Results for 'Henry Sebastián Rangel Quiñonez'

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  1. Fenomenologiczne zapytywanie o religijny wymiar istoty sztuki. Rozważania w kręgu myśli Heideggera, Duméry’ego, von Balthasara i Henry’ego.Andrzej Krawiec - 2021 - Pro Musica Sacra 19:7-20.
    Phenomenological reflection on the essence of art goes towards the revelation of its ultimate Source, which is also the Source of spirituality of a man and, finally, of artistic works. Art occupies a prominent place in the works of Martin Heidegger, Hans Urs von Balthasar and Michel Henry, and what they have in common is pointing out the ability of transcending artistic work towards beyond-aesthetic and over-aesthetic dimensions. For those philosophers the work of art is a ‘way’ which may (...)
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  2. Fisiologia do Ciclo Estral dos Animais Domésticos.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva -
    FISIOLOGIA DO CICLO ESTRAL DOS ANIMAIS -/- Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE Embrapa Semiárido e IPA -/- • _____OBJETIVO -/- O cio ou estro é a fase reprodutiva dos animais, onde as fêmeas apresentam receptividade sexual seguida de ovulação. Para tanto, é necessário entender a fisiologia do estro para a realização do manejo reprodutivo dos animais. Em geral, as fêmeas manifestam comportamentos fora do comum quando estão ciclando, tais comportamentos devem ser observados para que não percam o pico de ovulação (...)
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  3. Comportamento Sexual dos Animais Domésticos.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro Da Silva -
    COMPORTAMENTO SEXUAL DOS ANIMAIS OBJETIVO O estudante explicará a conduta sexual de fêmeas e machos de diferentes espécies domésticas para detectar a fase de receptividade sexual, com a finalidade de programar de maneira adequada a monta ou a inseminação artificial. A observação da conduta sexual dos animais é indispensável para o sucesso da estação reprodutiva em uma determinada propriedade. Logo, o estudante obterá o alicerce necessário sobre os pontos teóricos e práticos a serem observados para a seleção dos animais aptos (...)
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  4. On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.
    It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...)
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  5. The Ethics of Attention: an argument and a framework.Sebastian Watzl - 2022 - In Sophie Archer (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This paper argues for the normative significance of attention. Attention plays an important role when describing an individual’s mind and agency, and in explaining many central facts about that individual. In addition, many in the public want answers and guidance with regard to normative questions about attention. Given that attention is both descriptively central and the public cares about normative guidance with regard to it, attention should be central also in normative philosophy. We need an ethics of attention: a field (...)
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  6.  38
    Ist es erlaubt zu philosophieren? Altruismus und das gute Leben.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - In Dagmar Kiesel, Thomas Smettan & Sebastian Schmidt (eds.), Altruismus. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.
    Wenn wir Peter Singers Konklusion in „Famine, Affluence, and Morality“ (1972) akzeptieren, dann handeln wir im Alltag sehr viel häufiger falsch, als es uns lieb ist. Anstatt über die Natur von Altruismus zu philosophieren, könnten wir auch möglichst effektiv Hungerleidenden helfen. Ist es daher etwa moralisch verwerflich – weil egoistisch – zu philosophieren? In diesem Beitrag beleuchte ich die Gründe, die wir haben, Philosophie in den Mittelpunkt unseres Lebens zu stellen. Ich argumentiere, dass Philosophieren – genauso wie die Beschäftigung mit (...)
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  7. El regreso de Bradley y el problema de la unidad-compleja: ¿tropos al rescate?Sebastián Briceño - 2016 - Critica 48 (143):47-75.
    It is commonly held that Bradley’s regress has a solution within a trope ontology. This seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by non-transferable tropes. It also seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by transferable tropes related by a relational trope of compresence whose existence specifically depends on those relata. In this article I demonstrate that these proposals fail in addressing the essential question that underlies the regress, incurring in a question-begging response already (...)
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  8. Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens.Sebastian Schmidt - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):571-582.
    I argue that believing at will – i.e. believing for practical reasons – is in some sense possible and in some sense impossible. It is impossible insofar as we think of belief formation as a re-sult of our exercise of certain capacities (perception, memory, agency). But insofar as we think of belief formation as an action that might lead to such a result (i.e. a deliberation or an in-quiry), believing at will is possible. First I present and clarify the problem (...)
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  9. Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):48-64.
    Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...)
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  10. Wie vernünftig sind Verschwörungstheoretiker? Corona und intellektuelles Vertrauen.Sebastian Schmidt - 2021 - In Romy Jaster & Geert Keil (eds.), Nachdenken über Corona. Stuttgart: Reclam. pp. 98-109.
    Sebastian Schmidt (Zürich) fragt in seinem Beitrag »Wie vernünftig sind Verschwörungstheoretiker?«, wie es um die Vernunft derjenigen steht, die einer Verschwörungstheorie über die Corona-Pandemie anhängen. Im Umgang mit Corona scheint sich zu bestätigen, was die Psychologie seit Jahrzehnten lehrt: Menschen unterliegen in ihrem Denken kognitiven Fehlern und Verzerrungen. Doch ist verschwörungstheoretisches Denken, das solche Fehler ebenfalls begeht, deshalb irrational? Schmidt warnt davor, einander zu leichtfertig als irrational zu betrachten, und verweist auf die wichtige Rolle, die intellektuelles Vertrauen in Wissensgemeinschaften spielt. (...)
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  11. Is attention a non-propositional attitude?Sebastian Watzl - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 272-302.
    I argue first that attention is a (maybe the) paradigmatic case of an object-directed, non-propositional intentional mental episode. In addition attention cannot be reduced to any other (propositional or non-propositional) mental episodes. Yet, second, attention is not a non-propositional mental attitude. It might appear puzzling how one could hold both of these claims. I show how to combine them, and how that combination shows how propositionality and non-propositionality can co-exist in a mental life. The crucial move is one away from (...)
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  12. Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About It: Confusions, Virtues and Challenges of Higher-order Theories (in) Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal.Miguel Angel Sebastian - forthcoming - Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
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  13. Conciencia, primera persona y contenido no conceptual (en) Contenido y fenomenología de la percepción. Aproximaciones filosóficas.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2020 - Barcelona, España: Gedisa. Edited by A. Y. Cervieri Pelaez.
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  14. The Production of Space.Henri Lefebvre - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Henri Lefebvre has considerable claims to be the greatest living philosopher. His work spans some sixty years and includes original work on a diverse range of subjects, from dialectical materialism to architecture, urbanism and the experience of everyday life. The Production of Space is his major philosophical work and its translation has been long awaited by scholars in many different fields. The book is a search for a reconciliation between mental space and real space. In the course of his exploration, (...)
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  15. Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order thought theories.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1563-1572.
    Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...)
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  16. The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.
    ABSTRACT The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, (...)
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  17. Catholicity Under Heaven: Reformed Ecclesiology and Chinese Visions of Cosmopolitanism.Henry S. Kuo - 2021 - Ecclesiology 17 (1):51-71.
    Reformed catholicity suffers from a fragility that causes it to easily fragment over comparatively small differences. This study wagers that an important resource that can be useful for addressing this problem is the Chinese philosophy of tianxia. The article introduces the idea of a ‘Reformed catholicity under Heaven’ by placing a more liberal interpretation of tianxia in conversation with the problems in Reformed approaches to the church’s catholicity. In doing so, the article demonstrates tianxia’s ecclesiological usefulness while articulating two dimensions (...)
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  18. Experiential Awareness: Do You Prefer “It” to “Me”?Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):155-177.
    In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...)
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  19. Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 1-20.
    This chapter locates our overall approach within the dialectic of contemporary philosophical debates and provides an overall framework for discussion. First, I introduce the problem of mental normativity. I show how this problem poses a prima facie threat to the common assumption in epistemology and metaethics that beliefs and other attitudes are governed by robust normative requirements. Secondly, I motivate philosophical inquiry about an ethics of mind by tracing this field back to recent debates in the ethics of belief. I (...)
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  20. (1 other version)HOW FAR DOES THE BODY SCHEMA GO? EXTENDED BODY SCHEMA.Gerónimo Rangel - 2020 - Anuario Humanitas 1 (47):103-133.
    This work aims to uphold that a subject‘s body schema can be extended beyond their physical body, that is, external artifacts, such as tools, can be a part of the said body schema. To support this thesis, a new definition of ―body schema‖ is proposed. It starts by pointing out that body schema as a sub-personal sensorimotor is a necessary condition, albeit not a sufficient one, besides pursuing to include environmental interactions as a sufficient condition. Together, these elements favor the (...)
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  21. The paradox of ineffability.Gäb Sebastian - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 78 (3):1-12.
    Saying that x is ineffable seems to be paradoxical – either I cannot say anything about x, not even that it is ineffable – or I can say that it is ineffable, but then I can say something and it is not ineffable. In this article, I discuss Alston’s version of the paradox and a solution proposed by Hick which employs the concept of formal and substantial predicates. I reject Hick’s proposal and develop a different account based on some passages (...)
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  22. Not a HOT Dream.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2013 - In Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.
    Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...)
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  23. Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.
    What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something that we ought simpliciter to believe, all epistemic and practical reasons considered (the weighing view), or by denying the normativity of epistemic reasons altogether (epistemic anti-normativism). I argue against (...)
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  24. Can Imitating Nature Save the Planet?Henry Dicks & Vincent Blok - 2019 - Environmental Values 28 (5):519-526.
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  25. Mysticism without concepts.Sebastian Gäb - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (3):233-246.
    It has often been claimed, e.g. by William James or Aldous Huxley, that mystical experiences across times and cultures exhibit a striking similarity. Even though the words and images we use to describe them are different, underneath the surface we find a common experiential core. Others have rejected this claim and argued that all experiences are intrinsically shaped by the mystics’ pre-existing religious concepts. Against these constructivist objections, I defend the idea of a common core by arguing that even if (...)
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  26. Can Representationism Explain how Attention Affects Appearances?Sebastian Watzl - 2018 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. new york: MIT Press. pp. 481-607.
    Recent psychological research shows that attention affects appearances. An “attended item looks bigger, faster, earlier, more saturated, stripier.” (Block 2010, p. 41). What is the significance of these findings? Ned Block has argued that they undermine representationism, roughly the view that the phenomenal character of perception is determined by its representational content. My first goal in this paper is to show that Block’s argument has the structure of a Problem of Arbitrary Phenomenal Variation and that it improves on other instances (...)
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  27. Conceptual Engineering: For What Matters.Sebastian Köhler & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):400-427.
    Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...)
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  28. Dreams: an empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):263-285.
    Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...)
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  29. Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism.Henry Jackman - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    There has frequently been taken to be a tension, if not an incompatibility, between "externalist" theories of content (which allow the make-up of one's physical environment and the linguistic usage of one's community to contribute to the contents of one's thoughts and utterances) and the "methodologically individualist" intuition that whatever contributes to the content of one's thoughts and utterances must ultimately be grounded in facts about one's own attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation I argue that one can underwrite such (...)
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  30. Cross-National Associations Among Cyberbullying Victimization, Self-Esteem, and Internet Addiction: Direct and Indirect Effects of Alexithymia.Sebastian Wachs, Alexander T. Vazsonyi, Michelle F. Wright & Gabriela Ksinan Jiskrova - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  31. Expressivism, Belief, and All That.Sebastian Köhler - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (4):189-207.
    Meta-ethical expressivism was traditionally seen as the view that normative judgements are not beliefs. Recently, quasi-realists have argued, via a minimalist conception of “belief”, that expressivism is fully compatible with normative judgements being beliefs. This maneuver is successful, however, only if quasi-realists have really offered an expressivist-friendly account of belief that captures all platitudes characterizing belief. But, quasi-realists’ account has a crucial gap, namely how to account for the propositional contents of normative beliefs in an expressivist-friendly manner. In particular, quasi-realists (...)
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  32. Is that a Threat?Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1161-1183.
    I introduce game-theoretic models for threats to the discussion of threats in speech act theory. I first distinguish three categories of verbal threats: conditional threats, categorical threats, and covert threats. I establish that all categories of threats can be characterized in terms of an underlying conditional structure. I argue that the aim—or illocutionary point—of a threat is to change the conditions under which an agent makes decisions in a game. Threats are moves in a game that instantiate a subgame in (...)
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  33. THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: CONCEPTION AND CRITICISMS OF KARL POPPER.Henry Ovwigho Ukavwe - 2018 - Ifiok: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 4:84-96.
    From the Scientific Revolution to the present era, the natural sciences have developed remarkably and recorded colossal success in different areas such as genetic engineering, cloning, hybrid technology, health and food technologies, space travel, audio-visual technology, among others. These evidences are indications of the growth of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, this paper raises the question of what is responsible for the growth of scientific knowledge. Inherent in this question is the pool of diverse conceptions of what the nature and method of (...)
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  34. Extension of Crisp Functions on Neutrosophic Sets.Sabu Sebastian, Florentin Smarandache & Sebastian Sabu - 2017 - Neutrosophic Sets and Systems 17:88-92.
    In this paper, we generalize the definition of Neutrosophic sets and present a method for extending crisp functions on Neutrosophic sets and study some properties of such extended functions.
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  35. Why We Should Promote Irrationality.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):605-615.
    The author defends the claim that there are cases in which we should promote irrationality by arguing (1) that it is sometimes better to be in an irrational state of mind, and (2) that we can often influence our state of mind via our actions. The first claim is supported by presenting cases of irrational _belief_ and by countering a common line of argument associated with William K. Clifford, who defended the idea that having an irrational belief is always worse (...)
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  36. Responsibility for rationality: foundations of an ethics of mind.Sebastian Schmidt - 2025 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. First, it (...)
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  37. Incoherence and the balance of evidential reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-10.
    Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first (...)
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  38. All too human? Identifying and mitigating ethical risks of Social AI.Henry Shevlin - manuscript
    This paper presents an overview of the risks and benefits of Social AI, understood as conversational AI systems that cater to human social needs like romance, companionship, or entertainment. Section 1 of the paper provides a brief history of conversational AI systems and introduces conceptual distinctions to help distinguish varieties of Social AI and pathways to their deployment. Section 2 of the paper adds further context via a brief discussion of anthropomorphism and its relevance to assessment of human-chatbot relationships. Section (...)
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  39. Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 149-175.
    I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons for attitudes. (...)
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  40. Rationality and Responsibility.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):379-385.
    Broome takes the debate on rationality to be concerned with the ordinary use of 'rational'. I argue that this is at best misleading. For the object of current theories of rationality is determined by a specific use of 'rational' that is intimately connected to blame and praise. I call the property it refers to 'rationalityRESP'. This focus on rationalityRESP, I argue, has two significant implications for Broome's critique of theories of rationality as reasons-responsiveness. First, rationalityRESP is plausibly conceived of as (...)
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  41. Ineffability: The very concept.Sebastian Gäb - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1-12.
    In this paper, I analyze the concept of ineffability: what does it mean to say that something cannot be said? I begin by distinguishing ineffability from paradox: if something cannot be said truly or without contradiction, this is not an instance of ineffability. Next, I distinguish two different meanings of ‘saying something’ which result from a fundamental ambiguity in the term ‘language’, viz. language as a system of symbols and language as a medium of communication. Accordingly, ‘ineffability’ is ambiguous, too, (...)
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  42. Cayetano Betancur, filósofo conservador.Sebastián Pineda & Ana María Granados - 2021 - Ideas Y Valores 70 (Suplemento 7):13-40.
    Este artículo examina de qué forma se refleja el conservatismo de Cayetano Betancur en su filosofía política. El primer capítulo recoge dos acepciones del término conser- vador que abarcan, a grandes rasgos, las dos principales tendencias del conservatismo político. El segundo capítulo está dedicado a examinar cómo cada una de estas dos acepciones (que llamamos negativa y positiva) se reflejan en la obra de Betancur. Como conclusión, se hace referencia a los posibles rumbos hacia los que una investi- gación más (...)
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  43. Why you should be a religious skeptic.Sebastian Gäb - 2023 - Philosophical Forum (4):303-314.
    Most philosophers of religion subscribe to some variety of religious realism: they believe that religious statements aim at capturing a mind-independent reality and are true precisely if they successfully do so. Curiously, most religious realists also believe that at least some of our religious beliefs are rationally justified. In this paper, I argue that these positions are actually at odds with each other. Religious realists should rather be religious skeptics. I first argue that realism always implies the possibility of our (...)
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  44. Conscious Perception in Favour of Essential Indexicality.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2022 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 35 (2):13-30.
    It has been widely acknowledged that indexical thought poses a problem for traditional theories of mental content. However, recent work in philosophy has defied this received view and challenged its defenders not to rely on intuitions but rather to clearly articulate what the problem is supposed to be. For example, in “The Inessential Indexical”, Cappelen and Dever claim that there are no philosophically interesting or important roles played by essential indexical representations. This paper assesses the role of essential indexicality in (...)
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  45. Cognitive access and cognitive phenomenology: conceptual and empirical issues.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):188-204.
    The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...)
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  46. Culture or Biology? If this sounds interesting, you might be confused.Sebastian Watzl - 2019 - In Jaan Valsinger (ed.), Social Philosophy of Science for the Social Sciences. Springer. pp. 45-71.
    Culture or Biology? The question can seem deep and important. Yet, I argue in this chapter, if you are enthralled by questions about our biological differences, then you are probably confused. My goal is to diagnose the confusion. In debates about the role of biology in the social world it is easy to ask the wrong questions, and it is easy to misinterpret the scientific research. We are intuitively attracted to what is called psychological essentialism, and therefore interpret what is (...)
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  47. Construction and continuity: conceptual engineering without conceptual change.Henry Jackman - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9):909-918.
    The papers in this volume originated in a workshop on externalism and conceptual change held at the University of St. Andrews in June 2018. The discussion of conceptual change was driven largely by...
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  48. Can Informational Theories Account for Metarepresentation?Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Marc Artiga - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):81-94.
    In this essay we discuss recent attempts to analyse the notion of representation, as it is employed in cognitive science, in purely informational terms. In particular, we argue that recent informational theories cannot accommodate the existence of metarepresentations. Since metarepresentations play a central role in the explanation of many cognitive abilities, this is a serious shortcoming of these proposals.
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  49. Das Erbe der Philosophen.Sebastian Rödl - 2007 - Philosophische Rundschau 54 (2):123.
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  50. Should We Respond Correctly to Our Reasons?Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Episteme.
    It has been argued that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. Recent defenses of the normativity of rationality assume that this implies that we always ought to be rational. However, this follows only if the reasons rationality requires us to correctly respond to are normative reasons. Recent meta-epistemological contributions have questioned whether epistemic reasons are normative. If they were right, then epistemic rationality wouldn’t provide us with normative reasons independently of wrong-kind reasons to be epistemically rational. This paper spells (...)
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