algumas revoltas e irrupções políticas, uma vez que conseguiu manter a monarquia e também um sistema político e jurídico estável por muito tempo. -/- Pode-se dizer que a Revolução Inglesa é resultado de um acordo entre as várias classes dominantes existentes. Constituiu-se, assim, uma integração cultural em torno da ideia de nacionalidade. -/- Na Alemanha e no Japão também aconteceram mudanças políticas decorrentes de um pacto social entre as classes dominantes: os grandes proprietários de terras e a burguesia industrial e comercial emergente. Mesmo com as características próprias de cada país, o que houve foram alterações políticas e econômicas necessárias para o desenvolvimento de sociedades industriais modernas. Apesar de mudanças significativas nos processos e nas relações de produção, houve poucas alterações na estrutura do Estado e os detentores do poder político continuaram os mesmos. Assim, os proprietários da terra não perderam sua fonte de poder e continuaram conduzindo de forma compartilhada com a nova burguesia os destinos do Estado nacional. -/- No Japão, o período entre o início do século XVII até a segunda metade do século XIX (1600-1868) foi marcado por um governo autoritário assentado sobre a grande propriedade rural feudal. Esse período ficou conhecido como Era Xogunato Tokugawa, família que tinha apoio dos famosos guerreiros samurais. A chamada Revolução ou Restauração Meiji refere-se ao período de renovações políticas, religiosas e sociais profundas que ocorreram no Japão entre 1868 e 1900. É também chamado de “Renovação”, já que transformou o Império japonês num estado-nação moderno, o que levou o país a entrar na corrida imperialista do século XIX, principalmente na Ásia, tendo como fundamento o domínio econômico e o expansionismo militar. Essa reforma propriamente dita, apesar de ter assistido a revoltas e batalhas, não resultou na abolição das relações de produção no campo nem na derrubada da monarquia absoluta. Nesse contexto é que os antigos samurais e a pequena nobreza, composta de classes instruídas e já comandantes da burocracia estatal e de parte do exército, passam a ser uma força significativa no Estado japonês. Pode-se dizer, portanto, que houve uma “revolução conservadora” ou apenas uma conciliação de interesses e objetivos que visava manter os mesmos grupos e classes no comando das ações do Estado. Somente depois do fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial (1939-1945) é que se iniciou no Japão a reforma agrária, o que alterou profundamente a estrutura de propriedade da terra. -/- Na Alemanha, as mudanças passaram pelo processo de unificação de muitas unidades políticas, territoriais e culturais. A Alemanha de hoje é fruto de vários movimentos militares, políticos e culturais. Entre 1860 e 1871, foram incorporados novos territórios, demonstrando a força dos exércitos da Prússia – antigo Estado que fazia parte da então Alemanha pré-unificação –, concomitante à ideia de um inimigo externo e comum a todos que desejavam a unificação. Como consequência dessas necessidades, perpetrou-se guerra contra a Dinamarca, depois contra a Áustria e, finalmente, contra a França, em 1870, o que concorreu para o aumento do território. -/- Com a vitória na Guerra Franco-Prussiana, em 1870, a Prússia conseguiu unificar a Alemanha. O rei Guilherme I foi coroado kaiser (imperador) da Alemanha e considerado o líder máximo do país. Mas, mesmo quando o Império alemão se constituiu como tal, ainda existiam 22 estruturas políticas e territoriais diferenciadas, como principados, ducados, grão -ducados, grandes reinos (como os da Baviera e da Prússia) e até cidades livres (como Bremen e Hamburgo). -/- Apenas depois de 1870 foram possíveis a unificação nacional e a transformação da Alemanha em um país industrializado e desenvolvido, uma vez que, além das questões militares, houve outras ações urgentes para que a união se efetivasse. Otto von Bismarck – chefe de governo que estava à frente do processo de unificação alemã e uma das figuras mais proeminentes da política europeia do século XIX – desenvolveu um intenso projeto educacional que incluía um programa curricular unificado, no qual a língua alemã era obrigatória. Além disso, passaram a ser produzidas histórias da nação germânica atreladas a uma formação religiosa protestante única, cujo objetivo era unir a língua, a história e a religião e identificá-las com o povo alemão, rejeitando a diversidade e postulando a falsa ideia de uma unidade alemã indissolúvel e harmônica. -/- Assim, o pacto político orquestrado no interior dos Estados nacionais alemão e japonês aprofundou os laços políticos entre os grandes proprietários de terras e a burguesia, excluindo os operários e os camponeses do direito pleno à democracia e à cidadania, bem como ao acesso à terra. A burguesia não tinha poder para fazer a transformação, e os grandes proprietários não tinham como manter as coisas como estavam. Esse processo de modernização conservadora conduziu esses países à formação de uma sociedade industrial modernizada, mas cuja estrutura política se manteve conservadora. -/- 3. REVOLUÇÕES E MOVIMENTOS ANTICOLONIAIS -/- O rompimento com os laços coloniais também configura um conjunto de movimentos em prol de mudanças sociais. Mais do que isso: como resultado de profundas conscientizações políticas por parte de populações historicamente exploradas e segregadas, esses movimentos anticoloniais estabelecem de modo bastante peculiar um novo patamar para o conceito de revolução. -/- 3.1 Revoluções no continente americano pela independência -/- A Revolução Americana, ocorrida em 1776, caracterizou-se como uma luta contra o colonialismo inglês. O movimento teve grande repercussão, principalmente nos países da América Latina, pois provocou o rompimento dos laços coloniais. Teve influência significativa também por pregar a liberdade individual como um dos pilares da sociedade que se formara na América do Norte. -/- O Boston Tea Party foi um protesto de colonos ingleses considerado fundamental para a deflagração da Revolução Americana, o movimento de independência dos Estados Unidos. -/- Na América do Sul, Simón Bolívar foi sumamente decisivo para a conquista da independência da Venezuela, proclamada em 1811, mas só consumada com a tomada de Caracas e outras regiões de importância estratégica que permaneciam até 1821 sob domínio da coroa espanhola. -/- A maioria dos países da América Latina e do Caribe, seguindo o exemplo do que havia acontecido nos Estados Unidos e sob influência da Revolução Francesa, iniciou as lutas pela independência no início do século XIX, cujos desdobramentos se estenderam até 1820, aproximadamente. Foram necessárias muitas batalhas para que a Espanha aceitasse os termos de independência desses países. Após a emancipação, os países se organizaram politicamente na forma de repúblicas, abolindo a escravidão e o trabalho servil. -/- O Brasil, antiga colônia portuguesa, foi o único país que manteve a monarquia e a escravidão. Com o fim dos laços coloniais, os países que obtiveram a liberdade política assumiram uma nova forma de dependência econômica, agora em relação à Inglaterra, posto que o interesse do capitalismo britânico era conseguir manter o fornecimento de matérias-primas e ampliar o consumo de seus produtos manufaturados em território latino-americano. -/- 3.2 Independência das colônias no século XX -/- A segunda fase do processo de descolonização desenvolveu-se no contexto do neocolonialismo, após a Segunda Guerra Mundial e até a última parte do século XX. Os palcos principais foram a África e a Ásia. -/- O continente africano, no final do século XIX, tinha sido loteado pelos países europeus (com exceção de Portugal, que possuía colônias desde o século XVI), que buscavam matérias-primas para o desenvolvimento de suas indústrias e ampliação do mercado consumidor para os seus produtos manufaturados. Assim, a maior parte das estruturas políticas tribais foi sendo gradativamente destruída, bem como as formas de vida e de produção existentes. -/- Após o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial, em 1945, muitos povos africanos se organizaram e passaram a lutar por sua independência, criando, assim, uma série de novos países. -/- A independência, no entanto, não significou autonomia, uma vez que os novos países surgidos após a descolonização enfrentaram problemas para promover o desenvolvimento econômico e social. As heranças deixadas pelos colonizadores, representadas tanto por uma economia sempre dependente do exterior, exportadora de matéria-prima e importadora de gêneros de primeira necessidade quanto pelo baixo nível educacional e técnico da população, impediram os projetos de desenvolvimento e provocaram a continuidade da dependência através do endividamento, mantendo esses países subordinados aos interesses das antigas metrópoles. -/- Na Ásia, alguns países obtiveram sua independência mediante lutas ou acordos com as potências colonizadoras. Aqueles que foram invadidos durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial pelo Japão aproveitaram, depois da derrota nipônica em 1945, para iniciar ou retomar os vários movimentos pela independência. Do mesmo modo, o Vietnã, o Laos e o Camboja se tornaram independentes da França, e a Indonésia, da Holanda. Em alguns casos, houve acordo, como a Malásia e Cingapura, que conseguiram a independência da Inglaterra nos anos de 1957 e 1965, respectivamente. -/- O caso da Índia – emblemático – reúne movimentos por independência e acordos com o país colonizador. A presença dos ingleses na Índia data do século XVII e foi se ampliando com o tempo. A dominação foi facilitada pela inexistência de um governo centralizado e também pela diversidade religiosa e de castas, o que não contribuía para uma visão de unidade nacional. -/- Em 1920, logo após o término da Primeira Guerra Mundial (1914-1918), surgiram movimentos pela independência, os quais, ao final da Segunda Guerra, quando o declínio do poder econômico e militar da Inglaterra ficou evidente, foram muito bem -sucedidos em suas lutas. Assim, a dominação na Índia não pôde ser mantida e em 1947 os ingleses reconheceram a independência indiana, que, em função das rivalidades religiosas, deu origem à União Indiana, com maioria hinduísta, e à Liga Muçulmana, com maioria islâmica, que veio a constituir o Paquistão (Ocidental e Oriental). O Ceilão, de maioria budista, tornava-se também independente, passando a ilha a se denominar Sri-Lanka. Posteriormente, o Paquistão Oriental se tornou o atual Bangladesh. -/- 4. REVOLUÇÕES RADICAIS E POPULARES -/- Muitas foram as revoluções radicais e populares. Aqui será abordada apenas a Revolução Francesa. -/- 4.1 Revolução Francesa -/- A Revolução Francesa eclodiu em 1789 como um movimento contrário ao poder monárquico e aos resquícios do feudalismo na França. Foi exemplo para a luta em várias nações do mundo ocidental contra os regimes absolutistas e pela eliminação da monarquia, uma vez que essas formas e sistemas de governo significavam opressão à maioria da população. -/- Além disso, com a revolução foi alterada profundamente a estrutura da propriedade rural, eliminando entraves para o desenvolvimento de uma nova sociedade. Entretanto, o fato mais importante foi que os revolucionários lutaram em nome das pessoas (apesar de não incluir as mulheres), e não só dos franceses, o que transformou o movimento em paradigma das revoluções posteriores. -/- 5. REVOLUÇÕES POLÍTICAS NO SÉCULO XX -/- No século XX ocorreram várias experiências revolucionárias. Entretanto, foram poucas as que envolveram os mais explorados e, portanto, a maioria da sociedade. Duas delas serão aqui tratadas. -/- 5.1 Revolução Mexicana -/- A Revolução Mexicana começou em 1910 e foi uma resposta dos explorados no campo e nas cidades a uma situação insustentável de desigualdade e de exploração. Havia no México uma grande desigualdade social: 1% da população possuía 97% das terras, o que gerava uma situação de exploração e miséria muito grande. -/- Três grandes grupos, representando classes sociais diferentes, participaram do movimento: o dos camponeses, que eram a maioria (seus líderes mais conhecidos foram Pancho Villa no norte e Emiliano Zapata no sul); o dos trabalhadores urbanos organizados em torno da Casa del Obrero Mundial (COM), de orientação inicialmente anarquista; e o da burguesia urbana e rural, liderada por Francisco Madero. Os camponeses exigiam o fim da concentração e a redistribuição das terras. A burguesia dissidente exigia que fossem definidas regras claras sobre as eleições para que se implantasse uma democracia de tipo liberal. Os trabalhadores urbanos, por sua vez, que não tinham nenhum direito nem liberdade de expressão e reunião, exigiam direitos garantidos pela Constituição. -/- O movimento estendeu-se até 1917, quando foi promulgada uma nova Constituição para o México. Várias reivindicações dos camponeses foram atendidas, mas todas sob o controle do Estado. Grandes propriedades, principalmente as da Igreja, foram expropriadas e repartidas. Possibilitou-se a manutenção das terras comunais na forma de cooperativas, mas a reforma agrária (divisão dos latifúndios) propriamente dita não foi realizada e a restituição das terras usurpadas não se efetivou. Assim, os camponeses pouco tiveram a comemorar. -/- Aos trabalhadores urbanos garantiu-se uma série de novos direitos, como jornada máxima de oito horas e a regulamentação do trabalho das mulheres e de menores, do trabalho noturno, do repouso semanal, das férias e das horas extras. Além disso, foram regulamentados a liberdade de organização sindical e o direito à greve, entre outros direitos. -/- A burguesia industrial, os banqueiros, os grandes comerciantes e proprietários de terras, em nome da “revolução mexicana”, constituíram o Partido Revolucionário Institucional (PRI), que se manteve no poder de 1929 até 2000. -/- 5.2 Revolução Russa -/- Enquanto os mexicanos conquistavam sua Constituição, na Rússia a sociedade fervilhava. A maior parte dos russos, tanto no campo como na cidade, vivia em condições precárias e, desde 1905, lutava pela construção de uma nova ordem social. -/- A Revolução Russa de 1917 começou com a derrubada do czar, em fevereiro, e culminou com a tomada do poder pelos bolcheviques, liderados por Vladimir Ilitch Ulianov, o Lênin, e por Leon Trotsky, em outubro. O movimento teve como base os trabalhadores urbanos e os soldados. -/- Os revolucionários organizavam-se em conselhos populares que expressavam a proposta de uma sociedade que se orientasse pela vontade da maioria. Esses conselhos populares eram chamados de sovietes e constituíram o fato mais inovador da revolução. -/- Após a tomada do poder, com a constituição de uma nova estrutura estatal, os sovietes perderam pouco a pouco sua força. O termo, no entanto, ficou gravado no nome da unidade política e nacional formada em consequência da revolução: República Soviética. -/- A situação na Rússia, que era terrível por causa da Primeira Guerra Mundial, tornou-se ainda pior no período de afirmação da revolução. Mesmo assim, a propriedade privada foi extinta e procurou-se alterar a estrutura estatal e de serviços, como a educação, a saúde, o transporte ferroviário e o sistema bancário. A grande dificuldade foi mudar a estrutura da propriedade rural, que ainda era medieval, e a condição dos camponeses, precária em todos os sentidos. Assim, foi necessário primeiro privatizar a terra para depois torná-la coletiva. Isso foi possível com a concentração do poder pelo Partido Comunista e pelo Estado. -/- Em 1922 foi criada a União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS), formada por 12 repúblicas, todas sob o comando político e militar da República Soviética Russa. Depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial, mais três repúblicas foram incorporadas à URSS. -/- Em 1924, com a morte de Lênin, Josef Stálin assumiu o comando da URSS e aprofundou a concentração do poder no Partido Comunista e no Estado, eliminando a oposição. A partir de então, uma revolução que nascera com o propósito de transformar o sistema anterior e garantir a liberdade para todos gerou uma sociedade que teve parte dos problemas econômicos resolvidos, mas à custa da submissão a um Estado autoritário que oprimiu a maioria da população. -/- A União Soviética desmoronou na década de 1980, tendo seu fim assinalado pela queda do Muro de Berlim, em 1989. Deixou oficialmente de existir em dezembro de 1991. -/- Além da experiência russa, outras revoluções populares de orientação socialista ocorreram no século XX. Podemos citar alguns exemplos: na China, em 1949, a revolução liderada por Mao Tsé-Tung; em Cuba, em 1959, o movimento revolucionário encabeçado por Fidel Castro e Che Guevara; no Vietnã, de 1945 a 1954, o movimento liderado por Ho Chi Minh. -/- 5.3 Um breve balanço -/- Como se pode perceber, uma coisa é o início de uma revolução, com seus propósitos transformadores; outra é a situação pós-revolucionária ou a institucionalização da revolução, em que o momento inicial de tomada do poder e alteração das estruturas políticas, econômicas e sociais precisa ser deixado para trás. É necessário, então, criar novas instituições ou reformular as antigas para que a revolução possa se desenvolver. -/- Com o passar dos anos, a liderança muda, e as situações interna e externa se modificam; aparecem interesses novos e são necessárias novas ações, que podem gerar maior emancipação ou não. -/- Algumas revoluções, como a do México, são populares, mas depois do momento inicial as demandas da maioria do povo são deixadas de lado e, em nome delas, há uma reorganização das classes dominantes para continuar no poder. -/- Os exemplos analisados aqui são de sociedades que alteraram sua estrutura e seu modo de vida, mas avançaram pouco no processo de liberdade e emancipação. Pode-se afirmar, então, que não são parâmetros para futuras mudanças, embora devam ser vistos como repletos de lições da história, da vida e dos rumos sempre otimistas e de esperança num mundo melhor. -/- 6. E O QUE VEM PELA FRENTE? -/- A transformação radical de uma sociedade – revolução – está sempre ligada à superação de um sistema por outro, havendo um movimento popular ou uma classe social oprimida organizada para ir à frente e derrubar o antigo regime. -/- Na sociedade capitalista, segundo Marx, a classe social oprimida é o proletariado. Depois das muitas revoluções que ocorreram no mundo, há a possibilidade de a classe proletária, ou trabalhadora, organizar-se para derrubar o sistema capitalista? Há condições objetivas (crise do sistema, organização, poder, armas) e subjetivas (consciência social, aliança entre os diversos segmentos dos explorados) para que isso ocorra? Não se pode negar a existência de algumas dessas condições, principalmente nos países periféricos do sistema capitalista, mas, com as sociedades submetidas a forte esquema de massificação, torna-se cada dia mais difícil acontecer um movimento revolucionário nos moldes da Revolução Russa. -/- Hoje, em todos os meios de comunicação, ouvimos declarações de que estamos vivendo em uma “nova” sociedade, em uma “era pós-moderna”, em uma “sociedade pós-burguesa”, em uma “sociedade pós-industrial” etc. Com isso, afirma-se que está se estruturando uma nova organização social, completamente diferente da anterior. -/- Ora, na sociedade atual estão sendo levadas ao limite as potencialidades da modernidade estabelecida pela Revolução Industrial dos séculos XVIII e XIX, sem mudanças nas estruturas de poder e na economia; mas há indícios de que uma transformação esteja ocorrendo. Em que direção? As respostas a essa questão são divergentes. -/- É possível perceber que a ideia de uma revolução violenta, com a tomada do poder do Estado para desenvolver uma nova sociedade, está cada dia mais distante da realidade. Parece remota, também, a ideia de uma mudança significativa mediante ações lentas e graduais por parte das instituições políticas, pois estas estão muito amarradas às estruturas de poder existentes. Diante de uma possibilidade de mudança, a força da reação normalmente é muito grande e pode aniquilar qualquer tentativa de resistência. Além disso, devido à crise na democracia representativa, as pessoas já não acreditam que seus representantes possam tomar medidas que alterem profundamente a sociedade. -/- Então não há alternativa? Parece difícil, porque a capacidade de cooptação por parte dos poderes vigentes é muito grande. Mas a consciência da desigualdade e do sofrimento que isso acarreta não é apagada ou silenciada e se expressa em manifestações populares e revoltas pontuais em várias partes do mundo. -/- 6.1 Mobilizações e mudanças no século XXI -/- Para pensar um pouco mais sobre as possibilidades de mudança social, é urgente atentar para o que está acontecendo no mundo. Se é verdade que a simples ideia de mudanças lentas e constantes, em termos políticos, não avança para uma grande transformação da vida em sociedade, é também verdadeiro que os sintomas da inquietude que se alastram pelo mundo contemporâneo permitem observar a gestação de novas realidades no curso do processo histórico. -/- O filósofo italiano Antônio Negri (1933-) e o filósofo estadunidense Michael Hardt (1960-) destacaram ao menos três características que podem multiplicar os sintomas da inquietude social: -/- • o nascimento de um grupo composto de novos e jovens sujeitos políticos, conectados com o mundo e inconformados com os limites e a mediocridade de sua vida cotidiana nas periferias das metrópoles, que já não aceitam a condição de subordinação e, para abandoná-la, estão dispostos a sacudir o status quo; -/- • o cultivo de um projeto emancipador por esses jovens sujeitos políticos: eles querem organizar a produção e a distribuição de riquezas horizontalmente e em rede – sem os limites das hierarquias e da mercantilização atuais; -/- • a prática de uma nova democracia, ainda em construção, numa época em que a representação tradicional está se tornando cada vez mais obsoleta e desprestigiada. -/- Exemplos de inquietude social foram as Jornadas de Junho de 2013, quando as ruas do Brasil foram tomadas por insubmissas e plurais personagens. O mesmo aconteceu durante a ocupação, pelos estudantes, das escolas públicas paulistas, em 2015 e 2016, contrários às políticas do governo estadual. -/- Conforme o sociólogo espanhol Manuel Castells (1942-), em termos tecnológicos, econômicos e culturais já há um longo caminho percorrido e muitas transformações efetivadas. De acordo com ele, o período atual é um tempo de eclosão de uma nova era em termos políticos e institucionais. -/- É crucial que se estabeleça um alerta para as possíveis reações contrárias às mudanças sociais e políticas, posto que as forças conservadoras são robustas e poderosas e não desejam mudanças que possam ameaçar seus privilégios. É do confronto entre as correntes progressistas e conservadoras, no entanto, que poderá emergir uma nova era que seja constituída de saltos qualitativos na vida coletiva ou, então, que faça prevalecer o ritmo obscuro e perigoso do retrocesso histórico, rumo a um tempo que não garanta a existência de direitos, em que gritos não são ouvidos e em que as utopias não se alimentam. -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- ALMOND, M.; BATISTA, G. O livro de ouro das revoluções. 2ª ed. Nova Iorque: Harper Collins, 2018. -/- ARRUDA, J. J. de A. A Revolução Inglesa. Vol. 82. 1ª ed. São Paulo: brasiliense, 1984. Col. Tudo é História. -/- COTRIM, G. História global. Vol. Único. 11ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2016. -/- FUKASAWA, M.; ISI, M.; IRIMAJIRI, Y. Cultura japonesa 7: a era Meiji. Vol. 7. 1ª ed. São Paulo: Nikkey Shimbun, 2018. -/- SILVA, A. et al. Sociologia em movimento. Vol. Único. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016. -/- VÁRIOS AUTORES. O livro da Sociologia. Trad. Rafael Longo. 1ª ed. São Paulo: Globo, 2015. -/- -/- Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva © 2019 -/- Estimule a criatividade, respeite o direito autoral. -/- EICdaS, Belo Jardim, Pernambuco, 2019. (shrink)

The current global COVID-19 pandemic has led to a deep and multidimensional crisis across all sectors of society. As countries contemplate their mobility and social-distancing policy restrictions, we have a unique opportunity to re-imagine the deliberative frameworks and value priorities in our food systems. Pre-pandemic food systems at global, national, regional and local scales already needed revision to chart a common vision for sustainable and ethical food futures. Re-orientation is also needed by the relevant sciences, traditionally siloed in their disciplines (...) and without adequate attention paid to how the food system problem is variously framed by diverse stakeholders according to their values. From the transdisciplinary perspective of food ethics, we argue that a post-pandemic scheme focused on bottom-up, regional, cross-sectoral and non-partisan deliberation may provide the re-orientation and benchmarks needed for not only more sustainable, but also more ethical food futures. (shrink)

Individuals of many animal species are said to have a personality. It has been shown that some individuals are bolder than other individuals of the same species, or more sociable or more aggressive. In this paper, we analyse what it means to say that an animal has a personality. We clarify what an animal personality is, that is, its ontology, and how different personality concepts relate to each other, and we examine how personality traits are identified in biological practice. Our (...) analysis shows that biologists often study specific personality traits, such as boldness, sociability or aggressiveness, rather than personalities in general. We claim that personality traits are best understood as dispositions and that they are operationally defined in terms of certain sets of behaviours, which are studied in specific experimental set-ups. Furthermore, we develop an integrative philosophical account that specifies and formalises three criteria for identifying personality traits, which are used in biological practice. For an individual animal to have a personality trait it must, first, behave differently than others. Second, these behavioural differences must be stable over a certain time, and third, they must be consistent in different contexts. (shrink)

The central aim of this article is to specify the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena. After identifying three criteria of adequacy that any plausible approach to constitutive mechanistic phenomena must satisfy, we present four different suggestions, found in the mechanistic literature, of what mechanistic phenomena might be. We argue that none of these suggestions meets the criteria of adequacy. According to our analysis, constitutive mechanistic phenomena are best understood as what we will call ‘object-involving occurrents’. Furthermore, on the basis (...) of this notion, we will clarify what distinguishes constitutive mechanistic explanations from etiological ones. 1 Introduction 2 Criteria of Adequacy 2.1 Descriptive adequacy 2.2 Constitutive–etiological distinction 2.3 Constitution 3 The Ontological Nature of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena 3.1 Phenomena as input–output relations 3.2 Phenomena as end states 3.3 Phenomena as dispositions 3.4 Phenomena as behaviours 4 Phenomena as Object-Involving Occurrents 4.1 What object-involving occurrents are and why we need them 4.2 The object in the phenomenon 4.3 The adequacy of option 5 Conclusion. (shrink)

This paper provides a comprehensive review of the experimental philosophy of action, focusing on the various different accounts of the Knobe Effect.

In the past decade, experimental philosophy---the attempt at making progress on philosophical problems using empirical methods---has thrived in a wide range of domains. However, only in recent years has aesthetics succeeded in drawing the attention of experimental philosophers. The present paper constitutes the first survey of these works and of the nascent field of 'experimental philosophy of aesthetics'. We present both recent experimental works by philosophers on topics such as the ontology of aesthetics, aesthetic epistemology, aesthetic concepts, and imagination, as (...) well as research from other disciplines that not only are relevant to philosophy of aesthetics but also open new avenues of research for experimental philosophy of aesthetics. Overall, we conclude that the birth of an experimental philosophy of aesthetics is good news not only for aesthetics but also for experimental philosophy itself, as it contributes to broaden the scope of experimental philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that, barring a few important exceptions, the phenomenon we refer to using the expression “being moved” is a distinct type of emotion. In this paper’s first section, we motivate this hypothesis by reflecting on our linguistic use of this expression. In section two, pursuing a methodology that is both conceptual and empirical, we try to show that the phenomenon satisfies the five most commonly used criteria in philosophy and psychology for thinking that some affective episode (...) is a distinct emotion. Indeed, being moved, we claim, is the experience of a positive core value (particular object) perceived by the moved subject as standing out (formal object) in the circumstances triggering the emotion. Drawing on numerous examples, we describe the distinctively rich phenomenology characteristic of the experience as well as the far-reaching action-tendencies and functions associated with it. Having thus shown that the candidate emotion seem to satisfy the five criteria, we go on, in section three, to compare it with sadness and joy, arguing that it should not be confused with either. Finally, in section four, we illustrate the explanatory power of our account of “being moved” by showing how it can shed light on, and maybe even justify, the widespread distrust we feel towards the exhibition of ‘sentimentality’. On the whole and if we are right, we have uncovered an emotion which, though never or rarely talked about, is of great interest and no small importance. (shrink)

In this chapter, I present a comprehensive review of the literature on experimental philosophy of aesthetics.

We challenge an argument that aims to support Aesthetic Realism by claiming, first, that common sense is realist about aesthetic judgments because it considers that aesthetic judgments can be right or wrong, and, second, that becauseAesthetic Realism comes from and accounts for “folk aesthetics,” it is the best aesthetic theory available.We empirically evaluate this argument by probing whether ordinary people with no training whatsoever in the subtle debates of aesthetic philosophy consider their aesthetic judgments as right or wrong. Having shown (...) that the results do not support the main premise of the argument, we discuss the consequences for Aesthetic Realism and address possible objections to our study. (shrink)

If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to try (...) to dismiss it using data and theories coming from psychology. In opposition to this trend, the present paper argues that the paradox of fiction cannot be dissolved in the ways recommended by the recent literature. We start by showing how contemporary attempts at dissolving the paradox assume that it emerges from theoretical commitments regarding the nature of emotions. Next, we argue that the paradox of fiction rather emerges from everyday observations, the validity of which is independent from any such commitment. This is why we then go on to claim that a mere appeal to psychology in order to discredit these theoretical commitments cannot dissolve the paradox. We bring our discussion to a close on a more positive note, by exploring how the paradox could in fact be solved by an adequate theory of the emotions. (shrink)

This paper examines various ways in which philosophy of science can be interdisciplinary. It aims to provide a map of relations between philosophy and sciences, some of which are interdisciplinary. Such a map should also inform discussions concerning the question “How much philosophy is there in the philosophy of science?” In Sect. 1, we distinguish between synoptic and collaborative interdisciplinarity. With respect to the latter, we furthermore distinguish between two kinds of reflective forms of collaborative interdisciplinarity. We also briefly explicate (...) how complexity triggers interdisciplinarity. In Sect. 2, we apply the distinctions of Sect. 1 to philosophy of science and analyze in which sense different styles of philosophy of science are interdisciplinary. The styles that we discuss are a synoptic-general, a reflective-general, a reflective-particular, a particular-embedded and a descriptive or normative style. (shrink)

Manipulation arguments that start from the intuition that manipulated agents are neither free nor morally responsible then conclude to that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. The Zygote argument is a special case of Manipulation argument in which the manipulation intervenes at the very conception of the agent. In this paper, I argue that the Zygote argument fails because (i) very few people share the basic intuitions the argument rests on, and (ii) even those who share this (...) intuition do so for reasons that are unrelated to determinism. Rather, I argue that intuitions about the Zygote argument (and Manipulation arguments in general) are driven by people's intuitions about the deep self, as shown by the fact that intuitions about manipulated agents depend on the moral value of the agent's behavior. (shrink)

Why is it that most fictions present one and only one ending, rather than multiple ones? Fictions presenting multiple endings are possible, because a few exist; but they are very rare, and this calls for an explanation. We argue that such an explanation is likely to shed light on our engagement with fictions, for fictions having one and only one ending seem to be ubiquitous. After dismissing the most obvious explanations for this phenomenon, we compare the scarcity of multiple endings (...) in traditional kinds of fiction to their profusion in the case of interactive fictions. This contrast poses a challenge to accounts of our engagement with fictions in terms of games of make-believe. We conclude that solving this puzzle is likely to improve our philosophical understanding of fictions. (shrink)

This paper examines the adequacy of causal graph theory as a tool for modeling biological phenomena and formalizing biological explanations. I point out that the causal graph approach reaches it limits when it comes to modeling biological phenomena that involve complex spatial and structural relations. Using a case study from molecular biology, DNA-binding and -recognition of proteins, I argue that causal graph models fail to adequately represent and explain causal phenomena in this field. The inadequacy of these models is due (...) to their failure to include relevant spatial and structural information in a way that does not render the model non-explanatory, unmanageable, or inconsistent with basic assumptions of causal graph theory. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it is finally time to move beyond the Nagelian framework and to break new ground in thinking about epistemic reduction in biology. I will do so, not by simply repeating all the old objections that have been raised against Ernest Nagel’s classical model of theory reduction. Rather, I grant that a proponent of Nagel’s approach can handle several of these problems but that, nevertheless, Nagel’s general way of thinking about epistemic reduction in terms of (...) theories and their logical relations is entirely inadequate with respect to what is going on in actual biological research practice. (shrink)

This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits (...) of logical inferentialism, chiefly with regards to the epistemology of logic, and consider a number of objections. §3 introduces and critically examines the most influential and most fully developed form of global inferentialism: Robert Brandom’s inferentialism about linguistic and conceptual content in general. Finally, in §4 we consider a number of general objections to IRS and consider possible responses on the inferentialist’s behalf. (shrink)

Studying the folk concept of intentional action, Knobe (2003a) discovered a puzzling asymmetry: most people consider some bad side effects as intentional while they consider some good side effects as unintentional. In this study, we extend these findings with new experiments. The first experiment shows that the very same effect can be found in ascriptions of intentionality in the case of means for action. The second and third experiments show that means are nevertheless generally judged more intentional than side effects, (...) and that people do take into account the structure of the action when ascribing intentionality. We then discuss a number of hypotheses that can account for these data, using reactions times from our first experiment. (shrink)

Epistemic utility theory is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the risk (...) of error. A strong intuitive case can be made for a kind of epistemic conservatism – that we should disvalue error more than we value true belief. I argue that none of the ways in which advocates of veritist EUT have sought to motivate conservatism can be squared with their methodological commitments. Short of any such justification, they must therefore either abandon their most central methodological principle or else adopt a permissive line with respect to epistemic risk. (shrink)

The debate over whether free will and determinism are compatible is controversial, and produces wide scholarly discussion. This paper argues that recent studies in experimental philosophy suggest that people are in fact “natural compatibilists”. To support this claim, it surveys the experimental literature bearing directly or indirectly upon this issue, before pointing to three possible limitations of this claim. However, notwithstanding these limitations, the investigation concludes that the existing empirical evidence seems to support the view that most people have compatibilist (...) intuitions. (shrink)

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. (...) Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative. (shrink)

Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we (...) investigated intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘performance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best fit our data. (shrink)

‘Frankfurt-style cases’ (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy (J Philos 105:223–239, 2008) has recently argued that FSCs fail because we are not entitled to suppose that the agent is morally responsible, given that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener is enough to make an agent lose responsibility-grounding abilities. Here, I distinguish two (...) kinds of Frankfurt counter-arguments against the PAP: the direct and the indirect counter-arguments. I then argue that Levy’s argument, if valid, can shed doubt on the indirect argument but leaves the direct argument untouched. I conclude that FSCs can still do their job, even if we grant that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener can modify an agent’s abilities. (shrink)

Le modèle unificationniste de l’explication métaphysique, basé sur les travaux de Kitcher sur l’explication scientifique, offre une alternative intéressante aux modèles présumant la conception supportive de l’explication métaphysique [backing model]. Par contre, le caractère adéquat de ce modèle, i.e. sa capacité à classifier comme métaphysiquement explicative/non-explicative des propositions qui préthéoriquement sont classés comme tel, n’a pas encore été exploré. Pour ce faire, des interprétations pour les relations de détermination et d’appartenance à un ensemble sont fournies. Celles-ci étant potentiellement sujette au (...) problème d’artificialité, i.e. présence d’un biais structurel favorisant l’attribution du caractère explicatif, une réponse est offerte. En effet, le modèle unificationniste permet d’identifier les patrons argumentatifs pouvant être légitimement mis en compétition en comparant la distance entre les ensembles de faits qui doivent être considérés comme vrais dans la formulation d’un patron argumentatif. Cette propriété a des conséquences intéressantes dans l’identification du niveau adéquat de débat entre des propositions compétitrices. (shrink)

Sripada has recently advanced a new account for asymmetries that have been uncovered in folk judgments of intentionality: the ?Deep Self model,? according to which an action is more likely to be judged as intentional if it matches the agent's central and stable attitudes and values (i.e., the agent's Deep Self). In this paper, we present new experiments that challenge this model in two ways: first, we show that the Deep Self model makes predictions that are falsified, then we present (...) cases that it cannot account for. Finally, we discuss how the Deep Self model could be modified to accommodate these new data. (shrink)

Metaphysicians who are aware of modern physics usually follow Putnam (1967) in arguing that Special Theory of Relativity is incompatible with the view that what exists is only what exists now or presently. Partisans of presentism (the motto ‘only present things exist’) had very difficult times since, and no presentist theory of time seems to have been able to satisfactorily counter the objection raised from Special Relativity. One of the strategies offered to the presentist consists in relativizing existence to inertial (...) frames. This unfashionable strategy has been accused of counterfeiting, since the meaning of the concept of existence would be incompatible with its relativization. Therefore, existence could only be relativistically invariant. In this paper, I shall examine whether such an accusation hits its target, and I will do this by examining whether the different criteria of existence that have been suggested by the Philosophical Tradition from Plato onwards imply that existence cannot be relativized. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide some acquaintance with the exegetical history of ἐξαίφνης inside the Platonic Tradition, from Plato to Marsilio Ficino, by way of Middle Platonism and Greek Neoplatonism. (Since this is only a draft, several modifications should be made later, notably in order to improve the English.) Some part has been presented in Los Angeles: “Damascius’ Theodicy: Psychic Input of Disorder and Evil into the World”, 16th Annual ISNS (International Society for Neoplatonic Studies) Conference, Loyola (...) Marymount University, 14th June 2018. (shrink)

Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgements about intentional action, Knobe [. “Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] has claimed that these judgements are shaped by our moral judgements and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action – the “frame-of-mind condition”, according to which judgements about intentional action are about the agent’s frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition Hindriks [. “Intentional (...) Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 630–641;. “Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives.” Mind & Language 29: 51–72] has proposed an alternate account of the Knobe Effect. According to his “Normative Reason account of Intentional Action”, a side-effect counts as intentional only when the agent thought it constituted a normative reason not to act but did not care. In... (shrink)

Biological individuality is a notoriously thorny topic for biologists and philosophers of biology. In this paper we argue that biological individuality presents multiple, interconnected questions for biologists and philosophers that together form a problem agenda. Using a case study of an interdisciplinary research group in ecology, behavioral and evolutionary biology, we claim that a debate on biological individuality that seeks to account for diverse practices in the biological sciences should be broadened to include and give prominence to questions about uniqueness (...) and temporality. We show that broadening the problem agenda of biological individuality draws attention to underrecognized philosophical issues and discussions and thereby organizes and enriches the existing debate. (shrink)

In this chapter, I survey the experimental philosophy literature on folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. I argue that the hypothesis that folk are natural compatibilists is a better fit and explanation of existing data than the hypothesis that folk are natural incompatibilists. I discuss the use of 'Throughpass' measures in the recent literature (arguing that these measures are inadequate) as well as experimental philosophers' reliance on mediation analysis and structural equation modelling to infer causality (arguing that this (...) reliance is misguided). -/- . (shrink)

The ‘Knobe effect’ is the name given to the empirical finding that judgments about whether an action is intentional or not seems to depend on the moral valence of this action. To account for this phenomenon, Scaife and Webber have recently advanced the ‘Consideration Hypothesis’, according to which people’s ascriptions of intentionality are driven by whether they think the agent took the outcome in consideration when taking his decision. In this paper, I examine Scaife and Webber’s hypothesis and conclude that (...) it is supported neither by the existing literature nor by their own experiments, whose results I did not replicate, and that the ‘Consideration Hypothesis’ is not the best available account of the ‘Knobe Effect’. (shrink)

Tullmann et Buckwalter (2014) ont récemment soutenu que le paradoxe de la fiction tenait plus de l’illusion que de la réalité. D’après eux, les théories contemporaines des émotions ne fourniraient aucune raison d’adopter une interprétation du terme « existence » qui rende les prémisses du paradoxe incompatibles entre elles. Notre discussion a pour but de contester cette manière de dissoudre le paradoxe de la fiction en montrant qu’il ne prend pas sa source dans les théories contemporaines des émotions. Bien plutôt, (...) son origine se situe dans ce que Radford (1975) décrit comme une incohérence dans nos réactions émotionnelles aux évènements fictionnels et non fictionnels. Malgré ce désaccord, nous concédons à Tullmann et Buckwalter qu’une solution satisfaisante au paradoxe de la fiction doit s’appuyer sur les théories des émotions. Ainsi, en guise de conclusion, nous expliquons comment il convient de comprendre l’incohérence en question et comment les théories des émotions pourraient contribuer à la résolution du paradoxe de la fiction. (shrink)

Book Review Philosophy of Microbiology MAUREEN A. O’MALLEY.