In this paper I illustrate what is reconstructive rationality, a notion that remains rather undetermined in Robert Brandom's work. I argue that theoretical and historical thinking are instances of reconstruction and should not be identified with it. I then explore a further instance of rational reconstruction, which Brandom calls “reconstructive metaphysics”, arguing that the demarcation between metaphysical and non-metaphysical theories has to be understood as a pragmatic one. Finally, I argue that Brandom’s reconstructive metaphysics is basically a pragmatist metaphysics. Here (...) I try to outline a pragmatist understanding of the concept of metaphysics in order to reconcile Brandom's more or less implicit attempt at metaphysical theorizing with his devotion to a pragmatist tradition that is resistant if not hostile to the very idea of metaphysics. Hence I come back to the question of how pragmatism has contributed to the understanding of “reconstructive rationality”, and argue that the latter is a notion of rationality which is needed by Brandom’s philosophy but which cannot find a clear place in the typology of the five forms of rationality that he introduces, being more akin to the core structure of rationality rather than a specific form of it. (shrink)

Enterprise Risk Management and security have become a fundamental part of Enterprise Architecture, so several frameworks and modeling languages have been designed to support the activities associated with these areas. Archi- Mate’s Risk and Security Overlay is one of such proposals, endorsed by The Open Group. We investigate the capabilities of the proposed security-related con- structs in ArchiMate with regard to the necessities of enterprise security modeling. Our analysis relies on a well-founded reference ontology of security to uncover ambiguity, missing (...) modeling elements, and other deficiencies of the security mod- eling capabilities in ArchiMate. Based on this ontologically-founded analysis, we propose a redesign of security aspects of ArchiMate to overcome its original limitations. (shrink)

Enterprise Risk Management involves the process of identification, evaluation, treatment, and communication regarding risks throughout the enterprise. To support the tasks associated with this process, several frameworks and modeling languages have been proposed, such as the Risk and Security Overlay (RSO) of ArchiMate. An ontological investigation of this artifact would reveal its adequacy, capabilities, and limitations w.r.t. the domain of risk and security. Based on that, a language redesign can be proposed as a refinement. Such analysis and redesign have been (...) executed for the risk elements of the RSO grounded in the Common Ontology of Value and Risk. The next step along this line of research is to address the following research problems: What would be the outcome of an ontological analysis of security-related elements of the RSO? That is, can we identify other semantic deficiencies in the RSO through an ontological analysis? Once such an analysis is provided, can we redesign the security elements of the RSO accordingly, in order to produce an improved artifact? Here, with the aid of the Reference Ontology for Security Engineering (ROSE) and the ontological theory of prevention behind it, we address the remaining gap by proceeding with an ontological analysis of the security-related constructs of the RSO. The outcome of this assessment is an ontology-based redesign of the ArchiMate language regarding security modeling. In a nutshell, we report the following contributions: (1) an ontological analysis of the RSO that identifies six limitations concerning security modeling; (2) because of the key role of the notion of prevention in security modeling, the introduction of the ontological theory of prevention in ArchiMate; (3) a well-founded redesign of security elements of ArchiMate; and (4) ontology-based security modeling patterns that are logical consequences of our proposal of redesign due to its underlying ontology of security. As a form of evaluation, we show that our proposal can describe risk treatment options, according to ISO 31000. Finally, besides presenting multiple examples, we proceed with a real-world illustrative application taken from the cybersecurity domain. (shrink)

In this article I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of “second nature” and “recognition”. To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper to the theory of Hegelian and post- Hegelian Anerkennung. The solution strategy I propose is signifi cant also in terms of bringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of “space of reasons” that stems from the Hegelian concept of “Spirit”. I thus broach the notion of “second nature” as a bridgeconcept (...) that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Anerkennung and for a rethinking of the “space of reasons” within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the novelties introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between fi rst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levels. I then return to the question of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makes to the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalness. (shrink)

Hegel's philosophy aims at responding to the questions raised by modern scepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. A key-role in Hegel's argumentative strategy against modern scepticism is played here by Hegel's theory of recognition. Recognition mediates the constitution of individual self-consciousness and intersubjectivity: self-knowledge is not logically independent of the awareness of other minds. At the same time, recognition institutes the possibility of objective reference to the world. In this way, (...) in Hegel the theory of recognition furnishes a unitary response to the threefold sceptical issue of the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. The reference to a common world of public objects is thus possible only thanks to the mediation of recognitive capacities that are naturally possessed and socially articulated, which make possible the triangulation between self, world and others. (shrink)

I tackle the definition of the relation between first and second nature while examining some problems with McDowell's conception. This, in the first place, will bring out the need to extend the notion of second nature to the social dimension, understanding it not just as `inner' second nature — individual mind — but also as `outer' second nature — objective spirit. In the second place the dialectical connection between these two notions of second nature will point the way to a (...) critical use of the concept itself, which will link up with a theory of reification. Furthermore, I shall endeavor to fit my reflection into the problematic constellation of critical theory: my analysis in fact rests on the question whether, within a critical theory, the philosophy of nature can be recaptured today, in such a way as to give meaning to the very notion of socio-philosophical criticism of reality. (shrink)

The paper proposes a reconstruction of some fragments of Hegel’s Jena manuscripts concerning the natural genesis of recognitive spiritual consciousness. On this basis it will be argued that recognition has a foothold in nature. As a consequence, recognition should not be understood as a bootstrapping process, that is, as a self-positing and self-justifying normative social phenomenon, intelligible within itself and independently of anything external to it.

n this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that her framework is a two-sided one, since it involves an understanding of forms of life both as inert bundles of practices and as having a normative structure. Here I argue that this approach is based on an a priori argument which assumes normativity as the condition of intelligibility of social criticism. I show that the intimate tension between these two sides is reflected in the (...) socio-ontological model of the constitution of social phenomena, which on the one side is understood in terms of habituation and materialization, and on the other side in terms of constitution through norms. The second side in the end prevails and leads to some sort of normative essentialism which involves a prescriptive meta-theoretical understanding of normativity combined with a socio-ontological model of constitutive rules. I then analyse two arguments that Jaeggi offers in support of her assumption that normative constitution is the deep structure of social practices. I name these the functional- teleological argument, and the crisis developmental argument, and argue that neither succeeds in proving that practices are not normatively underdetermined. (shrink)

In Risk Management, security issues arise from complex relations among objects and agents, their capabilities and vulnerabilities, the events they are involved in, and the value and risk they ensue to the stakeholders at hand. Further, there are patterns involving these relations that crosscut many domains, ranging from information security to public safety. Understanding and forming a shared conceptualization and vocabulary about these notions and their relations is fundamental for modeling the corresponding scenarios, so that proper security countermeasures can be (...) devised. Ontologies are instruments developed to address these conceptual clarification and terminological systematization issues. Over the years, several ontologies have been proposed in Risk Management and Security Engineering. However, as shown in recent literature, they fall short in many respects, including generality and expressivity - the latter impacting on their interoperability with related models. We propose a Reference Ontology for Security Engineering (ROSE) from a Risk Treatment perspective. Our proposal leverages on two existing Reference Ontologies: the Common Ontology of Value and Risk and a Reference Ontology of Prevention, both of which are grounded on the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO). ROSE is employed for modeling and analysing some cases, in particular providing clarification to the semantically overloaded notion of Security Mechanism. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that critical theory needs to make its socio-ontological commitments explicit, whilst on the other hand I will posit that contemporary social ontology needs to amend its formalistic approach by embodying a critical theory perspective. In the first part of my paper I will discuss how the question was posed in Horkheimer’s essays of the 1930s, which leave open two options: (1) a constructive inclusion of social ontology within social philosophy, or else (2) a program (...) of social philosophy that excludes social ontology. Option (2) corresponds to Adorno’s position, which I argue is forced to recur to a hidden social ontology. Following option (1), I first develop a metacritical analysis of Searle, arguing that his social ontology presupposes a notion of 'recognition' which it cannot account for. Furthermore, by means of a critical reading of Honneth, I argue that critical theory could incorporate a socioontological approach, giving value to the constitutive socio-ontological role of recognition and to the socio-ontological role of objectification. I will finish with a proposal for a socio-ontological characterization of reification which involves that the basic occurrence of recognition is to be grasped at the level of background practices. (shrink)

Introductory essay to the collection "I that is We, We that is I" (ed. by Italo Testa and Luigi Ruggiu, Brill Books, 2016). In this book an international group of philosophers explore the many facets of Hegel’s formula which expresses the recognitive and social structures of human life. The book offers a guiding thread for the reconstruction of crucial motifs of contemporary thought such as the socio-ontological paradigm; the action-theoretical model in moral and social philosophy; the question of naturalism; (...) and the reassessment of the relevance of work and power for our understanding of human life. This collection addresses the shortcomings of Kantian and constructivist normative approaches to social practices and practical rationality it involves. It sheds new light on Hegel’s take on metaphysics and puts into question some presuppositions of the post-metaphysical interpretative paradigm. (shrink)

Dewey’s notion of second nature is strictly connected with that of habit. I reconstruct the Hegelian heritage of this model and argue that habit qua second nature is understood by Dewey as a something which encompasses both the subjective and the objective dimension – individual dispositions and features of the objective natural and social environment.. Secondly, the notion of habit qua second nature is used by Dewey both in a descriptive and in a critical sense and is as such a (...) dialectical concept which connects ‘impulse’ and ‘habit’, ‘original’ or ‘native’ and ‘acquired’ nature, ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. Thirdly, the ethical model of second nature as habituation and the aesthetic model of second nature as art are for Dewey not opposed to one another, since by distinguishing ‘routine’ and ‘art’ as two modes of habit, he makes space for an expressive and creative notion of second nature. Finally, I argue that the expressive dialectics of habit formation plays a crucial role in Dewey’s critical social philosophy and that first and second nature operate as benchmark concepts for his diagnosis of social pathologies. (shrink)

In this paper recognition is taken to be a question of social ontology, regarding the very constitution of the social space of interaction. I concentrate on the question of whether certain aspects of the theory of recognition can be translated into the terms of a socio-ontological paradigm: to do so, I make reference to some conceptual tools derived from John Searle's social ontology and Robert Brandom's normative pragmatics. My strategy consists in showing that recognitive phenomena cannot be isolated at the (...) level of human interaction, and are, rather, in part proper to animal interaction as well. Furthermore, it is argued that recognitive powers are constitutive powers more basic than deontic ones and play a role much broader than the one they in fact assume in Searle and in Brandom. (shrink)

This article deals with the question of skepticism within Hegel's Phenomenology. The article reconstructs the role played by the tropes of ancient skepticism in Hegel's criticism of foundationalism and monological thinking. Furthermore, the skeptical method applied by Hegel is read as a sort of negative dialectics that is constitutive of a relational theory of rationality, and which culminates in his conception of the Absolute Knowing as speculative tropology.

Paper given at the 20th Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America, University of South Carolina, October 24-26, 2008 -/- The local problem of the soul-body relation can be grasped only against the global background of the relation between Nature and Spirit. This relates to Hegel's naturalism: the idea that there is one single reality - living reality - and different levels of description of it. This implies, moreover, that it is possible to ascribe some form of naturality also (...) to the social body of institutionalized ethical life. Hegel’s position can thus be characterised as a kind of aristotelian social naturalism: this, at bottom, is the combined meaning of the Hegelian theses that soul is the substance of Spirit, and habit its universal form. (shrink)

The meaning of Enlightenment for the young Hegel (1785-1800) is closely related to the historical and theoretical moment in which skepticism became a constitutive aspect of his dialectical conception of philosophy. In this light the paper shows that the problem of skepticism understood as self-reflection of epistemological and social critique is deeply linked in the young Hegel’s writings with the archeology of the very idea of the dialectics of enlightenment.

In _"I that is We, We that is I"_ leading scholars analyze the many facets of Hegel’s formula for the intersubjective structure of human life and explores its relevance for debates on social ontology, recognition, action theory, constructivism, and naturalism.

In this article I argue that contemporary critical theory needs the conceptual tools of social ontology in order to make its own ontological commitments explicit and strengthen its interdisciplinary approach. On the other hand, contemporary analytic social ontology needs critical theory in order to be able to focus on the role that social change, power, and historicity play in the constitution of social facts, and to see the shortcomings of an agential and intentionalist approach to social facts. My thesis is (...) strengthened by a historical reconstruction of the presence of two different approaches in the original program of the family of critical theory apparently most hostile to social ontology, (the Frankfurt School), namely Horkheimer’s program of a critical social philosophy which includes a social ontology, and Adorno’s negative attitude towards it, epitomized by the paradoxical notion of “ontology of the false state”. Adorno’s negative attitude was later inherited by Habermas and Honneth, whose work I show to be nevertheless deeply laden with ontological commitments. I then argue that, if one accepts the socio-ontological redefinition of critical theory, then the post-metaphysical paradigm adopted by Habermas should be revised and a certain conception of the linguistic turn in the understanding of social action abandoned. On the side of contemporary social ontology, the impulse coming from critical theory should allow us to distinguish between forms of ‘traditional social ontology’, that simply apply ready-made general metaphysical concepts to social reality, and a ‘critical social ontology’, oriented to socializing ontology and critically transforming metaphysical categories. (shrink)

In this contribution I outline some ideas on what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could offer us as regards the appreciation of the constitutive role that imagery plays for social action and cognition. Accordingly, a Deweyan understanding of habit would allow for an understanding of imagery in terms of embodied cognition rather than in representational terms. I first underline the motor character of imagery, and the role its embodiment in habit plays for the anticipation of action. Secondly, I reconstruct (...) Dewey's notion of imaginative rehearsal in light of contemporary, competing models of intersubjectivity such as embodied simulation theory and the narrative practice hypothesis, and argue that the Deweyan model offers us a more encompassing framework which can be useful for reconciling these approaches. In this text I am mainly concerned with sketching a broad picture of the lines along which such a project could be developed. For this reason not all questions are given equal attention, and I shall concentrate mainly on the basic ideas, without going directly into the details of many of them. (shrink)

Deliberative politics should start from an adequate and differentiated image of our dialogical practices and their normative structures; the ideals that we eventually propose for deliberative politics should be tested against this background. In this article I will argue that equal respect, understood as respect a priori conferred on persons, is not and should not be counted as a constitutive normative ground of public discourse. Furthermore, requiring such respect, even if it might facilitate dialogue, could have negative effects and lead (...) to fallacious paths of thought –as seems to happen on matters of deep disagreement such as the Colorado Fundamentalist/Gay HIV issue I discuss in paragraph 6. I will put forward this argument from the standpoint of argumentation or discourse theory, drawing consequences for dialogical theories of politics. Basing my argument on a pluralistic notion of public discourse – understood as a mixed discourse of persuasion, information-seeking and negotiation – I will argue that respect is a dynamic, situational phenomenon, and that the norm of equal respect for persons is contextually contingent in political deliberation: equal respect should be considered as a potential outcome, a discursive achievement – which I understand as a second order consensus achieved dynamically on a provisional basis – rather than as an universal condition for dialogue. (shrink)

In this essay I first set out the advantages the " multivariate democratic polity " framework proposed by Ferrara offers in comparison to other more consensus-based notions of democratic legitimacy. Secondly, I highlight some ambiguities concerning the meta-theoretical status of this frame, since it is not clear whether it consists of an adaptive realistic description, or otherwise is a normative argument. Thirdly, I cast some doubts on the compatibility between the multivariate frame and the " dualist conception of democratic constitutionalism (...) " adopted by Ferrara, since the latter seems too indebted to the domestic analogy, and to a consensus-based model of legitimacy. Finally, I argue that the dualist approach does not seem a convenient way to include citizenship in deliberative processes, and the question of the emergence of a transnational demos should rather be reconsidered as crucial for this purpose. (shrink)

In this paper, making reference to Robert Brandom's philosophical proposal - and against the background of Brandom's debate with Jürgen Habermas - I shall endeavor, first, to define the relation between recognition and normativity and then between recognition and criticism; in the final part of the paper I shall suggest a perspective that approaches recognition in terms of capacities. On this basis I attempt to see the critical attitude as something that is founded more on individual potentials than on formal (...) criteria and that is essentially connected with a power of redescription: a dialectical anthropology of recognition is thus the most promising base to account for that which substantiates our critical powers. (shrink)

The theory of recognition arises within Hegel's confrontation with epistemological skepticism and aims at responding to the questions raised by modern skepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. This is possible to the extent that the theory of recognition is the guiding thread of a critique of the modern foundational theory of knowledge and, at the same time, the point of departure for an alternative approach. In this article I will dwell (...) on six stages of the evolution of Hegel's thought prior to the Phenomenology (1797-1806),stages shed great light on the direction taken by his argumentative strategy. Synthetically, the stages are as follows: 1. Hegel naturalizes the epistemological questions; 2. to do so he critiques foundationalism qua theory of empirical knowledge; 3. and qua theory of epistemic justification; 4. the critique of foundationalism is linked to a critique of the corresponding representationalistic theory of perception; 5. this, in turn, is linked to a critique of the monological theories of self-consciousness and to the development of a model of the rise of self-conscious knowing; 6. finally, Hegel synthesizes these epistemological views in a theory of knowledge qua recognition and in a metaphilosophical theory of philosophical rationality qua self-recognition: knowledge without foundation is thus the condition of possibility of philosophy’s self-justification. (shrink)

If different translations of the same literary work have different syntaxes and semantics, how are they supposed to be about one and the same fictional character? In order to answer this question it’s necessary to (a) know what fictional characters are and (b) present reference conditions for them. Relying on Amie Thomasson’s (1999, 2003, 2007) and Saul Kripke’s (1980, 2013) works I argue that fictional characters are abstract artifacts whose reference is fixed by the baptism performed by an author; and (...) that the identity of a fictional character is preserved due to the maintenance of the same chain of reference. Finally, I show how translators maintain the chain of reference initiated by the author of a given work and how consequently a fictional character remains the same abstract artifact throughout different translations. (shrink)

Introduction to a Forum on Michael's Thompson "Life and Action".

Argumentation theory underwent a significant development in the Fifties and Sixties: its revival is usually connected to Perelman's criticism of formal logic and the development of informal logic. Interestingly enough it was during this period that Artificial Intelligence was developed, which defended the following thesis (from now on referred to as the AI-thesis): human reasoning can be emulated by machines. The paper suggests a reconstruction of the opposition between formal and informal logic as a move against a premise of an (...) argument for the AI-thesis, and suggests making a distinction between a broad and a narrow notion of algorithm that might be used to reformulate the question as a foundational problem for argumentation theory. (shrink)

RESUMO A inseminação artificial (IA) é a biotecnologia mais empregada com vantagens superiores em relação a utilização da monta natural, cuja eficácia se dá na larga escala de reprodução entre os bovinos. Associando essa biotécnica com hormônios pode-se estabelecer manipulações do sistema reprodutivo da fêmea, levando a manejos de inúmeras cabeças de gado para inseminar a um tempo fixo. Portanto, foram realizados 5 protocolos de IATF, tendo 2 categorias de animais: nulíparas e multíparas. No protocolo 1 foram submetidas 81 multíparas, (...) resultando em 47 animais prenhes; No protocolo 2 foram protocoladas 103 animais multíparas, no qual resultou em 51 prenhes; já o protocolo 5 foram submetidas 77 animais multíparas, no qual resultou em 36 animais prenhes. Cada serviço realizado foi matematicamente calculado, sendo o ponto de partida o escore corporal, bem estar animal e a técnica bem exercida. Desta forma obteve bons resultados na (IATF) , no qual destaca-se o percentual : o protocolo 1 obteve 58,02%, o protocolo 2 obteve 49,51% na taxa de prenhez, No protocolo 3 obteve 55,67% na taxa de prenhez, o protocolo 4 obteve 53,33% de prenhes, já o protocolo 5 resultou em 46,75% de prenhez. O uso das biotecnologias da reprodução, realizadas em bovinos de corte, obteve resultado dentro do descrito pela literatura consultada. A boa taxa de prenhes apresentada na IATF deveu-se ao bom controle hormonal do ciclo estral e da qualidade do sêmen utilizado. A taxa de prenhez dos animais que foram submetidos à monta natural foi baixa pelo fato de que os reprodutores não conseguiram cobrir todas as fêmeas. ABSTRACT The artificial insemination (AI) is the most used biotechnology with superior advantages in relation to the use of natural mounting, whose effectiveness is given in the large scale of reproduction among cattle. Associating this biotechnique with hormones it is possible to establish manipulations of the reproductive system of the female, leading to managements of numerous heads of cattle to inseminate at a fixed time. Therefore, 5 IATF protocols were performed, having 2 categories of animals: nulliparous and multiparous. In protocol 1, 81 multiparous animals were submitted, resulting in 47 pregnant animals; in protocol 2, 103 multiparous animals were submitted, resulting in 51 pregnancies; and in protocol 5, 77 multiparous animals were submitted, resulting in 36 pregnant animals. Each service performed was mathematically calculated, with the starting point being the body score, animal welfare and the well exercised technique. Thus obtained good results in the (IATF), which highlights the percentage: protocol 1 obtained 58.02%, protocol 2 obtained 49.51% in pregnancy rate, in protocol 3 obtained 55.67% in pregnancy rate, protocol 4 obtained 53.33% pregnant, and protocol 5 resulted in 46.75% pregnant. The use of the reproduction biotechnologies, performed in beef cattle, obtained results within the described by the consulted literature. The good pregnancy rate presented in the IATF was due to the good hormonal control of the estrous cycle and the quality of the semen used. The pregnancy rate of animals that were subjected to natural mating was low due to the fact that the sires could not cover all the females. Keywords: Hormones. Cattle Pregnancy Rate. Artificial Insemination in Cattle. Hormones in Cattle Reproduction. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS AMBRÓSIO, P. H. et al. Ressincronização da ovulação em programas de IATF: novas estratégias. 2018. BARUSELLI, P. S.; GIMENES, L. U.; SALES, J. N. de S. Fisiologia reprodutiva de fêmeas taurinas e zebuínas. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 31, n. 2, p. 205-211, 2007. BARUSELLI, P. S. et al. Evolução e perspectivas da inseminação artificial em bovinos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 43, n. 2, p. 308-314, 2019. BÓ, G. A. et al. Alternative programs for synchronizing and resynchronizing ovulation in beef cattle. Theriogenology, v. 86, n. 1, p. 388-396, 2016. BOTTINO, M. P. et al. Effects of eCG and FSH in timed artificial insemination treatment regimens on estrous expression and pregnancy rates in primiparous and multiparous Bos indicus cows. Animal Reproduction Science, v. 228, p. 106751, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Técnica da Inseminação Artificial em Bovinos: Manejo Passo a Passo. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Reprodução Animal: Inseminação Artificial. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Ovulação, Controle e Sincronização do Cio. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros: Aspectos Básicos e Clínicos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2022. KRAUS, Beth M.; PARENTE, Eric J.; TULLENERS, Eric P. Laryngoplasty with ventriculectomy or ventriculocordectomy in 104 draft horses (1992–2000). Veterinary Surgery, v. 32, n. 6, p. 530-538, 2003. MONGELLI, Melissa Sanches; TAVARES, Izabel Cristina; FERRANTE, Marcos. Evolução e premissas dos protocolos hormonais de inseminação artificial em tempo fixo na pecuária. Ciência Animal, v. 31, n. 1, p. 119-133, 2021. VILELA, G. C. Protocolos de IATF em novilhas precoce e super precoce. 2021. (shrink)

La dicha y la auto-realización del hombre.

Nel corso del Novecento l’uso dei modelli matematici, che si era già rivelato così utile in fisica e ingegneria, è stato introdotto, talvolta con difficoltà non trascurabili, anche in discipline tradizionalmente considerate poco adatte ad un simile approccio, quali l’economia, la sociologia, la biologia. Un percorso che inizia prendendo a prestito molte delle idee e dei modelli della fisica, tanto che nel discorso inaugurale dell’anno accademico 1901-1902 all’Università di Roma il grande fisico matematico Vito Volterra (1860- 1940) pronunciava le seguenti (...) parole: «è intorno a quelle scienze nelle quali le matematiche solo da poco tempo hanno tentato d’introdursi, le scienze biologiche e sociali, che è più intensa la curiosità, giacché è forte il desiderio di assicurarsi se i metodi classici, i quali hanno dato così grandi risultati nelle scienze meccanico-fisiche, sono suscettibili di essere trasportati con pari successo nei nuovi ed inesplorati campi che si dischiudono loro dinanzi». In effetti l’economia arriverà, nel corso della prima metà del secolo, a un’elegante formulazione assiomatico-deduttiva della teoria dell’equilibrio economico, con l’utilizzo di metodi matematici eleganti e sofisticati. Ma le ipotesi di base, che coinvolgono concetti legati alle scelte degli individui influenzate dal loro livello di razionalità, influenzate da componenti psicologiche e interazioni sociali, condizionano fortemente i risultati ottenuti, e tuttora molti ritengono che il fatto che i metodi matematici si siano rivelati così utili in fisica non implica che lo siano anche per l’economia e le scienze sociali. La formalizzazione sempre più astratta di tali modelli, insieme alla loro difficoltà a spiegare e prevedere alcuni fenomeni economici e sociali osservati, ha portato a frequenti polemiche sulla reale opportunità di trasformare le discipline sociali in teorie matematiche, con strumenti che talvolta sembrano impiegati come fine a se stessi. In questo articolo, dopo aver brevemente delineato la storia della progressiva matematizzazione dell’economia, ci si concentrerà soprattutto sull’utilizzo in economia dei modelli dinamici non lineari, anche questi sviluppati inizialmente in fisica. Si tratta di modelli deterministici utilizzati per prevedere, ed eventualmente controllare, l’evoluzione temporale di sistemi reali. Basati su equazioni di evoluzione, espresse mediante equazioni differenziali o alle differenze a seconda che si consideri il tempo continuo o discreto, il loro studio qualitativo permette di ottenere informazioni sul tipo di comportamento che emergerà nel lungo periodo, e di come questo è influenzato dai principali parametri. La scoperta che modelli dinamici non lineari (che sono la regola nei sistemi sociali, caratterizzati da interazioni e meccanismi di feed-back) possono esibire comportamenti denotati col termine di caos deterministico per la proprietà di amplificare in modo difficilmente prevedibile perturbazioni arbitrariamente piccole (la cosiddetta sensitività rispetto alle condizioni iniziali, o “effetto farfalla”) ha suscitato un certo imbarazzo e nel contempo creato nuove possibilità. L’imbarazzo è dovuto al fatto che, come descriveremo meglio in seguito, la presenza di caos deterministico rende insostenibile l’ipotesi di agente economico razionale, ovvero capace di prevedere correttamente. Le nuove possibilità sono legate al fatto che quei sistemi economici e sociali caratterizzati da fluttuazioni in apparenza casuali potrebbero essere governati da leggi del moto deterministiche (anche se non lineari). In ogni caso, gli studi sui sistemi dinamici non lineari hanno portato a distinguere fra la rappresentazione matematica deterministica e la prevedibilità. L’attuale crisi economica ha senz’altro contribuito a riaccendere il dibattito sul modo di studiare i sistemi economici e sociali e la capacità di spiegare e prevedere. Le scienze sociali, e in particolare l’economia, sono davvero una scienza? Come può una scienza non prevedere e non accorgersi di quello che sta succedendo? Si tratta, come vedremo nel seguito, di domande ricorrenti, e anche in questa occasione qualcuno ha detto che, inseguendo i formalismi matematici, si sta perdendo di vista la realtà, mentre altri sostengono che il problema sta negli specifici formalismi adottati, che quelli usati sono superati, legati ad una matematica “vecchia”, magari mutuata in modo acritico da altre discipline. La speranza è allora che la crisi economica comporti un cambio di paradigma anche nella modellizzazione matematica. (shrink)

Risk propagation encompasses a plethora of techniques for analyzing how risk “spreads” in a given system. Albeit commonly used in technical literature, the very notion of risk propagation turns out to be a conceptually imprecise and overloaded one. This might also explain the multitude of modeling solutions that have been proposed in the lit- erature. Having a clear understanding of what exactly risk is, how it be quantified, and in what sense it can be propagated is fundamental for devising high-quality (...) risk assessment and decision-making solutions. In this paper, we exploit a previous well-established work about the nature of risk and related notions with the goal of providing a proper interpre- tation of the different notions of risk propagation, as well as revealing and harmonizing the alternative semantics for the links used in common risk propagation graphs. Finally, we discuss how these results can be leveraged in practice to model risk propagation scenarios. (shrink)

Toda la conducta humana tiene como fundamento cósmico ancestral, el sinchi amachaq.

La catástrofe actual de la relación hombre-medio ambiente, se explica por el egoísmo irracional. Éste yace latente en todo ser humano y explica toda su conducta hacia su alteridad. La posición del autor es audaz, incide en el fondo del problema, y marca un antes y un después en la filosofía sobre la problemática ambiental. The current catastrophe of the man-environment relationship is explained by irrational selfishness. It lies dormant in every human being and explains all his conduct toward his (...) otherness. The author’s position is bold, at the heart of the problem, and marks a before and after in the philosophy of environmental problems. (shrink)

In this paper, we attempt to reconstruct Hegel’s theory of punishment through its development on the levels of abstract right and civil society, incorporating to the latter the concepts of contingency and arbitrariness. We demonstrate how the unjust is anulled and how right is restored under a retributive foundation of the penalty. We approach the issue of the death penalty and conclude that a retibutivist argument is insufficient to serve as its foundation.

The aim of this essay is to examine the path of the philosopher of religion Italo Mancini related to his early speculative period on meontology and to show a theoretical consonance with his later period of “double thoughts”. The first part of the contribution argues: it is possible to explain the meontological path as prolegomena to the non-being of being through an in-depth analysis of the notions in his youthful essay “e La struttura dell’essere" e "Il trascendentale come fondamento”, (...) understood as status quaestionis on ontology in general (§1, §2); it presents also why for Mancini transcendence and functionality ground his scheme of possibilities (§3, §4); we define why the fundamental reason why Mancini’s strategy works is entirely based on a theology of oxymorons: starting with double thoughts (§5), as an open and structured path, insofar as thought and revelation appear as a hermeneutic circle (§6); in the last part, we delve into the logic of fragmentariness as an integral principle of religious hermeneutics and, finally, a summary relation between Mancini’s first speculation and the last of his posthumous work “Frammento su Dio” is assessed (§7). (shrink)

This work aims to analyze complex noun phrases of the qualitative binominal kind (an N of an N) in a Southern Italo–Romance language, namely Apulian. The principle of compositionality – even if it represents a good working hypothesis for syntactic analysis – faces several challenges with linguistic expressions such as idioms (with which binominal qualitatives share several properties), whose meaning is not yielded compositionally (Szabò, 2004). The data under analysis here are particularly interesting for two main reasons. The first (...) pertains to the nature of the preposition, and whether it is an a priori specified element depending on the syntactic embedding; two main working hypotheses are found: Den Dikken (2006) posits two different derivations, one for binominal qualitative of and one for genitive of. On the other hand, Kayne (1994) posits a unitary derivation for both instances of the preposition. The second reason pertains to the problem of the overall interpretation of the phrase, i.e., an intersectional interpretation of the predicate and the subject of the predication, and the focus/topic subdivision in the phrase (Villalba, 2007): the interpretation depends on the marked order of the predicate with respect to the subject. Given that N1 is a predicate and usually an adjectivized noun or a nominalized adjective and that in southern Italo–Romance only few adjectives can precede a noun, cases in which the predicate precedes the noun can be considered as displaying a marked order. Even though the case of the preposition might seem a challenge for compositionality, it will be shown that a proper characterization of such an element confirms that compositionality can still account for instances such as those of binominal qualitatives. (shrink)

It is widely believed, among philosophers of literature, that imagining contradictions is as easy as telling or reading a story with contradictory content. Italo Calvino’s The Nonexistent Knight, for instance, concerns a knight who performs many brave deeds, but who does not exist. Anything at all, they argue, can be true in a story, including contradictions and other impossibilia. While most will readily concede that we cannot objectually imagine contradictions, they nevertheless insist that we can propositionally imagine them, and (...) regularly do, simply by entertaining a text which prompts us to do so. I argue that this narrative does not bear scrutiny for two main reasons. First, because propositional imagining is beside the point, where truth in fiction is concerned; evaluating truth in fiction engages the cognitive architecture in ways that prohibit the mobilization of merely propositional imagination to that end. And second, because it is not obvious, given the strategies usually suggested, that we ever propositionally imagine contradictions in the first place—in fact, it seems we go out of our way to avoid directly imagining them. (shrink)

In this paper, which discusses data from Gargano Apulian Italo-Romance, I propose that prepositional and non-prepositional genitives are fundamentally two different types of phrases, and that the interpretation of a non-prepositional noun as the possessor is not due to a silent preposition or head-modifier inversion, but rather to an agreement mechanism taking place between the modifier and its head. We propose that, just as a genitive can agree with its head for gender and number features so it can for (...) definiteness, and that agreement for definiteness yields a genitival interpretation of the non-prepositional noun. I.e., definiteness can externalize the syntactic relation between head and modifier. We also propose that in this Apulian variety, non-prepositional genitives are syntactic phases (Chomsky 2001), and that the same holds for non-prepositional ‘qualitative’ predicative phrases in the same language. This would explain the impossibility of accessing the phrase through syntactic operations such as extraction. DOI 10.1111/1467-968X.12229 . (shrink)

Coletânea de textos: 1.Idealismo transcendental, naturalismo e um pouco de história, Adriano Naves de Brito; 2. Ceticismo e a reconstrução de P.F. Strawson da dedução kantiana das categorias, Pedro Stepanenko; 3. Dedução Transcendental e Ceticismo, Marco Antonio Franciotti; 4. Strawson e Kant sobre a dualidade entre intuições e conceitos, Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira; 5. Princípio de significatividade em Kant e Strawson, Cristina de Moraes Nunes; 6. Strawson e Kant sobre a Liberdade, Albertinho Luiz Gallina e Cecília Rearte Terrosa; 7. (...) Argumentos Transcendentais e Metafísica Descritiva em P. F. Strawson, Itamar Luís Gelain; 8. Breve consideração sobre o problema da tese da aprioridade do espaço e do tempo, Juan Adolfo Bonaccini; 9. Os novos fundamentos da metafísica estabelecidos por Kant, Peter F. Strawson, Trad. Jaimir Conte; 10. Imaginação e percepção, Peter F. Strawson, Trad. Ítalo Lins Lemos. (shrink)

Le film d’animation de Jean-François Laguionie "Le voyage du prince" (2019), d’après "Le château des singes" (1999) du même réalisateur, inspiré du livre "Le baron perché", d’Italo Calvino (1957), est marqué par une prégnance végétale forte. Le film nous invite dans un monde de fiction, dans lequel les singes sont l’espèce animale principale – évoquant les humainsles humains les humainsles humains les humainsles humains les humains – représentée à travers des peuples aux modes de vie contrastés. Le monde végétal (...) est présent dans toute sa diversité, et dans la richesse des transactions qui s’établissent entre les espèces. Pourrions-nous alors inventer et réinventer la "nature" ? Nous sommes invités, en suivant le baron et la façon dont le film s’en inspire, à contempler et questionner notre lien aux plantes. Comment les transactions établies avec elles et avec le reste du vivant font-elles le monde ? C’est ce que nous tenterons d’approcher. (shrink)

We investigate the morphosyntax of qualitative binominal constructions (QBCs) in a Southern Italo-Romance language from the Apulian town of San Marco in Lamis. QBCs are complex noun phrases like ‘a jewelN1 of a villageN2’, appearing here prepositionally (with the preposition də, ‘of’, allowing definites, indefinites, and demonstratives) and non-prepositionally (only allowing definites with definite articles and not proper names). We propose that in the latter, a categorial match in the determiner layer, which we call ‘match D’, relates N1 and (...) N2. N1 is embedded as a noun, allowing for: 1) the recursive DP strategy of non-prepositional genitives, and 2) the extension of this mechanism to QBCs. This leads to the impossibility of syntactic extraction, which we connect to the concept of phase. With non-denominal N1s, N1’s article is treated as a head-agreeing adjectival linker, forming a constituent with the modifier but agreeing with the head. A phrase is interpreted as a QBC if N1 and N2 share the same number features and if the features of N1 do not allow for it to be interpreted as the possessum of N2 . We also discuss external agreement with the construction, presenting data supporting the relevance of the [+HUMAN] feature for agreement relations. (forthcoming, Italian Journal of Linguistics). (shrink)